idnits 2.17.1 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-00.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (January 1, 2011) is 4856 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Best Current Practice ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Outdated reference: A later version (-13) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-arch-11 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational draft: draft-ietf-sidr-arch (ref. 'I-D.ietf-sidr-arch') == Outdated reference: A later version (-09) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-06 == Outdated reference: A later version (-12) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-09 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational draft: draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets (ref. 'I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets') Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 4 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ 4 Intended status: BCP January 1, 2011 5 Expires: July 5, 2011 7 RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operations 8 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-00 10 Abstract 12 Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many 13 operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and 14 present them. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin 15 validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood. 17 Requirements Language 19 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 20 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 21 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 23 Status of this Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on July 5, 2011. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 47 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 48 publication of this document. Please review these documents 49 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 50 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 51 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 52 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 53 described in the Simplified BSD License. 55 Table of Contents 57 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 64 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 65 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 69 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 71 1. Introduction 73 RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread propagation of the 74 Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How 75 the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern 76 from many aspects. 78 The global RPKI has yet to be deployed, only a testbed exists, and 79 some beta testing is being done by the IANA and some RIRs. It is 80 expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. It is 81 thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will deploy over the 82 next year to five years. 84 Origin validation only need be done by an AS's border routers and is 85 designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are 86 originated by large providers, upstreams and downstreams, and by 87 small stub/entetprise/edge routers. 89 Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers 90 without hardware upgrade. It should be used by everyone from large 91 backbones to small stub/entetprise/edge routers. 93 RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent 94 local routing policies, there is no liability that normal Internet 95 routing is threatened by unprudent deployment of the global RPKI, see 96 Section 5. 98 2. Suggested Reading 100 It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, 101 see [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, see 102 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], ROAs, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], 103 the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [I-D.ymbk-rpki-rtr-protocol], and 104 RPKI-based Prefix Validation, see [I-D.pmohapat-sidr-pfx-validate]. 106 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 108 The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, 109 manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbuster Records as described in 110 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Policies and considerations for RPKI 111 object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere. 113 A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the 114 global distributed database using the rsync protocol and a validation 115 tool such as rcynic. 117 Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other 118 validated caches. An operator should take maximum advantage of this 119 feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI database. 121 As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI 122 data, operators will likely want border routers to have one or more 123 nearby caches. 125 For redundancy, a router may peer with more than one cache at the 126 same time. Peering with two or more, one local and others remote, is 127 recommended. 129 If an operator or site trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they 130 might as well trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache and feed off 131 of those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those 132 upstreams to maintain fresh and reliable caches. 134 A transit provider or a network with peers will want to validate 135 origins in announcements made by downstreams and peers. They still 136 may choose to trust the caches provided by their upstreams. 138 4. Within a Network 140 Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, 141 those which border other networks/ASs. 143 A validating router will use the result of origin validation to 144 influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In 145 deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, 146 preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy 147 validation capable border routers. 149 eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would 150 be candidates for the earliest deployment. Validating more critical 151 received announcements should be considered in partial deployment. 153 5. Routing Policy 155 Origin validation based on the RPKI merely marks a received 156 announcement as having an origin which is Validated, Unknown, or 157 Invalid. How this is used in routing is up to the router operator's 158 local policy. See [I-D.pmohapat-sidr-pfx-validate]. 160 Reasonable application of local policy should be designed eliminate 161 the threat of unroutability of prefixes due to ill-advised or 162 incorrect certification policies. 164 As origin validation will be rolled out over years coverage will be 165 spotty for a long time. Hence a normal operator's policy should not 166 be overly strict, perhaps preferring valid announcements and giving 167 very low preference, but still using, invalid announcements. 169 Some may choose to use the large Local-Preference hammer. Others 170 might choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which 171 comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process. 173 Certainly, routing on unknown validity state will be prevalent for a 174 long time. 176 Until the community feels comfortable relying on RPKI data, routing 177 on invalid origin validity, though at a low preference, may be 178 prevalent for a long time. 180 Announcements with valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with 181 unknown or invalid origins. 183 Announcements with unvalidatable origins SHOULD be preferred over 184 those with invalid origins. 186 Announcements with invalid origins MAY be used, but SHOULD be less 187 preferred than those with valid or unknown. 189 6. Notes 191 Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent 192 view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache 193 or router may have different data about a particular prefix than 194 another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the 195 nature of distributed data with distributed caches. 197 There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, 198 if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the 199 deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]. 201 7. Security Considerations 203 As the BGP origin is not signed, origin validation is open to 204 malicious spoofing. It is only designed to deal with inadvertent 205 mis-advertisement. 207 Origin validation does nothing about AS-Path validation and therefore 208 is open to monkey in the middle path attacks. 210 The data plane may not follow the control plane. 212 8. IANA Considerations 214 This document has no IANA Considerations. 216 9. Acknowledgments 218 The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Pradosh 219 Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Schiller, 220 John Scudder, and Dave Ward. 222 10. References 224 10.1. Normative References 226 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 227 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 229 [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] 230 Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 231 Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-11 (work in 232 progress), September 2010. 234 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] 235 Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 236 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", 237 draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-06 (work in progress), 238 November 2010. 240 [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] 241 Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 242 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", 243 draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-09 (work in progress), 244 November 2010. 246 [I-D.ymbk-rpki-rtr-protocol] 247 Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol", 248 draft-ymbk-rpki-rtr-protocol-06 (work in progress), 249 July 2010. 251 [I-D.pmohapat-sidr-pfx-validate] 252 Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 253 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", 254 draft-pmohapat-sidr-pfx-validate-07 (work in progress), 255 April 2010. 257 [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets] 258 Kumari, W., "Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.", 259 draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01 (work in progress), 260 September 2010. 262 10.2. Informative References 264 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway 265 Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. 267 Author's Address 269 Randy Bush 270 Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. 271 5147 Crystal Springs 272 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 273 US 275 Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 276 Email: randy@psg.com