idnits 2.17.1 draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-02.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The exact meaning of the all-uppercase expression 'MAY NOT' is not defined in RFC 2119. If it is intended as a requirements expression, it should be rewritten using one of the combinations defined in RFC 2119; otherwise it should not be all-uppercase. == The expression 'MAY NOT', while looking like RFC 2119 requirements text, is not defined in RFC 2119, and should not be used. Consider using 'MUST NOT' instead (if that is what you mean). Found 'MAY NOT' in this paragraph: Per [RFC2426], the BEGIN, VERSION, FN, N, and END types MUST be included in a record. To be useful, one or more of ADR, TEL, and EMAIL MUST be included. Other types MAY NOT be included. -- The document date (March 11, 2011) is 4794 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Outdated reference: A later version (-04) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-signed-object-03 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2426 (Obsoleted by RFC 6350) == Outdated reference: A later version (-13) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-arch-12 == Outdated reference: A later version (-17) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-cp-16 == Outdated reference: A later version (-09) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-07 Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 6 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan 4 Intended status: Standards Track March 11, 2011 5 Expires: September 12, 2011 7 The RPKI Ghostbusters Record 8 draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-02 10 Abstract 12 In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), resource 13 certificates completely obscure names or any other information which 14 might be useful for contacting responsible parties to deal with 15 issues of certificate expiration, maintenance, roll-overs, 16 compromises, etc. This draft describes the RPKI Ghostbusters Record 17 containing human contact information to be signed (indirectly) by a 18 resource-owning certificate. The data in the record are those of a 19 severely profiled vCARD. 21 Requirements Language 23 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 24 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 25 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 27 Status of this Memo 29 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 30 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 32 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 33 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 34 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 35 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 37 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 38 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 39 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 40 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 42 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2011. 44 Copyright Notice 46 Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 47 document authors. All rights reserved. 49 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 50 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 51 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 52 publication of this document. Please review these documents 53 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 54 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 55 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 56 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 57 described in the Simplified BSD License. 59 Table of Contents 61 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 3. RPKI Ghostbusters Record Payload Example . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 4. vCARD Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 5. CMS Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 6. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 73 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 75 1. Introduction 77 In the operational use of the RPKI it can become necessary to 78 contact, human to human, the party responsible for a resource-owning 79 certificate. An important example is when the owner of a Route 80 Origin Authorization (ROA) sees a problem, or an impending problem, 81 with a certificate or CRL in the path between the ROA and a trust 82 anchor. E.g., a certificate along that path has expired, is soon to 83 expire, or a CRL associated with a CA along the path is stale, thus 84 placing the quality of the routing of the address space described by 85 the ROA in jeopardy. 87 As the names in RPKI certificates are intentionally hashes which are 88 not meaningful to humans, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp], there is no way to 89 use a certificate itself to lead to the worrisome certificate's or 90 CRL's maintainer. So, "Who do you call?" 92 This document specifies the RPKI Ghostbusters Record, an object 93 signed, indirectly via an End Entity (EE) certificate, by the 94 certificate whose maintainer may be contacted using the human usable 95 payload information in the Ghostbusters Record. 97 The Ghostbusters Record conforms to the syntax defined in 98 [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. 100 Note that the Ghostbusters Record is not an identity certificate, but 101 rather an attestation to the contact data made by the issuer of the 102 certificate signing the Ghostbusters Record. 104 This record is not meant to supplant or be used as resource registry 105 whois data. It gives information about an RPKI certificate 106 maintainer not a resource holder. 108 This specification has three main sections. The first, Section 4, is 109 the format of the contact payload information, a severely profiled 110 vCARD. The second, Section 5, profiles the packaging of the payload 111 as a profile of the RPKI Signed Object Template specification 112 [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. The third, Section 6, describes the 113 proper validation of the signed Ghostbusters Record. 115 2. Suggested Reading 117 It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, 118 [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, 119 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], Signed RPKI Objects, 120 [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object], and vCARDs [RFC2426]. 122 3. RPKI Ghostbusters Record Payload Example 124 An example of an RPKI Ghostbusters Record payload with all types 125 populated is as follows: 127 BEGIN:vCard 128 VERSION:3.0 129 FN:Human's Name 130 N:Name;Human's;Ms.;Dr.;OCD;ADD 131 ORG:Organizational Entity 132 ADR;TYPE=WORK:;;42 Twisty Passage;Deep Cavern; WA; 98666;U.S.A. 133 TEL;TYPE=VOICE,MSG,WORK:+1-666-555-1212 134 TEL;TYPE=FAX,WORK:+1-666-555-1213 135 EMAIL;TYPE=INTERNET:human@example.com 136 END:vCard 138 4. vCARD Profile 140 The goal in profiling the vCARD is not to include as much information 141 as possible, but rather to include as few types as possible while 142 providing the minimal necessary data to enable one to contact the 143 maintainer of the RPKI data which threatens the ROA[s] of concern. 145 The Ghostbusters vCARD payload is a minimalist subset of the vCARD as 146 described in [RFC2426]. 148 BEGIN - pro forma packaging which MUST be the first line in the 149 vCARD and MUST have the value "BEGIN:vCARD" as described in 150 [RFC2426]. 152 VERSION - pro forma packaging which MUST be the second line in the 153 vCARD and MUST have the value "VERSION:3.0" as described in 3.6.9 154 of [RFC2426]. 156 FN - the name, as described in 3.1.1 of [RFC2426], of a contactable 157 person who responsible for the certificate. 159 N - the components of the name of the object the vCard represents, 160 as described in 3.1.2 of [RFC2426]. 162 ORG - an organization as described in 3.5.5 of [RFC2426]. 164 ADR - a postal address as described in 3.2.1 of [RFC2426]. 166 TEL - a voice and/or fax phone as described in 3.3.1 of [RFC2426]. 168 EMAIL - an Email address as described in 3.3.2 of [RFC2426] 170 END - pro forma packaging which MUST be the last line in the vCARD 171 and MUST have the value "END:vCARD" as described in [RFC2426]. 173 Per [RFC2426], the BEGIN, VERSION, FN, N, and END types MUST be 174 included in a record. To be useful, one or more of ADR, TEL, and 175 EMAIL MUST be included. Other types MAY NOT be included. 177 5. CMS Packaging 179 The Ghostbusters Record is a CMS signed-data object conforming to the 180 RPKI Signed Data Object Template, [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. 182 The ContentType of a Ghostbusters Record is defined as 183 rpkiGhostbusters, and has the numerical value of [TO BE ASSIGNED]. 184 This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the 185 encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute 186 in the signerInfo object. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. 188 eContent: The content of a Ghostbusters Record is described above in 189 Section 4 above. 191 Similarly to a ROA, the Ghostbusters Record is verified using an EE 192 certificate issued under the CA certificate associated with the 193 resource-holding certificate whose maintainer is described in the 194 vCARD. 196 The EE certificate used to verify the Ghostbusters Record is the one 197 that appears in the CMS data structure that contains the payload 198 defined above. 200 6. Validation 202 The validation procedure defined in Section 3 of 203 [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object] is applied to a Ghostbusters Record. 204 After this procedure has been performed, the Version number type 205 within the payload is checked, and the OCTET STRING containing the 206 vCARD data is extracted. These data are checked against the profile 207 defined in Section 4 of this document. Only if all of these checks 208 pass is the Ghostbusters payload deemed valid and made available to 209 the application that requested the payload. 211 7. Security Considerations 213 Though there is no on the wire protocol in this specification, there 214 are attacks which could abuse the data described. As the data, to be 215 useful, need to be public, little can be done to avoid this exposure. 217 Phone Numbers: The vCARDs may contain real world telephone numbers 218 which could be abused for telemarketing, abusive calls, etc. 220 Email Addresses: The vCARDs may contain Email addresses which could 221 be abused for purposes of spam. 223 Relying parties are warned that the data in a Ghostbusters Record are 224 self-asserted. These data have not been verified by the CA that 225 issued a (CA) certificate to the entity that issued the EE 226 certificate used to validate the Ghostbusters Record. 228 8. IANA Considerations 230 This document has no IANA Considerations. 232 9. Acknowledgments 234 The author wishes to thank Russ Housley, the authors of 235 [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object], Stephen Kent, and Michael Elkins for 236 their contributions. 238 10. References 240 10.1. Normative References 242 [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object] 243 Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object 244 Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", 245 draft-ietf-sidr-signed-object-03 (work in progress), 246 February 2011. 248 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 249 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 251 [RFC2426] Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile", 252 RFC 2426, September 1998. 254 10.2. Informative References 256 [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] 257 Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 258 Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-12 (work in 259 progress), February 2011. 261 [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp] 262 Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate 263 Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI", 264 draft-ietf-sidr-cp-16 (work in progress), December 2010. 266 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] 267 Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 268 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", 269 draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-07 (work in progress), 270 February 2011. 272 Author's Address 274 Randy Bush 275 Internet Initiative Japan 276 5147 Crystal Springs 277 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 278 US 280 Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 281 Email: randy@psg.com