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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Outdated reference: A later version (-04) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-signed-object-01 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2426 (Obsoleted by RFC 6350) == Outdated reference: A later version (-13) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-arch-11 == Outdated reference: A later version (-17) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-cp-16 == Outdated reference: A later version (-09) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-06 Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 5 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ 4 Intended status: Standards Track January 1, 2011 5 Expires: July 5, 2011 7 The RPKI Ghostbusters Record 8 draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-00 10 Abstract 12 In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), resource 13 certificates completely obscure names or any other information which 14 might be useful for contacting responsible parties to deal with 15 issues of certificate expiration, maintenance, roll-overs, 16 compromises, etc. This draft describes the RPKI Ghostbusters Record 17 containing human contact information to be signed (indirectly) by a 18 resource-owning certificate. The data in the record are those of a 19 severely profiled vCARD. 21 Requirements Language 23 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 24 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 25 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 27 Status of this Memo 29 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 30 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 32 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 33 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 34 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 35 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 37 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 38 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 39 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 40 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 42 This Internet-Draft will expire on July 5, 2011. 44 Copyright Notice 46 Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 47 document authors. All rights reserved. 49 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 50 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 51 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 52 publication of this document. Please review these documents 53 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 54 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 55 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 56 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 57 described in the Simplified BSD License. 59 Table of Contents 61 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 3. RPKI Ghostbuster Record Payload Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 64 4. vCARD Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 5. CMS Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 6. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 73 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 75 1. Introduction 77 In the operational use of the RPKI it can become necessary to 78 contact, human to human, the party responsible for a resource-owning 79 certificate. The primary example of this need is when the owner of a 80 Route Origin Authorizations (ROA) sees that a upstream certificate in 81 the chain needed to validate the ROA is soon to expire or a CRL 82 associated with the certificate is stale, thus placing the quality of 83 the routing of the address space described by the ROA in jeopardy. 85 As the names in RPKI certificates are intentionally obscured hashes, 86 see [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp], there is no way to use the certificate itself 87 to lead to the certificate's maintainer. So, "Who do you call?" 89 This document specifies the RPKI Ghostbusters Record, signed 90 indirectly by the certificate whose maintainer needs to be contacted, 91 which contains human usable contact information for that maintainer. 93 This document and the Ghostbusters Record conform to the syntax 94 defined in [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. 96 Note that this record is not an identity certificate, but an 97 attestation to the contact data made by the holder of the signing 98 certificate, and its parent if that is an EE certificate. 100 This record is not meant to supplant or be used as resource registry 101 whois data. It gives information about a certificate maintainer not 102 a resource holder. 104 This specification has three main sections. The first, Section 4, is 105 the format of the contact payload information, a severely profiled 106 vCARD. The second, Section 5, profiles the packaging of the payload 107 as a profile of the RPKI Signed Object Template specification 108 [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. The third, Section 6, describes the 109 proper validation of the signed Ghostbusters Record. 111 2. Suggested Reading 113 It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, 114 [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, 115 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], Signed RPKI Objects, 116 [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object], and vCARDS [RFC2426]. 118 3. RPKI Ghostbuster Record Payload Example 120 An example of an RPKI Ghostbusters Record payload with all fields 121 used is as follows: 123 BEGIN:vCard 124 VERSION:3.0 125 FN:Human's Name 126 ORG:Organizational Entity 127 ADR;TYPE=WORK:;;42 Twisty Passage;Deep Cavern; WA; 98666;U.S.A. 128 TEL;TYPE=VOICE,MSG,WORK:+1-666-555-1212 129 TEL;TYPE=FAX,WORK:+1-666-555-1213 130 EMAIL;TYPE=INTERNET:human@example.com 131 END:vCard 133 4. vCARD Profile 135 The goal in profiling the vCARD is not to include as much information 136 as possible, but rather to include as few fields as possible while 137 providing the minimal necessary data to enable one to contact the 138 maintainer of the RPKI data which threatens the ROA[s] of concern. 140 The Ghostbusters vCARD payload is a minimalist subset of the vCARD as 141 described in [RFC2426]. 143 BEGIN - pro forma packaging which MUST be the first line in the 144 vCARD and MUST have the value "BEGIN:vCARD" as described in 145 [RFC2426]. 147 VERSION - pro forma packaging which MUST be the second line in the 148 vCARD and MUST have the value "VERSION:3.0" as described in 3.6.9 149 of [RFC2426]. 151 FN - the name, as described in 3.1.1 of [RFC2426], of a contactable 152 person who responsible for the certificate. 154 ORG - an organization as described in 3.5.5 of [RFC2426]. 156 ADR - a postal address as described in 3.2.1 of [RFC2426]. 158 TEL - a voice and/or fax phone as described in 3.3.1 of [RFC2426]. 160 EMAIL - an Email address as described in 3.3.2 of [RFC2426] 162 END - pro forma packaging which MUST be the last line in the vCARD 163 and MUST have the value "END:vCARD" as described in [RFC2426]. 165 The BEGIN, VERSION, and END lines MUST be included in a record. To 166 be useful, FN and one or more of ADR, TEL, and EMAIL SHOULD be 167 included. 169 5. CMS Packaging 171 The Ghostbusters Record is a CMS signed-data object conforming to the 172 RPKI Signed Data Object Template, [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. 174 The ContentType of a Ghostbusters Record is defined as 175 rpkiGhostbusters, and has the numerical value of TO BE ASSIGNED. 176 This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the 177 encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute 178 in the signerInfo object. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. 180 eContent: The content of a Ghostbusters Record is described above in 181 Section 4 above. 183 Similarly to a ROA, the Ghostbusters Record is usually signed by an 184 end-entity certificate which is, in turn, signed by the resource- 185 holding certificate whose maintainer is described in the vCARD. 187 6. Validation 189 The validation procedure defined in Section 3 of 190 [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object] is applied to a Ghostbusters Record. 191 After this procedure has been performed, the Version number field 192 within the payload is checked, and the OCTET STRING containing the 193 vCARD data is extracted. These data are checked against the profile 194 defined in Section 4 of this document. Only if all of these checks 195 pass is the Ghostbusters payload deemed valid and made available to 196 the application that requested the payload. 198 7. Security Considerations 200 Though there is no on the wire protocol in this specification, there 201 are attacks which could abuse the data described. As the data, to be 202 useful, need to be public, little can be done to avoid this exposure. 204 Phone Numbers: The vCARDs may contain real world telephone numbers 205 which could be abused for telemarketing, abusive calls, etc. 207 Email Addresses: The vCARDs may contain Email addresses which could 208 be abused for purpases of spam. 210 Relying parties are warned that the data in a Ghostbusters Record are 211 self-asserted. These data have not been verified by the CA that 212 issued a (CA) certificate to the entity that issued the EE 213 certificate used to validate the Ghostbusters Record. 215 8. IANA Considerations 217 This document has no IANA Considerations. 219 9. Acknowledgments 221 The author wishes to thank Russ Housley for suggesting profiling the 222 vCARD specification, the authors of [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object], 223 and particularly Steven Kent. 225 10. References 227 10.1. Normative References 229 [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object] 230 Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object 231 Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", 232 draft-ietf-sidr-signed-object-01 (work in progress), 233 October 2010. 235 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 236 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 238 [RFC2426] Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile", 239 RFC 2426, September 1998. 241 10.2. Informative References 243 [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] 244 Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 245 Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-11 (work in 246 progress), September 2010. 248 [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp] 249 Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate 250 Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI", 251 draft-ietf-sidr-cp-16 (work in progress), December 2010. 253 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] 254 Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 255 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", 256 draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-06 (work in progress), 257 November 2010. 259 Author's Address 261 Randy Bush 262 Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. 263 5147 Crystal Springs 264 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 265 US 267 Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 268 Email: randy@psg.com