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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ 4 Intended status: BCP February 1, 2011 5 Expires: August 5, 2011 7 RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation 8 draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-05 10 Abstract 12 Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many 13 operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and 14 present them. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin 15 validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood. 17 Requirements Language 19 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 20 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 21 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 23 Status of this Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 5, 2011. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 47 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 48 publication of this document. Please review these documents 49 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 50 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 51 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 52 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 53 described in the Simplified BSD License. 55 Table of Contents 57 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 63 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 64 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 65 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 67 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 68 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 69 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 71 1. Introduction 73 RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread propagation of the 74 Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How 75 the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern 76 from many aspects. 78 The global RPKI has yet to be deployed, only a testbed exists, and 79 some beta testing is being done by the IANA and some RIRs. It is 80 expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. It is 81 thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will deploy over the 82 next year to five years. 84 Origin validation only need be done by an AS's border routers and is 85 designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are 86 originated by large providers, upstreams and downstreams, and by 87 small stub/enterprise/edge routers. 89 Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers 90 without hardware upgrade. It should be used by everyone from large 91 backbones to small stub/entetprise/edge routers. 93 RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent 94 local routing policies, there is little risk that normal Internet 95 routing is threatened by imprudent deployment of the global RPKI, see 96 Section 5. 98 2. Suggested Reading 100 It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, 101 see [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, see 102 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], ROAs, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], 103 the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr], and RPKI- 104 based Prefix Validation, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. 106 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 108 The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, 109 manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbuster Records as described in 110 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Policies and considerations for RPKI 111 object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere. 113 A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the 114 global distributed database using the rsync protocol and a validation 115 tool such as rcynic. 117 Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other 118 validated caches. Network operators SHOULD take maximum advantage of 119 this feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI 120 database. 122 As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI 123 data, operators SHOULD locate caches close to routers that require 124 these data and services. A router can peer with one or more nearby 125 caches. 127 For redundancy, a router SHOULD peer with more than one cache at the 128 same time. Peering with two or more, one local and others remote, is 129 recommended. 131 If an operator trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they can also 132 trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache, and peer with those 133 caches. Note that this places an obligation on those upstreams to 134 maintain fresh and reliable caches. 136 A transit provider or a network with peers will want to validate 137 origins in announcements made by downstreams and peers. They still 138 SHOULD trust the caches provided by their upstreams. 140 Before issuing a ROA for a block, an operator MUST ensure that any 141 sub-allocations from that block which are announced by others (e.g. 142 customers) have ROAs in play. Otherwise, issuing a ROA for the 143 super-block will cause the announcements of sub-allocations with no 144 ROAs to be Invalid. 146 An environment where private address space is announced in eBGP the 147 operator MAY have private RPKI objects which cover these private 148 spaces. This will require a trust anchor created and owned by that 149 environment. 151 "Operators issuing ROAs may have customers announce into global eBGP 152 but do not wish to go though the work to manage their own 153 certificates and ROAs. The operator SHOULD provision the RPKI data 154 for these customers just as they provision many other things for 155 them. 157 4. Within a Network 159 Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, 160 those which border other networks/ASs. 162 A validating router will use the result of origin validation to 163 influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In 164 deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, 165 preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy 166 validation capable border routers. 168 eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would 169 be candidates for the earliest deployment. Validating more critical 170 received announcements should be considered in partial deployment. 172 5. Routing Policy 174 Origin validation based on the RPKI merely marks a received 175 announcement as having an origin which is Valid, NotFound, or 176 Invalid. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate]. How this is used in 177 routing is specified by the operator's local policy. 179 Local policy using relative preference is suggested to manage the 180 uncertainty associated with a system in flux, applying local policy 181 to eliminate the threat of unroutability of prefixes due to ill- 182 advised certification policies and/or incorrect certification data. 183 E.g. until the community feels comfortable relying on RPKI data, 184 routing on Invalid origin validity, though at a low preference, may 185 be common. 187 As origin validation will be rolled out incrementally, coverage will 188 be incomplete for a long time. Therefore, routing on NotFound 189 validity state will be advisable for a long time. As the transition 190 moves forward, the number of BGP announcements with validation state 191 NotFound should decrease. Hence an operator's policy SHOULD NOT be 192 overly strict, preferring Valid announcements, attaching a lower 193 preference to, but still using, NotFound announcements, and dropping 194 or giving very low preference to Invalid announcements. 196 Some may choose to use the large Local-Preference hammer. Others 197 might choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which 198 comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process. 200 When using a metric which is also influenced by other local policy, 201 the operator should be careful not to create privilege upgrade 202 vulnerabilities. E.g. if Local Pref is set depending on validity 203 state, be careful that peer community signaling can not upgrade an 204 invalid announcement to valid or better. 206 Announcements with Valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with 207 NotFound or Invalid origins. 209 Announcements with NotFound origins SHOULD be preferred over those 210 with Invalid origins. 212 Announcements with Invalid origins MAY be used, but SHOULD be less 213 preferred than those with Valid or NotFound. 215 6. Notes 217 Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent 218 view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache 219 or router may have different data about a particular prefix than 220 another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the 221 nature of distributed data with distributed caches. 223 There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, 224 if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the 225 deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]. 227 7. Security Considerations 229 As the BGP origin is not signed, origin validation is open to 230 malicious spoofing. It is only designed to deal with inadvertent 231 mis-advertisement. 233 Origin validation does not address the problem of AS-Path validation. 234 Therefore paths are open to manipulation, either malicious or 235 accidental. 237 The data plane may not follow the control plane. 239 Be aware of the class of privilege escalation issues discussed in 240 Section 5 above. 242 8. IANA Considerations 244 This document has no IANA Considerations. 246 9. Acknowledgments 248 The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Pradosh 249 Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Sandy Murphy, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason 250 Schiller, John Scudder, Maureen Stillman, and Dave Ward. 252 10. References 253 10.1. Normative References 255 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 256 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 258 [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] 259 Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 260 Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-11 (work in 261 progress), September 2010. 263 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] 264 Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 265 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", 266 draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-06 (work in progress), 267 November 2010. 269 [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] 270 Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 271 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", 272 draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-09 (work in progress), 273 November 2010. 275 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr] 276 Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol", 277 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-07 (work in progress), 278 January 2011. 280 [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] 281 Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 282 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", 283 draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-00 (work in progress), 284 July 2010. 286 10.2. Informative References 288 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway 289 Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. 291 [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets] 292 Kumari, W., "Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.", 293 draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01 (work in progress), 294 September 2010. 296 Author's Address 298 Randy Bush 299 Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. 300 5147 Crystal Springs 301 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 302 US 304 Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 305 Email: randy@psg.com