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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group S. Turner 3 Internet-Draft sn3rd 4 Updates: 7935 (if approved) O. Borchert 5 Intended status: Standards Track NIST 6 Expires: September 7, 2017 March 6, 2017 8 BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature Formats 9 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-17 11 Abstract 13 This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters, 14 asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key size and signature format used 15 in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security). This document updates 16 the Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource 17 Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 7935). 19 This document also includes example BGPsec Update messages as well 20 as the private keys used to generate the messages and the 21 certificates necessary to validate those signatures. 23 Status of this Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 Copyright Notice 40 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 41 document authors. All rights reserved. 43 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 44 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 45 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 46 publication of this document. Please review these documents 47 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 48 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 49 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 50 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 51 described in the Simplified BSD License. 53 Table of Contents 55 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 56 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 2. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 3.1. Public Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 3.2. Private Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 4. Signature Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 5. Additional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 63 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 65 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 69 Appendix A Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 70 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 72 1. Introduction 74 This document specifies: 75 o the digital signature algorithm and parameters; 76 o the hash algorithm and parameters; 77 o the public and private key formats; and, 78 o the signature format 79 used by Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification 80 Authorities (CA), and BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security) 81 speakers (i.e., routers). CAs use these algorithms when processing 82 requests for BGPsec Router Certificates [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki- 83 profiles]. Examples when BGPsec routers use these algorithms include 84 requesting BGPsec certificates [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles], signing 85 BGPsec Update messages [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], and verifying 86 BGPsec Update messages [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. 88 This document updates [RFC7935] to add support for a) a different 89 algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are issued only by 90 BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for 91 BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPsec 92 signature algorithm; and, c) a different signature format for BGPsec 93 signatures, which is needed for the specified BGPsec signature 94 algorithm. The BGPsec certificate are differentiated from other RPKI 95 certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage defined in 96 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]. BGPsec uses a different algorithm as 97 compared to the rest of the RPKI to minimize the size of the protocol 98 exchanged between routers [RFC5480]. 100 Appendix A contains example BGPsec Update messages as well as the 101 private keys used to generate the signatures and the certificates 102 necessary to validate those signatures. 104 1.1. Terminology 106 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 107 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 108 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 109 [RFC2119]. 111 2. Algorithms 113 The algorithms used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec 114 Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 2 of 115 [RFC7935]. This section addresses BGPsec algorithms, for example 116 these algorithms are used by BGPsec routers to request BGPsec 117 certificates, by RPKI CAs to verify BGPsec certification requests, by 118 BGPsec routers to generate BGPsec Update messages, and by BGPsec 119 routers to verify BGPsec Update message: 121 o The signature algorithm used MUST be the Elliptic Curve Digital 122 Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-256 [RFC6090][DSS]. 124 o The hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS]. 126 Hash algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates or 127 BGPsec Update messages. They are represented by an OID that combines 128 the hash algorithm with the digital signature algorithm as follows: 130 o The ecdsa-with-SHA256 OID [RFC5480] MUST appear in the PKCS #10 131 signatureAlgorithm field [RFC2986] or in Certificate Request 132 Message Format (CRMF) POPOSigningKey algorithm field [RFC4211], 133 which location depends on the certificate request format 134 generated. 136 o In BGPsec Update messages, the ECDSA with SHA-256 Algorithm Suite 137 Identifier value 0x1 (see Section 7) is included in the 138 Signature-Block List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field. 140 3. Asymmetric Key Pair Formats 142 The key formats used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec 143 Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 3 of 144 [RFC7935]. This section addresses key formats found in the BGPsec 145 router certificate requests and in BGPsec Router Certificates. 147 The ECDSA private keys used to compute signatures for certificate 148 requests and BGPsec Update messages MUST come from the P-256 curve 149 [RFC5480]. The public key pair MUST use the uncompressed form. 151 3.1. Public Key Format 153 The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo 154 [RFC5280]. It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey. 155 The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow: 157 o algorithm (an AlgorithmIdentifier type): The id-ecPublicKey OID 158 MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 159 2.1.1 of [RFC5480]. The value for the associated parameters MUST 160 be secp256r1, as specified in Section 2.1.1.1 of [RFC5480]. 162 o subjectPublicKey: ECPoint MUST be used to encode the 163 certificate's subjectPublicKey field, as specified in Section 2.2 164 of [RFC5480]. 166 3.2. Private Key Format 168 Local Policy determines private key format. 170 4. Signature Format 172 The structure for the certificate's and CRL's signature field MUST be 173 as specified in Section 4 of [RFC7935], which is the same format used 174 by other RPKI certificates. The structure for the certification 175 request's and BGPsec Update message's signature field MUST be as 176 specified in Section 2.2.3 of [RFC3279]. 178 5. Additional Requirements 180 It is anticipated that BGPsec will require the adoption of updated 181 key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over 182 time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic 183 security. This profile should be updated to specify such future 184 requirements, when appropriate. 186 The recommended procedures to implement such a transition of key 187 sizes and algorithms is specified in [RFC6916]. 189 6. Security Considerations 191 The Security Considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC5480], [RFC6090], 192 [RFC7935], and [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to certificates. 194 The security considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC7935], 195 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] apply to certification requests. The 196 security considerations of [RFC3279], [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], and 197 [RFC6090] apply to BGPsec Update messages. No new security 198 considerations are introduced as a result of this specification. 200 7. IANA Considerations 202 The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is requested to define 203 the "BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry" in the Resource Public Key 204 Infrastructure (RPKI) group. The one-octet BGPsec Algorithm Suite 205 Registry identifiers assigned by IANA identifies the digest algorithm 206 and a signature algorithm used in the BGPsec Signature-Block List's 207 Algorithm Suite Identifier field. 209 IANA is kindly requested to also register a single algorithm suite 210 identifier, for the digest algorithm SHA-256 [SHS] and the signature 211 algorithm ECDSA on the P-256 curve [RFC6090][DSS]. 213 BGPsec Algorithm Suites Registry 215 Algorithm Digest Signature Specification 216 Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer 217 Identifier 219 +------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+ 220 | 0x0 | Reserved | Reserved | This draft | 221 +------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+ 222 | 0x1 | SHA-256 | ECDSA P-256 | [SHS][DSS][RFC6090] | 223 +------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+ 224 | 0x2-0xEF | Unassigned | Unassigned | This draft | 225 +------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+ 226 | 0xFF | Reserved | Reserved | This draft | 227 +------------+------------+-------------+---------------------+ 229 Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process 230 defined in [RFC5226]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm 231 suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and 232 signature algorithm name. 234 8. Acknowledgements 236 The author wishes to thank Geoff Huston and George Michaelson for 237 producing [RFC7935], which this document is entirely based on. I'd 238 also like to thank Roque Gagliano, David Mandelberg, Tom Petch, Sam 239 Weiller, and Stephen Kent for their reviews and comments. Mehmet 240 Adalier, Kotikalapudi Sriram, and Doug Montgomery were instrumental 241 in developing the test vectors found in Appendix A. 243 9. References 245 9.1. Normative References 247 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 248 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 249 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . 252 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 253 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, DOI 254 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, . 257 [RFC3279] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and 258 Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key 259 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 260 (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April 2002, 261 . 263 [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 264 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, DOI 265 10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, . 268 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 269 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, DOI 270 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, . 273 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 274 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 275 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 276 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, 277 . 279 [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, 280 "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key 281 Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009, 282 . 284 [RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic 285 Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, DOI 286 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011, . 289 [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility 290 Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 291 (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April 292 2013, . 294 [RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for 295 Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key 296 Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935, August 297 2016, . 299 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinski, M., "BGPsec Protocol 300 Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in- 301 progress. 303 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "A Profile 304 for BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation 305 Lists, and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec- 306 pki-profiles, work-in-progress. 308 [DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. 309 Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature Standard", FIPS 310 Publication 186-4, July 2013. 312 [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. 313 Department of Commerce, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS 314 Publication 180-4, August 2015. 316 9.2. Informative References 318 None. 320 Appendix A Examples 322 AS(64496)----AS(65536)----AS(65537) 324 Prefix Announcements: AS(64496), 192.0.2.0/24, 2001:db8::/32 326 For this example, the ECDSA algorithm was provided with a static 327 k to make the result deterministic. 329 The k used for all signature operations was taken from RFC 6979, 330 chapter A.2.5 ?Signatures With SHA-256, message 'sample'?. 332 k = A6E3C57DD01ABE90086538398355DD4C 333 3B17AA873382B0F24D6129493D8AAD60 335 Keys of AS64496: 336 ================ 337 ski: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154 339 private key: 340 x = D8AA4DFBE2478F86E88A7451BF075565 341 709C575AC1C136D081C540254CA440B9 343 public key: 344 Ux = 7391BABB92A0CB3BE10E59B19EBFFB21 345 4E04A91E0CBA1B139A7D38D90F77E55A 346 Uy = A05B8E695678E0FA16904B55D9D4F5C0 347 DFC58895EE50BC4F75D205A25BD36FF5 349 Router Key Certificate example using OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013 350 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 351 Certificate: 352 Data: 353 Version: 3 (0x2) 354 Serial Number: 38655612 (0x24dd67c) 355 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 356 Issuer: CN=ROUTER-0000FBF0 357 Validity 358 Not Before: Jan 1 05:00:00 2017 GMT 359 Not After : Jul 1 05:00:00 2018 GMT 360 Subject: CN=ROUTER-0000FBF0 361 Subject Public Key Info: 362 Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey 363 Public-Key: (256 bit) 364 pub: 365 04:73:91:ba:bb:92:a0:cb:3b:e1:0e:59:b1:9e:bf: 366 fb:21:4e:04:a9:1e:0c:ba:1b:13:9a:7d:38:d9:0f: 367 77:e5:5a:a0:5b:8e:69:56:78:e0:fa:16:90:4b:55: 369 d9:d4:f5:c0:df:c5:88:95:ee:50:bc:4f:75:d2:05: 370 a2:5b:d3:6f:f5 371 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 372 X509v3 extensions: 373 X509v3 Key Usage: 374 Digital Signature 375 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 376 AB:4D:91:0F:55:CA:E7:1A:21:5E: 377 F3:CA:FE:3A:CC:45:B5:EE:C1:54 378 X509v3 Extended Key Usage: 379 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30 380 sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical 381 Autonomous System Numbers: 382 64496 383 Routing Domain Identifiers: 384 inherit 386 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 387 30:44:02:20:07:b7:b4:6a:5f:a4:f1:cc:68:36:39:03:a4:83: 388 ec:7c:80:02:d2:f6:08:9d:46:b2:ec:2a:7b:e6:92:b3:6f:b1: 389 02:20:00:91:05:4a:a1:f5:b0:18:9d:27:24:e8:b4:22:fd:d1: 390 1c:f0:3d:b1:38:24:5d:64:29:35:28:8d:ee:0c:38:29 392 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 393 MIIBiDCCAS+gAwIBAgIEAk3WfDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAaMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9ST1VU 394 RVItMDAwMEZCRjAwHhcNMTcwMTAxMDUwMDAwWhcNMTgwNzAxMDUwMDAwWjAaMRgw 395 FgYDVQQDDA9ST1VURVItMDAwMEZCRjAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNC 396 AARzkbq7kqDLO+EOWbGev/shTgSpHgy6GxOafTjZD3flWqBbjmlWeOD6FpBLVdnU 397 9cDfxYiV7lC8T3XSBaJb02/1o2MwYTALBgNVHQ8EBAMCB4AwHQYDVR0OBBYEFKtN 398 kQ9VyucaIV7zyv46zEW17sFUMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMeMB4GCCsGAQUF 399 BwEIAQH/BA8wDaAHMAUCAwD78KECBQAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDRwAwRAIgB7e0al+k 400 8cxoNjkDpIPsfIAC0vYInUay7Cp75pKzb7ECIACRBUqh9bAYnSck6LQi/dEc8D2x 401 OCRdZCk1KI3uDDgp 402 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 404 Keys of AS(65636): 405 ================== 406 ski: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC 408 private key: 409 x = 6CB2E931B112F24554BCDCAAFD9553A9 410 519A9AF33C023B60846A21FC95583172 412 public key: 413 Ux = 28FC5FE9AFCF5F4CAB3F5F85CB212FC1 414 E9D0E0DBEAEE425BD2F0D3175AA0E989 415 Uy = EA9B603E38F35FB329DF495641F2BA04 416 0F1C3AC6138307F257CBA6B8B588F41F 418 Router Key Certificate example using OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013 419 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 420 Certificate: 421 Data: 422 Version: 3 (0x2) 423 Serial Number: 3168189942 (0xbcd6bdf6) 424 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 425 Issuer: CN=ROUTER-0000FFFF 426 Validity 427 Not Before: Jan 1 05:00:00 2017 GMT 428 Not After : Jul 1 05:00:00 2018 GMT 429 Subject: CN=ROUTER-0000FFFF 430 Subject Public Key Info: 431 Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey 432 Public-Key: (256 bit) 433 pub: 434 04:28:fc:5f:e9:af:cf:5f:4c:ab:3f:5f:85:cb:21: 435 2f:c1:e9:d0:e0:db:ea:ee:42:5b:d2:f0:d3:17:5a: 436 a0:e9:89:ea:9b:60:3e:38:f3:5f:b3:29:df:49:56: 437 41:f2:ba:04:0f:1c:3a:c6:13:83:07:f2:57:cb:a6: 438 b8:b5:88:f4:1f 439 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 440 X509v3 extensions: 441 X509v3 Key Usage: 442 Digital Signature 443 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 444 47:F2:3B:F1:AB:2F:8A:9D:26:86: 445 4E:BB:D8:DF:27:11:C7:44:06:EC 446 X509v3 Extended Key Usage: 447 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30 448 sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical 449 Autonomous System Numbers: 450 65535 451 Routing Domain Identifiers: 452 inherit 454 Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256 455 30:45:02:21:00:df:04:c5:17:04:d0:f2:b9:fa:f3:d9:6e:3f: 456 6f:a1:58:d8:fe:6c:18:e4:37:ca:19:7c:c8:75:40:57:6e:7e: 457 9d:02:20:12:45:e8:a8:58:6b:00:7b:e6:a9:0e:f2:b6:62:50: 458 4b:1c:01:6f:3b:41:11:69:88:30:73:9f:d7:02:9e:64:4f 460 -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- 461 MIIBijCCATCgAwIBAgIFALzWvfYwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwGjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPUk9V 462 VEVSLTAwMDBGRkZGMB4XDTE3MDEwMTA1MDAwMFoXDTE4MDcwMTA1MDAwMFowGjEY 463 MBYGA1UEAwwPUk9VVEVSLTAwMDBGRkZGMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcD 464 QgAEKPxf6a/PX0yrP1+FyyEvwenQ4Nvq7kJb0vDTF1qg6Ynqm2A+OPNfsynfSVZB 465 8roEDxw6xhODB/JXy6a4tYj0H6NjMGEwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgeAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRH 466 8jvxqy+KnSaGTrvY3ycRx0QG7DATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDHjAeBggrBgEF 467 BQcBCAEB/wQPMA2gBzAFAgMA//+hAgUAMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIQDfBMUX 468 BNDyufrz2W4/b6FY2P5sGOQ3yhl8yHVAV25+nQIgEkXoqFhrAHvmqQ7ytmJQSxwB 469 bztBEWmIMHOf1wKeZE8= 470 -----END CERTIFICATE----- 472 BGPSec IPv4 Update from AS(65536) to AS(65537): 473 =============================================== 474 Binary Form of BGPSec Update (TCP-DUMP): 476 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 477 01 00 02 00 00 00 E9 40 01 01 02 80 04 04 00 00 478 00 00 80 0E 0D 00 01 01 04 C6 33 64 64 00 18 C0 479 00 02 90 21 00 CA 00 0E 01 00 00 01 00 00 01 00 480 00 00 FB F0 00 BC 01 47 F2 3B F1 AB 2F 8A 9D 26 481 86 4E BB D8 DF 27 11 C7 44 06 EC 00 46 30 44 02 482 20 72 14 BC 96 47 16 0B BD 39 FF 2F 80 53 3F 5D 483 C6 DD D7 0D DF 86 BB 81 56 61 E8 05 D5 D4 E6 F2 484 7C 02 20 2D DC 00 3C 64 BE 7B 29 C9 EB DB C8 A4 485 97 ED 66 28 5E E9 22 76 83 E6 C1 78 CE 8D E6 D3 486 59 5F 41 AB 4D 91 0F 55 CA E7 1A 21 5E F3 CA FE 487 3A CC 45 B5 EE C1 54 00 47 30 45 02 20 72 14 BC 488 96 47 16 0B BD 39 FF 2F 80 53 3F 5D C6 DD D7 0D 489 DF 86 BB 81 56 61 E8 05 D5 D4 E6 F2 7C 02 21 00 490 C6 17 19 34 07 43 06 3B 8A 5C CD 54 16 39 0B 31 491 21 1D 3C 52 48 07 95 87 D0 13 13 7B 41 CD 23 E2 493 Signature From AS(64496) to AS(65536): 494 --------------------------------------- 495 Digest: 21 33 E5 CA A0 26 BE 07 3D 9C 1B 4E FE B9 B9 77 496 9F 20 F8 F5 DE 29 FA 98 40 00 9F 60 497 Signature: 30 45 02 20 72 14 BC 96 47 16 0B BD 39 FF 2F 80 498 53 3F 5D C6 DD D7 0D DF 86 BB 81 56 61 E8 05 D5 499 D4 E6 F2 7C 02 21 00 C6 17 19 34 07 43 06 3B 8A 500 5C CD 54 16 39 0B 31 21 1D 3C 52 48 07 95 87 D0 501 13 13 7B 41 CD 23 E2 503 Signature From AS(65536) to AS(65537): 504 -------------------------------------- 505 Digest: 46 4B 57 CE B1 2D 18 B0 FD 1A 1A 35 94 17 3A 4A 506 09 88 E5 F4 ED ED 2F 3D 83 08 5A A8 507 Signature: 30 44 02 20 72 14 BC 96 47 16 0B BD 39 FF 2F 80 508 53 3F 5D C6 DD D7 0D DF 86 BB 81 56 61 E8 05 D5 509 D4 E6 F2 7C 02 20 2D DC 00 3C 64 BE 7B 29 C9 EB 510 DB C8 A4 97 ED 66 28 5E E9 22 76 83 E6 C1 78 CE 511 8D E6 D3 59 5F 41 513 The human readable output is produced using bgpsec-io, a bgpsec 514 traffic generator that uses a wireshark like printout. 516 Send Update Message 517 +--marker: FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 518 +--length: 256 519 +--type: 2 (UPDATE) 520 +--withdrawn_routes_length: 0 521 +--total_path_attr_length: 233 522 +--ORIGIN: INCOMPLETE (4 bytes) 523 | +--Flags: 0x40 (Well-Known, Transitive, Complete) 524 | +--Type Code: ORIGIN (1) 525 | +--Length: 1 byte 526 | +--Origin: INCOMPLETE (1) 527 +--MULTI_EXIT_DISC (7 bytes) 528 | +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Complete) 529 | +--Type Code: MULTI_EXIT_DISC (4) 530 | +--Length: 4 bytes 531 | +--data: 00 00 00 00 532 +--MP_REACH_NLRI (16 bytes) 533 | +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Complete) 534 | +--Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14) 535 | +--Length: 13 bytes 536 | +--Address family: IPv4 (1) 537 | +--Subsequent address family identifier: Unicast (1) 538 | +--Next hop network address: (4 bytes) 539 | | +--Next hop: 198.51.100.100 540 | +--Subnetwork points of attachment: 0 541 | +--Network layer reachability information: (4 bytes) 542 | +--192.0.2.0/24 543 | +--MP Reach NLRI prefix length: 24 544 | +--MP Reach NLRI IPv4 prefix: 192.0.2.0 545 +--BGPSEC Path Attribute (206 bytes) 546 +--Flags: 0x90 (Optional, Complete, Extended Length) 547 +--Type Code: BGPSEC Path Attribute (33) 548 +--Length: 202 bytes 549 +--Secure Path (14 bytes) 550 | +--Length: 14 bytes 551 | +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes) 552 | | +--pCount: 1 553 | | +--Flags: 0 554 | | +--AS number: 65536 (1.0) 555 | +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes) 556 | +--pCount: 1 557 | +--Flags: 0 558 | +--AS number: 64496 (0.64496) 559 +--Signature Block (188 bytes) 560 +--Length: 188 bytes 561 +--Algo ID: 1 562 +--Signature Segment: (92 bytes) 563 | +--SKI: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC 564 | +--Length: 70 bytes 565 | +--Signature: 304402207214BC96 47160BBD39FF2F80 566 | 533F5DC6DDD70DDF 86BB815661E805D5 567 | D4E6F27C02202DDC 003C64BE7B29C9EB 568 | DBC8A497ED66285E E9227683E6C178CE 569 | 8DE6D3595F41 570 +--Signature Segment: (93 bytes) 571 +--SKI: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154 572 +--Length: 71 bytes 573 +--Signature: 304502207214BC96 47160BBD39FF2F80 574 533F5DC6DDD70DDF 86BB815661E805D5 575 D4E6F27C022100C6 1719340743063B8A 576 5CCD5416390B3121 1D3C5248079587D0 577 13137B41CD23E2 579 BGPSec IPv6 Update from AS(65536) to AS(65537): 580 =============================================== 581 Binary Form of BGPSec Update (TCP-DUMP): 583 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 584 01 0C 02 00 00 00 F5 40 01 01 02 80 04 04 00 00 585 00 00 80 0E 1A 00 02 01 10 20 01 00 10 00 00 00 586 00 00 00 00 00 C6 33 64 64 00 20 20 01 0D B8 90 587 21 00 C9 00 0E 01 00 00 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 FB 588 F0 00 BB 01 47 F2 3B F1 AB 2F 8A 9D 26 86 4E BB 589 D8 DF 27 11 C7 44 06 EC 00 46 30 44 02 20 72 14 590 BC 96 47 16 0B BD 39 FF 2F 80 53 3F 5D C6 DD D7 591 0D DF 86 BB 81 56 61 E8 05 D5 D4 E6 F2 7C 02 20 592 0A 9A E7 5F 56 CE 42 9C D2 D2 20 38 6B 8D 24 73 593 E9 5C 8A 50 E5 58 DB 92 B7 88 3D 09 E8 42 4E E7 594 AB 4D 91 0F 55 CA E7 1A 21 5E F3 CA FE 3A CC 45 595 B5 EE C1 54 00 46 30 44 02 20 72 14 BC 96 47 16 596 0B BD 39 FF 2F 80 53 3F 5D C6 DD D7 0D DF 86 BB 597 81 56 61 E8 05 D5 D4 E6 F2 7C 02 20 6E 26 52 40 598 CF CA 0E F6 5C 8E A1 AF 6B 65 2A 19 13 D2 FC BD 599 B5 8E E9 53 60 9F 85 F0 D2 69 99 DF 601 Signature From AS(64496) to AS(65536): 602 --------------------------------------- 603 Digest: 8A 0C D3 E9 8E 55 10 45 82 1D 80 46 01 D6 55 FC 604 52 11 89 DF 4D B0 28 7D 84 AC FC 77 605 Signature: 30 44 02 20 72 14 BC 96 47 16 0B BD 39 FF 2F 80 606 53 3F 5D C6 DD D7 0D DF 86 BB 81 56 61 E8 05 D5 607 D4 E6 F2 7C 02 20 6E 26 52 40 CF CA 0E F6 5C 8E 608 A1 AF 6B 65 2A 19 13 D2 FC BD B5 8E E9 53 60 9F 609 85 F0 D2 69 99 DF 611 Signature From AS(65536) to AS(65537): 612 -------------------------------------- 613 Digest: BA BF F7 95 BF 3C BE 81 79 1F A9 90 06 FC 30 1B 614 0D BC D5 49 39 5A 0A 71 C2 D5 B2 FA 615 Signature: 30 44 02 20 72 14 BC 96 47 16 0B BD 39 FF 2F 80 616 53 3F 5D C6 DD D7 0D DF 86 BB 81 56 61 E8 05 D5 617 D4 E6 F2 7C 02 20 0A 9A E7 5F 56 CE 42 9C D2 D2 618 20 38 6B 8D 24 73 E9 5C 8A 50 E5 58 DB 92 B7 88 619 3D 09 E8 42 4E E7 621 The human readable output is produced using bgpsec-io, a bgpsec 622 traffic generator that uses a wireshark like printout. 624 Send Update Message 625 +--marker: FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF 626 +--length: 268 627 +--type: 2 (UPDATE) 628 +--withdrawn_routes_length: 0 629 +--total_path_attr_length: 245 630 +--ORIGIN: INCOMPLETE (4 bytes) 631 | +--Flags: 0x40 (Well-Known, Transitive, Complete) 632 | +--Type Code: ORIGIN (1) 633 | +--Length: 1 byte 634 | +--Origin: INCOMPLETE (1) 635 +--MULTI_EXIT_DISC (7 bytes) 636 | +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Complete) 637 | +--Type Code: MULTI_EXIT_DISC (4) 638 | +--Length: 4 bytes 639 | +--data: 00 00 00 00 640 +--MP_REACH_NLRI (29 bytes) 641 | +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Complete) 642 | +--Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14) 643 | +--Length: 26 bytes 644 | +--Address family: IPv6 (2) 645 | +--Subsequent address family identifier: Unicast (1) 646 | +--Next hop network address: (16 bytes) 647 | | +--Next hop: 2001:0010:0000:0000:0000:0000:c633:6464 648 | +--Subnetwork points of attachment: 0 649 | +--Network layer reachability information: (5 bytes) 650 | +--2001:db8::/32 651 | +--MP Reach NLRI prefix length: 32 652 | +--MP Reach NLRI IPv6 prefix: 2001:db8:: 653 +--BGPSEC Path Attribute (205 bytes) 654 +--Flags: 0x90 (Optional, Complete, Extended Length) 655 +--Type Code: BGPSEC Path Attribute (33) 656 +--Length: 201 bytes 657 +--Secure Path (14 bytes) 658 | +--Length: 14 bytes 659 | +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes) 660 | | +--pCount: 1 661 | | +--Flags: 0 662 | | +--AS number: 65536 (1.0) 663 | +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes) 664 | +--pCount: 1 665 | +--Flags: 0 666 | +--AS number: 64496 (0.64496) 667 +--Signature Block (187 bytes) 668 +--Length: 187 bytes 669 +--Algo ID: 1 670 +--Signature Segment: (92 bytes) 671 | +--SKI: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC 672 | +--Length: 70 bytes 673 | +--Signature: 304402207214BC96 47160BBD39FF2F80 674 | 533F5DC6DDD70DDF 86BB815661E805D5 675 | D4E6F27C02200A9A E75F56CE429CD2D2 676 | 20386B8D2473E95C 8A50E558DB92B788 677 | 3D09E8424EE7 678 +--Signature Segment: (92 bytes) 679 +--SKI: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154 680 +--Length: 70 bytes 681 +--Signature: 304402207214BC96 47160BBD39FF2F80 682 533F5DC6DDD70DDF 86BB815661E805D5 683 D4E6F27C02206E26 5240CFCA0EF65C8E 684 A1AF6B652A1913D2 FCBDB58EE953609F 685 85F0D26999DF 687 Authors' Addresses 689 Sean Turner 690 sn3rd 692 EMail: sean@sn3rd.com 694 Oliver Borchert 695 NIST 696 100 Bureau Drive 697 Gaithersburg MD 20899 698 USA 700 Email: oliver.borchert@nist.gov