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Kent 7 BBN 8 June 1, 2016 10 A Profile for BGPsec Router Certificates, 11 Certificate Revocation Lists, and Certification Requests 12 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-17 14 Abstract 16 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates used 17 to enable validation of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border 18 Gateway Protocol (BGP), as part of an extension to that protocol 19 known as BGPsec. BGP is the standard for inter-domain routing in the 20 Internet; it is the "glue" that holds the Internet together. BGPsec 21 is being developed as one component of a solution that addresses the 22 requirement to provide security for BGP. The goal of BGPsec is to 23 provide full AS path validation based on the use of strong 24 cryptographic primitives. The end-entity (EE) certificates specified 25 by this profile are issued (to routers within an Autonomous System). 26 Each of these certificates is issued under a Resource Public Key 27 Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification Authority (CA) certificate. 28 These CA certificates and EE certificates both contain the AS 29 Identifier Delegation extension. An EE certificate of this type 30 asserts that the router(s) holding the corresponding private key are 31 authorized to emit secure route advertisements on behalf of the 32 AS(es) specified in the certificate. This document also profiles the 33 format of certification requests, and specifies Relying Party (RP) 34 certificate path validation procedures for these EE certificates. 35 This document extends the RPKI; therefore, this documents updates the 36 RPKI Resource Certificates Profile (RFC 6487). 38 Status of this Memo 40 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 41 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 43 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 44 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 45 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 46 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 48 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 49 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 50 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 51 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 53 Copyright Notice 55 Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 56 document authors. All rights reserved. 58 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 59 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 60 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 61 publication of this document. Please review these documents 62 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 63 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 64 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 65 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 66 described in the Simplified BSD License. 68 Table of Contents 70 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 71 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 72 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 73 3. Updates to [RFC6487] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 74 3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 75 3.1.1.1. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 76 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 77 3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . 6 78 3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 79 3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 80 3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 81 3.1.3.4. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 82 3.1.3.5. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 83 3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . 7 84 3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 7 85 3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI . . 8 86 4. Design Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 87 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 88 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 89 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 90 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 91 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 92 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 93 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 94 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 96 1. Introduction 98 This document defines a profile for X.509 end-entity (EE) 99 certificates [RFC5280] for use in the context of certification of 100 Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol Security 101 protocol (BGPsec). Such certificates are termed "BGPsec Router 102 Certificates". The holder of the private key associated with a 103 BGPsec Router Certificate is authorized to send secure route 104 advertisements (BGPsec UPDATEs) on behalf of the AS(es) named in the 105 certificate. A router holding the private key is authorized to send 106 route advertisements (to its peers) that contain one or more of the 107 specified AS number as the last item in the AS PATH attribute. A key 108 property provided by BGPsec is that every AS along the AS PATH can 109 verify that the other ASes along the path have authorized the 110 advertisement of the given route (to the next AS along the AS PATH). 112 This document is a profile of [RFC6487], which is a profile of 113 [RFC5280]; thus this document updates [RFC6487]. It establishes 114 requirements imposed on a Resource Certificate that is used as a 115 BGPsec Router Certificate, i.e., it defines constraints for 116 certificate fields and extensions for the certificate to be valid in 117 this context. This document also profiles the certification requests 118 used to acquire BGPsec Router Certificates. Finally, this document 119 specifies the Relying Party (RP) certificate path validation 120 procedures for these certificates. 122 1.1. Terminology 124 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 125 described in "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates" 126 [RFC6487], "BGPsec Protocol Specification" [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol], 127 "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)" [RFC4271], "BGP Security 128 Vulnerabilities Analysis" [RFC4272], "Considerations in Validating 129 the Path in BGP" [RFC5123], and "Capability Advertisement with BGP-4" 130 [RFC5492]. 132 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 133 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 134 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 135 [RFC2119]. 137 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 139 Figure 1 depicts some of the entities in the RPKI and some of the 140 products generated by RPKI entities. IANA issues a Certification 141 Authority (CA) certificate to each Regional Internet Registry (RIR). 142 The RIR, in turn, issues a CA certificate to an Internet Service 143 Providers (ISP). The ISP in turn issues EE Certificates to itself to 144 enable verification of signatures on RPKI signed objects. The CA also 145 generate. The CA also generates Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). 146 These CA and EE certificates are referred to as "Resource 147 Certificates", and are profiled in [RFC6487]. The [RFC6480] 148 envisioned using Resource Certificates to enable verification of 149 Manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482]. 150 ROAs and Manifests include the Resource Certificates used to verify 151 them. 153 +---------+ +------+ 154 | CA Cert |---| IANA | 155 +---------+ +------+ 156 \ 157 +---------+ +-----+ 158 | CA Cert |---| RIR | 159 +---------+ +-----+ 160 \ 161 +---------+ +-----+ 162 | CA Cert |---| ISP | 163 +---------+ +-----+ 164 / | | | 165 +-----+ / | | | +-----+ 166 | CRL |--+ | | +---| ROA | 167 +-----+ | | +-----+ 168 | | +----------+ 169 +----+ | +---| Manifest | 170 +-| EE |---+ +----------+ 171 | +----+ 172 +-----+ 173 Figure 1 175 This document defines another type of Resource Certificate, which is 176 referred to as a "BGPsec Router Certificate". The purpose of this 177 certificate is explained in Section 1 and falls within the scope of 178 appropriate uses defined within [RFC6484]. The issuance of BGPsec 179 Router Certificates has minimal impact on RPKI CAs because the RPKI 180 CA certificate and CRL profile remain unchanged (i.e., they are as 181 specified in [RFC6487]). Further, the algorithms used to generate 182 RPKI CA certificates that issue the BGPsec Router Certificates and 183 the CRLs necessary to check the validity of the BGPsec Router 184 Certificates remain unchanged (i.e., they are as specified in 185 [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]). The only impact is that RPKI CAs will need to 186 be able to process a profiled certificate request (see Section 5) 187 signed with algorithms found in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. The use of 188 BGPsec Router Certificates in no way affects RPKI RPs that process 189 Manifests and ROAs because the public key found in the BGPsec Router 190 Certificate is used only to verify the signature on the BGPsec 191 certificate request (only CAs process these) and the signature on a 192 BGPsec Update Message [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] (only BGPsec routers 193 process these). 195 This document enumerates only the differences between this profile 196 and the profile in [RFC6487]. Note that BGPsec Router Certificates 197 are EE certificates and as such there is no impact on process 198 described in [RFC6916]. 200 3. Updates to [RFC6487] 202 3.1 BGPsec Router Certificate Fields 204 A BGPsec Router Certificate is a valid X.509 public key certificate, 205 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields 206 listed in this section. This profile is also based on [RFC6487] and 207 only the differences between this profile and the profile in 208 [RFC6487] are specified below. 210 3.1.1.1. Subject 212 This field identifies the router to which the certificate has been 213 issued. Consistent with [RFC6487], only two attributes are allowed 214 in the Subject field: common name and serial number. Moreover, the 215 only common name encoding options that are supported are 216 printableString and UTF8String. For BGPsec Router Certificates, it 217 is RECOMMENDED that the common name attribute contain the literal 218 string "ROUTER-" followed by the 32-bit AS Number [RFC3779] encoded 219 as eight hexadecimal digits and that the serial number attribute 220 contain the 32-bit BGP Identifier [RFC4271] (i.e., the router ID) 221 encoded as eight hexadecimal digits. If there is more than one AS 222 number, the choice of which to include in the common name is at the 223 discretion of the Issuer. If the same certificate is issued to more 224 than one router (hence the private key is shared among these 225 routers), the choice of the router ID used in this name is at the 226 discretion of the Issuer. Note that router IDs are not guaranteed to 227 be unique across the Internet, and thus the Subject name in a BGPsec 228 Router Certificate issued using this convention also is not 229 guaranteed to be unique across different issuers. However, each 230 certificate issued by an individual CA MUST contain a Subject name 231 that is unique within that context. 233 3.1.2. Subject Public Key Info 235 Refer to section 3.1 of [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. 237 3.1.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 239 3.1.3.1. Basic Constraints 241 BGPsec speakers are EEs; therefore, the Basic Constraints extension 242 must not be present, as per [RFC6487]. 244 3.1.3.2. Extended Key Usage 246 BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the Extended Key Usage (EKU) 247 extension. As specified in [RFC6487] this extension MUST be marked 248 as non-critical. This document defines one EKU for BGPsec Router 249 Certificates: 251 id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= 252 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 253 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) } 255 id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 } 257 A BGPsec router MUST require the extended key usage extension to be 258 present in a BGPsec Router Certificate it receives. If multiple 259 KeyPurposeId values are included, the BGPsec routers need not 260 recognize all of them, as long as the required KeyPurposeId value is 261 present. BGPsec routers MUST reject certificates that do not contain 262 the BGPsec Router EKU even if they include the anyExtendedKeyUsage 263 OID defined in [RFC5280]. 265 3.1.3.3. Subject Information Access 267 This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be 268 omitted. 270 3.1.3.4. IP Resources 272 This extension is not used in BGPsec Router Certificates. It MUST be 273 omitted. 275 3.1.3.5. AS Resources 277 Each BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the AS Resource 278 Identifier Delegation extension, as specified in section 4.8.11 of 279 [RFC6487]. The AS Resource Identifier Delegation extension MUST 280 include one or more AS numbers, and the "inherit" element MUST NOT be 281 specified. 283 3.2. BGPsec Router Certificate Request Profile 285 Refer to section 6 of [RFC6487]. The only differences between this 286 profile and the profile in [RFC6487] are: 288 o The Basic Constraints extension: 290 If included, the CA MUST NOT honor the cA boolean if set to TRUE. 292 o The Extended Key Usage extension: 294 If included, id-kp-bgpsec-router MUST be present (see Section 295 3.1). If included, the CA MUST honor the request for id-kp- 296 bgpsec-router. 298 o The Subject Information Access extension: 300 If included, the CA MUST NOT honor the request to include the 301 extension. 303 o The SubjectPublicKeyInfo and PublicKey fields are specified in 304 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. 306 o The request is signed with the algorithms specified in [ID.sidr- 307 bgpsec-algs]. 309 3.3. BGPsec Router Certificate Validation 311 The validation procedure used for BGPsec Router Certificates is 312 identical to the validation procedure described in Section 7 of 313 [RFC6487], but using the constraints applied come from this 314 specification. For example, in step 3: "the certificate contains all 315 the field that must be present" - refers to the fields that are 316 required by this specification. 318 The differences are as follows: 320 o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the BGPsec Router EKU 321 defined in Section 3.1.3.2. 323 o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the SIA extension. 325 o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST NOT include the IP Resource 326 extension. 328 o BGPsec Router Certificates MUST include the AS Resource Identifier 329 Delegation extension. 331 o BGPsec Router Certificate MUST include the "Subject Public Key 332 Info" described in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] as it updates [ID.sidr- 333 rfc6485bis]. 335 NOTE: The cryptographic algorithms used by BGPsec routers are found 336 in [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs]. Currently, the algorithms specified in 337 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] and [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] are different. BGPsec 338 RPs will need to support algorithms that are used to validate BGPsec 339 signatures as well as the algorithms that are needed to validate 340 signatures on BGPsec certificates, RPKI CA certificates, and RPKI 341 CRLs. 343 3.4. Router Certificates and Signing Functions in the RPKI 345 As described in Section 1, the primary function of BGPsec route 346 certificates in the RPKI is for use in the context of certification 347 of Autonomous System (AS) paths in the Border Gateway Protocol 348 Security protocol (BGPsec). 350 The private key associated with a router EE certificate may be used 351 multiple times in generating signatures in multiple instances of the 352 BGPsec_Path Attribute Signature Segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. 353 I.e., the BGPsec router certificate is used to validate multiple 354 signatures. 356 BGPsec router certificates are stored in the issuing CA's repository, 357 where a repository following RFC6481 MUST use a .cer filename 358 extension for the certificate file. 360 4. Design Notes 362 The BGPsec Router Certificate profile is based on the Resource 363 Certificate profile as specified in [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis]. As a 364 result, many of the design choices herein are a reflection of the 365 design choices that were taken in that prior work. The reader is 366 referred to [RFC6484] for a fuller discussion of those choices. 368 CAs are required by the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] to issue 369 properly formed BGPsec Router Certificates regardless of what is 370 present in the certification request so there is some flexibility 371 permitted in the certificate requests: 373 o BGPsec Router Certificates are always EE certificates; therefore, 374 requests to issue a CA certificate result in EE certificates; 376 o BGPsec Router Certificates are always EE certificates; therefore, 377 requests for Key Usage extension values keyCertSign and cRLSign 378 result in certificates with neither of these values; 380 o BGPsec Router Certificates always include the BGPsec Rouer EKU 381 value; therefore, request without the value result in certificates 382 with the value; and, 384 o BGPsec Router Certificates never include the Subject Information 385 Access extension; therefore, request with this extension result in 386 certificates without the extension. 388 Note that this behavior is similar to the CA including the AS 389 Resource Identifier Delegation extension in issued BGPsec Router 390 Certificates despite the fact it is not present in the request. 392 5. Security Considerations 394 The Security Considerations of [RFC6487] apply. 396 A BGPsec Router Certificate will fail RPKI validation, as defined in 397 [RFC6487], because the algorithm suite is different. Consequently, a 398 RP needs to identify the EKU to determine the appropriate Validation 399 constraint. 401 A BGPsec Router Certificate is an extension of the RPKI [RFC6480] to 402 encompass routers. It is a building block BGPsec and is used to 403 validate signatures on BGPsec Signature-Segment origination of 404 Signed-Path segments [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]. Thus its essential 405 security function is the secure binding of one or more AS numbers to 406 a public key, consistent with the RPKI allocation/assignment 407 hierarchy. 409 Hash functions [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] are used when generating the two 410 key identifiers extension included in BGPsec certificates. However 411 as noted in [RFC6818], collision resistance is not a required 412 property of one-way hash functions when used to generate key 413 identifiers. Regardless, hash collisions are possible and if 414 detected an operator should be alerted. 416 6. IANA Considerations 418 This document makes use of two object identifiers in the SMI Registry 419 for PKIX. One is for the ASN.1 module in Appendix A and it comes 420 from the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier IANA registry (id- 421 mod-bgpsec-eku). The other is for the BGPsec router EKU defined in 422 Section 3.1.3.2 and Appendix A and it comes from the SMI Security for 423 PKIX Extended Key Purpose IANA registry. These OIDs were assigned 424 before management of the PKIX Arc was handed to IANA. No IANA 425 allocations are request of IANA, but please update the references in 426 those registries when this document is published by the RFC editor. 428 7. Acknowledgements 430 We would like to thank Geoff Huston, George Michaelson, and Robert 431 Loomans for their work on [RFC6487], which this work is based on. In 432 addition, the efforts of Steve Kent and Matt Lepinski were 433 instrumental in preparing this work. Additionally, we'd like to 434 thank Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano, Richard Hansen, Geoff Huston, 435 David Mandelberg, Sandra Murphy, and Sam Weiller for their reviews 436 and comments. 438 8. References 440 8.1. Normative References 442 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 443 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 444 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . 447 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 448 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, DOI 449 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, . 452 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border 453 Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI 454 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, . 457 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 458 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 459 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 460 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, 461 . 463 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 464 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 465 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, . 468 [RFC6818] Yee, P., "Updates to the Internet X.509 Public Key 469 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 470 (CRL) Profile", RFC 6818, DOI 10.17487/RFC6818, January 471 2013, . 473 [ID.sidr-rfc6485bis] G. Huston and G. Michaelson, "The Profile for 474 Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key 475 Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rfc6485bis, work-in- 476 progress. 478 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-algs] S. Turner, "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & 479 Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs, work-in- 480 progress. 482 8.2. Informative References 484 [RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", 485 RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006, 486 . 488 [RFC5123] White, R. and B. Akyol, "Considerations in Validating the 489 Path in BGP", RFC 5123, DOI 10.17487/RFC5123, February 490 2008, . 492 [RFC5492] Scudder, J. and R. Chandra, "Capabilities Advertisement 493 with BGP-4", RFC 5492, DOI 10.17487/RFC5492, February 2009, 494 . 496 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 497 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 498 February 2012, . 500 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 501 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, DOI 502 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, . 505 [RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate 506 Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 507 (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, DOI 10.17487/RFC6484, February 508 2012, . 510 [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, 511 "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 512 (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012, 513 . 515 [RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility 516 Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 517 (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April 518 2013, . 520 [ID.sidr-bgpsec-protocol] Lepinksi, M., "BGPsec Protocol 521 Specification", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol, work-in- 522 progress. 524 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module 526 BGPSECEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 527 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-bgpsec-eku(84) } 529 DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= 531 BEGIN 533 -- EXPORTS ALL -- 535 -- IMPORTS NOTHING -- 537 -- OID Arc -- 539 id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 540 iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 541 security(5) mechanisms(5) kp(3) } 543 -- BGPsec Router Extended Key Usage -- 545 id-kp-bgpsec-router OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 30 } 547 END 549 Authors' Addresses 551 Mark Reynolds 552 Island Peak Software 553 328 Virginia Road 554 Concord, MA 01742 556 Email: mcr@islandpeaksoftware.com 558 Sean Turner 559 IECA, Inc. 560 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 561 Fairfax, VA 22031 562 USA 564 EMail: turners@ieca.com 566 Stephen Kent 567 Raytheon BBN Technologies 568 10 Moulton St. 569 Cambridge, MA 02138 571 Email: kent@bbn.com