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Kent 7 BBN 8 November 2, 2015 10 A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, 11 Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests 12 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-13 14 Abstract 16 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used 17 to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border 18 Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol 19 known as BGPsec. BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the 20 Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec 21 is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the 22 requirement to provide security for BGP. The goal of BGPsec is to 23 provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong 24 cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified 25 by this profile are issued (to routers within an Autonomous System). 26 Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key 27 Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate. 28 These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS 29 Identifier Delegation extension. An EE certificate of this type 30 asserts that the router(s) holding the corresponding private key are 31 authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the 32 AS(es) specified in the certificate. This document also profiles the 33 format of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party (RP) 34 certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates. 35 This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the 36 RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487). 38 Status of this Memo 40 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 41 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 43 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 44 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 45 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 46 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 48 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 49 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 50 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 51 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 53 Copyright Notice 55 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 56 document authors. All rights reserved. 58 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 59 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 60 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 61 publication of this document. Please review these documents 62 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 63 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 64 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 65 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 66 described in the Simplified BSD License. 68 Table of Contents 70 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 71 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 72 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 73 3. Updates to [RFC6487] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 74 3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 75 3.1.1.1. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 76 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 77 3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . 6 78 3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 79 3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 80 3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 81 3.1.3.4. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 82 3.1.3.5. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 83 3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . 7 84 3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 7 85 4. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 86 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 87 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 88 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 89 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 90 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 91 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 92 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 93 Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 94 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 96 1. Introduction 98 This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE) 99 certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of 100 Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security 101 protocol (BGPsec). Such certificates are termed "BGPsec Router 102 Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a 103 BGPsec Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route 104 advertisements (BGPsec UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es) named in the 105 certificate. A router holding the private key is authorized to send 106 route advertisements (to its peers) that contain one or more of the 107 specified AS number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key 108 property provided by BGPsec is that every AS along the AS PATH can 109 verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the 110 advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH). 112 This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of 113 [RFC5280]; thus this document [RFC6487]. It establishes requirements 114 imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a BGPsec Router 115 Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for certificate fields and 116 extensions for the certificate to be valid in this context. This 117 document also profiles the certification requests used to acquire 118 BGPsec Router Certificates. Finally, this document specifies the 119 Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation procedures for these 120 certificates. 122 1.1. Terminology 124 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 125 described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates" 126 [RFC6487], "BGPsec Protocol Specification" [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], 127 "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security 128 Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Validating 129 the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and "Capability Advertisement with BGP-4" 130 [RFC5492]. 132 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 133 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 134 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 135 [RFC2119]. 137 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 139 Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the 140 products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification 141 Authority (CA) certificate to each Regional Internet Registry (RIR). 142 The RIR, in turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service 143 Providers (ISP). The ISP in turn issues EE Certificates to itself to 144 enable verification of signatures on RPKI signed objects. The CA also 145 generate. The CA also generates CRLs. These CA and EE certificates 146 are referred to as "Resource Certificates", and are profiled in 147 [RFC6487]. The [RFC6480] envisioned using Resource Certificates to 148 enable verification of Manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin 149 Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482]. ROAs and Manifests include the 150 Resource Certificates used to verify them. 152 +---------+ +------+ 153 | CA Cert |---| IANA | 154 +---------+ +------+ 155 \ 156 +---------+ +-----+ 157 | CA Cert |---| RIR | 158 +---------+ +-----+ 159 \ 160 +---------+ +-----+ 161 | CA Cert |---| ISP | 162 +---------+ +-----+ 163 / | | | 164 +-----+ / | | | +-----+ 165 | CRL |--+ | | +---| ROA | 166 +-----+ | | +-----+ 167 | | +----------+ 168 +----+ | +---| Manifest | 169 +-| EE |---+ +----------+ 170 | +----+ 171 +-----+ 172 Figure 1 174 This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is 175 referred to as a "BGPsec Router Certificate". The purpose of this 176 certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of 177 appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPsec 178 Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI 179 CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as 180 specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate 181 RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPsec Router Certificates and 182 the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPsec Router 183 Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in 184 [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]). The only impact is that RPKI CAs will need to 185 be able to process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5) 186 signed with algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The use of 187 BGPsec Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process 188 Manifests and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPsec Router 189 Certificate is used only to verify the signature on the BGPsec 190 certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a 191 BGPsec Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec routers 192 process these). 194 This document enumerates only the differences between this profile 195 and the profile in [RFC6487]. Note that BGPsec Router Certificates 196 are EE certificates and as such there is no impact on process 197 described in [RFC6916]. 199 3. Updates to [RFC6487] 201 3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields 203 A BGPsec Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate, 204 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields 205 listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and 206 only the differences between this profile and the profile in 207 [RFC6487] are specified below. 209 3.1.1.1. Subject 211 This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been 212 issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed 213 in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the 214 only common name encoding options that are supported are 215 printableString and UTF8String. For BGPsec Router Certificates, it 216 is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal 217 string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded 218 as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute 219 contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID) 220 encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If there is more than one AS 221 number, the choice of which to include in the common name is at the 222 discretion of the Issuer. If the same certificate is issued to more 223 than one router (hence the private key is shared among these 224 routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at the 225 discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not guaranteed to 226 be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject name in a BGPsec 227 Router Certificate issued using this convention also is not 228 guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However, each 229 certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject name 230 that is unique within that context. 232 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info 234 Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. 236 3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 238 3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints 240 BGPsec speakers are EEs; therefore, the Basic Constraints extension 241 must not be present, as per [RFC6487]. 243 3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage 245 BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU) 246 extension. As specified in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked 247 as non-critical. This document defines one EKU for BGPsec Router 248 Certificates: 250 id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= 251 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 252 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } 254 id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 } 256 A BGPsec router MUST require the extended key usage extension to be 257 present in a BGPsec Router Certificate it receives. If multiple 258 KeyPurposeId values are included, the BGPsec routers need not 259 recognize all of them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is 260 present. BGPsec routers MUST reject certificates that do not contain 261 the BGPsec Router EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage 262 OID defined in [RFC5280]. 264 3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access 266 This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be 267 omitted. 269 3.1.3.4. IP Resources 271 This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be 272 omitted. 274 3.1.3.5. AS Resources 276 Each BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource 277 Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of 278 [RFC6487]. The AS Resource Identifier Delegation extension MUST 279 include one or more AS numbers, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be 280 specified. 282 3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile 284 Refer to section 6 of [RFC6487]. The only differences between this 285 profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are: 287 o The ExtendedKeyUsage extension request MUST be included and the CA 288 MUST honor the request; 290 o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in 291 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]; and, 293 o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr- 294 bgpsec-algs]. 296 3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation 298 The validation procedure used for BGPsec Router Certificates is 299 identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of 300 [RFC6487], but using the constraints applied come from this 301 specification. For example, in step 3: "the certificate contains all 302 the field that must be present" - refers to the fields that are 303 required by this specification. 305 The differences are as follows: 307 o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the BGPsec EKU defined in 308 Section 3.1.3.1. 310 o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension. 312 o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource 313 extension. 315 o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier 316 Delegation extension. 318 o BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key 319 Info" described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates [ID.sidr- 320 rfc6485bis]. 322 NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPsec routers are found 323 in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Currently, the algorithms specified in 324 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] are different. BGPsec 325 RPs will need to support algorithms that are used to validate BGPsec 326 signatures as well as the algorithms that are needed to validate 327 signatures on BGPsec certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and RPKI 328 CRLs. 330 4. Design Notes 332 The BGPsec Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource 333 Certificate profile as specified in [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]. As a 334 result, many of the design choices herein are a reflection of the 335 design choices that were taken in that prior work. The reader is 336 referred to [RFC6484] for a fuller discussion of those choices. 338 5. Security Considerations 340 The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply. 342 A BGPsec Router Certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in 343 [RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a 344 RP needs to identify the EKU to determine the appropriate Validation 345 constraint. 347 A BGPsec Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to 348 encompass routers. It is a building block BGPsec and is used to 349 validate signatures on BGPsec Signature-Segment origination of 350 Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. Thus its essential 351 security function is the secure binding of one or more AS numbers to 352 a public key, consistent with the RPKI allocation/assignment 353 hierarchy. 355 Hash functions [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] are used when generating the two 356 key identifiers extension included in BGPsec certificates. However 357 as noted in [RFC6818], collision resistance is not a required 358 property of one-way hash functions when used to generate key 359 identifiers. Regardless, hash collisions are possible and if 360 detected an operator should be alerted. 362 6. IANA Considerations 364 This document makes use of two object identifiers in the SMI Registry 365 for PKIX. One is for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A and it comes 366 from the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier IANA registry (id- 367 mod-bgpsec-eku). The other is for the BGPsec router EKU defined in 368 Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for 369 PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry. These OIDs were assigned 370 before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA. No IANA 371 allocations are request of IANA, but please update the references in 372 those registries when this document is published by the RFC editor. 374 7. Acknowledgements 376 We would like to thank Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert 377 Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on. In 378 addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were 379 instrumental in preparing this work. Additionally, we'd like to 380 thank Roque Gagliano, Sandra Murphy, Geoff Huston, Richard Hansen, 381 David Mandelberg, and Sam Weiller for their reviews and comments. 383 8. References 385 8.1. Normative References 387 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 388 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 390 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 391 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 393 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border 394 Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. 396 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 397 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 398 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 399 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 401 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 402 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012. 404 [RFC6818] Yee, P., "Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key 405 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 406 (CRL) Profile", RFC 6818, January 2013. 408 [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] G. Huston and G. Michaelson, "The Profile for 409 Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key 410 Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis, work-in- 411 progress. 413 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & 414 Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs, work-in- 415 progress. 417 8.2. Informative References 419 [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", 420 RFC 4272, January 2006. 422 [RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the 423 Path in BGP", RFC 5123, February 2008. 425 [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement 426 with BGP-4", RFC 5492, February 2009. 428 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 429 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. 431 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 432 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. 434 [RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate 435 Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 436 (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012. 438 [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, 439 "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 440 (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012. 442 [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility 443 Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 444 (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, April 2013. 446 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPsec Protocol 447 Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in- 448 progress. 450 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module 452 BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 453 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-bgpsec-eku(84) } 455 DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= 457 BEGIN 459 -- EXPORTS ALL -- 461 -- IMPORTS NOTHING -- 463 -- OID Arc -- 465 id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 466 iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 467 security(5) mechanisms(5) kp(3) } 469 -- BGPsec Router Extended Key Usage -- 471 id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 } 473 END 475 Appendix B. Change Log 477 Please delete this section prior to publication. 479 B.0 Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-12 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 480 profiles-13 482 Minor modifications to address WGLC comments. 484 B.1 Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-11 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 485 profiles-12 487 Added security consideration to address SKI collisions. Also updated 488 the IANA considerations section. 490 B.2 Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-10 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 491 profiles-11 493 Removed text in s3.1.3. Consistently used BGPsec to refer to BGP 494 Security. Fixed typos. Refer to RFC6485bis instead of RFC6485. 495 Included OIDs. 497 B.3. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-09 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 498 profiles-10 500 Updated dates. 502 B.4. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-08 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 503 profiles-09 505 Editorial fixes for the sake of brevity. 507 B.5. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-07 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 508 profiles-08 510 Fixed section numbering. 512 B.6. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-06 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 513 profiles-07 515 Added text to multiple AS numbers in a single certificate. Updated 516 reference to RFC 6916. 518 B.7. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-05 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 519 profiles-06 521 Keep alive version. 523 B.8. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-04 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 524 profiles-05 526 Keep alive version. 528 B.9. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 529 profiles-04 531 In s2.1, removed the phrase "another BGPSEC Router Certificate (only 532 BGPSEC routers process these)" because the BGPSEC certificates are 533 only ever EE certificates and they're never used to verify another 534 certificate only the PDUs that are signed. 536 Added new s3.1.3.1 to explicitly state that EE certificates are only 537 ever EE certs. 539 B.10. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 540 profiles-03 542 Updated s3.3 to clarify restrictions on path validation procedures 543 are in this specification (1st para was reworded). 545 Updated s3.3 to point to s3.1.3.1 for BGPSEC EKU (thanks Tom). 547 B.11. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 548 profiles-02 550 Updated references. 552 B.12. Changes from sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-00 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 553 profiles-01 555 Added an ASN.1 Module and corrected the id-kp OID in s3.1.3.1. 557 B.13. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles-02 to sidr-bgpsec-pki- 558 profiles-00 560 Added this change log. 562 Amplified that a BGPSEC RP will need to support both the algorithms 563 in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] for BGPSEC and the algorithms in [ID.sidr- 564 rpki-algs] for certificates and CRLs. 566 Changed the name of AS Resource extension to AS Resource Identifier 567 Delegation to match what's in RFC 3779. 569 B.14. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -01 to -02 570 Added text in Section 2 to indicate that there's no impact on the 571 procedures defined in [RFC6916]. 573 Added a security consideration to let implementers know the BGPSEC 574 certificates will not pass RPKI validation [RFC6487] and that keying 575 off the EKU will help tremendously. 577 B.15. Changes from turner-bgpsec-pki-profiles -00 to -01 579 Corrected Section 2 to indicate that CA certificates are also RPKI 580 certificates. 582 Removed sections and text that was already in [RFC6487]. This will 583 make it easier for reviewers to figure out what is different. 585 Modified Section 6 to use 2119-language. 587 Removed requirement from Section 6 to check that the AS # in the 588 certificate is the last number in the AS path information of each BGP 589 UPDATE message. Moved to [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. 591 Authors' Addresses 593 Mark Reynolds 594 Island Peak Software 595 328 Virginia Road 596 Concord, MA 01742 598 Email: mcr@islandpeaksoftware.com 600 Sean Turner 601 IECA, Inc. 602 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 603 Fairfax, VA 22031 604 USA 606 EMail: turners@ieca.com 608 Stephen Kent 609 Raytheon BBN Technologies 610 10 Moulton St. 611 Cambridge, MA 02138 613 Email: kent@bbn.com