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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Missing Reference: 'ID.turner-sidr-bgpsec-algs' is mentioned on line 154, but not defined == Missing Reference: 'ID.sidr-res-cert-profile' is mentioned on line 455, but not defined ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6485 (Obsoleted by RFC 7935) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 6486 (Obsoleted by RFC 9286) Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 4 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds 3 Internet-Draft IPSw 4 Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner 5 Intended Status: Standards Track IECA 6 Expires: September 27, 2012 S. Kent 7 BBN 8 March 26, 2012 10 A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, 11 Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests 12 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 14 Abstract 16 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 17 the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths 18 in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that 19 protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper 20 operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under 21 development as a component to address the requirement to provide 22 security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a 23 protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong 24 cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified 25 by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure 26 (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS 27 Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous 28 System (AS). The certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the 29 private key are authorized to send out secure route advertisements on 30 behalf of the specified AS. This document also profiles the 31 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format of 32 certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate path 33 validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; therefore, 34 this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 35 6487). 37 Status of this Memo 39 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 40 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 42 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 43 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 44 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 45 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 47 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 48 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 49 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 50 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 52 Copyright Notice 54 Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 55 document authors. All rights reserved. 57 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 58 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 59 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 60 publication of this document. Please review these documents 61 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 62 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 63 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 64 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 65 described in the Simplified BSD License. 67 1. Introduction 69 This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE) 70 certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of 71 Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security 72 (BGPSEC) protocol. Such certificates are termed "BGPSEC Router 73 Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a 74 BGPSEC Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route 75 advertisements (BGPSEC UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS named in the 76 certificate. That is, a router holding the private key may send to 77 its BGP peers, route advertisements that contain the specified AS 78 number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key property 79 that BGPSEC will provide is that every AS along the AS PATH can 80 verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the 81 advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH). 83 This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of 84 [RFC5280], and it updates [RFC6487]. It establishes requirements 85 imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPSEC Router 86 Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and 87 extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context. This 88 document also profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and 89 certification requests. Finally, this document specifies the Relying 90 Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures. 92 1.1. Terminology 94 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 95 described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates" 96 [RFC6487], "BGPSEC Protocol Specification" [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], 97 "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security 98 Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Validating 99 the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and "Capability Advertisement with BGP-4" 100 [RFC5492]. 102 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 103 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 104 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 105 [RFC2119]. 107 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 109 Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the 110 products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification 111 Authority (CA) to a Regional Internet Registries (RIR). The RIR, in 112 turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service Providers (ISP). 113 The ISP in turn issues End-Entity (EE) Certificates to itself as 114 well as CRLs. These certificates are referred to as "Resource 115 Certificates", and are profiled in [RFC6487]. The [RFC6480] 116 envisioned using Resource Certificates to generate Manifests 117 [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482]. ROAs and 118 Manifests also include the Resource Certificates used to sign them. 120 +---------+ +------+ 121 | CA Cert |---| IANA | 122 +---------+ +------+ 123 \ 124 +---------+ +-----+ 125 | CA Cert |---| RIR | 126 +---------+ +-----+ 127 \ 128 +---------+ +-----+ 129 | CA Cert |---| ISP | 130 +---------+ +-----+ 131 / | | | 132 +-----+ / | | | +-----+ 133 | CRL |--+ | | +---| ROA | 134 +-----+ | | +-----+ 135 | | +----------+ 136 +----+ | +---| Manifest | 137 +-| EE |---+ +----------+ 138 | +----+ 139 +-----+ 140 Figure 1 142 This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is 143 referred to as a "BGPSEC Router Certificate". The purpose of this 144 certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of 145 appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPSEC 146 Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI 147 CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as 148 specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate 149 RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPSEC Router Certificates and 150 the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPSEC Router 151 Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in 152 [RFC6485]). The only impact is that the RPKI CAs will need to be 153 able to process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5) signed 154 with algorithms found in [ID.turner-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The use of 155 BGPSEC Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process 156 Manifests and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPSEC Router 157 Certificate is only ever used to verify the signature on the BGPSEC 158 certificate request (only CAs process these), another BGPSEC Router 159 Certificate (only BGPSEC routers process these), and the signature on 160 a BGPSEC Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPSEC 161 routers process these). 163 Only the differences between this profile and the profile in 164 [RFC6487] are listed. Note that BGPSEC Router Certificates are EE 165 certificates and as such there is no impact on process described in 166 [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility]. 168 3. Updates to [RFC6487] 170 3.1 BGPSEC Router Certificate Fields 172 A BGPSEC Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate, 173 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields 174 listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and 175 only the differences between this profile and the profile in 176 [RFC6487] are listed. 178 3.1.1.1 Subject 180 This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been 181 issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed 182 in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the 183 only common name encoding options that are supported are 184 printableString and UTF8String. For BGPSEC Router Certificates, it 185 is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal 186 string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded 187 as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute 188 contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID) 189 encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If the same certificate is 190 issued to more than one router (hence the private key is shared among 191 these routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at 192 the discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not 193 guaranteed to be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject 194 name in a BGPSEC Router Certificate issued using this convention also 195 is not guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However, 196 each certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject 197 name that is unique within that context. 199 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info 201 Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. 203 3.1.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 205 The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present (or MUST be absent, 206 if so stated) in a conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate, except where 207 explicitly noted otherwise. No other extensions are allowed in a 208 conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate. 210 3.1.3.1. Extended Key Usage 212 BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU) 213 extension. As specified, in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked 214 as non-critical. This document defines one EKU for BGPSEC Router 215 Certificates: 217 id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= 218 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 219 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } 221 id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD } 223 Relying Parties MUST require the extended key usage extension to be 224 present in a BGPSEC Router Certificate. If multiple KeyPurposeId 225 values are included, the relying parties need not recognize all of 226 them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is present. BGPSEC 227 RPs MUST reject certificates that do not contain the BGPSEC Router 228 EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID defined in 229 [RFC5280]. 231 3.1.3.2. Subject Information Access 233 This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUST be 234 omitted. 236 3.1.3.3. IP Resources 238 This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUSt be 239 omitted. 241 3.1.3.4. AS Resources 243 Each BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource 244 Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of 245 [RFC6487]. The AS Resource Identifier Delegation extension MUST 246 include exactly one AS number, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be 247 specified. 249 3.2. BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Profile 251 Refer to section 6 of [RFC6487]. The only differences between this 252 profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are: 254 o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA 255 MUST honor the request; 257 o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in 258 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and, 260 o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr- 261 bgpsec-algs]. 263 3.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Validation 265 The validation procedure used for BGPSEC Router Certificates is 266 identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of 267 [RFC6487] except that where "this specification" refers to [RFC6487] 268 in that profile in this profile "this specification" is this 269 document. 271 The differences are as follows: 273 o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the BGPSEC EKU defined in 274 Section 3.9.5. 276 o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension. 278 o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource 279 extension. 281 o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier 282 Delegation extension. 284 o BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key 285 Info" described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates [RFC6485]. 287 NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPSEC routers are 288 found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Currently, the algorithms 289 specified in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [RFC6485] are different. 290 BGPSEC RPs will need to support algorithms that are needed to 291 validate BGPSEC signatures as well as the algorithms that are 292 needed to validate signatures on BGPSEC certificates, RPKI CA 293 certificates, and RPKI CRLs. 295 4. Design Notes 297 The BGPSEC Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource 298 Certificate profile as specified in [RFC6485]. As a result, many of 299 the design choices herein are a reflection of the design choices that 300 were taken in that prior work. The reader is referred to [RFC6484] 301 for a fuller discussion of those choices. 303 5. Security Considerations 305 The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply. 307 A bgpsec certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in 308 [RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a 309 RP needs to identify the EKU before applying the correspondent 310 validation. 312 A BGPSEC Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to 313 encompass routers. It is a building block of the larger BGPSEC 314 security protocol used to validate signatures on BGPSEC Signature- 315 Segment origination of Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec- 316 protocol]. Thus its essential security function is the secure 317 binding of an AS number to a public key, consistent with the RPKI 318 allocation/assignment hierarchy. 320 6. IANA Considerations 322 None. 324 7. Acknowledgements 326 We would like to thanks Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert 327 Loomans for their work on [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile], which this work 328 is based on. In addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt 329 Lepinski were instrumental in preparing this work. Additionally, 330 we'd like to thank Roque Gagliano, Sandra Murphy, and Geoff Huston 331 for their reviews and comments. 333 8. References 335 8.1. Normative References 337 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 338 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 340 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 341 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 343 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border 344 Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. 346 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 347 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 348 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 349 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 351 [RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for 352 Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", 353 RFC 6485, February 2012. 355 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 356 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012. 358 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms, 359 Key Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec- 360 algs, work-in-progress. 362 8.2. Informative References 364 [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", 365 RFC 4272, January 2006. 367 [RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the 368 Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008. 370 [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement 371 with BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009. 373 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 374 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. 376 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 377 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. 379 [RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate 380 Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 381 (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012. 383 [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, 384 "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 385 (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012. 387 [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, 388 "Algorithm Agility Procedure for RPKI", draft-ietf-sidr- 389 algorithm-agility, work-in-progress. 391 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPSEC Protocol 392 Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in- 393 progress. 395 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module 397 BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 398 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD } 400 DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= 402 BEGIN 404 -- EXPORTS ALL -- 406 -- IMPORTS NOTHING -- 408 -- OID Arc -- 410 id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 411 iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 412 security(5) mechanisms(5) kp(3) } 414 -- BGPSEC Router Extended Key Usage -- 416 id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD } 418 END 420 Appendix B. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate 422 Appendix C. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Request 423 Appendix D. Change Log 425 Please delete this section prior to publication. 427 D.1 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 428 profiles-02 430 Updated references. 432 D.2 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 433 profiles-01 435 Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1. 437 D.3 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 438 profiles-00 440 Added this change log. 442 Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms 443 in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in [ID.sidr- 444 rpki-algs] for certificates and CRLs. 446 Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier 447 Delegation to match what's in RFC 3779. 449 D.4 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02 451 Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the 452 procedures defined in [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility]. 454 Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC 455 certificates will not pass RPKI validation [ID.sidr-res-cert-profile] 456 and that keying off the EKU will help tremendously. 458 D.5 Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01 460 Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI 461 certificates. 463 Removed sections and text that was already in [ID.sidr-res-cert- 464 profile]. This will make it easier for reviewers to figure out what 465 is different. 467 Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language. 469 Removed requirement from Section 6 to check that the AS # in the 470 certificate is the last number in the AS path information of each BGP 471 UPDATE message. Moved to [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. 473 Authors' Addresses 475 Mark Reynolds 476 Island Peak Software 477 328 Virginia Road 478 Concord, MA 01742 480 Email: mcr@islandpeaksoftware.com 482 Sean Turner 483 IECA, Inc. 484 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 485 Fairfax, VA 22031 486 USA 488 EMail: turners@ieca.com 490 Steve Kent 491 Raytheon BBN Technologies 492 10 Moulton St. 493 Cambridge, MA 02138 495 Email: kent@bbn.com