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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5246 (Obsoleted by RFC 8446) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6125 (Obsoleted by RFC 9525) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 7525 (Obsoleted by RFC 9325) == Outdated reference: A later version (-07) exists of draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-03 Summary: 3 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Security Events Working Group P. Hunt, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft Oracle 4 Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones 5 Expires: November 10, 2018 Microsoft 6 W. Denniss 7 Google 8 M. Ansari 9 Cisco 10 May 9, 2018 12 Security Event Token (SET) 13 draft-ietf-secevent-token-12 15 Abstract 17 This specification defines the Security Event Token (SET) data 18 structure. A SET describes statements of fact from the perspective 19 of an issuer about a subject. These statements of fact represent an 20 event that occurred directly to or about a security subject, for 21 example, a statement about the issuance or revocation of a token on 22 behalf of a subject. This specification is intended to enable 23 representing security- and identity-related events. A SET is a JSON 24 Web Token (JWT), which can be optionally signed and/or encrypted. 25 SETs can be distributed via protocols such as HTTP. 27 Status of This Memo 29 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 30 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 32 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 33 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 34 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 35 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 37 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 38 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 39 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 40 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 42 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 10, 2018. 44 Copyright Notice 46 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 47 document authors. All rights reserved. 49 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 50 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 51 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 52 publication of this document. Please review these documents 53 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 54 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 55 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 56 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 57 described in the Simplified BSD License. 59 Table of Contents 61 1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 63 1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 2. The Security Event Token (SET) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 65 2.1. Illustrative Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 2.1.1. SCIM Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 2.1.2. Logout Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 68 2.1.3. Consent Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 69 2.1.4. RISC Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 70 2.2. Core SET Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 71 2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 72 2.4. Security Event Token Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 73 3. Requirements for SET Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 74 4. Preventing Confusion between SETs and other JWTs . . . . . . 16 75 4.1. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . 16 76 4.2. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . 16 77 4.3. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs . . . . . . 17 78 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 79 5.1. Confidentiality and Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 80 5.2. Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 81 5.3. Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 82 5.4. Timing Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 83 5.5. Preventing Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 84 6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 85 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 86 7.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 20 87 7.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 88 7.2. Structured Syntax Suffix Registration . . . . . . . . . . 21 89 7.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 90 7.3. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 91 7.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 92 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 93 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 94 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 95 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 96 Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 97 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 99 1. Introduction and Overview 101 This specification defines an extensible Security Event Token (SET) 102 data structure, which can be exchanged using protocols such as HTTP. 103 The specification builds on the JSON Web Token (JWT) format [RFC7519] 104 in order to provide a self-contained token that can be optionally 105 signed using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] and/or encrypted 106 using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516]. 108 This specification profiles the use of JWT for the purpose of issuing 109 Security Event Tokens (SETs). This specification defines a base 110 format used by profiling specifications to define actual events and 111 their meanings. This specification uses non-normative example events 112 to demonstrate how events can be constructed. 114 This specification is scoped to security- and identity-related 115 events. While Security Event Tokens may be used for other purposes, 116 the specification only considers security and privacy concerns 117 relevant to identity and personal information. 119 Security events are not commands issued between parties. A SET 120 describes statements of fact from the perspective of an issuer about 121 a subject (e.g., a web resource, token, IP address, the issuer 122 itself). These statements of fact represent a logical event that 123 occurred directly to or about a security subject, for example, a 124 statement about the issuance or revocation of a token on behalf of a 125 subject. A security subject may be permanent (e.g., a user account) 126 or temporary (e.g., an HTTP session) in nature. A state change could 127 describe a direct change of entity state, an implicit change of 128 state, or other higher-level security statements such as: 130 o The creation, modification, removal of a resource. 132 o The resetting or suspension of an account. 134 o The revocation of a security token prior to its expiry. 136 o The logout of a user session. Or, 138 o An indication that a user has been given control of an email 139 identifier that was previously controlled by another user. 141 While subject state changes are often triggered by a user agent or 142 security subsystem, the issuance and transmission of an event may 143 occur asynchronously and in a back channel to the action that caused 144 the change that generated the security event. Subsequently, a SET 145 recipient, having received a SET, validates and interprets the 146 received SET and takes its own independent actions, if any. For 147 example, having been informed of a personal identifier being 148 associated with a different security subject (e.g., an email address 149 is being used by someone else), the SET recipient may choose to 150 ensure that the new user is not granted access to resources 151 associated with the previous user. Or, the SET recipient may not 152 have any relationship with the subject, and no action is taken. 154 While SET recipients will often take actions upon receiving SETs, 155 security events cannot be assumed to be commands or requests. The 156 intent of this specification is to define a syntax for statements of 157 fact that SET recipients may interpret for their own purposes. 159 1.1. Notational Conventions 161 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 162 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 163 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 164 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 165 capitals, as shown here. 167 For purposes of readability, examples are not URL encoded. 168 Implementers MUST percent encode URLs as described in Section 2.1 of 169 [RFC3986]. 171 Throughout this document, all figures MAY contain spaces and extra 172 line-wrapping for readability and space limitations. Similarly, some 173 URIs contained within examples have been shortened for space and 174 readability reasons. 176 1.2. Definitions 178 The following definitions are used with SETs: 180 Security Event Token (SET) 181 A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] conforming to this specification. 183 SET Issuer 184 A service provider that creates SETs to be sent to other service 185 providers known as SET recipients. 187 SET Recipient 188 A SET recipient is an entity that receives SETs through some 189 distribution method. A SET recipient is the same entity referred 190 as a "recipient" in [RFC7519] or "receiver" in related 191 specifications. 193 Subject 194 A SET describes an event or state change that has occurred to a 195 subject. A subject might, for instance, be a principal (e.g., 196 Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519]), a web resource, an entity such as an 197 IP address, or the issuer of the SET. 199 Event Identifier 200 A member name for an element of the JSON object that is the value 201 of the "events" claim in a SET. This member name MUST be a URI. 203 Event Payload 204 A member value for an element of the JSON object that is the value 205 of the "events" claim in a SET. This member value MUST be a JSON 206 object. 208 Profiling Specification 209 A specification that profiles the SET data structure to define one 210 or more specific event types and their associated claims and 211 processing rules. 213 2. The Security Event Token (SET) 215 A SET is a JWT [RFC7519] data structure that represents one or more 216 related aspects of a security event that occurred to a subject. The 217 JWT Claims Set in a SET has the following structure: 219 o The top-level claims in the JWT Claims Set are called the SET 220 "envelope". Some of these claims are present in every SET; others 221 will be specific to particular SET profiles or profile families. 222 Claims in the envelope SHOULD be registered in the "JSON Web Token 223 Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] or be Public Claims or Private 224 Claims, as defined in [RFC7519]. 226 o Envelope claims that are profiled and defined in this 227 specification are used to validate the SET and provide information 228 about the event data included in the SET. The claim "events" 229 contains the event identifiers and event-specific data expressed 230 about the security subject. The envelope MAY include event- 231 specific or profile-specific data. The "events" claim value MUST 232 be a JSON object that contains at least one member. 234 o Each member of the "events" JSON object is a name/value pair. The 235 JSON member name is a URI string value, which is the event 236 identifier, and the corresponding value is a JSON object known as 237 the event "payload". The payload JSON object contains claims that 238 pertain to that event identifier and need not be registered as JWT 239 claims. These claims are defined by the profiling specification 240 that defines the event. An event with no payload claims SHALL be 241 represented as the empty JSON object ("{}"). 243 o When multiple event identifiers are contained in a SET, they 244 represent multiple aspects of the same state transition that 245 occurred to the security subject. They are not intended to be 246 used to aggregate distinct events about the same subject. Beyond 247 this, the interpretation of SETs containing multiple event 248 identifiers is out of scope for this specification; profiling 249 specifications MAY define their own rules regarding their use of 250 SETs containing multiple event identifiers, as described in 251 Section 3. Possible uses of multiple values include, but are not 252 limited to: 254 * Values to provide classification information (e.g., threat type 255 or level). 257 * Additions to existing event representations. 259 * Values used to link potential series of events. 261 * Specific-purpose event URIs used between particular SET issuers 262 and SET recipients. 264 2.1. Illustrative Examples 266 This section illustrates several possible uses of SETs through non- 267 normative examples. 269 2.1.1. SCIM Example 271 The following example shows the JWT Claims Set for a hypothetical 272 SCIM [RFC7644] password reset SET. Such a SET might be used by a 273 receiver as a trigger to reset active user-agent sessions related to 274 the identified user. 276 { 277 "iss": "https://scim.example.com", 278 "iat": 1458496025, 279 "jti": "3d0c3cf797584bd193bd0fb1bd4e7d30", 280 "aud": [ 281 "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754", 282 "https://jhub.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7" 283 ], 284 "sub": "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9", 285 "events": { 286 "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset": 287 { "id": "44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9"}, 288 "https://example.com/scim/event/passwordResetExt": 289 { "resetAttempts": 5} 290 } 291 } 293 Figure 1: Example SCIM Password Reset Event 295 The JWT Claims Set usage consists of: 297 o The "events" claim specifying the hypothetical SCIM URN 298 ("urn:ietf:params:scim:event:passwordReset") for a password reset, 299 and a second value, "https://example.com/scim/event/ 300 passwordResetExt", that is used to provide additional event 301 information such as the current count of resets. 303 o The "iss" claim, denoting the SET issuer. 305 o The "sub" claim, specifying the SCIM resource URI that was 306 affected. 308 o The "aud" claim, specifying the intended audiences for the event. 309 (The syntax of the "aud" claim is defined in Section 4.1.3 of 310 [RFC7519].) 312 The SET contains two event payloads: 314 o The "id" claim represents SCIM's unique identifier for a subject. 316 o The second payload identified by "https://example.com/scim/event/ 317 passwordResetExt") and the payload claim "resetAttempts" conveys 318 the current count of reset attempts. In this example, while the 319 count is a simple factual statement for the issuer, the meaning of 320 the value (a count) is up to the receiver. As an example, such a 321 value might be used by the receiver to infer increasing risk. 323 In this example, the SCIM event indicates that a password has been 324 updated and the current password reset count is 5. Notice that the 325 value for "resetAttempts" is in the event payload of an event used to 326 convey this information. 328 2.1.2. Logout Example 330 Here is another example JWT Claims Set for a security event token, 331 this one for a Logout Token: 333 { 334 "iss": "https://server.example.com", 335 "sub": "248289761001", 336 "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3", 337 "iat": 1471566154, 338 "jti": "bWJq", 339 "sid": "08a5019c-17e1-4977-8f42-65a12843ea02", 340 "events": { 341 "http://schemas.openid.net/event/backchannel-logout": {} 342 } 343 } 345 Figure 2: Example OpenID Back-Channel Logout Event 347 Note that the above SET has an empty JSON object and uses the JWT 348 claims "sub" and "sid" to identify the subject that was logged out. 349 At the time of this writing, this example corresponds to the logout 350 token defined in the OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0 351 [OpenID.BackChannel] specification. 353 2.1.3. Consent Example 354 In the following example JWT Claims Set, a fictional medical service 355 collects consent for medical actions and notifies other parties. The 356 individual for whom consent is identified was originally 357 authenticated via OpenID Connect. In this case, the issuer of the 358 security event is an application rather than the OpenID provider: 360 { 361 "iss": "https://my.med.example.org", 362 "iat": 1458496025, 363 "jti": "fb4e75b5411e4e19b6c0fe87950f7749", 364 "aud": [ 365 "https://rp.example.com" 366 ], 367 "events": { 368 "https://openid.net/heart/specs/consent.html": { 369 "iss": "https://connect.example.com", 370 "sub": "248289761001", 371 "consentUri": [ 372 "https://terms.med.example.org/labdisclosure.html#Agree" 373 ] 374 } 375 } 376 } 378 Figure 3: Example Consent Event 380 In the above example, the attribute "iss" contained within the 381 payload for the event "https://openid.net/heart/specs/consent.html" 382 refers to the issuer of the security subject ("sub") rather than the 383 SET issuer "https://my.med.example.org". They are distinct from the 384 top-level value of "iss", which always refers to the issuer of the 385 event -- a medical consent service that is a relying party to the 386 OpenID Provider. 388 2.1.4. RISC Example 389 The following example JWT Claims Set is for an account disabled 390 event. This example was taken from a working draft of the RISC 391 events specification, where RISC is the OpenID RISC (Risk and 392 Incident Sharing and Coordination) working group [RISC]. The example 393 is subject to change. 395 { 396 "iss": "https://idp.example.com/", 397 "jti": "756E69717565206964656E746966696572", 398 "iat": 1508184845, 399 "aud": "636C69656E745F6964", 400 "events": { 401 "http://schemas.openid.net/secevent/risc/event-type/\ 402 account-disabled": { 403 "subject": { 404 "subject_type": "iss-sub", 405 "iss": "https://idp.example.com/", 406 "sub": "7375626A656374" 407 }, 408 "reason": "hijacking", 409 "cause-time": 1508012752 410 } 411 } 412 } 414 Figure 4: Example RISC Event 416 Notice that parameters to the event are included in the event 417 payload, in this case, the "reason" and "cause-time" values. The 418 subject of the event is identified using the "subject" payload value, 419 which itself is a JSON object. 421 2.2. Core SET Claims 423 The following claims from [RFC7519] are profiled for use in SETs: 425 "iss" (Issuer) Claim 426 As defined by Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a 427 string identifying the service provider publishing the SET (the 428 issuer). In some cases, the issuer of the SET will not be the 429 issuer associated with the security subject of the SET. 430 Therefore, implementers cannot assume that the issuers are the 431 same unless the profiling specification specifies that they are 432 for SETs conforming to that profile. This claim is REQUIRED. 434 "iat" (Issued At) Claim 435 As defined by Section 4.1.6 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a 436 value representing when the SET was issued. This claim is 437 REQUIRED. 439 "jti" (JWT ID) Claim 440 As defined by Section 4.1.7 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a 441 unique identifier for the SET. The identifier MUST be unique 442 within a particular event feed and MAY be used by clients to track 443 whether a particular SET has already been received. This claim is 444 REQUIRED. 446 "aud" (Audience) Claim 447 As defined by Section 4.1.3 of [RFC7519], this claim contains one 448 or more audience identifiers for the SET. This claim is 449 RECOMMENDED. 451 "sub" (Subject) Claim 452 As defined by Section 4.1.2 of [RFC7519], this claim contains a 453 StringOrURI value representing the principal that is the subject 454 of the SET. This is usually the entity whose "state" was changed. 455 For example: 457 * an IP Address was added to a black list; 459 * a URI representing a user resource that was modified; or, 461 * a token identifier (e.g. "jti") for a revoked token. 463 If used, the profiling specification MUST define the content and 464 format semantics for the value. This claim is OPTIONAL, as the 465 principal for any given profile may already be identified without 466 the inclusion of a subject claim. Note that some SET profiles MAY 467 choose to convey event subject information in the event payload 468 (either using the "sub" member name or another name), particularly 469 if the subject information is relative to issuer information that 470 is also conveyed in the event payload, which may be the case for 471 some identity SET profiles. 473 "exp" (Expiration Time) Claim 474 As defined by Section 4.1.4 of [RFC7519], this claim is the time 475 after which the JWT MUST NOT be accepted for processing. In the 476 context of a SET however, this notion does not typically apply, 477 since a SET represents something that has already occurred and is 478 historical in nature. Therefore, its use is NOT RECOMMENDED. 479 (Also, see Section 4.1 for additional reasons not to use the "exp" 480 claim in some SET use cases.) 482 The following new claims are defined by this specification: 484 "events" (Security Events) Claim 485 This claim contains a set of event statements that each provide 486 information describing a single logical event that has occurred 487 about a security subject (e.g., a state change to the subject). 488 Multiple event identifiers with the same value MUST NOT be used. 489 The "events" claim MUST NOT be used to express multiple 490 independent logical events. 492 The value of the "events" claim is a JSON object whose members are 493 name/value pairs whose names are URIs identifying the event 494 statements being expressed. Event identifiers SHOULD be stable 495 values (e.g., a permanent URL for an event specification). For 496 each name present, the corresponding value MUST be a JSON object. 497 The JSON object MAY be an empty object ("{}"), or it MAY be a JSON 498 object containing data described by the profiling specification. 500 "txn" (Transaction Identifier) Claim 501 An OPTIONAL string value that represents a unique transaction 502 identifier. In cases in which multiple related JWTs are issued, 503 the transaction identifier claim can be used to correlate these 504 related JWTs. Note that this claim can be used in JWTs that are 505 SETs and also in JWTs using non-SET profiles. 507 "toe" (Time of Event) Claim 508 A value that represents the date and time at which the event 509 occurred. This value is a NumericDate (see Section 2 of 510 [RFC7519]). By omitting this claim, the issuer indicates that 511 they are not sharing an event time with the recipient. (Note that 512 in some use cases, the represented time might be approximate; 513 statements about the accuracy of this field MAY be made by 514 profiling specifications.) This claim is OPTIONAL. 516 2.3. Explicit Typing of SETs 518 This specification registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media 519 type, which can be used to indicate that the content is a SET. SETs 520 MAY include this media type in the "typ" header parameter of the JWT 521 representing the SET to explicitly declare that the JWT is a SET. 522 This MUST be included if the SET could be used in an application 523 context in which it could be confused with other kinds of JWTs. 525 Per the definition of "typ" in Section 4.1.9 of [RFC7515], it is 526 RECOMMENDED that the "application/" prefix be omitted. Therefore, 527 the "typ" value used SHOULD be "secevent+jwt". 529 2.4. Security Event Token Construction 531 This section describes how to construct a SET. 533 The following is an example JWT Claims Set for a hypothetical SCIM 534 SET (which has been formatted for readability): 536 { 537 "iss": "https://scim.example.com", 538 "iat": 1458496404, 539 "jti": "4d3559ec67504aaba65d40b0363faad8", 540 "aud": [ 541 "https://scim.example.com/Feeds/98d52461fa5bbc879593b7754", 542 "https://scim.example.com/Feeds/5d7604516b1d08641d7676ee7" 543 ], 545 "events": { 546 "urn:ietf:params:scim:event:create": { 547 "ref": 548 "https://scim.example.com/Users/44f6142df96bd6ab61e7521d9", 549 "attributes": ["id", "name", "userName", "password", "emails"] 550 } 551 } 552 } 554 Figure 5: Example Event Claims 556 The JSON Claims Set is encoded per [RFC7519]. 558 In this example, the SCIM SET claims are encoded in an unsecured JWT. 559 The JOSE Header for this example is: 561 {"typ":"secevent+jwt","alg":"none"} 563 Base64url encoding (see Section 2 of [RFC7515]) of the octets of the 564 UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation of the JOSE Header yields: 566 eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0 567 The above example JWT Claims Set is encoded as follows: 569 eyJqdGkiOiI0ZDM1NTllYzY3NTA0YWFiYTY1ZDQwYjAzNjNmYWFkOCIsImlhdCI6MTQ1 570 ODQ5NjQwNCwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiYXVkIjpbImh0 571 dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M2I3 572 NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4 573 NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV2ZW50 574 OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcnMvNDRm 575 NjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuYW1lIiwi 576 dXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19 578 The encoded JWS signature is the empty string. Concatenating the 579 parts yields this complete SET: 581 eyJ0eXAiOiJzZWNldmVudCtqd3QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0. 582 eyJqdGkiOiI0ZDM1NTllYzY3NTA0YWFiYTY1ZDQwYjAzNjNmYWFkOCIsImlhdCI6MTQ1 583 ODQ5NjQwNCwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwiYXVkIjpbImh0 584 dHBzOi8vc2NpbS5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9GZWVkcy85OGQ1MjQ2MWZhNWJiYzg3OTU5M2I3 585 NzU0IiwiaHR0cHM6Ly9zY2ltLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tL0ZlZWRzLzVkNzYwNDUxNmIxZDA4 586 NjQxZDc2NzZlZTciXSwiZXZlbnRzIjp7InVybjppZXRmOnBhcmFtczpzY2ltOmV2ZW50 587 OmNyZWF0ZSI6eyJyZWYiOiJodHRwczovL3NjaW0uZXhhbXBsZS5jb20vVXNlcnMvNDRm 588 NjE0MmRmOTZiZDZhYjYxZTc1MjFkOSIsImF0dHJpYnV0ZXMiOlsiaWQiLCJuYW1lIiwi 589 dXNlck5hbWUiLCJwYXNzd29yZCIsImVtYWlscyJdfX19. 591 Figure 6: Example Unsecured Security Event Token 593 For the purpose of having a simpler example in Figure 6, an unsecured 594 token is shown. When SETs are not signed or encrypted, other 595 mechanisms such as TLS MUST be employed to provide integrity 596 protection, confidentiality, and issuer authenticity, as needed by 597 the application. 599 When validation (i.e., auditing), or additional transmission security 600 is required, JWS signing and/or JWE encryption MAY be used. To 601 create and or validate a signed and/or encrypted SET, follow the 602 instructions in Section 7 of [RFC7519]. 604 3. Requirements for SET Profiles 606 Profiling specifications of this specification define actual SETs to 607 be used in particular use cases. These profiling specifications 608 define the syntax and semantics of SETs conforming to that SET 609 profile and rules for validating those SETs. Profiling 610 specifications SHOULD define syntax, semantics, subject 611 identification, and validation. 613 Syntax 614 The syntax of the SETs defined, including: 616 Top-Level Claims 617 Claims and values placed at the JWT Claims Set. Examples are 618 claims defined by the JWT specification (see [RFC7519]), the 619 SET specification, and by the profiling specification. 621 Event Payload 622 The JSON data structure contents and format, containing event- 623 specific information, if any (see Section 1.2). 625 Semantics 626 Defining the semantics of the SET contents for SETs utilizing the 627 profile is equally important. Possibly most important is defining 628 the procedures used to validate the SET issuer and to obtain the 629 keys controlled by the issuer that were used for cryptographic 630 operations used in the JWT representing the SET. For instance, 631 some profiles may define an algorithm for retrieving the SET 632 issuer's keys that uses the "iss" claim value as its input. 633 Likewise, if the profile allows (or requires) that the JWT be 634 unsecured, the means by which the integrity of the JWT is ensured 635 MUST be specified. 637 Subject Identification 638 Profiling specifications MUST define how the event subject is 639 identified in the SET, as well as how to differentiate between the 640 event subject's issuer and the SET issuer, if applicable. It is 641 NOT RECOMMENDED for profiling specifications to use the "sub" 642 claim in cases in which the subject is not globally unique and has 643 a different issuer from the SET itself. 645 Validation 646 Profiling specifications MUST clearly specify the steps that a 647 recipient of a SET utilizing that profile MUST perform to validate 648 that the SET is both syntactically and semantically valid. 650 Among the syntax and semantics of SETs that a profiling 651 specification may define is whether the value of the "events" 652 claim may contain multiple members, and what processing 653 instructions are employed in the single- and multiple-valued cases 654 for SETs conforming to that profile. Many valid choices are 655 possible. For instance, some profiles might allow multiple event 656 identifiers to be present and specify that any that are not 657 understood by recipients be ignored, thus enabling extensibility. 658 Other profiles might allow multiple event identifiers to be 659 present but require that all be understood if the SET is to be 660 accepted. Some profiles might require that only a single value be 661 present. All such choices are within the scope of profiling 662 specifications to define. 664 4. Preventing Confusion between SETs and other JWTs 666 Because [RFC7519] states that "all claims that are not understood by 667 implementations MUST be ignored", there is a consideration that a SET 668 might be confused with another kind of JWT from the same issuer. 669 Unless this confusion is prevented, this might enable an attacker who 670 possesses a SET to use it in a context in which another kind of JWT 671 is expected, or vice-versa. This section presents concrete 672 techniques for preventing confusion between SETs and several other 673 specific kinds of JWTs, as well as generic techniques for preventing 674 possible confusion between SETs and other kinds of JWTs. 676 4.1. Distinguishing SETs from ID Tokens 678 A SET might be confused with ID Token [OpenID.Core] if a SET is 679 mistakenly or maliciously used in a context requiring an ID Token. 680 If a SET could otherwise be interpreted as a valid ID Token (because 681 it includes the required claims for an ID Token and valid issuer and 682 audience claim values for an ID Token) then that SET profile MUST 683 require that the "exp" claim not be present in the SET. Because 684 "exp" is a required claim in ID Tokens, valid ID Token 685 implementations will reject such a SET if presented as if it were an 686 ID Token. 688 Excluding "exp" from SETs that could otherwise be confused with ID 689 Tokens is actually defense in depth. In any OpenID Connect contexts 690 in which an attacker could attempt to substitute a SET for an ID 691 Token, the SET would actually already be rejected as an ID Token 692 because it would not contain the correct "nonce" claim value for the 693 ID Token to be accepted in contexts for which substitution is 694 possible. 696 Note that the use of explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3, 697 will not achieve disambiguation between ID Tokens and SETs, as the ID 698 Token validation rules do not use the "typ" header parameter value. 700 4.2. Distinguishing SETs from Access Tokens 702 OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] defines access tokens as being opaque. 703 Nonetheless, some implementations implement access tokens as JWTs. 704 Because the structure of these JWTs is implementation-specific, 705 ensuring that a SET cannot be confused with such an access token is 706 therefore likewise, in general, implementation specific. 707 Nonetheless, it is recommended that SET profiles employ the following 708 strategies to prevent possible substitutions of SETs for access 709 tokens in contexts in which that might be possible: 711 o Prohibit use of the "exp" claim, as is done to prevent ID Token 712 confusion. 714 o Where possible, use a separate "aud" claim value to distinguish 715 between the SET recipient and the protected resource that is the 716 audience of an access token. 718 o Modify access token validation systems to check for the presence 719 of the "events" claim as a means to detect security event tokens. 720 This is particularly useful if the same endpoint may receive both 721 types of tokens. 723 o Employ explicit typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify 724 access token validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter 725 value. 727 4.3. Distinguishing SETs from other kinds of JWTs 729 JWTs are now being used in application areas beyond the identity 730 applications in which they first appeared. For instance, the 731 "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to 732 Indicate Received Realm" [RFC8055] and "Personal Assertion Token 733 (PASSporT)" [RFC8225] specifications both define JWT profiles that 734 use mostly or completely different sets of claims than are used by ID 735 Tokens. If it would otherwise be possible for an attacker to 736 substitute a SET for one of these (or other) kinds of JWTs, then the 737 SET profile must be defined in such a way that any substituted SET 738 will result in its rejection when validated as the intended kind of 739 JWT. 741 The most direct way to prevent confusion is to employ explicit 742 typing, as described in Section 2.3, and modify applicable token 743 validation systems to use the "typ" header parameter value. This 744 approach can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to 745 existing systems. 747 Another way to ensure that a SET is not confused with another kind of 748 JWT is to have the JWT validation logic reject JWTs containing an 749 "events" claim unless the JWT is intended to be a SET. This approach 750 can be employed for new systems but may not be applicable to existing 751 systems. Validating that the JWT has an "events" claim will be 752 effective in preventing attackers from passing other kinds of JWTs 753 off as SETs. 755 For many use cases, the simplest way to prevent substitution is 756 requiring that the SET not include claims that are required for the 757 kind of JWT that might be the target of an attack. For example, for 759 [RFC8055], the "sip_callid" claim could be omitted and for [RFC8225], 760 the "orig" claim could be omitted. 762 In many contexts, simple measures such as these will accomplish the 763 task, should confusion otherwise even be possible. Note that this 764 topic is being explored in a more general fashion in JSON Web Token 765 Best Current Practices [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp]. The proposed best 766 practices in that draft may also be applicable for particular SET 767 profiles and use cases. 769 5. Security Considerations 771 5.1. Confidentiality and Integrity 773 SETs may contain sensitive information. Therefore, methods for 774 distribution of events SHOULD require the use of a transport-layer 775 security mechanism when distributing events. Parties MUST support 776 TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or a higher version and MAY support additional 777 transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When 778 using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS server certificate check, 779 per [RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations for TLS can be 780 found in "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525]. 782 Security events distributed through third parties or that carry 783 personally identifiable information MUST be encrypted using JWE 784 [RFC7516] or secured for confidentiality by other means. 786 Unless integrity of the JWT is ensured by other means, it MUST be 787 signed using JWS [RFC7515] by an issuer that is trusted to do so for 788 the use case so that the SET can be authenticated and validated by 789 the SET recipient. 791 5.2. Delivery 793 This specification does not define a delivery mechanism for SETs. In 794 addition to confidentiality and integrity (discussed above), 795 implementers and profiling specifications must consider the 796 consequences of delivery mechanisms that are not secure and/or not 797 assured. For example, while a SET may be end-to-end secured using 798 JWE encrypted SETs, without (mutual) TLS, there is no assurance that 799 the correct endpoint received the SET and that it could be 800 successfully processed. 802 5.3. Sequencing 804 This specification defines no means of ordering multiple SETs in a 805 sequence. Depending on the type and nature of the events represented 806 by SETs, order may or may not matter. For example, in provisioning, 807 event order is critical -- an object cannot be modified before it is 808 created. In other SET types, such as a token revocation, the order 809 of SETs for revoked tokens does not matter. If, however, the event 810 conveys a logged in or logged out status for a user subject, then 811 order becomes important. 813 Profiling specifications and implementers SHOULD take caution when 814 using timestamps such as "iat" to define order. Distributed systems 815 will have some amount of clock skew. Thus, time by itself will not 816 guarantee order. 818 Specifications profiling SET SHOULD define a mechanism for detecting 819 order or sequence of events when the order matters. For example, the 820 "txn" claim could contain an ordered value (e.g., a counter) that the 821 issuer includes, although just as for timestamps, ensuring such 822 ordering can be difficult in distributed systems. 824 5.4. Timing Issues 826 When SETs are delivered asynchronously and/or out-of-band with 827 respect to the original action that incurred the security event, it 828 is important to consider that a SET might be delivered to a SET 829 recipient in advance of or behind the process that caused the event. 830 For example, a user having been required to log out and then log back 831 in again, may cause a "token revoked" SET to be issued, typically 832 causing the receiver to reset all active sessions at the receiver 833 that are related to that user. If revocation SET arrives at the same 834 time as the user agent re-logs in, timing could cause problems by 835 erroneously treating the new user session as logged out. Profiling 836 specifications SHOULD be careful to consider both SET expression and 837 timing issues. For example, it might be more appropriate to revoke a 838 specific session or identity token rather than a general logout 839 statement about a "user". Alternatively, profiling specifications 840 could use timestamps that allow new sessions to be started 841 immediately after a stated logout event time. 843 5.5. Preventing Confusion 845 Also, see Section 4 above for both additional security considerations 846 and normative text on preventing SETs from being confused with other 847 kinds of JWTs. 849 6. Privacy Considerations 851 If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, the signature can 852 be used to provide verification of its authenticity. 854 SET issuers SHOULD attempt to specialize SETs so that their content 855 is targeted to the specific business and protocol needs of the 856 intended SET recipients. 858 When sharing personally identifiable information or information that 859 is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET issuers 860 and recipients should have the appropriate legal agreements and user 861 consent and/or terms of service in place. 863 The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally 864 identifiable information. Where possible, SET issuers and recipients 865 SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for example, the 866 passing of a salted hash value that requires the SET recipient to 867 know the subject. 869 In some cases, it may be possible for a SET recipient to correlate 870 different events and thereby gain information about a subject that 871 the SET issuer did not intend to share. For example, a SET recipient 872 might be able to use "iat" values or highly precise "toe" values to 873 determine that two otherwise un-relatable events actually relate to 874 the same real-world event. The union of information from both events 875 could allow a SET recipient to de-anonymize data or recognize that 876 unrelated identifiers relate to the same individual. SET issuers 877 SHOULD take steps to minimize the chance of event correlation, when 878 such correlation would constitute a privacy violation. For instance, 879 they could use approximate values for the "toe" claim or arbitrarily 880 delay SET issuance, where such delay can be tolerated. 882 7. IANA Considerations 884 7.1. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 886 This specification registers the "events", "toe", and "txn" claims in 887 the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry [IANA.JWT.Claims] 888 established by [RFC7519]. 890 7.1.1. Registry Contents 892 o Claim Name: "events" 893 o Claim Description: Security Events 894 o Change Controller: IESG 895 o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] 897 o Claim Name: "toe" 898 o Claim Description: Time of Event 899 o Change Controller: IESG 900 o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] 901 o Claim Name: "txn" 902 o Claim Description: Transaction Identifier 903 o Change Controller: IESG 904 o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2 of [[ this specification ]] 906 7.2. Structured Syntax Suffix Registration 908 This section registers the "+jwt" structured syntax suffix [RFC6838] 909 in the "Structured Syntax Suffix" registry [IANA.StructuredSuffix] in 910 the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that 911 the media type is encoded as a JWT. 913 7.2.1. Registry Contents 915 o Name: JSON Web Token (JWT) 916 o +suffix: +jwt 917 o References: Section 3 of [RFC7519] 918 o Encoding considerations: binary; JWT values are encoded as a 919 series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty 920 string) separated by period ('.') characters. 921 o Interoperability considerations: n/a 922 o Fragment identifier considerations: 923 The syntax and semantics of fragment identifiers specified for 924 +jwt SHOULD be as specified for "application/jwt". (At 925 publication of this document, there is no fragment identification 926 syntax defined for "application/jwt".) 928 The syntax and semantics for fragment identifiers for a specific 929 "xxx/yyy+jwt" SHOULD be processed as follows: 931 For cases defined in +jwt, where the fragment identifier resolves 932 per the +jwt rules, then process as specified in +jwt. 934 For cases defined in +jwt, where the fragment identifier does not 935 resolve per the +jwt rules, then process as specified in "xxx/ 936 yyy+jwt". 938 For cases not defined in +jwt, then process as specified in "xxx/ 939 yyy+jwt". 940 o Security considerations: See Section 11 of [RFC7519]. 941 o Contact: 942 Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com 943 o Author/Change controller: 944 Security Events Working Group. 945 The IESG has change control over this registration. 947 7.3. Media Type Registration 949 7.3.1. Registry Contents 951 This section registers the "application/secevent+jwt" media type 952 [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the 953 manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the 954 content is a SET. 956 o Type name: application 957 o Subtype name: secevent+jwt 958 o Required parameters: n/a 959 o Optional parameters: n/a 960 o Encoding considerations: binary; A SET is a JWT; JWT values are 961 encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may 962 be the empty string) separated by period ('.') characters. 963 o Security considerations: See Section 5 of [[ this specification ]] 964 o Interoperability considerations: n/a 965 o Published specification: Section 2.3 of [[ this specification ]] 966 o Applications that use this media type: Applications that exchange 967 SETs 968 o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a 969 o Additional information: 971 Magic number(s): n/a 972 File extension(s): n/a 973 Macintosh file type code(s): n/a 975 o Person & email address to contact for further information: 976 Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com 977 o Intended usage: COMMON 978 o Restrictions on usage: none 979 o Author: Michael B. Jones, mbj@microsoft.com 980 o Change controller: IESG 981 o Provisional registration? No 983 8. References 985 8.1. Normative References 987 [IANA.JWT.Claims] 988 IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims", 989 . 991 [IANA.MediaTypes] 992 IANA, "Media Types", 993 . 995 [IANA.StructuredSuffix] 996 IANA, "Structured Syntax Suffix", 997 . 1000 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 1001 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 1002 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 1003 . 1005 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 1006 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 1007 2003, . 1009 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform 1010 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, 1011 RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, 1012 . 1014 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 1015 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, 1016 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, 1017 . 1019 [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and 1020 Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity 1021 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 1022 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer 1023 Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March 1024 2011, . 1026 [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", 1027 RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, 1028 . 1030 [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web 1031 Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 1032 2015, . 1034 [RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", 1035 RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015, 1036 . 1038 [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token 1039 (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, 1040 . 1042 [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, 1043 "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer 1044 Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security 1045 (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May 1046 2015, . 1048 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 1049 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 1050 May 2017, . 1052 8.2. Informative References 1054 [I-D.ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp] 1055 Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best 1056 Current Practices", draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bcp-03 (work in 1057 progress), May 2018. 1059 [OpenID.BackChannel] 1060 Jones, M. and J. Bradley, "OpenID Connect Back-Channel 1061 Logout 1.0", January 2017, . 1064 [OpenID.Core] 1065 Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and 1066 C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014, 1067 . 1069 [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail 1070 Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, 1071 DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, 1072 . 1074 [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type 1075 Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, 1076 RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, 1077 . 1079 [RFC7644] Hunt, P., Ed., Grizzle, K., Ansari, M., Wahlstroem, E., 1080 and C. Mortimore, "System for Cross-domain Identity 1081 Management: Protocol", RFC 7644, DOI 10.17487/RFC7644, 1082 September 2015, . 1084 [RFC8055] Holmberg, C. and Y. Jiang, "Session Initiation Protocol 1085 (SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to Indicate Received 1086 Realm", RFC 8055, DOI 10.17487/RFC8055, January 2017, 1087 . 1089 [RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion 1090 Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018, 1091 . 1093 [RISC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Risk and Incident Sharing and 1094 Coordination (RISC) Working Group", 1095 . 1097 Appendix A. Acknowledgments 1099 The editors would like to thank the members of the IETF SCIM working 1100 group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with 1101 draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015. The editors would like to thank 1102 the participants in the IETF id-event mailing list, the Security 1103 Events working group, and related working groups for their 1104 contributions to this specification. The specification incorporates 1105 suggestions made by many people, including Annabelle Backman, John 1106 Bradley, Alissa Cooper, Ned Freed, Dick Hardt, Russ Housley, Benjamin 1107 Kaduk, Mark Lizar, Alexey Melnikov, Andrew Nash, Eric Rescorla, Adam 1108 Roach, Justin Richer, Nat Sakimura, Marius Scurtescu, and Yaron 1109 Sheffer. 1111 Appendix B. Change Log 1113 [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] 1115 From the original draft-hunt-idevent-token: 1117 Draft 01 - PH - Renamed eventUris to events 1119 Draft 00 - PH - First Draft 1121 Draft 01 - PH - Fixed some alignment issues with JWT. Remove event 1122 type attribute. 1124 Draft 02 - PH - Renamed to Security Events, removed questions, 1125 clarified examples and intro text, and added security and privacy 1126 section. 1128 Draft 03 - PH 1130 General edit corrections from Sarah Squire 1132 Changed "event" term to "SET" 1134 Corrected author organization for William Denniss to Google 1135 Changed definition of SET to be 2 parts, an envelope and 1 or more 1136 payloads. 1138 Clarified that the intent is to express a single event with 1139 optional extensions only. 1141 - mbj - Registered "events" claim, and proof-reading corrections. 1143 Draft 04 - PH - 1145 o Re-added the "sub" claim with clarifications that any SET type may 1146 use it. 1148 o Added additional clarification on the use of envelope vs. payload 1149 attributes 1151 o Added security consideration for event timing. 1153 o Switched use of "attribute" to "claim" for consistency. 1155 o Revised examples to put "sub" claim back in the top level. 1157 o Added clarification that SETs typically do not use "exp". 1159 o Added security consideration for distinguishing Access Tokens and 1160 SETs. 1162 Draft 05 - PH - Fixed find/replace error that resulted in claim being 1163 spelled claimc 1165 Draft 06 - PH - 1167 o Corrected typos 1169 o New txn claim 1171 o New security considerations Sequencing and Timing Issues 1173 Draft 07 - 1175 o PH - Moved payload objects to be values of event URI attributes, 1176 per discussion. 1178 o mbj - Applied terminology consistency and grammar cleanups. 1180 Draft 08 - PH - 1182 o Added clarification to status of examples 1183 o Changed from primary vs. extension to state that multiple events 1184 may be expressed, some of which may or may not be considered 1185 extensions of others (which is for the subscriber or profiling 1186 specifications to determine). 1188 o Other editorial changes suggested by Yaron 1189 From draft-ietf-secevent-token: 1191 Draft 00 - PH - First WG Draft based on draft-hunt-idevent-token 1193 Draft 01 - PH - Changes as follows: 1195 o Changed terminology away from pub-sub to transmitter/receiver 1196 based on WG feedback 1198 o Cleaned up/removed some text about extensions (now only used as 1199 example) 1201 o Clarify purpose of spec vs. future profiling specs that define 1202 actual events 1204 Draft 02 - Changes are as follows: 1206 o mbj - Added the Requirements for SET Profiles section. 1208 o mbj - Expanded the Security Considerations section to describe how 1209 to prevent confusion of SETs with ID Tokens, access tokens, and 1210 other kinds of JWTs. 1212 o mbj - Registered the "application/secevent+jwt" media type and 1213 defined how to use it for explicit typing of SETs. 1215 o mbj - Clarified the misleading statement that used to say that a 1216 SET conveys a single security event. 1218 o mbj - Added a note explicitly acknowledging that some SET profiles 1219 may choose to convey event subject information in the event 1220 payload. 1222 o PH - Corrected encoded claim example on page 10. 1224 o mbj - Applied grammar corrections. 1226 Draft 03 - Changes are as follows: 1228 o pjh - Corrected old "subscriber" to "Event Receiver". Added 1229 clarification in definition that Event Receiver is the same as JWT 1230 recipient. 1232 o pjh - Added definition for "toe" (and IANA registration). 1234 o pjh - Removed "nbf" claim. 1236 o pjh - Figure 3, moved "sub" to the events payload next to "iss". 1238 o pjh - Clarified the use of "nonce" in contexts where substitution 1239 is possible. 1241 o mbj - Addressed WGLC comments by Nat Sakimura. 1243 o mbj - Addressed WGLC comments by Annabelle Backman. 1245 o mbj - Addressed WGLC comments by Marius Scurtescu. 1247 Draft 04 - mbj - Changes were as follows: 1249 o Clarified that all "events" values must represent aspects of the 1250 same state change that occurred to the subject -- not an 1251 aggregation of unrelated events about the subject. 1253 o Removed ambiguities about the roles of multiple "events" values 1254 and the responsibilities of profiling specifications for defining 1255 how and when they are used. 1257 o Corrected places where the term JWT was used when what was 1258 actually being discussed was the JWT Claims Set. 1260 o Addressed terminology inconsistencies. In particular, 1261 standardized on using the term "issuer" to align with JWT 1262 terminology and the "iss" claim. Previously the term 1263 "transmitter" was sometimes used and "issuer" was sometimes used. 1264 Likewise, standardized on using the term "recipient" instead of 1265 "receiver" for the same reasons. 1267 o Added a RISC event example, courtesy of Marius Scurtescu. 1269 o Applied wording clarifications suggested by Annabelle Backman and 1270 Yaron Sheffer. 1272 o Applied numerous grammar, syntax, and formatting corrections. 1274 Draft 05 - mbj - Changes were as follows: 1276 o Simplified the definitions of the "iat" and "toe" claims in ways 1277 suggested by Annabelle Backman. 1279 o Added privacy considerations text suggested by Annabelle Backman. 1281 o Updated the RISC event example, courtesy of Marius Scurtescu. 1283 o Reordered the claim definitions to place the required claims 1284 first. 1286 o Changed to using the RFC 8174 boilerplate instead of the RFC 2119 1287 boilerplate. 1289 Draft 06 - mbj - Changes were as follows: 1291 o Changed "when the event was issued" to "when the SET was issued" 1292 in the "iat" description, as suggested by Annabelle Backman. 1294 o Applied editorial improvements that improve the consistency of the 1295 specification that were suggested by Annabelle Backman, Marius 1296 Scurtescu, and Yaron Sheffer. 1298 Draft 07 - PH - Text refinement to Section 3 proposed by Annabelle 1299 Backman post WGLC 1301 Draft 08 - mbj - Changes were as follows: 1303 o Incorporated wording improvements resulting from Russ Housley's 1304 SecDir comments. 1306 o Acknowledged individuals who made significant contributions. 1308 Draft 09 - pjh/mbj - Changes addressing AD review comments by 1309 Benjamin Kaduk 1311 Draft 10 - pjh/mbj - Changes were as follows: 1313 o Incorporated wording improvements resulting from Russ Housley's 1314 additional SecDir comments. 1316 o Registered +jwt structured syntax suffix. 1318 Draft 11 - pjh/mbj - Incorporated feedback from Security Area 1319 Director Eric Rescorla and IANA Designated Expert Ned Freed. 1321 o Clarified "iss" claim language about the SET issuer versus the 1322 security subject issuer. 1324 o Changed a "SHOULD" to a "MUST" in the "sub" claim description to 1325 be consistent with the Requirements for SET Profiles section. 1327 o Described the use of the "events" claim to prevent attackers from 1328 passing off other kinds of JWTs as SETs. 1330 o Stated that SETs are to be signed by an issuer that is trusted to 1331 do so for the use case. 1333 o Added quotes in the phrase '"token revoked" SET to be issued' in 1334 the Timing Issues section. 1336 o Added section number references to the media type and media type 1337 suffix registrations. 1339 o Changed the encodings of the media type and media type suffix 1340 registrations to binary (since no line breaks are allowed). 1342 o Replaced a "TBD" in the media type registration with descriptive 1343 text. 1345 o Acknowledged Eric Rescorla and Ned Freed. 1347 Draft 12 - pjh/mbj - Incorporated feedback from Adam Roach, Alexey 1348 Melnikov, and Alissa Cooper. 1350 o Removed unused references to RFC 7009 and RFC 7517. 1352 o Corrected name of RFC 8055 in Section 4.3 to "Session Initiation 1353 Protocol (SIP) Via Header Field Parameter to Indicate Received 1354 Realm". 1356 o Added normative references for base64url and UTF-8. 1358 o Section 5.1 - Changed SHOULD to MUST in "personally identifiable 1359 information MUST be encrypted using JWE [RFC7516] or ...". 1361 o Section 5.2 - Changed "MUST consider" to "must consider". 1363 Authors' Addresses 1365 Phil Hunt (editor) 1366 Oracle Corporation 1368 Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com 1370 Michael B. Jones 1371 Microsoft 1373 Email: mbj@microsoft.com 1374 URI: http://self-issued.info/ 1375 William Denniss 1376 Google 1378 Email: wdenniss@google.com 1380 Morteza Ansari 1381 Cisco 1383 Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com