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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 4995 (ref. 'ROHC') (Obsoleted by RFC 5795) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 4306 (ref. 'IKEV2') (Obsoleted by RFC 5996) -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'IPSEC-ROHC' ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5226 (ref. 'IANA-CONSIDERATIONS') (Obsoleted by RFC 8126) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 4835 (ref. 'CRYPTO-ALG') (Obsoleted by RFC 7321) Summary: 4 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 4 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group E. Ertekin 3 Internet-Draft C. Christou 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Jasani 5 Expires: August 19, 2010 Booz Allen Hamilton 6 T. Kivinen 7 Safenet, Inc. 8 C. Bormann 9 Universitaet Bremen TZI 10 February 15, 2010 12 IKEv2 Extensions to Support Robust Header Compression over IPsec 13 draft-ietf-rohc-ikev2-extensions-hcoipsec-12 15 Abstract 17 In order to integrate Robust Header Compression (ROHC) with IPsec, a 18 mechanism is needed to signal ROHC channel parameters between end- 19 points. Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is a mechanism which can be 20 leveraged to exchange these parameters. This document specifies 21 extensions to IKEv2 that will allow ROHC and its associated channel 22 parameters to be signaled for IPsec security associations (SAs). 24 Status of this Memo 26 This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the 27 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 29 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 30 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 31 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 32 Drafts. 34 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 35 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 36 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 37 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 39 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 40 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 42 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 43 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 45 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 19, 2010. 47 Copyright Notice 48 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 49 document authors. All rights reserved. 51 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 52 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 53 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 54 publication of this document. Please review these documents 55 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 56 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 57 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 58 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 59 described in the BSD License. 61 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF 62 Contributions published or made publicly available before November 63 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this 64 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow 65 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. 66 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling 67 the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified 68 outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may 69 not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format 70 it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other 71 than English. 73 Table of Contents 75 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 76 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 77 3. ROHC Channel Initialization for ROHCoIPsec . . . . . . . . . . 3 78 3.1. ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 79 3.1.1. ROHC Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 80 3.1.2. ROHC Attribute Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 81 3.2. ROHC Channel Parameters that are Implicitly Set . . . . . 8 82 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 83 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 84 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 85 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 86 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 87 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 88 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 90 1. Introduction 92 Increased packet header overhead due to IPsec [IPSEC] can result in 93 the inefficient utilization of bandwidth. Coupling ROHC [ROHC] with 94 IPsec offers an efficient way to transfer protected IP traffic. 96 ROHCoIPsec [ROHCOIPSEC] requires configuration parameters to be 97 initialized at the compressor and decompressor. Current 98 specifications for hop-by-hop ROHC negotiate these parameters through 99 a link-layer protocol such as Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) (i.e. 100 ROHC over PPP [ROHC-PPP]). Since key exchange protocols (e.g. IKEv2 101 [IKEV2]) can be used to dynamically establish parameters between 102 IPsec peers, this document defines extensions to IKEv2 to signal ROHC 103 parameters for ROHCoIPsec. 105 2. Terminology 107 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 108 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 109 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [BRA97]. 111 3. ROHC Channel Initialization for ROHCoIPsec 113 The following subsections define extensions to IKEv2 which enables an 114 initiator and a responder to signal parameters required to establish 115 a ROHC channel for a ROHCoIPsec session. 117 3.1. ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify Message 119 ROHC channel parameters MUST be signaled separately for each ROHC- 120 enabled IPsec SA. Specifically, a new Notify message type MUST be 121 included in the IKE_AUTH and CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges whenever a new 122 ROHC-enabled IPsec SA is created, or an existing one is rekeyed. 124 The Notify payload sent by the initiator MUST contain the channel 125 parameters for the ROHC session. These parameters indicate the 126 capabilities of the ROHC decompressor at the initiator. Upon receipt 127 of the initiator's request, the responder will either ignore the 128 payload (if it doesn't support ROHC or the proposed parameters) or 129 respond with a Notify payload that contains its own ROHC channel 130 parameters. 132 Note that only one Notify payload is used to convey ROHC parameters. 133 If multiple Notify payloads containing ROHC parameters are received, 134 all but the first such Notify payload MUST be dropped. If the 135 initiator does not receive a Notify Payload with the responder's ROHC 136 channel parameters, ROHC MUST NOT be enabled on the Child SA. 138 A new Notify Message Type value, denoted ROHC_SUPPORTED, indicates 139 that the Notify payload is conveying ROHC channel parameters (Section 140 4). 142 The Notify Payload (defined in RFC 4306 [IKEV2]) is illustrated in 143 Figure 1. 145 1 2 3 146 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 147 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 148 ! Next Payload !C! RESERVED ! Payload Length ! 149 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 150 ! Protocol ID ! SPI Size ! Notify Message Type ! 151 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 152 ! ! 153 ~ Security Parameter Index (SPI) ~ 154 ! ! 155 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 156 ! ! 157 ~ Notification Data ~ 158 ! ! 159 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 161 Figure 1. Notify Payload format. 163 The fields of the Notify Payload are set as follows: 165 Next Payload (1 octet) 166 Identifier for the payload type of the next payload in the 167 message. Further details can be found in RFC 4306 [IKEV2]. 169 Critical (1 bit) 170 Since all IKEv2 implementations support the Notify Payload, this 171 value MUST be set to zero. 173 Payload Length (2 octets) 174 As defined in RFC 4306 [IKEV2], this field indicates the length of 175 the current payload, including the generic payload header. 177 Protocol ID (1 octet) 178 Since this Notification message is used during the creation of a 179 Child SA, this field MUST be set to zero. 181 SPI Size (1 octet) 182 This value MUST be set to zero, since no SPI is applicable (ROHC 183 parameters are set at SA creation, thus the SPI has not been 184 defined). 186 Notify Message Type (2 octets) 187 This field MUST be set to ROHC_SUPPORTED. 189 Security Parameter Index (SPI) 190 Since the SPI Size field is 0, this field MUST NOT be transmitted. 192 Notification Data (variable) 193 This field MUST contain at least three ROHC Attributes (Section 194 3.1.1). 196 3.1.1. ROHC Attributes 198 The ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify message is used to signal channel 199 parameters between ROHCoIPsec compressor and decompressor. The 200 message contains a list of "ROHC Attributes" which contain the 201 parameters required for the ROHCoIPsec session. 203 The format for signaling ROHC Attributes takes a similar format to 204 the Transform Attributes described in Section 3.3.5 of RFC 205 4306[IKEV2]. The format of the ROHC Attribute is shown in Figure 2. 207 1 2 3 208 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 209 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 210 !A! ROHC Attribute Type ! AF=0 ROHC Attribute Length ! 211 !F! ! AF=1 ROHC Attribute Value ! 212 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 213 ! AF=0 ROHC Attribute Value ! 214 ! AF=1 Not Transmitted ! 215 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 217 Figure 2. Format of the ROHC Attribute. 219 o Attribute Format (AF) (1 bit) - If the AF bit is a zero (0), then 220 the ROHC Attribute is expressed in a Type/Length/Value format. If 221 the AF bit is a one (1), then the ROHC attribute is expressed in a 222 Type/Value (TV) format. 223 o ROHC Attribute Type (15 bits) - Unique identifier for each type of 224 ROHC attribute (Section 3.1.2). 225 o ROHC Attribute Length (2 octets) - Length (in octets) of the 226 Attribute Value. When the AF bit is a one (1), the ROHC Attribute 227 Value is 2 octets and the ROHC Attribute Length field is not 228 present. 229 o ROHC Attribute Value (variable length) - Value of the ROHC 230 Attribute associated with the ROHC Attribute Type. If the AF bit 231 is a zero (0), this field's length is defined by the ROHC 232 Attribute Length field. If the AF bit is a one (1), the length of 233 the ROHC Attribute Value is 2 octets. 235 3.1.2. ROHC Attribute Types 237 This section describes five ROHC Attribute Types: MAX_CID, 238 ROHC_PROFILE, ROHC_INTEG, ROHC_ICV_LEN, and MRRU. The value 239 allocated for each ROHC Attribute Type is specified in Section 4. 241 MAX_CID (Maximum Context Identifier, AF = 1) 242 The MAX_CID attribute is a mandatory attribute. Exactly one 243 MAX_CID attribute MUST be sent. The MAX_CID field indicates the 244 maximum value of a context identifier supported by the ROHCoIPsec 245 decompressor. This attribute value is two octets in length. The 246 range of values for MAX_CID MUST be at least 0 and at most 16383. 247 Since CIDs can take values between 0 and MAX_CID, the actual 248 number of contexts that can be used are MAX_CID+1. If MAX_CID is 249 0, this implies having one context. The recipient of the MAX_CID 250 Attribute MUST only use up to MAX_CID context identifiers for 251 compression. 253 Note that the MAX_CID parameter is a one-way notification (i.e., 254 the sender of the attribute indicates what it can handle to the 255 other end); therefore, different values for MAX_CID may be 256 announced in each direction. 258 ROHC_PROFILE (ROHC Profile, AF = 1) 259 The ROHC_PROFILE attribute is a mandatory attribute. Each 260 ROHC_PROFILE attribute has a fixed length of 4 octets, and its 261 attribute value is a two-octet long ROHC Profile Identifier 262 [ROHCPROF]. There MUST be at least one ROHC_PROFILE attribute 263 included in the ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify Message. If multiple 264 ROHC_PROFILE attributes are sent, the order is arbitrary. The 265 recipient of a ROHC_PROFILE attribute(s) MUST only use the 266 profile(s) proposed for compression. 268 Several common profiles are defined in RFC 3095 [ROHCV1] and 5225 269 [ROHCV2]. Note, however, that two versions of the same profile 270 MUST NOT be signaled. For example, if a ROHCoIPsec decompressor 271 supports both ROHCv1 UDP (0x0002) and ROHCv2 UDP (0x0102), both 272 profiles MUST NOT be signaled. This restriction is needed, as 273 packets compressed by ROHC express only the 8 least significant 274 bits of the profile identifier; since the 8 least significant bits 275 for corresponding profiles in ROHCv1 and ROHCv2 are identical, the 276 decompressor is not capable of determining the ROHC version that 277 was used to compress the packet. 279 Note that the ROHC_PROFILE attribute is a one-way notification; 280 therefore, different values for ROHC_PROFILE may be announced in 281 each direction. 283 ROHC_INTEG (Integrity Algorithm for Verification of Decompressed 284 Headers, AF = 1) 285 The ROHC_INTEG attribute is a mandatory attribute. There MUST be 286 at least one ROHC_INTEG attribute contained within the 287 ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify message. The attribute value contains the 288 identifier of an integrity algorithm that is used to ensure the 289 integrity of the decompressed packets (i.e. ensure that the 290 decompressed packet headers are identical to the original packet 291 headers prior to compression). 293 Authentication algorithms that MUST be supported are specified in 294 the "Authentication Algorithms" table in section 3.1.1 ("ESP 295 Encryption and Authentication Algorithms") of RFC 4835 [CRYPTO- 296 ALG] (or its successor). 297 The integrity algorithm is represented by a two octet value that 298 corresponds to the value listed in the IKEv2 Parameters registry 299 [IKEV2-PARA] "For Transform Type 3 (Integrity Algorithm)" section. 300 Upon receipt of the ROHC_INTEG attribute(s), the responder MUST 301 select exactly one of the proposed algorithms; the chosen value is 302 sent back in the ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify message returned by the 303 responder to the initiator. The selected integrity algorithm MUST 304 be used in both directions. If the responder does not accept any 305 of the algorithms proposed by the initiator, ROHC MUST NOT be 306 enabled on the SA. 308 It is noted that: 309 1. The keys (one for each direction) for this Integrity Algorithm 310 are derived from the IKEv2 KEYMAT (see [IKEV2], Section 2.17). 311 For the purposes of this key derivation, ROHC is considered to 312 be an IPsec protocol. When a ROHC-enabled CHILD_SA is 313 rekeyed, the key associated with this integrity algorithm is 314 rekeyed as well. 315 2. A ROHCoIPsec initiator MAY signal a value of zero (0x0000) in 316 a ROHC_INTEG attribute. This corresponds to "NONE" in the 317 Integrity Algorithm Transform ID registry. The ROHCoIPsec 318 responder MAY select this value by responding to the initiator 319 with a ROHC_INTEG attribute of zero (0x0000). In this 320 scenario, no integrity algorithm is applied in either 321 direction. 323 3. The ROHC_INTEG attribute is a parameter that is negotiated 324 between two ends. In other words, the initiator indicates 325 what it supports; the responder selects one of the ROHC_INTEG 326 values proposed, and sends the selected value to the 327 initiator. 329 ROHC_ICV_LEN (Integrity Algorithm Length, AF = 1) 330 The ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute is an optional attribute. There MAY be 331 zero or one ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute contained within the 332 ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify message. The attribute specifies the number 333 of Integrity Check Value (ICV) octets the sender expects to 334 receive on incoming ROHC packets. The ICV of the negotiated 335 ROHC_INTEG algorithms MUST be truncated to ROHC_ICV_LEN bytes by 336 taking the first ROHC_ICV_LEN bytes of the output. Both the 337 initiator and responder announce a single value for their own ICV 338 length. The recipient of the ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute MUST truncate 339 the ICV to the length contained in the message. If the value of 340 the ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute is zero, then an ICV MUST NOT be sent. 341 If no ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute is sent at all or the ROHC_ICV_LEN is 342 larger than the length of the ICV of selected algorithm, then the 343 full ICV length as specified by the ROHC_INTEG algorithm MUST be 344 sent. 346 Note that the ROHC_ICV_LEN attribute is a one-way notification; 347 therefore, different values for ROHC_ICV_LEN may be announced in 348 each direction. 350 MRRU (Maximum Reconstructed Reception Unit, AF = 1) 351 The MRRU attribute is an optional attribute. There MAY be zero or 352 one MRRU attribute contained within the ROHC_SUPPORTED Notify 353 message. The attribute value is two octets in length. The 354 attribute specifies the size of the largest reconstructed unit in 355 octets that the ROHCoIPsec decompressor is expected to reassemble 356 from ROHC segments (see Section 5.2.5 of [ROHCV1]). This size 357 includes the CRC, and the ROHC ICV. If MRRU is 0 or if no MRRU 358 attribute is sent, segment headers MUST NOT be transmitted on the 359 ROHCoIPsec channel. 361 Note that the MRRU attribute is a one-way notification; therefore, 362 different values for MRRU may be announced in each direction. 364 If an unknown ROHC Attribute Type Value is received, it MUST be 365 silently ignored. 367 3.2. ROHC Channel Parameters that are Implicitly Set 369 The following ROHC channel parameters MUST NOT be signaled: 371 o LARGE_CIDS: This value is implicitly determined by the value of 372 MAX_CID (e.g. if MAX_CID is <= 15, LARGE_CIDS is assumed to be 0). 373 o FEEDBACK_FOR: When a pair of SAs are created (one in each 374 direction), the ROHC channel parameter FEEDBACK_FOR MUST be set 375 implicitly to the other SA of the pair (i.e. the SA pointing in 376 the reverse direction). 378 4. Security Considerations 380 The ability to negotiate the length of the ROHC ICV may introduce 381 vulnerabilities to the ROHCoIPsec protocol. Specifically, the 382 capability to signal a short ICV length may result in scenarios where 383 erroneous packets are forwarded into the protected domain. This 384 security consideration is documented in further detail in Section 385 6.1.4 of [ROHCOIPSEC] and Section 5 of [IPSEC-ROHC]. 387 This security consideration can be mitigated by using longer ICVs, 388 but this comes at the cost of additional overhead, which reduces the 389 overall benefits offered by ROHCoIPsec. 391 5. IANA Considerations 393 This document defines a new Notify Message (Status Type). Therefore, 394 IANA is requested to allocate one value from the IKEv2 Notify Message 395 registry to indicate ROHC_SUPPORTED. Note that, since this Notify 396 Message is a Status Type, values ranging from 0 to 16383 must not be 397 allocated for ROHC_SUPPORTED. 399 In addition, IANA is requested to create a new "ROHC Attribute Types" 400 registry in the IKEv2 Parameters Registry [IKEV2-PARA]. Within the 401 "ROHC Attribute Types" registry, this document allocates the 402 following values: 404 Registry: 405 Value ROHC Attribute Type Format Reference 406 ----------- -------------------------------------- ------ --------- 407 0 RESERVED [rfcThis] 408 1 Maximum Context Identifier (MAX_CID) TV [rfcThis] 409 2 ROHC Profile (ROHC_PROFILE) TV [rfcThis] 410 3 ROHC Integrity Algorithm (ROHC_INTEG) TV [rfcThis] 411 4 ROHC ICV Length in bytes (ROHC_ICV_LEN) TV [rfcThis] 412 5 Maximum Reconstructed Reception Unit (MRRU) TV [rfcThis] 413 6-16383 Unassigned [rfcThis] 414 16384-32767 Private use [rfcThis] 416 Following the policies outlined in [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS], the IANA 417 policy for assigning new values for the ROHC Attribute Types registry 418 shall be Expert Review. 420 For registration requests, the responsible IESG area director will 421 appoint the Designated Expert. The Designated Expert will post a 422 request to both the rohc and ipsec mailing lists (or a successor 423 designated by the Area Director) for comment and review. The 424 Designated Expert will either approve or deny the registration 425 request and publish a notice of the decision to both mailing lists 426 (or their successors), as well as informing IANA. A denial notice 427 must be justified by an explanation. 429 6. Acknowledgments 431 The authors would like to thank Mr. Sean O'Keeffe, Mr. James Kohler, 432 and Ms. Linda Noone of the Department of Defense, as well as Mr. Rich 433 Espy of OPnet for their contributions and support in the development 434 of this document. 436 The authors would also like to thank Mr. Yoav Nir, and Mr. Robert A 437 Stangarone Jr.: both served as committed document reviewers for this 438 specification. 440 In addition, the authors would like to thank the following for their 441 numerous reviews and comments to this document: 443 o Mr. Magnus Westerlund 444 o Dr. Stephen Kent 445 o Mr. Lars-Erik Jonsson 446 o Mr. Pasi Eronen 447 o Dr. Jonah Pezeshki 448 o Mr. Carl Knutsson 449 o Dr. Joseph Touch 450 o Mr. David Black 451 o Mr. Glen Zorn 453 Finally, the authors would also like to thank Mr. Tom Conkle, Ms. 454 Michele Casey, and Mr. Etzel Brower. 456 7. References 458 7.1. Normative References 460 [IPSEC] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the 461 Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. 463 [ROHC] Jonsson, L-E., Pelletier, G., and K. Sandlund, "The RObust 464 Header Compression (ROHC) Framework", RFC 4995, July 2007. 466 [IKEV2] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", 467 RFC 4306, December 2005. 469 [BRA97] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 470 Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. 472 [ROHCV1] Bormann, C., Burmeister, C., Degermark, M., Fukushima, H., 473 Hannu, H., Jonsson, L., Hakenberg, R., Koren, T., Le, K., 474 Liu, Z., Martensson, A., Miyazaki, A., Svanbro, K., 475 Wiebke, T., Yoshimura, T., and H. Zheng, "RObust Header 476 Compression (ROHC): Framework and four profiles: RTP, UDP, 477 ESP, and uncompressed", RFC 3095, July 2001. 479 [ROHCV2] Pelletier, G. and K. Sandlund, "RObust Header Compression 480 Version 2 (ROHCv2): Profiles for RTP, UDP, IP, ESP and UDP 481 Lite", RFC 5225, April 2008. 483 [IPSEC-ROHC] 484 Ertekin, E., Christou, C., and C. Bormann, "IPsec 485 Extensions to Support ROHCoIPsec", work in progress , 486 February 2010. 488 [IANA-CONSIDERATIONS] 489 Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 490 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, 491 October 1998. 493 7.2. Informative References 495 [ROHCOIPSEC] 496 Ertekin, E., Jasani, R., Christou, C., and C. Bormann, 497 "Integration of Header Compression over IPsec Security 498 Associations", work in progress , February 2010. 500 [ROHC-PPP] 501 Bormann, C., "Robust Header Compression (ROHC) over PPP", 502 RFC 3241, April 2002. 504 [ROHCPROF] 505 "RObust Header Compression (ROHC) Profile Identifiers", 506 www.iana.org/assignments/rohc-pro-ids , May 2008. 508 [CRYPTO-ALG] 509 Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation 510 Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and 511 Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 4835, April 2007. 513 [IKEV2-PARA] 514 IANA, "IKEv2 Parameters, 515 http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters", 516 November 2009. 518 Authors' Addresses 520 Emre Ertekin 521 Booz Allen Hamilton 522 5220 Pacific Concourse Drive, Suite 200 523 Los Angeles, CA 90045 524 US 526 Email: ertekin_emre@bah.com 528 Chris Christou 529 Booz Allen Hamilton 530 13200 Woodland Park Dr. 531 Herndon, VA 20171 532 US 534 Email: christou_chris@bah.com 535 Rohan Jasani 536 Booz Allen Hamilton 537 13200 Woodland Park Dr. 538 Herndon, VA 20171 539 US 541 Email: ro@breakcheck.com 543 Tero Kivinen 544 Safenet, Inc. 545 Fredrikinkatu 47 546 HELSINKI 547 FI 549 Email: kivinen@iki.fi 551 Carsten Bormann 552 Universitaet Bremen TZI 553 Postfach 330440 554 Bremen D-28334 555 Germany 557 Email: cabo@tzi.org