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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 IETF PKIX WG Sean Turner, IECA 2 Internet Draft Daniel Brown, Certicom 3 Intended Status: Standard Track Kelvin Yiu, Microsoft 4 Updates: 4055 (once approved) Russ Housley, Vigil Security 5 Expires: September 9, 2009 Tim Polk, NIST 6 March 9, 2009 8 Update for RSAES-OAEP Algorithm Parameters 9 draft-ietf-pkix-rfc4055-update-02.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the 14 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 16 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 17 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 18 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 19 Drafts. 21 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 22 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 23 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 24 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 26 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 27 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt 29 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 30 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html 32 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 9, 2009. 34 Copyright Notice 36 Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 37 document authors. All rights reserved. 39 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 40 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of 41 publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). 42 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 43 and restrictions with respect to this document. 45 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF 46 Contributions published or made publicly available before November 47 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this 48 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow 49 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. 50 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling 51 the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified 52 outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may 53 not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format 54 it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other 55 than English. 57 Abstract 59 This document updates RFC 4055. It updates the conventions for using 60 the RSA Encryption Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding 61 (RSAES-OAEP) key transport algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key 62 Infrastructure (PKI). Specifically, it updates the conventions for 63 algorithm parameters in an X.509 certificate's subjectPublicKeyInfo 64 field. 66 Conventions used in this document 68 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 69 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 70 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 72 Discussion 74 This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-pkix' mailing list. To 75 subscribe, send a message to ietf-pkix-request@imc.org with the 76 single word subscribe in the body of the message. There is a Web site 77 for the mailing list at . 79 1. Introduction 81 RFC 4055 specifies conventions for using the RSA Encryption Scheme - 82 Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key transport 83 algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). It 84 provides algorithm identifiers and parameters for RSAES-OAEP. 86 This document updates the conventions for RSAES-OAEP parameters in 87 the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of an X.509 certificate. The PKIX WG 88 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) design team recommended that Key 89 Derivation Functions (KDFs) should not be constrained within a 90 certificate; rather, KDF constraints should be negotiated in 91 protocols that need to employ certificates. 93 Only two paragraphs in [RFC4055] discuss RSAES-OAEP parameters in 94 X.509 certificates: the second paragraph of section 4 and the first 95 paragraph of section 4.1. This document only updates these two 96 paragraphs. Section 3 updates the second paragraph in section 4 97 while section 3 updates the second paragraph in section 4.1. "Old:" 98 prefaces the text to be replaced and "New:" prefaces the replacement 99 text. 101 This document also replaces incorrect references to the 102 publicKeyAlgorithms field in Section 3 with references to the 103 parameters field in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field. No 104 other changes are made to the RSASSA-PSS sections. 106 2. Changes to Section 3 2nd and 3rd Paragraph 108 This change clarifies the placement of RSASSA-PSS-params in the 109 signature, signatureAlgorithm, and subjectPublicKeyInfo fields for CA 110 and EE certificates. It also clarifies the placement of RSASSA-PSS- 111 params in the signatureAlgorithm field in CRLs. 113 Old: 115 CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSASSA-PSS algorithm 116 identifier SHOULD require the presence of parameters in the 117 publicKeyAlgorithms field if the cA boolean flag is set in the basic 118 constraints certificate extension. CAs MAY require that the 119 parameters be present in the publicKeyAlgorithms field for end-entity 120 certificates. 122 CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS algorithm for signing certificates SHOULD 123 include RSASSA-PSS-params in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm 124 parameters in their own certificates. CAs that use the RSASSA-PSS 125 algorithm for signing certificates or CRLs MUST include RSASSA-PSS- 126 params in the signatureAlgorithm parameters in the TBSCertificate or 127 TBSCertList structures. 129 New: 131 When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the 132 TBSCertificate or TBSCertList signature algorithm field, then the 133 RSASSA-PSS-params structure MUST be included in the TBSCertificate or 134 TBSCertList signature parameters field. 136 When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the 137 TBSCertificate subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field of CA 138 certificates, then the parameters field SHOULD include the RSASSA- 139 PSS-params structure. When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier 140 appears in the TBSCertificate subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field of 141 EE certificates, then the parameters field MAY include the RSASSA- 142 PSS-params structure. 144 All certificates and CRLs signed by a CA that supports the id-RSASSA- 145 PSS algorithm MUST include the RSASSA-PSS-params in the 146 signatureAlgorithm parameters in Certificate and CertList structures, 147 respectively. 149 3. Changes to Section 4 2nd Paragraph 151 This change prohibits the inclusion of RSAES-OAEP-params in the 152 subjectPublicKeyInfo field. This was done because a) it does not 153 affect interoperability b) aligns with PKIX practice to not include 154 limitations on how the public key can be used in 155 subjectPublicKeyInfo. A poll of implementers was taken and there 156 were no objections to this change as it did not affect current 157 implmentations. 159 Old: 161 CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm 162 identifier SHOULD require the presence of parameters in the 163 publicKeyAlgorithms field for all certificates. Entities that use a 164 certificate with a publicKeyAlgorithm value of id-RSA-OAEP where the 165 parameters are absent SHOULD use the default set of parameters for 166 RSAES-OAEP-params. Entities that use a certificate with a 167 publicKeyAlgorithm value of rsaEncryption SHOULD use the default set 168 of parameters for RSAES-OAEP-params. 170 New: 172 CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm 173 identifier MUST NOT include parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo 174 algorithm field. 176 4. Changes to Section 4.1 1st Paragraph 178 This change prohibits the inclusion of parameters in the 179 subjectPublicKeyInfo field. This was done because a) it does not 180 affect interoperability b) aligns with PKIX practice to not include 181 limitations on how the public key can be used in 182 subjectPublicKeyInfo. A poll of implementers was taken and there 183 were no objections to this change as it did not affect current 184 implmentations. 186 Old: 188 When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters 189 MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax. The parameters may be 190 either absent or present when used as subject public key information. 192 The parameters MUST be present when used in the algorithm identifier 193 associated with an encrypted value. 195 New: 197 When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters 198 MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax. The parameters MUST be 199 absent when used in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field. The parameters 200 MUST be present when used in the algorithm identifier associated with 201 an encrypted value. 203 5. Security Considerations 205 The security considerations from [RFC4055] apply. 207 If the RSAES-OAEP-params are negotiated, then the negotiation 208 mechanism needs to provide integrity for these parameters. For 209 example, an S/MIME Agent can advertise their capabilities in the 210 SMIMECapabilities attribute, which is either signed attribute 211 [RFC3851bis] or a certificate extension [RFC4262]. 213 6. IANA Considerations 215 None 217 {{Please remove this section prior to publication as an RFC.}} 219 7. References 221 7.1. Normative References 223 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 224 Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. 226 [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 227 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for 228 use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 229 Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) 230 Profile", RFC 4055, June 2005. 232 7.2. Informative References 234 [RFC4262] S. Santesson, "X.509 Certificate Extension for 235 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) 236 Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005. 238 [RFC3851bis] Turner, S., Farrell, S., and R. Housley, "An Internet 239 Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization", 240 draft-ietf-pkix-3281update-04.txt, work-in-progress. 242 /*** RFC EDITOR: Please replace RFC3851bis with RFCXYAZ when draft- 243 ietf-pkix-3281update is published. 245 Author's Addresses 247 Sean Turner 249 IECA, Inc. 250 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 251 Fairfax, VA 22031 252 USA 254 EMail: turners@ieca.com 256 Kelvin Yiu 258 Microsoft 259 One Microsoft Way 260 Redmond, WA 98052-6399 261 USA 263 Email: kelviny@microsoft.com 265 Daniel R. L. Brown 267 Certicom Corp 268 5520 Explorer Drive #400 269 Mississauga, ON L4W 5L1 270 CANADA 272 EMail: dbrown@certicom.com 274 Russ Housley 276 Vigil Security, LLC 277 918 Spring Knoll Drive 278 Herndon, VA 20170 279 USA 281 EMail: housley@vigilsec.com 283 Tim Polk 285 NIST 286 Building 820, Room 426 287 Gaithersburg, MD 20899 288 USA 290 EMail: wpolk@nist.gov