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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6485 (Obsoleted by RFC 7935) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 6486 (Obsoleted by RFC 9286) Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 4 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group M. Reynolds 3 Internet-Draft IPSw 4 Updates: 6487 (if approved) S. Turner 5 Intended Status: Standards Track IECA 6 Expires: March 21, 2014 S. Kent 7 BBN 8 September 17, 2013 10 A Profile for BGPSEC Router Certificates, 11 Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests 12 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-06 14 Abstract 16 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 17 the purposes of supporting validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths 18 in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that 19 protocol known as BGPSEC. BGP is a critical component for the proper 20 operation of the Internet as a whole. The BGPSEC protocol is under 21 development as a component to address the requirement to provide 22 security for the BGP protocol. The goal of BGPSEC is to design a 23 protocol for full AS path validation based on the use of strong 24 cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified 25 by this profile are issued under Resource Public Key Infrastructure 26 (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificates, containing the AS 27 Identifier Delegation extension, to routers within the Autonomous 28 System (AS). The certificate asserts that the router(s) holding the 29 private key are authorized to send out secure route advertisements on 30 behalf of the specified AS. This document also profiles the 31 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), profiles the format of 32 certification requests, and specifies Relying Party certificate path 33 validation procedures. The document extends the RPKI; therefore, 34 this documents updates the RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 35 6487). 37 Status of this Memo 39 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 40 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 42 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 43 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 44 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 45 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 47 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 48 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 49 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 50 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 52 Copyright Notice 54 Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 55 document authors. All rights reserved. 57 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 58 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 59 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 60 publication of this document. Please review these documents 61 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 62 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 63 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 64 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 65 described in the Simplified BSD License. 67 1. Introduction 69 This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE) 70 certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of 71 Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security 72 (BGPSEC) protocol. Such certificates are termed "BGPSEC Router 73 Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a 74 BGPSEC Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route 75 advertisements (BGPSEC UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS named in the 76 certificate. That is, a router holding the private key may send to 77 its BGP peers, route advertisements that contain the specified AS 78 number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key property 79 that BGPSEC will provide is that every AS along the AS PATH can 80 verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the 81 advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH). 83 This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of 84 [RFC5280], and it updates [RFC6487]. It establishes requirements 85 imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPSEC Router 86 Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and 87 extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context. This 88 document also profiles the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and 89 certification requests. Finally, this document specifies the Relying 90 Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures. 92 1.1. Terminology 94 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 95 described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates" 96 [RFC6487], "BGPSEC Protocol Specification" [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], 97 "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security 98 Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Validating 99 the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and "Capability Advertisement with BGP-4" 100 [RFC5492]. 102 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 103 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 104 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 105 [RFC2119]. 107 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 109 Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the 110 products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification 111 Authority (CA) to a Regional Internet Registries (RIR). The RIR, in 112 turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service Providers (ISP). 113 The ISP in turn issues End-Entity (EE) Certificates to itself as 114 well as CRLs. These certificates are referred to as "Resource 115 Certificates", and are profiled in [RFC6487]. The [RFC6480] 116 envisioned using Resource Certificates to generate Manifests 117 [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482]. ROAs and 118 Manifests also include the Resource Certificates used to sign them. 120 +---------+ +------+ 121 | CA Cert |---| IANA | 122 +---------+ +------+ 123 \ 124 +---------+ +-----+ 125 | CA Cert |---| RIR | 126 +---------+ +-----+ 127 \ 128 +---------+ +-----+ 129 | CA Cert |---| ISP | 130 +---------+ +-----+ 131 / | | | 132 +-----+ / | | | +-----+ 133 | CRL |--+ | | +---| ROA | 134 +-----+ | | +-----+ 135 | | +----------+ 136 +----+ | +---| Manifest | 137 +-| EE |---+ +----------+ 138 | +----+ 139 +-----+ 140 Figure 1 142 This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is 143 referred to as a "BGPSEC Router Certificate". The purpose of this 144 certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of 145 appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPSEC 146 Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI 147 CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as 148 specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate 149 RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPSEC Router Certificates and 150 the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPSEC Router 151 Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in 152 [RFC6485]). The only impact is that the RPKI CAs will need to be 153 able to process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5) signed 154 with algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The use of BGPSEC 155 Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process Manifests 156 and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPSEC Router 157 Certificate is only ever used to verify the signature on the BGPSEC 158 certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a 159 BGPSEC Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPSEC routers 160 process these). 162 Only the differences between this profile and the profile in 163 [RFC6487] are listed. Note that BGPSEC Router Certificates are EE 164 certificates and as such there is no impact on process described in 165 [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility]. 167 3. Updates to [RFC6487] 169 3.1 BGPSEC Router Certificate Fields 171 A BGPSEC Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate, 172 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields 173 listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and 174 only the differences between this profile and the profile in 175 [RFC6487] are listed. 177 3.1.1.1. Subject 179 This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been 180 issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed 181 in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the 182 only common name encoding options that are supported are 183 printableString and UTF8String. For BGPSEC Router Certificates, it 184 is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal 185 string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded 186 as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute 187 contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID) 188 encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If the same certificate is 189 issued to more than one router (hence the private key is shared among 190 these routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at 191 the discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not 192 guaranteed to be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject 193 name in a BGPSEC Router Certificate issued using this convention also 194 is not guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However, 195 each certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject 196 name that is unique within that context. 198 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info 200 Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. 202 3.1.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 204 The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present (or MUST be absent, 205 if so stated) in a conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate, except where 206 explicitly noted otherwise. No other extensions are allowed in a 207 conforming BGPSEC Router Certificate. 209 3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints 211 BGPSEC speakers are EEs; therefore, the Basic Constraints extension 212 must not be present, as per [RFC6487]. 214 3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage 216 BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU) 217 extension. As specified, in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked 218 as non-critical. This document defines one EKU for BGPSEC Router 219 Certificates: 221 id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= 222 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 223 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } 225 id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD } 227 Relying Parties MUST require the extended key usage extension to be 228 present in a BGPSEC Router Certificate. If multiple KeyPurposeId 229 values are included, the relying parties need not recognize all of 230 them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is present. BGPSEC 231 RPs MUST reject certificates that do not contain the BGPSEC Router 232 EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage OID defined in 233 [RFC5280]. 235 3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access 237 This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUST be 238 omitted. 240 3.1.3.4. IP Resources 242 This extension is not used in BGPSEC Router Certificates. It MUSt be 243 omitted. 245 3.1.3.5. AS Resources 247 Each BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource 248 Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of 249 [RFC6487]. The AS Resource Identifier Delegation extension MUST 250 include exactly one AS number, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be 251 specified. 253 3.2. BGPSEC Router Certificate Request Profile 255 Refer to section 6 of [RFC6487]. The only differences between this 256 profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are: 258 o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA 259 MUST honor the request; 261 o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in 262 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and, 264 o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr- 265 bgpsec-algs]. 267 3.3. BGPSEC Router Certificate Validation 269 The validation procedure used for BGPSEC Router Certificates is 270 identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of 271 [RFC6487]. The exception is that the constraints applied come from 272 this specification (e.g., in step 3: the certificate contains all the 273 field that must be present - refers to the fields that are required 274 by this specification). 276 The differences are as follows: 278 o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the BGPSEC EKU defined in 279 Section 3.1.3.1. 281 o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension. 283 o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource 284 extension. 286 o BGPSEC Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier 287 Delegation extension. 289 o BGPSEC Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key 290 Info" described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates [RFC6485]. 292 NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPSEC routers are 293 found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Currently, the algorithms 294 specified in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [RFC6485] are different. 295 BGPSEC RPs will need to support algorithms that are needed to 296 validate BGPSEC signatures as well as the algorithms that are 297 needed to validate signatures on BGPSEC certificates, RPKI CA 298 certificates, and RPKI CRLs. 300 4. Design Notes 302 The BGPSEC Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource 303 Certificate profile as specified in [RFC6485]. As a result, many of 304 the design choices herein are a reflection of the design choices that 305 were taken in that prior work. The reader is referred to [RFC6484] 306 for a fuller discussion of those choices. 308 5. Security Considerations 310 The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply. 312 A bgpsec certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in 313 [RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a 314 RP needs to identify the EKU before applying the correspondent 315 validation. 317 A BGPSEC Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to 318 encompass routers. It is a building block of the larger BGPSEC 319 security protocol used to validate signatures on BGPSEC Signature- 320 Segment origination of Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec- 321 protocol]. Thus its essential security function is the secure 322 binding of an AS number to a public key, consistent with the RPKI 323 allocation/assignment hierarchy. 325 6. IANA Considerations 327 None. 329 7. Acknowledgements 331 We would like to thanks Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert 332 Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on. In 333 addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were 334 instrumental in preparing this work. Additionally, we'd like to 335 thank Roque Gagliano, Sandra Murphy, and Geoff Huston for their 336 reviews and comments. 338 8. References 340 8.1. Normative References 342 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 343 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 345 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 346 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 348 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border 349 Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. 351 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 352 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 353 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 354 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 356 [RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for 357 Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", 358 RFC 6485, February 2012. 360 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 361 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012. 363 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] Reynolds, M. and S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms, 364 Key Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec- 365 algs, work-in-progress. 367 8.2. Informative References 369 [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", 370 RFC 4272, January 2006. 372 [RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the 373 Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008. 375 [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement 376 with BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009. 378 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 379 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. 381 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 382 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. 384 [RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate 385 Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 386 (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012. 388 [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, 389 "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 390 (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012. 392 [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, 393 "Algorithm Agility Procedure for RPKI", draft-ietf-sidr- 394 algorithm-agility, work-in-progress. 396 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPSEC Protocol 397 Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in- 398 progress. 400 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module 402 BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 403 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) TBD } 405 DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= 407 BEGIN 409 -- EXPORTS ALL -- 411 -- IMPORTS NOTHING -- 413 -- OID Arc -- 415 id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 416 iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 417 security(5) mechanisms(5) kp(3) } 419 -- BGPSEC Router Extended Key Usage -- 421 id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD } 423 END 425 Appendix B. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate 427 Appendix C. Example BGPSEC Router Certificate Request 428 Appendix D. Change Log 430 Please delete this section prior to publication. 432 D.1. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 433 profiles-04 435 In s2.1, removed the phrase "another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only 436 BGPSEC routers process these)" because the BGPSEC certificates are 437 only ever EE certificates and they're never used to verify another 438 certificate only the PDUs that are signed. 440 Added new s3.1.3.1 to explicitly state that EE certificates are only 441 ever EE certs. 443 D.2. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 444 profiles-03 446 Updated s3.3 to clarifify restrictions on path validation procedures 447 are in this specification (1st para was reworded). 449 Updated s3.3 to point to s3.1.3.1 for BGPSEC EKU (thanks Tom). 451 D.3. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 452 profiles-02 454 Updated references. 456 D.4. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 457 profiles-01 459 Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1. 461 D.5. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 462 profiles-00 464 Added this change log. 466 Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms 467 in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in [ID.sidr- 468 rpki-algs] for certificates and CRLs. 470 Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier 471 Delegation to match what's in RFC 3779. 473 D.6. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02 475 Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the 476 procedures defined in [ID.sidr-algorithm-agility]. 478 Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC 479 certificates will not pass RPKI validation [RFC6487] and that keying 480 off the EKU will help tremendously. 482 D.7. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01 484 Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI 485 certificates. 487 Removed sections and text that was already in [RFC6487]. This will 488 make it easier for reviewers to figure out what is different. 490 Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language. 492 Removed requirement from Section 6 to check that the AS # in the 493 certificate is the last number in the AS path information of each BGP 494 UPDATE message. Moved to [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. 496 Authors' Addresses 498 Mark Reynolds 499 Island Peak Software 500 328 Virginia Road 501 Concord, MA 01742 503 Email: mcr@islandpeaksoftware.com 505 Sean Turner 506 IECA, Inc. 507 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 508 Fairfax, VA 22031 509 USA 511 EMail: turners@ieca.com 513 Steve Kent 514 Raytheon BBN Technologies 515 10 Moulton St. 516 Cambridge, MA 02138 518 Email: kent@bbn.com