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Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group A. Lindem, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft Cisco Systems 4 Intended status: Standards Track Y. Qu 5 Expires: July 22, 2017 Huawei 6 D. Yeung 7 Arrcus, Inc 8 I. Chen 9 Ericsson 10 J. Zhang 11 Juniper Networks 12 Y. Yang 13 SockRate 14 January 18, 2017 16 Routing Key Chain YANG Data Model 17 draft-ietf-rtgwg-yang-key-chain-12.txt 19 Abstract 21 This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain 22 is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept 23 lifetime, and algorithm (authentication or encryption). By properly 24 overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain 25 elements, keys and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By 26 representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be 27 automated. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol 28 authentication and other applications. In some applications, the 29 protocols do not use the key chain element key directly, but rather a 30 key derivation function is used to derive a short-lived key from the 31 key chain element key (e.g., the Master Keys used in the TCP 32 Authentication Option. 34 Status of This Memo 36 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 37 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 39 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 40 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 41 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 42 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 44 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 45 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 46 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 47 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 48 This Internet-Draft will expire on July 22, 2017. 50 Copyright Notice 52 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 53 document authors. All rights reserved. 55 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 56 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 57 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 58 publication of this document. Please review these documents 59 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 60 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 61 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 62 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 63 described in the Simplified BSD License. 65 Table of Contents 67 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 68 1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 69 1.2. Tree Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 70 2. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 71 2.1. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 72 2.2. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains . . . . . . . . . 4 73 3. Design of the Key Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 74 3.1. Key Chain Operational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 75 3.2. Key Chain Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 76 3.3. Key Chain Model Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 77 4. Key Chain YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 78 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 79 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 80 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 81 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 82 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 83 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 84 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 86 1. Introduction 88 This document describes the key chain YANG data model. A key chain 89 is a list of elements each containing a key, send lifetime, accept 90 lifetime, and algorithm (authentication or encryption). By properly 91 overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain 92 elements, keys and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By 93 representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be 94 automated. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol 95 authentication and other applications. In some applications, the 96 protocols do not use the key chain element key directly, but rather a 97 key derivation function is used to derive a short-lived key from the 98 key chain element key (e.g., the Master Keys used in [TCP-AO]). 100 1.1. Requirements Notation 102 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 103 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 104 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-KEYWORDS]. 106 1.2. Tree Diagrams 108 A simplified graphical representation of the complete data tree is 109 presented in Section 3.3. The following tree notation is used. 111 o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys. 113 o Curly braces "{" and "}" contain names of optional features that 114 make the corresponding node conditional. 116 o Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration 117 (read-write), "ro" state data (read-only), "-x" RPC operations, 118 and "-n" notifications. 120 o Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!" a 121 container with presence, and "*" denotes a "list" or "leaf-list". 123 o Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also 124 marked with a colon (":"). 126 o Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not 127 shown. 129 2. Problem Statement 131 This document describes a YANG [YANG] data model for key chains. Key 132 chains have been implemented and deployed by a large percentage of 133 network equipment vendors. Providing a standard YANG model will 134 facilitate automated key distribution and non-disruptive key 135 rollover. This will aid in tightening the security of the core 136 routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT]. 138 A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a 139 Key ID, key, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication 140 or encryption algorithm. A key chain can be used by any service or 141 application requiring authentication or encryption. In essence, the 142 key-chain is a reusable key policy that can be referenced where ever 143 it is required. The key-chain construct has been implemented by most 144 networking vendors and deployed in many networks. 146 The module name was change from ietf-key-chain to ietf-routing-key- 147 chain to avoid disambiguate it from the ietf-system-keychain module 148 defined in [NETCONF-SERVER-CONF]. However, due to popular demand, 149 the module name has been restored to simply ietf-key-chain. 151 A conceptual representation of a crypto key table is described in 152 [CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]. The crypto key table also includes keys as well 153 as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the 154 key table includes key selection criteria and envisions a deployment 155 model where the details of the applications or services requiring 156 authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The 157 YANG key-chain model described herein doesn't include key selection 158 criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does 159 not preclude it. The draft [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes 160 augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection 161 criteria. 163 2.1. Applicability 165 Other YANG modules may reference ietf-key-chain YANG module key-chain 166 names for authentication and encryption applications. A YANG type 167 has been provided to facilate reference to the key-chain name without 168 having to specify the complete YANG XML Path Language (XPath) 169 selector. 171 2.2. Graceful Key Rollover using Key Chains 173 Key chains may be used to gracefully update the key and/or algorithm 174 used by an application for authentication or encryption. This MAY be 175 accomplished by accepting all the keys that have a valid accept 176 lifetime and sending the key with the most recent send lifetime. One 177 scenario for facilitating key rollover is to: 179 1. Distribute a key chain with a new key to all the routers or other 180 network devices in the domain of that key chain. The new key's 181 accept lifetime should be such that it is accepted during the key 182 rollover period. The send lifetime should be a time in the 183 future when it can be assured that all the routers in the domain 184 of that key are upgraded. This will have no immediate impact on 185 the keys used for transmission. 187 2. Assure that all the network devices have been updated with the 188 updated key chain and that their system times are roughly 189 synchronized. The system times of devices within an 190 administrative domain are commonly synchronized (e.g., using 191 Network Time Protocol (NTP) [NTP-PROTO]). This also may be 192 automated. 194 3. When the send lifetime of the new key becomes valid, the network 195 devices within the domain of key chain will start sending the new 196 key. 198 4. At some point in the future, a new key chain with the old key 199 removed may be distributed to the network devices within the 200 domain of the key chain. However, this may be deferred until the 201 next key rollover. If this is done, the key chain will always 202 include two keys; either the current and future key (during key 203 rollovers) or the current and previous keys (between key 204 rollovers). 206 3. Design of the Key Chain Model 208 The ietf-key-chain module contains a list of one or more keys indexed 209 by a Key ID. For some applications (e.g., OSPFv3 [OSPFV3-AUTH]), the 210 Key-Id is used to identify the key chain entry to be used. In 211 addition to the Key-ID, each key chain entry includes a key-string 212 and a cryptographic algorithm. Optionally, the key chain entries 213 include send/accept lifetimes. If the send/accept lifetime is 214 unspecified, the key is always considered valid. 216 Note that asymmetric keys, i.e., a different key value used for 217 transmission versus acceptance, may be supported with multiple key 218 chain elements where the accept-lifetime or send-lifetime is not 219 valid (e.g., has an end-time equal to the start-time). 221 Due to the differences in key chain implementations across various 222 vendors, some of the data elements are optional. Additionally, the 223 key-chain is made a grouping so that an implementation could support 224 scoping other than at the global level. Finally, the crypto- 225 algorithm-types grouping is provided for reuse when configuring 226 legacy authentication and encryption not using key-chains. 228 A key-chain is identified by a unique name within the scope of the 229 network device. The "key-chain-ref" typedef SHOULD be used by other 230 YANG modules when they need to reference a configured key-chain. 232 3.1. Key Chain Operational State 234 The key chain operational state is maintained in a separate tree. 235 The key string itself is omitted from the operational state to 236 minimize visibility similar to what was done with keys in SNMP MIBs. 237 The timestamp of the last key-chain modification is also maintained 238 in the operational state. Additionally, the operational state 239 includes an indication of whether or not a key chain entry is valid 240 for sending or acceptance. 242 3.2. Key Chain Model Features 244 Features are used to handle differences between vendor 245 implementations. For example, not all vendors support configuration 246 an acceptance tolerance or configuration of key strings in 247 hexadecimal. They are also used to support of security requirements 248 (e.g., TCP-AO Algorithms [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]) not implemented by 249 vendors or only a single vendor. 251 3.3. Key Chain Model Tree 253 +--rw key-chain 254 | +--rw key-chain-list* [name] 255 | | +--rw name string 256 | | +--rw description? string 257 | | +--rw accept-tolerance {accept-tolerance}? 258 | | | +--rw duration? uint32 259 | | +--rw key-chain-entries* [key-id] 260 | | +--rw key-id uint64 261 | | +--rw lifetime 262 | | | +--rw (lifetime)? 263 | | | +--:(send-and-accept-lifetime) 264 | | | | +--rw send-accept-lifetime 265 | | | | +--rw (lifetime)? 266 | | | | +--:(always) 267 | | | | | +--rw always? empty 268 | | | | +--:(start-end-time) 269 | | | | +--rw start-date-time? 270 | | | | | yang:date-and-time 271 | | | | +--rw (end-time)? 272 | | | | +--:(infinite) 273 | | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty 274 | | | | +--:(duration) 275 | | | | | +--rw duration? uint32 276 | | | | +--:(end-date-time) 277 | | | | +--rw end-date-time? 278 | | | | yang:date-and-time 279 | | | +--:(independent-send-accept-lifetime) 280 | | | | {independent-send-accept-lifetime}? 281 | | | +--rw send-lifetime 282 | | | | +--rw (lifetime)? 283 | | | | +--:(always) 284 | | | | | +--rw always? empty 285 | | | | +--:(start-end-time) 286 | | | | +--rw start-date-time? 287 | | | | yang:date-and-time 288 | | | | +--rw (end-time)? 289 | | | | +--:(infinite) 290 | | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty 291 | | | | +--:(duration) 292 | | | | | +--rw duration? uint32 293 | | | | +--:(end-date-time) 294 | | | | +--rw end-date-time? 295 | | | | yang:date-and-time 296 | | | +--rw accept-lifetime 297 | | | +--rw (lifetime)? 298 | | | +--:(always) 299 | | | | +--rw always? empty 300 | | | +--:(start-end-time) 301 | | | +--rw start-date-time? 302 | | | yang:date-and-time 303 | | | +--rw (end-time)? 304 | | | +--:(infinite) 305 | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty 306 | | | +--:(duration) 307 | | | | +--rw duration? uint32 308 | | | +--:(end-date-time) 309 | | | +--rw end-date-time? 310 | | | yang:date-and-time 311 | | +--rw crypto-algorithm 312 | | | +--rw (algorithm)? 313 | | | +--:(hmac-sha-1-12) {crypto-hmac-sha-1-12}? 314 | | | | +--rw hmac-sha1-12? empty 315 | | | +--:(aes-cmac-prf-128) {aes-cmac-prf-128}? 316 | | | | +--rw aes-cmac-prf-128? empty 317 | | | +--:(md5) 318 | | | | +--rw md5? empty 319 | | | +--:(sha-1) 320 | | | | +--rw sha-1? empty 321 | | | +--:(hmac-sha-1) 322 | | | | +--rw hmac-sha-1? empty 323 | | | +--:(hmac-sha-256) 324 | | | | +--rw hmac-sha-256? empty 325 | | | +--:(hmac-sha-384) 326 | | | | +--rw hmac-sha-384? empty 327 | | | +--:(hmac-sha-512) 328 | | | | +--rw hmac-sha-512? empty 329 | | | +--:(clear-text) {clear-text}? 330 | | | | +--rw clear-text? empty 331 | | | +--:(replay-protection-only) 332 | | | {replay-protection-only}? 333 | | | +--rw replay-protection-only? empty 334 | | +--rw key-string 335 | | +--rw (key-string-style)? 336 | | +--:(keystring) 337 | | | +--rw keystring? string 338 | | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}? 339 | | +--rw hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string 340 | +--rw aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}? 341 | +--rw enable? boolean 342 +--ro key-chain-state 343 +--ro key-chain-list* [name] 344 | +--ro name string 345 | +--ro description? string 346 | +--ro accept-tolerance {accept-tolerance}? 347 | | +--ro duration? uint32 348 | +--ro last-modified-timestamp? yang:date-and-time 349 | +--ro key-chain-entries* [key-id] 350 | +--ro key-id uint64 351 | +--ro lifetime 352 | | +--ro (lifetime)? 353 | | +--:(send-and-accept-lifetime) 354 | | | +--ro send-accept-lifetime 355 | | | +--ro (lifetime)? 356 | | | +--:(always) 357 | | | | +--ro always? empty 358 | | | +--:(start-end-time) 359 | | | +--ro start-date-time? 360 | | | yang:date-and-time 361 | | | +--ro (end-time)? 362 | | | +--:(infinite) 363 | | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty 364 | | | +--:(duration) 365 | | | | +--ro duration? uint32 366 | | | +--:(end-date-time) 367 | | | +--ro end-date-time? 368 | | | yang:date-and-time 369 | | +--:(independent-send-accept-lifetime) 370 | | | {independent-send-accept-lifetime}? 371 | | +--ro send-lifetime 372 | | | +--ro (lifetime)? 373 | | | +--:(always) 374 | | | | +--ro always? empty 375 | | | +--:(start-end-time) 376 | | | +--ro start-date-time? 377 | | | yang:date-and-time 378 | | | +--ro (end-time)? 379 | | | +--:(infinite) 380 | | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty 381 | | | +--:(duration) 382 | | | | +--ro duration? uint32 383 | | | +--:(end-date-time) 384 | | | +--ro end-date-time? 385 | | | yang:date-and-time 386 | | +--ro accept-lifetime 387 | | +--ro (lifetime)? 388 | | +--:(always) 389 | | | +--ro always? empty 390 | | +--:(start-end-time) 391 | | +--ro start-date-time? yang:date-and-time 392 | | +--ro (end-time)? 393 | | +--:(infinite) 394 | | | +--ro no-end-time? empty 395 | | +--:(duration) 396 | | | +--ro duration? uint32 397 | | +--:(end-date-time) 398 | | +--ro end-date-time? 399 | | yang:date-and-time 400 | +--ro crypto-algorithm 401 | | +--ro (algorithm)? 402 | | +--:(hmac-sha-1-12) {crypto-hmac-sha-1-12}? 403 | | | +--ro hmac-sha1-12? empty 404 | | +--:(aes-cmac-prf-128) {aes-cmac-prf-128}? 405 | | | +--ro aes-cmac-prf-128? empty 406 | | +--:(md5) 407 | | | +--ro md5? empty 408 | | +--:(sha-1) 409 | | | +--ro sha-1? empty 410 | | +--:(hmac-sha-1) 411 | | | +--ro hmac-sha-1? empty 412 | | +--:(hmac-sha-256) 413 | | | +--ro hmac-sha-256? empty 414 | | +--:(hmac-sha-384) 415 | | | +--ro hmac-sha-384? empty 416 | | +--:(hmac-sha-512) 417 | | | +--ro hmac-sha-512? empty 418 | | +--:(clear-text) {clear-text}? 419 | | | +--ro clear-text? empty 420 | | +--:(replay-protection-only) 421 | | | {replay-protection-only}? 422 | | +--ro replay-protection-only? empty 423 | +--ro key-string 424 | +--ro (key-string-style)? 425 | +--:(keystring) 426 | | +--ro keystring? string 427 | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}? 428 | +--ro hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string 429 | +--ro send-lifetime-active? boolean 430 | +--ro accept-lifetime-active? boolean 431 +--ro aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}? 432 +--ro enable? boolean 434 4. Key Chain YANG Model 436 file "ietf-key-chain@2017-01-20.yang" < 437 933 5. Security Considerations 935 This document enables the automated distribution of industry standard 936 key chains using the NETCONF [NETCONF] protocol. As such, the 937 security considerations for the NETCONF protocol are applicable. 938 Given that the key chains themselves are sensitive data, it is 939 RECOMMENDED that the NETCONF communication channel be encrypted. One 940 way to do accomplish this would be to invoke and run NETCONF over SSH 941 as described in [NETCONF-SSH]. 943 When configured, the key-strings can be encrypted using the AES Key 944 Wrap algorithm [AES-KEY-WRAP]. The AES key-encryption key (KEK) is 945 not included in the YANG model and must be set or derived independent 946 of key-chain configuration. 948 The key strings are not accessible by default and NETCONF Access 949 Control Mode [NETCONF-ACM] rules are required to configure or 950 retrieve them. 952 The clear-text algorithm is included as a YANG feature. Usage is NOT 953 RECOMMENDED except in cases where the application and device have no 954 other alternative (e.g., a legacy network device that must 955 authenticate packets at intervals of 10 milliseconds or less for many 956 peers using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD]). Keys used 957 with the clear-text algorithm are considered insecure and SHOULD NOT 958 be reused with more secure algorithms. 960 6. IANA Considerations 962 This document registers a URI in the IETF XML registry 963 [XML-REGISTRY]. Following the format in [XML-REGISTRY], the 964 following registration is requested to be made: 966 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain 968 Registrant Contact: The IESG. 970 XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. 972 This document registers a YANG module in the YANG Module Names 973 registry [YANG]. 975 name: ietf-key-chain namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf- 976 key-chain prefix: ietf-key-chain reference: RFC XXXX 978 7. References 980 7.1. Normative References 982 [NETCONF] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., and A. 983 Bierman, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 984 6241, June 2011. 986 [NETCONF-ACM] 987 Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration 988 Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model", RFC 6536, March 989 2012. 991 [NETCONF-SSH] 992 Wasserman, M., "Using NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell 993 (SSH)", RFC 6242, June 2011. 995 [RFC-KEYWORDS] 996 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFC's to Indicate 997 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 999 [XML-REGISTRY] 1000 Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, 1001 January 2004. 1003 [YANG] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the 1004 Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, 1005 October 2010. 1007 7.2. Informative References 1009 [AES-KEY-WRAP] 1010 Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard 1011 (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", RFC 5649, August 1012 2009. 1014 [BFD] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection 1015 (BFD)", RFC 5880, June 2010. 1017 [CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] 1018 Housley, R., Polk, T., Hartman, S., and D. Zhang, 1019 "Table of Cryptographic Keys", RFC 7210, April 2014. 1021 [IAB-REPORT] 1022 Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the 1023 IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006", RFC 1024 4948, August 2007. 1026 [NETCONF-SERVER-CONF] 1027 Watsen, K. and J. Schoenwaelder, "NETCONF Server and 1028 RESTCONF Server Configuration Models", draft-ietf-netconf- 1029 server-model-08.txt (work in progress), October 2015. 1031 [NTP-PROTO] 1032 Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network 1033 Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms 1034 Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010. 1036 [OSPFV3-AUTH] 1037 Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting 1038 Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166, March 2014. 1040 [TCP-AO] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP 1041 Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010. 1043 [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS] 1044 Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms 1045 for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, 1046 June 2010. 1048 [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] 1049 Chen, I., "YANG Data Model for RFC 7210 Key Table", draft- 1050 chen-rtg-key-table-yang-02.txt (work in progress), 1051 November 2015. 1053 Appendix A. Acknowledgments 1054 The RFC text was produced using Marshall Rose's xml2rfc tool. 1056 Thanks to Brian Weis for fruitful discussions on security 1057 requirements. 1059 Thanks to Ines Robles for Routing Directorate QA review comments. 1061 Authors' Addresses 1063 Acee Lindem (editor) 1064 Cisco Systems 1065 301 Midenhall Way 1066 Cary, NC 27513 1067 USA 1069 Email: acee@cisco.com 1071 Yingzhen Qu 1072 Huawei 1074 Email: yingzhen.qu@huawei.com 1076 Derek Yeung 1077 Arrcus, Inc 1079 Email: derek@arrcus.com 1081 Ing-Wher Chen 1082 Ericsson 1084 Email: ichen@kuatrotech.com 1086 Jeffrey Zhang 1087 Juniper Networks 1088 10 Technology Park Drive 1089 Westford, MA 01886 1090 USA 1092 Email: zzhang@juniper.net 1093 Yi Yang 1094 SockRate 1096 Email: yi.yang@sockrate.com