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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ 4 Intended status: BCP January 29, 2011 5 Expires: August 2, 2011 7 RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation 8 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-04 10 Abstract 12 Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many 13 operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and 14 present them. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin 15 validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood. 17 Requirements Language 19 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 20 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 21 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 23 Status of this Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 2, 2011. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 47 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 48 publication of this document. Please review these documents 49 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 50 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 51 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 52 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 53 described in the Simplified BSD License. 55 Table of Contents 57 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 63 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 64 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 65 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 69 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 71 1. Introduction 73 RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread propagation of the 74 Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How 75 the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern 76 from many aspects. 78 The global RPKI has yet to be deployed, only a testbed exists, and 79 some beta testing is being done by the IANA and some RIRs. It is 80 expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. It is 81 thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will deploy over the 82 next year to five years. 84 Origin validation only need be done by an AS's border routers and is 85 designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are 86 originated by large providers, upstreams and downstreams, and by 87 small stub/entetprise/edge routers. 89 Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers 90 without hardware upgrade. It should be used by everyone from large 91 backbones to small stub/entetprise/edge routers. 93 RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent 94 local routing policies, there is little risk that normal Internet 95 routing is threatened by unprudent deployment of the global RPKI, see 96 Section 5. 98 2. Suggested Reading 100 It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, 101 see [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, see 102 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], ROAs, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], 103 the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr], and RPKI- 104 based Prefix Validation, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. 106 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 108 The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, 109 manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbuster Records as described in 110 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Policies and considerations for RPKI 111 object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere. 113 A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the 114 global distributed database using the rsync protocol and a validation 115 tool such as rcynic. 117 Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other 118 validated caches. An operator should take maximum advantage of this 119 feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI database. 121 As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI 122 data, operators will likely want border routers to have one or more 123 nearby caches. 125 For redundancy, a router may peer with more than one cache at the 126 same time. Peering with two or more, one local and others remote, is 127 recommended. 129 If an operator or site trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they 130 might as well trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache and peer with 131 of those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those 132 upstreams to maintain fresh and reliable caches. 134 A transit provider or a network with peers will want to validate 135 origins in announcements made by downstreams and peers. They still 136 may choose to trust the caches provided by their upstreams. 138 Before issuing a ROA for a block, an operator MUST ensure that any 139 sub-allocations from that block which are announced by others (e.g. 140 customers) have ROAs in play. Otherwise, issuing a ROA for the 141 super-block will cause the announcements of sub-allocations with no 142 ROAs to be Invalid. 144 An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP MAY 145 wish to have private RPKI for that space with its own trust anchor. 147 Operators issuing ROAs may have 'lazy' customers who announce into 148 global eBGP but who do not wish to go though the work to manage their 149 own certificates and ROAs. The operator SHOULD provision the RPKI 150 data for the lazy customer just as they provision many other things 151 for them. 153 4. Within a Network 155 Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, 156 those which border other networks/ASs. 158 A validating router will use the result of origin validation to 159 influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In 160 deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, 161 preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy 162 validation capable border routers. 164 eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would 165 be candidates for the earliest deployment. Validating more critical 166 received announcements should be considered in partial deployment. 168 5. Routing Policy 170 Origin validation based on the RPKI merely marks a received 171 announcement as having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or 172 Invalid. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in 173 routing is specified by the operator's local policy. 175 Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the 176 uncertainty associated with a system in flux, applying local policy 177 to eliminate the threat of unroutability of prefixes due to ill- 178 advised certification policies and/or incorrect certification data. 179 E.g. until the community feels comfortable relying on RPKI data, 180 routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a low preference, will 181 likely be prevalent for a long time. 183 As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will 184 be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound 185 validity state will be advisable for a long time. As the transition 186 moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state 187 NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy should not be 188 overly strict, preferring Valid announcements, attaching a lower 189 preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and giving 190 very low preference to, but still using, Invalid announcements. 192 Some may choose to use the large Local-Preference hammer. Others 193 might choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which 194 comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process. 196 When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy, 197 the operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade 198 vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity 199 state, be careful that peer community signaling can not upgrade an 200 invalid announcement to valid or better. 202 Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with 203 NotFound or Invalid origins. 205 Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those 206 with Invalid origins. 208 Announcements with Invalid origins MAY be used, but SHOULD be less 209 preferred than those with Valid or NotFound. 211 6. Notes 213 Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent 214 view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache 215 or router may have different data about a particular prefix than 216 another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the 217 nature of distributed data with distributed caches. 219 There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, 220 if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the 221 deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]. 223 7. Security Considerations 225 As the BGP origin is not signed, origin validation is open to 226 malicious spoofing. It is only designed to deal with inadvertent 227 mis-advertisement. 229 Origin validation does nothing about AS-Path validation and therefore 230 is open to monkey in the middle path attacks. 232 The data plane may not follow the control plane. 234 Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in 235 Section 5 above. 237 8. IANA Considerations 239 This document has no IANA Considerations. 241 9. Acknowledgments 243 The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Pradosh 244 Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason 245 Schiller, John Scudder, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward. 247 10. References 249 10.1. Normative References 251 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 252 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 254 [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] 255 Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 256 Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-11 (work in 257 progress), September 2010. 259 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] 260 Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 261 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", 262 draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-06 (work in progress), 263 November 2010. 265 [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] 266 Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 267 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", 268 draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-09 (work in progress), 269 November 2010. 271 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] 272 Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol", 273 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-07 (work in progress), 274 January 2011. 276 [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] 277 Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 278 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", 279 draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-00 (work in progress), 280 July 2010. 282 10.2. Informative References 284 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway 285 Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. 287 [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets] 288 Kumari, W., "Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.", 289 draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01 (work in progress), 290 September 2010. 292 Author's Address 294 Randy Bush 295 Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. 296 5147 Crystal Springs 297 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 298 US 300 Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 301 Email: randy@psg.com