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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group P. Hunt, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft Oracle 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Scurtescu 5 Expires: May 1, 2018 Google 6 M. Ansari 7 Cisco 8 A. Nadalin 9 Microsoft 10 A. Backman 11 Amazon 12 October 28, 2017 14 SET Token Delivery Using HTTP 15 draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-01 17 Abstract 19 This specification defines how a series of security event tokens 20 (SETs) may be delivered to a previously registered receiver using 21 HTTP POST over TLS initiated as a push to the receiver, or as a poll 22 by the receiver. The specification also defines how delivery can be 23 assured subject to the SET Token Receiver's need for assurance. 25 Status of This Memo 27 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 28 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 30 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 31 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 32 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 33 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 35 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 36 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 37 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 38 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 40 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 1, 2018. 42 Copyright Notice 44 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 45 document authors. All rights reserved. 47 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 48 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 49 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 50 publication of this document. Please review these documents 51 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 52 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 53 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 54 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 55 described in the Simplified BSD License. 57 Table of Contents 59 1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 60 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 2. SET Event Stream Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 2.1. Event Delivery Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 64 2.2. Push Delivery using HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 65 2.3. Polling Delivery using HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 66 2.3.1. Polling HTTP Request Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 2.3.2. Polling HTTP Response Attributes . . . . . . . . . . 10 68 2.3.3. Poll Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 2.3.4. Poll Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 70 2.4. Error Response Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 71 3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 72 3.1. Use of Tokens as Authorizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 73 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 74 4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 75 4.2. HTTP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 76 4.3. TLS Support Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 77 4.4. Authorization Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 19 78 4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 79 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 80 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 81 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 82 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 83 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 84 Appendix A. Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 23 85 Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 86 Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 87 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 89 1. Introduction and Overview 91 This specification defines how a stream of SETs (see 92 [I-D.ietf-secevent-token]) can be transmitted to a previously 93 registered Event Receiver using HTTP [RFC7231] over TLS. The 94 specification defines a method to push SETs via HTTP POST and to poll 95 for SETs using HTTP POST. 97 This specification defines to methods of SET delivery in what is 98 known as Event Streams. The specification includes a verification 99 process which tests and validates Event Stream configuration. 101 This specification does not define the method by which Event Streams 102 are defined, provisioned, managed, monitored, and configured and is 103 out of scope of this specification. 104 [[This work is TBD by the SECEVENTS WG]] 106 1.1. Notational Conventions 108 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 109 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 110 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] . These 111 keywords are capitalized when used to unambiguously specify 112 requirements of the protocol or application features and behavior 113 that affect the inter-operability and security of implementations. 114 When these words are not capitalized, they are meant in their 115 natural-language sense. 117 For purposes of readability examples are not URL encoded. 118 Implementers MUST percent encode URLs as described in Section 2.1 of 119 [RFC3986] . 121 Throughout this documents all figures MAY contain spaces and extra 122 line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. Similarly, some 123 URI's contained within examples, have been shortened for space and 124 readability reasons. 126 1.2. Definitions 128 This specification assumes terminology defined in the Security Event 129 Token specification[I-D.ietf-secevent-token] . 131 The following definitions are defined for Security Event 132 distribution: 134 Identity Provider 135 An Identity Provider is a service provider that issues 136 authentication assertions that may be used by Relying Party 137 service providers to establish login sessions with users. 138 Examples of Identity Providers are defined in: OpenID Connect 139 [openid-connect-core] and SAML2 [saml-core-2.0]. For the purpose 140 of this specification an Identity Provider also includes any 141 provider of services where the compromise of an account may open 142 up relying parties to attack. For example for the purposes of 143 security events, an email service provider could be considered an 144 "implicit" Identity Provider. 146 Relying Party 147 Relying Parties come in multiple forms generally classified as 148 "Explicit" or "Implicit". An Explicit Relying Party is a service 149 provider that accepts a standard security assertion (e.g. a JWT 150 access tokens [RFC7519]) from an Identity Provider to establish a 151 session or authorization. An Implicit Relying Party (implicit) 152 uses a personal identifier such as an email address or telephone 153 number from another provider to establish a Subject's identity. 154 Examples of Explicit Relying Parties are defined in: OpenID 155 Connect [openid-connect-core] and SAML2 [saml-core-2.0]. Implicit 156 relying parties are verified by a common channel associated with 157 the identifier. For example, an email or a text message is sent 158 with a unique link to establish ownership of the identifier by the 159 Subject. 161 Event Transmitter 162 A service provider that delivers SETs to other providers known as 163 Event Receivers. Some examples of Event Transmitters are Identity 164 Providers and Relying Parties. An Event Transmitter is 165 responsible for offering a service that allows the Event Receiver 166 to check the Event Stream configuration and status known as the 167 "Control Plane". 169 Event Receiver 170 A service provider that registers to receive SETs from an Event 171 Transmitter and provides an endpoint to receive SETs via HTTP POST 172 (known as the "Data Plane"). Some examples of Event Receivers are 173 Identity Providers and Relying Parties. Event Receivers can check 174 current Event Stream configuration and status by accessing the 175 Event Transmitters "Control Plane". 177 Event Stream 178 An Event Stream is a defined location, distribution method and 179 whereby an Event Transmitter and Event Receiver exchange a pre- 180 defined family of SETs. A Stream is assumed to have configuration 181 data such as HTTP endpoints, timeouts, public key sets for signing 182 and encryption, and Event Families. 184 Event Family 185 An Event Family is a URI that describes the set of Events types be 186 issued in an Event Stream. 188 Subject 189 The security subject around which a security event has occurred. 190 For example, a security subject might per a user, a person, an 191 email address, a service provider entity, an IP address, an OAuth 192 Client, a mobile device, or any identifiable thing referenced in 193 security and authorization systems. 195 Event 196 An Event is defined to be an event as represented by a security 197 event token (SET). See [I-D.ietf-secevent-token]. 199 NumericDate 200 A JSON numeric value representing the number of seconds from 201 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z UTC until the specified UTC date/time, 202 ignoring leap seconds. This is equivalent to the IEEE Std 1003.1, 203 2013 Edition [POSIX.1] definition "Seconds Since the Epoch", in 204 which each day is accounted for by exactly 86400 seconds, other 205 than that non-integer values can be represented. See [RFC3339] 206 for details regarding date/times in general and UTC in particular. 208 2. SET Event Stream Protocol 210 An Event Stream represents the communication channel over which a 211 series of SETs are delivered to a configured Event Receiver. 213 2.1. Event Delivery Process 215 When an Event occurs, the Feed Provider constructs a SET token 216 [I-D.ietf-secevent-token] that describes the Event. The SET issuer 217 determines the Event Streams over which the SET should be distributed 218 to. 220 How SET Events are defined and the process by which Events are 221 identified for Event Receivers is out-of-scope of this specification. 223 When a SET is available for a Event Receiver, the Feed Transmitter 224 attempts to deliver the SET based on the Event Receiver's registered 225 delivery mechanism: 227 o The Event Transmitter uses an HTTP/1.1 POST to the Event Receiver 228 endpoint to deliver the SET; 230 o The Event Transmitter queues up the SET in a buffer so that an 231 Event Receiver MAY poll for SETs using HTTP/1.1 POST. 233 o Or, the Feed Transmitter delivers the Event through a different 234 method not defined by this specification. 236 Delivery of SETs MAY be delivered using one of two modes: 238 PUSH 239 In which SETs are delivered one at a time using HTTP POST requests 240 by an Event Transmitter to an Event Receiver. The HTTP request 241 body is a JSON Web Token [RFC7519] with a "Content-Type" header of 242 "application/secevent+jwt" as defined in Section 2.2 and 6.2 of 244 [I-D.ietf-secevent-token]. Upon receipt, the Event Receiver 245 acknowledges receipt with an HTTP response which is a JSON 246 document with a "Content-Type" header of "application/json" (see 247 Section 11 of [RFC7159]) as described below in Section 2.2. 249 POLLING Where multiple SETs are delivered in a JSON document 250 [RFC7159] to an Event Receiver in response to an HTTP POST request 251 to the Event Transmitter. Then in a following request, the Event 252 Receiver acknowledges received SETs and MAY poll for more. In 253 POLLING mode, all requests and responses are JSON documents and 254 use a "Content-Type" of "application/json" as described in 255 Section 2.3. 257 After successful (acknowledged) SET delivery, Event Transmitters 258 SHOULD NOT be required to maintain or record SETs for recovery. Once 259 a SET is acknowledged, the Event Receiver SHALL be responsible for 260 retention and recovery. 262 Transmitted SETs SHOULD be self-validating (e.g. signed) if there is 263 a requirement to verify they were issued by the Event Transmitter at 264 a later date when de-coupled from the original delivery where 265 authenticity could be checked via the HTTP or TLS mutual 266 authentication. 268 Upon receiving a SET, the Event Receiver reads the SET and validates 269 it. The receiver MUST acknowledge receipt to the Event transmitter, 270 using the defined acknowledgement or error method depending on the 271 method of transfer. 273 The Event Receiver SHALL NOT use the Event acknowledgement mechanism 274 to report Event errors other than relating to the parsing and 275 validation of the SET token. 277 2.2. Push Delivery using HTTP 279 This method allows an Event Transmitter to use HTTP POST 280 (Section 4.3.3 [RFC7231]) to deliver SETs to a previously registered 281 web callback URI supplied by the Event Receiver as part of an Event 282 Stream configuration process (not defined by this document). 284 The SET to be delivered MAY be signed and/or encrypted as defined in 285 [I-D.ietf-secevent-token]. 287 The Event Stream configuration defines a URI the of an Event Receiver 288 provided endpoint which accepts HTTP POST requests (e.g. 289 "https://notify.examplerp.com/Events"). 291 The HTTP Content-Type (see Section 3.1.1.5 [RFC7231]) for the HTTP 292 POST is "application/jwt" and SHALL consist of a single SET token 293 (see [I-D.ietf-secevent-token]). As per Section 5.3.2 [RFC7231], the 294 expected media type ("Accept" header) response is "application/json". 296 To deliver an Event, the Event Transmitter generates an event 297 delivery message and uses HTTP POST to the configured endpoint with 298 the appropriate "Accept" and "Content-Type" headers. 300 POST /Events HTTP/1.1 302 Host: notify.examplerp.com 303 Accept: application/json 304 Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8 305 Content-Type: application/secevent+jwt 306 eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0 307 . 308 eyJwdWJsaXNoZXJVcmkiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLCJmZWV 309 kVXJpcyI6WyJodHRwczovL2podWIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vRmVlZHMvOThkNTI0Nj 310 FmYTViYmM4Nzk1OTNiNzc1NCIsImh0dHBzOi8vamh1Yi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZ 311 WVkcy81ZDc2MDQ1MTZiMWQwODY0MWQ3Njc2ZWU3Il0sInJlc291cmNlVXJpcyI6 312 WyJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcnMvNDRmNjE0MmRmOTZiZDZ 313 hYjYxZTc1MjFkOSJdLCJldmVudFR5cGVzIjpbIkNSRUFURSJdLCJhdHRyaWJ1dG 314 VzIjpbImlkIiwibmFtZSIsInVzZXJOYW1lIiwicGFzc3dvcmQiLCJlbWFpbHMiX 315 SwidmFsdWVzIjp7ImVtYWlscyI6W3sidHlwZSI6IndvcmsiLCJ2YWx1ZSI6Impk 316 b2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20ifV0sInBhc3N3b3JkIjoibm90NHUybm8iLCJ1c2VyTmF 317 tZSI6Impkb2UiLCJpZCI6IjQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIxZDkiLCJuYW 318 1lIjp7ImdpdmVuTmFtZSI6IkpvaG4iLCJmYW1pbHlOYW1lIjoiRG9lIn19fQ 319 . 321 Figure 1: Example HTTP POST Request 323 Upon receipt of the request, the Event Receiver SHALL validate the 324 JWT structure of the SET as defined in Section 7.2 [RFC7519]. The 325 Event Receiver SHALL also validate the SET information as described 326 in Section 2 [I-D.ietf-secevent-token]. 328 If the SET is determined to be valid, the Event Receiver SHALL 329 "acknowledge" successful submission by responding with HTTP Status 330 202 as "Accepted" (see Section 6.3.3 [RFC7231]). 332 In order to maintain compatibility with other methods of 333 transmission, the Event Receiver SHOULD NOT include an HTTP response 334 body representation of the submitted SET or what the SET's pending 335 status is when acknowledging success. In the case of an error (e.g. 336 HTTP Status 400), purpose of the HTTP response body is to indicate 337 any SET parsing, validation, or cryptographic errors. 339 The following is a non-normative example of a successful receipt of a 340 SET. 342 HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted 344 Figure 2: Example Successful Delivery Response 346 Note that the purpose of the "acknowledgement" response is to let the 347 Event Transmitter know that a SET has been delivered and the 348 information no longer needs to be retained by the Event Transmitter. 349 Before acknowledgement, Event Receivers SHOULD ensure they have 350 validated received SETs and retained them in a manner appropriate to 351 information retention requirements appropriate to the SET event types 352 signaled. The level of retention and method of SETs by Event 353 Receivers is out-of-scope of this specification. 355 In the Event of a general HTTP error condition, the Event Receiver 356 MAY respond with an appropriate HTTP Status code as defined in 357 Section 6 [RFC7231]. 359 When the Event Receiver detects an error parsing or validating a 360 received SET (as defined by [I-D.ietf-secevent-token]), the Event 361 Receiver SHALL indicate an HTTP Status 400 error with an error code 362 as described in Section 2.4. 364 The following is an example non-normative error response. 366 HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request 367 Content-Type: application/json 369 { 370 "err":"dup", 371 "description":"SET already received. Ignored." 373 } 375 Figure 3: Example HTTP Status 400 Response 377 2.3. Polling Delivery using HTTP 379 This method allows an Event Receiver to use HTTP POST (Section 4.3.3 380 [RFC7231]) to acknowledge SETs and to check for and receive zero or 381 more SETs. Requests MAY be made at a periodic interval (short 382 polling) or requests MAY wait pending availability of new SETs using 383 long polling (see Section 2 [RFC6202]). 385 The delivery of SETs in this method is facilitated by HTTP POST 386 requests initiated by the Event Receiver in which: 388 o The Event Receiver makes an request for available SETs using an 389 HTTP POST to a pre-arranged endpoint provided by the Event 390 Transmitter. Or, 392 o After validating previously received SETs, the Event Receiver 393 initiates another poll request using HTTP POST that includes 394 acknowledgement of previous SETs, and waits for the next batch of 395 SETs. 397 The purpose of the "acknowledgement" is to inform the Event 398 Transmitter that has successfully been delivered and attempts to re- 399 deliver are no longer required. Before acknowledgement, Event 400 Receivers SHOULD ensure received SETs have been validated and 401 retained in a manner appropriate to the receiver's retention 402 requirements. The level and method of retention of SETs by Event 403 Receivers is out-of-scope of this specification. 405 2.3.1. Polling HTTP Request Attributes 407 When initiating a poll request, the Event Receiver constructs a JSON 408 document that consists of polling request parameters and SET 409 acknowledgement parameters in the form of JSON attributes. 411 The request payloads are delivered in one of two forms as described 412 in Section 2.3.3 and Section 2.3.4 414 When making a request, the HTTP header "Content-Type" is set to 415 "application/json". 417 The following JSON Attributes are used in a polling request: 419 Request Processing Parameters 421 maxEvents 422 an OPTIONAL JSON integer value indicating the maximum number of 423 unacknowledged SETs that SHOULD be returned. If more than the 424 maximum number of SETs are available, the oldest SETs available 425 SHOULD be returned first. A value of "0" MAY be used by Event 426 Receivers that would like to perform an acknowledge only 427 request. This enables the Receiver to use separate HTTP 428 requests for acknowledgement and reception of SETs. When zero 429 returned events is requested, the value of the attribute 430 "returnImmediately" SHALL be ignored as an immediate response 431 is expected. 433 returnImmediately 434 An OPTIONAL JSON boolean value that indicates the Event 435 Transmitter SHOULD return an immediate response even if no 436 results are available (short polling). The default value is 437 "false" indicates the request is to be treated as an HTTP Long 438 Poll (see Section 2 [RFC6202]). The time out for the request 439 is part of the Stream configuration which is out of scope of 440 this specification. 442 SET Acknowledgment Parameters 444 ack 445 Which is an array of Strings that each correspond to the "jti" 446 of a successfully received SET. If there are no outstanding 447 SETs to acknowledge, the attribute MAY be omitted. When 448 acknowledging a SET, the Event Transmitter is released from any 449 obligation to retain the SET (e.g. for a future re-try to 450 receive). 452 setErrs 453 A JSON Object that contains one or more nested JSON attributes 454 that correspond to the "jti" of each invalid SET received. The 455 value of each is a JSON object whose contents is an "err" 456 attribute and "description" attribute whose value correspond to 457 the errors described in Section 2.4. 459 2.3.2. Polling HTTP Response Attributes 461 In response to a poll request, the Event Transmitter checks for 462 available SET events and responds with a JSON document containing the 463 following JSON attributes: 465 sets 466 A JSON object that contains zero or more nested JSON attributes. 467 Each nested attribute corresponds to the "jti" of a SET to be 468 delivered and whose value is a JSON String containing the value of 469 the encoded corresponding SET. If there are no outstanding SETs 470 to be transmitted, the JSON object SHALL be empty. 472 moreAvailable 473 A JSON boolean value that indicates if more unacknowledged SETs 474 are available to be returned. 476 When making a response, the HTTP header "Content-Type" is set to 477 "application/json". 479 2.3.3. Poll Request 481 The Event Receiver performs an HTTP POST (see Section 4.3.4 482 [RFC7231]) to a pre-arranged polling endpoint URI to check for SETs 483 that are available. Because the Event Receiver has no prior SETs to 484 acknowledge, the "ack" and "errs" request parameters are omitted. 486 If after a period of time, negotiated between the Event Transmitter 487 and Receiver, an Event Transmitter MAY re-issue SETs it has 488 previously delivered. The Event Receiver SHOULD accept repeat SETs 489 and acknowledge the SETs regardless of whether the Receiver believes 490 it has already acknowledged the SETs previously. An Event 491 Transmitter MAY limit the number of times it attempts to deliver a 492 SET. Upon abandoning delivery of a SET, the Event Transmitter SHOULD 493 have a method to notify the Event Receiver of the loss such as 494 through a status service (not defined by this specification). 496 If the Event Receiver has received SETs from the Event Transmitter, 497 the Event Receiver SHOULD parse and validate received SETs to meet 498 its own requirements and SHOULD acknowledge receipt in a timely (e.g. 499 minutes) fashion so that the Event Transmitter may mark the SETs as 500 received. Event Receivers SHOULD acknowledge receipt before taking 501 any local actions based on the SETs to avoid unnecessary delay in 502 acknowledgement where possible. 504 Poll requests have three variations: 506 Poll Only 507 In which an Event Receiver asks for the next set of Events where 508 no previous SET deliveries are acknowledged (such as in the 509 initial poll request). 511 Acknowledge Only 512 In which an Event Receiver sets the "maxEvents" attribute to "0" 513 along with "ack" and "err" attributes indicating the Event 514 Receiver is acknowledging previously received SETs and does not 515 want to receive any new SETs in response to the request. 517 Combined Acknowledge and Poll 518 In which an Event Receiver is both acknowledging previously 519 received SETs using the "ack" and "err" attributes and will wait 520 for the next group of SETs in the Event Transmitters response. 522 2.3.3.1. Poll Only Request 524 In the case where no SETs were received in a previous poll (see 525 Figure 10), the Event Receiver simply polls without acknowledgement 526 parameters ("sets" and "setErrs"). 528 The following is an example request made by an Event Receiver that 529 has no outstanding SETs to acknowledge and is polling for available 530 SETs. 532 The following is a non-normative example poll request to the 533 endpoint: "https://nofity.exampleidp.com/Events". 535 POST /Events HTTP/1.1 537 Host: notify.exampleidp.com 538 Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8 539 Accept: application/json 541 { 542 "returnImmediately":true 543 } 545 Figure 4: Example Initial Poll Request 547 An Event Receiver MAY poll with no parameters at all by passing an 548 empty JSON object. 550 The following is a non-normative example default poll request to the 551 endpoint: "https://nofity.exampleidp.com/Events". 553 POST /Events HTTP/1.1 555 Host: notify.exampleidp.com 556 Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8 557 Accept: application/json 559 {} 561 Figure 5: Example Default Poll Request 563 2.3.3.2. Acknowledge Only Request 565 In this variation, the Event Receiver acknowledges previously 566 received SETs and indicates it does not want to receive SETs in 567 response by setting the "maxEvents" attribute to "0". 569 This variation is typically used when an Event Receiver needs to 570 acknowledge received SETs independently (e.g. on separate threads) 571 from the process of receiving SETs. 573 The following is a non-normative example poll with acknowledgement of 574 SETs received (for example as shown in Figure 9). 576 POST /Events HTTP/1.1 578 Host: notify.exampleidp.com 579 Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8 580 Content-Type: application/json 581 Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8 583 { 584 "ack":[ 585 "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8", 586 "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" 587 ], 588 "maxEvents":0 589 } 591 Figure 6: Example Acknowledge Only equest 593 2.3.3.3. Poll with Acknowledgement 595 This variation allows a receiver thread to simultaneously acknowledge 596 previously received SETs and wait for the next group of SETs in a 597 single request. 599 The following is a non-normative example poll with acknowledgement of 600 SETs received in Figure 9. 602 POST /Events HTTP/1.1 604 Host: notify.exampleidp.com 605 Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8 606 Content-Type: application/json 607 Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8 609 { 610 "ack":[ 611 "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8", 612 "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" 613 ], 614 "returnImmediately":false 615 } 617 Figure 7: Example Poll With Acknowledgement and No Errors 619 In the above acknowledgement, the Event Receiver has acknowledged 620 receipt of two SETs and has indicated it wants to wait until the next 621 SET is available. 623 2.3.3.4. Poll with Acknowledgement and Errors 625 In the case where errors were detected in previously delivered SETs, 626 the Event Receiver MAY use the "setErrs" attribute to indicate errors 627 in the following poll request. 629 The following is a non-normative example of a response acknowledging 630 1 error and 1 receipt of two SETs received in Figure 9. 632 POST /Events HTTP/1.1 634 Host: notify.exampleidp.com 635 Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8 636 Content-Type: application/json 637 Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8 639 { 640 "ack":["3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30"], 641 "setErrs":{ 642 "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8":{ 643 "err":"jwtAud", 644 "description":"The audience value was incorrect." 645 } 646 }, 647 "returnImmediately":true 648 } 650 Figure 8: Example Poll Acknowledgement With Error 652 2.3.4. Poll Response 654 In response to a poll request, the service provider MAY respond 655 immediately if SETs are available to be delivered. If no SETs are 656 available at the time of the request, the Event Transmitter SHALL 657 delay responding until a SET is available unless the poll request 658 parameter "returnImmediately" is "true". 660 As described in Section 2.3.2 a JSON document is returned containing 661 a number of attributes including "sets" which SHALL contain zero or 662 more SETs. 664 The following is a non-normative example response to the request 665 shown Section 2.3.3. This example shows two SETs are returned. 667 HTTP/1.1 200 OK 668 Content-Type: application/json 669 Location: https://notify.exampleidp/Events 671 { 672 "sets":{ 673 "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8": 674 "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0. 675 eyJqdGkiOiI0ZDM1NTllYzY3NTA0YWFiYTY1ZDQwYjAzNjNmYWFkOCIsImlhdCI6MTQ 676 1ODQ5NjQwNCwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiYXVkIjpbIm 677 h0dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M 678 2I3NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIx 679 ZDA4NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV 680 2ZW50OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcn 681 MvNDRmNjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuY 682 W1lIiwidXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19.", 683 "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30": 684 "eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0. 685 eyJqdGkiOiIzZDBjM2NmNzk3NTg0YmQxOTNiZDBmYjFiZDRlN2QzMCIsImlhdCI6MTQ 686 1ODQ5NjAyNSwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiYXVkIjpbIm 687 h0dHBzOi8vamh1Yi5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M 688 2I3NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9qaHViLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIx 689 ZDA4NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwic3ViIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL1V 690 zZXJzLzQ0ZjYxNDJkZjk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIxZDkiLCJldmVudHMiOnsidXJuOmlldG 691 Y6cGFyYW1zOnNjaW06ZXZlbnQ6cGFzc3dvcmRSZXNldCI6eyJpZCI6IjQ0ZjYxNDJkZ 692 jk2YmQ2YWI2MWU3NTIxZDkifSwiaHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9zY2ltL2V2ZW50 693 L3Bhc3N3b3JkUmVzZXRFeHQiOnsicmVzZXRBdHRlbXB0cyI6NX19fQ." 694 } 695 } 697 Figure 9: Example Poll Response 699 In the above example, a two SETs whose "jti" are 700 "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8" and 701 "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30" are delivered. 703 The following is a non-normative example response to the request 704 shown Section 2.3.3 showing no new SETs or unacknowledged SETs are 705 available. 707 HTTP/1.1 200 OK 708 Content-Type: application/json 709 Location: https://notify.exampleidp/Events 711 { 712 "sets":{ } 713 } 715 Figure 10: Example No SETs Poll Response 717 Upon receiving the JSON document (e.g. as shown in Figure 9), the 718 Event Receiver parses and verifies the received SETs and notifies the 719 Event Transmitter via the next poll request to the Event Transmitter 720 as described in Section 2.3.3.3 or Section 2.3.3.4. 722 2.4. Error Response Handling 724 If a SET is invalid, the following error codes are defined: 726 +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ 727 | Err Value | Description | 728 +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ 729 | json | Invalid JSON object. | 730 | jwtParse | Invalid or unparsable JWT or JSON structure. | 731 | jwtHdr | In invalid JWT header was detected. | 732 | jwtCrypto | Unable to parse due to unsupported algorithm. | 733 | jws | Signature was not validated. | 734 | jwe | Unable to decrypt JWE encoded data. | 735 | jwtAud | Invalid audience value. | 736 | jwtIss | Issuer not recognized. | 737 | setType | An unexpected Event type was received. | 738 | setParse | Invalid structure was encountered such as an | 739 | | inability to parse or an incomplete set of Event | 740 | | claims. | 741 | setData | SET event claims incomplete or invalid. | 742 | dup | A duplicate SET was received and has been ignored. | 743 +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ 745 Table 1: SET Errors 747 An error response SHALL include a JSON object which provides details 748 about the error. The JSON object includes the JSON attributes: 750 err 751 A value which is a keyword that describes the error (see Table 1). 753 description 754 A human-readable text that provides additional diagnostic 755 information. 757 When included as part of an HTTP Status 400 response, the above JSON 758 is the HTTP response body (see Figure 3). When included as part of a 759 batch of SETs, the above JSON is included as part of the "setErrs" 760 attribute as defined in Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3.4 762 3. Authentication and Authorization 764 The SET delivery methods described in this specification are based 765 upon HTTP and depend on the use of TLS and/or standard HTTP 766 authentication and authorization schemes as per [RFC7235]. For 767 example, the following methodologies could be used among others: 769 TLS Client Authentication 770 Event delivery endpoints MAY request TLS mutual client 771 authentication. See Section 7.3 [RFC5246]. 773 Bearer Tokens 774 Bearer tokens [RFC6750] MAY be used when combined with TLS and a 775 token framework such as OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]. For security 776 considerations regarding the use of bearer tokens in SET delivery 777 see Section 4.4.1. 779 Basic Authentication 780 Usage of basic authentication should be avoided due to its use of 781 a single factor that is based upon a relatively static, symmetric 782 secret. Implementers SHOULD combine the use of basic 783 authentication with other factors. The security considerations of 784 HTTP BASIC, are well documented in [RFC7617] and SHOULD be 785 considered along with using signed SETs (see SET Payload 786 Authentication below). 788 SET Payload Authentication 789 In scenarios where SETs are signed and the delivery method is HTTP 790 POST (see Section 2.2), Event Receivers MAY elect to use Basic 791 Authentication or not to use HTTP or TLS based authentication at 792 all. See Section 4.1 for considerations. 794 As per Section 4.1 of [RFC7235], a SET delivery endpoint SHALL 795 indicate supported HTTP authentication schemes via the "WWW- 796 Authenticate" header. 798 Because SET Delivery describes a simple function, authorization for 799 the ability to pick-up or deliver SETs can be derived by considering 800 the identity of the SET issuer, or via an authentication method 801 above. This specification considers authentication as a feature to 802 prevent denial-of-service attacks. Because SETs are not commands 803 (see ), Event Receivers are free to ignore SETs that are not of 804 interest. 806 For illustrative purposes only, SET delivery examples show an OAuth2 807 bearer token value [RFC6750] in the authorization header. This is 808 not intended to imply that bearer tokens are preferred. However, the 809 use of bearer tokens in the specification does reflect common 810 practice. 812 3.1. Use of Tokens as Authorizations 814 When using bearer tokens or proof-of-possession tokens that represent 815 an authorization grant such as issued by OAuth (see [RFC6749]), 816 implementers SHOULD consider the type of authorization granted, any 817 authorized scopes (see Section 3.3 of [RFC6749]), and the security 818 subject(s) that SHOULD be mapped from the authorization when 819 considering local access control rules. Section 6 of the OAuth 820 Assertions draft [RFC7521], documents common scenarios for 821 authorization including: 823 o Clients using an assertion to authenticate and/or act on behalf of 824 itself; 826 o Clients acting on behalf of a user; and, 828 o A Client acting on behalf of an anonymous user (e.g., see next 829 section). 831 When using OAuth authorization tokens, implementers MUST take into 832 account the threats and countermeasures documented in the security 833 considerations for the use of client authorizations (see Section 8 of 834 [RFC7521]). When using other token formats or frameworks, 835 implementers MUST take into account similar threats and 836 countermeasures, especially those documented by the relevant 837 specifications. 839 4. Security Considerations 841 4.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs 843 In scenarios where HTTP authorization or TLS mutual authentication 844 are not used or are considered weak, JWS signed SETs SHOULD be used 845 (see [RFC7515] and Security Considerations 847 [I-D.ietf-secevent-token]). This enables the Event Receiver to 848 validate that the SET issuer is authorized to deliver SETs. 850 4.2. HTTP Considerations 852 SET delivery depends on the use of Hypertext Transfer Protocol and 853 thus subject to the security considerations of HTTP Section 9 854 [RFC7230] and its related specifications. 856 As stated in Section 2.7.1 [RFC7230], an HTTP requestor MUST NOT 857 generate the "userinfo" (i.e., username and password) component (and 858 its "@" delimiter) when an "http" URI reference is generated with a 859 message as they are now disallowed in HTTP. 861 4.3. TLS Support Considerations 863 SETs contain sensitive information that is considered PII (e.g. 864 subject claims). Therefore, Event Transmitters and Event Receivers 865 MUST require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism. Event 866 delivery endpoints MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support 867 additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security 868 requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL 869 server certificate check, per [RFC6125]. Implementation security 870 considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure 871 Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. 873 4.4. Authorization Token Considerations 875 When using authorization tokens such as those issued by OAuth 2.0 876 [RFC6749], implementers MUST take into account threats and 877 countermeasures documented in Section 8 of [RFC7521]. 879 4.4.1. Bearer Token Considerations 881 Due to the possibility of interception, Bearer tokens MUST be 882 exchanged using TLS. 884 Bearer tokens MUST have a limited lifetime that can be determined 885 directly or indirectly (e.g., by checking with a validation service) 886 by the service provider. By expiring tokens, clients are forced to 887 obtain a new token (which usually involves re-authentication) for 888 continued authorized access. For example, in OAuth2, a client MAY 889 use OAuth token refresh to obtain a new bearer token after 890 authenticating to an authorization server. See Section 6 of 891 [RFC6749]. 893 Implementations supporting OAuth bearer tokens need to factor in 894 security considerations of this authorization method [RFC7521]. 896 Since security is only as good as the weakest link, implementers also 897 need to consider authentication choices coupled with OAuth bearer 898 tokens. The security considerations of the default authentication 899 method for OAuth bearer tokens, HTTP BASIC, are well documented in 900 [RFC7617], therefore implementers are encouraged to prefer stronger 901 authentication methods. Designating the specific methods of 902 authentication and authorization are out-of-scope for the delivery of 903 SET tokens, however this information is provided as a resource to 904 implementers. 906 5. Privacy Considerations 908 If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, JWS MAY be used to 909 provide verification of its authenticity. 911 Event Transmitters SHOULD attempt to specialize Event Streams so that 912 the content is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs 913 of subscribers. 915 When sharing personally identifiable information or information that 916 is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, Event 917 Transmitters and Receivers MUST have the appropriate legal agreements 918 and user consent or terms of service in place. 920 The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally 921 identifiable information. Where possible, Event Transmitters and 922 Receivers SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for 923 example, the passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to 924 already know the subject. 926 6. IANA Considerations 928 There are no IANA considerations. 930 7. References 932 7.1. Normative References 934 [I-D.ietf-secevent-token] 935 Hunt, P., Denniss, W., Ansari, M., and M. Jones, "Security 936 Event Token (SET)", draft-ietf-secevent-token-00 (work in 937 progress), January 2017. 939 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 940 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 941 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 942 . 944 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform 945 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, 946 RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, 947 . 949 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 950 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, 951 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, 952 . 954 [RFC5988] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988, 955 DOI 10.17487/RFC5988, October 2010, 956 . 958 [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and 959 Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity 960 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 961 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer 962 Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March 963 2011, . 965 [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 966 Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March 967 2014, . 969 [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer 970 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, 971 DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, 972 . 974 [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, 975 DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, 976 . 978 [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token 979 (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, 980 . 982 [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, 983 "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer 984 Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security 985 (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 986 2015, . 988 7.2. Informative References 990 [openid-connect-core] 991 NRI, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", Nov 2014. 993 [POSIX.1] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "The 994 Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7", IEEE Std 1003.1, 995 2013 Edition, 2013. 997 [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: 998 Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, 999 . 1001 [RFC6202] Loreto, S., Saint-Andre, P., Salsano, S., and G. Wilkins, 1002 "Known Issues and Best Practices for the Use of Long 1003 Polling and Streaming in Bidirectional HTTP", RFC 6202, 1004 DOI 10.17487/RFC6202, April 2011, 1005 . 1007 [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", 1008 RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, 1009 . 1011 [RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization 1012 Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, 1013 DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012, 1014 . 1016 [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer 1017 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", 1018 RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, 1019 . 1021 [RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer 1022 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, 1023 DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014, 1024 . 1026 [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web 1027 Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 1028 2015, . 1030 [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", 1031 RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, 1032 . 1034 [RFC7521] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland, 1035 "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication 1036 and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521, 1037 May 2015, . 1039 [RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme", 1040 RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015, 1041 . 1043 [saml-core-2.0] 1044 Internet2, "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS 1045 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", March 1046 2005. 1048 Appendix A. Other Streaming Specifications 1050 [[EDITORS NOTE: This section to be removed prior to publication]] 1052 The following pub/sub, queuing, streaming systems were reviewed as 1053 possible solutions or as input to the current draft: 1055 XMPP Events 1057 The WG considered the XMPP events ands its ability to provide a 1058 single messaging solution without the need for both polling and push 1059 modes. The feeling was the size and methodology of XMPP was to far 1060 apart from the current capabilities of the SECEVENTs community which 1061 focuses in on HTTP based service delivery and authorization. 1063 Amazon Simple Notification Service 1065 Simple Notification Service, is a pub/sub messaging product from AWS. 1066 SNS supports a variety of subscriber types: HTTP/HTTPS endpoints, AWS 1067 Lambda functions, email addresses (as JSON or plain text), phone 1068 numbers (via SMS), and AWS SQS standard queues. It doesn't directly 1069 support pull, but subscribers can get the pull model by creating an 1070 SQS queue and subscribing it to the topic. Note that this puts the 1071 cost of pull support back onto the subscriber, just as it is in the 1072 push model. It is not clear that one way is strictly better than the 1073 other; larger, sophisticated developers may be happy to own message 1074 persistence so they can have their own internal delivery guarantees. 1075 The long tail of OIDC clients may not care about that, or may fail to 1076 get it right. Regardless, I think we can learn something from the 1077 Delivery Policies supported by SNS, as well as the delivery controls 1078 that SQS offers (e.g. Visibility Timeout, Dead-Letter Queues). I'm 1079 not suggesting that we need all of these things in the spec, but they 1080 give an idea of what features people have found useful. 1082 Other information: 1084 o API Reference: 1085 http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSSimpleQueueService/latest/ 1086 APIReference/Welcome.html 1088 o Visibility Timeouts: 1089 http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSSimpleQueueService/latest/ 1090 SQSDeveloperGuide/sqs-visibility-timeout.html 1092 Apache Kafka 1094 Apache Kafka is an Apache open source project based upon TCP for 1095 distributed streaming. It prescribes some interesting general 1096 purpose features that seem to extend far beyond the simpler streaming 1097 model SECEVENTs is after. A comment from MS has been that Kafka does 1098 an acknowledge with poll combination event which seems to be a 1099 performance advantage. See: https://kafka.apache.org/intro 1101 Google Pub/Sub 1103 Google Pub Sub system favours a model whereby polling and 1104 acknowledgement of events is done as separate endpoints as separate 1105 functions. 1107 Information: 1109 o Cloud Overview - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/ 1111 o Subscriber Overview - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/docs/ 1112 subscriber 1114 o Subscriber Pull(poll) - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/docs/pull 1116 Appendix B. Acknowledgments 1118 The editors would like to thanks the members of the SCIM WG which 1119 began discussions of provisioning events starting with: draft-hunt- 1120 scim-notify-00 in 2015. 1122 The editor would like to thank the participants in the the SECEVENTS 1123 working group for their support of this specification. 1125 Appendix C. Change Log 1127 Draft 00 - PH - Based on draft-hunt-secevent.distribution with the 1128 following additions: 1130 o Removed Control Plane from specification 1132 o Added new HTTP Polling delivery method 1134 o Added general HTTP security considerations 1136 o Added authentication and authorization 1138 o Revised Verify Event to work with both types of delivery 1140 Draft 01 - PH - Removed Verification section per feedback from 1141 IETF99. 1143 This draft was based on draft-hunt-secevent.distribution revision 1144 history: 1146 o Draft 00 - PH - First Draft based on reduced version of draft- 1147 hunt-idevent-distribution 1149 o Draft 01 - PH - 1151 * Reworked terminology to match new WG Transmitter/Receiver terms 1153 * Reworked sections into Data Plane vs. Control Plane 1155 * Removed method transmission registry in order to simplify the 1156 specification 1158 * Made Create, Update operations optional for Control Plane (Read 1159 is MTI) 1161 o Draft 02 - PH 1163 * Added iss metadata for Event Stream 1165 * Changed to using JWKS_uri for issuer and receiver. 1167 * Control Plane sections moved to draft-hunt-secevent-stream-mgmt 1169 * Added support for delivering multiple events using HTTP POST 1170 polling 1172 Authors' Addresses 1174 Phil Hunt (editor) 1175 Oracle Corporation 1177 Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com 1178 Marius Scurtescu 1179 Google 1181 Email: mscurtescu@google.com 1183 Morteza Ansari 1184 Cisco 1186 Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com 1188 Anthony Nadalin 1189 Microsoft 1191 Email: tonynad@microsoft.com 1193 Annabelle Richard Backman 1194 Amazon 1196 Email: richanna@amazon.com