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Checking references for intended status: Best Current Practice ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2050 (Obsoleted by RFC 7020) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3280 (Obsoleted by RFC 5280) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 4158 Summary: 7 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 7 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDR G. Huston 3 Internet-Draft R. Loomans 4 Intended status: Best Current G. Michaelson 5 Practice APNIC 6 Expires: December 21, 2006 June 19, 2006 8 A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates 9 draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-01.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any 14 applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware 15 have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes 16 aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 24 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 25 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 26 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on December 21, 2006. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). 40 Abstract 42 This document defines a profile for X.509 certificates for the 43 purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to- use" of 44 an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System 45 Numbers). This profile is used to convey the authorization of the 46 subject to be regarded as the current unique controlled of the IP 47 addresses and AS numbers that are described in a Resource 48 Certificate. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 54 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 55 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 56 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 60 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 62 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 7 65 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 66 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 67 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 68 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 69 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 70 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 71 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 72 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 73 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 74 3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 75 3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 76 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 11 77 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 78 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 79 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 80 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 81 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 82 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 83 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 84 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 85 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 86 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 87 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 88 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 89 5.1. Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . . . . . . 14 90 5.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . . . 17 91 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 92 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 19 93 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 94 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 20 95 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 96 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 97 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 98 10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 99 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 100 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 24 101 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 102 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 26 104 1. Introduction 106 This document defines a profile for X.509 certificates for use in the 107 context of Resources Certificates. Resource Certificates are X.509 108 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC3280] and to this 109 additional profile, and attest that the subject has the "right-to- 110 use" a listed set of IP addresses and Autonomous Numbers. 112 A Resource Certificate describes an action by an Issuer that binds a 113 list of IP address blocks and AS numbers to the Subject of a 114 certificate, identified by the unique association of the Subject's 115 private key with the public key contained in the Resource 116 Certificate. 118 In the context of the public Internet it is intended that Resource 119 Certificates are used in a manner that is aligned to the public 120 number resource distribution function, Specifically, when a number 121 resource is allocated or assigned by a Registry to an entity, this 122 allocation is described by a Resource Certificate issued by the 123 Registry with a subject corresponding to the entity that is the 124 recipient of this assignment or allocation. This corresponds to a 125 hierarchical PKI structure, where Resource Certificates are only 126 issued in one 'direction' and there is a single unique path from a 127 "Root CA" to any valid certificate. 129 Validation of a certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can be 130 undertaken by creating a valid issuer - subject chain from the trust 131 anchor allocation authorities to the certificate [RFC4158]. 133 Resource Certificates may be used in the context of secure inter- 134 domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an IP number 135 resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, to verify 136 legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related use 137 contexts include validation of access to Internet Routing Registries 138 for nominated routing objects, validation of routing requests, and 139 detection of potential unauthorized used of IP addresses. 141 This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource 142 Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. 143 Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to 144 this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. 146 1.1. Terminology 148 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 149 described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 150 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509 151 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet 152 Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing 153 Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" 154 [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management 155 policy documents. 157 The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 158 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 159 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 161 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 163 The framework for describing an association between the subject of a 164 certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current 165 control is described in [RFC3779]. 167 There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in 168 this profile: 170 1. RFC 3779 notes that this resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL 171 extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate 172 profile further defines that the use of this certificate 173 extension MUST be used and MUST be marked as CRITICAL. 175 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 176 set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix 177 masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile 178 MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description 180 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 181 unique value token within the context of certificates issued by 182 the validity includes the first condition that the resources 183 described in the Issuer's resource extension must encompass those 184 of the Subject's resource extension. In this context "encompass" 185 allows for the Issuer's resource set to be the same as, or a 186 strict superset of, any subject's resource set. Certificate 187 validity in the context of this profile also includes a second 188 condition that no two (or more) certificates issued by a single 189 Issuer to two (or more) different subjects have a non-null 190 intersection of resources. In other words an Issuer can certify 191 at most one unique subject as the unique holder of a right-to-use 192 for any particular resource. 194 This implies that a test of certificate validity implies that there 195 exists a set of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain from 196 one, and only one, trust anchor to the certificate in question, and 197 that the resource extensions from the trust anchor to the certificate 198 form a sequence of encompassing relationships. 200 3. Resource Certificate Fields 202 A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, 203 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields 204 listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, 205 all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST 206 NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value 207 is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource 208 Certificates. 210 3.1. Version 212 Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field 213 MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this 214 field is 2). 216 3.2. Serial number 218 The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per 219 Issuer. 221 3.3. Signature Algorithm 223 This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on 224 this certificate. This profile uses SHA-256 with RSA 225 (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and the value for this field MUST be the 226 OID value 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 [RFC4055]. 228 3.4. Issuer 230 This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the 231 certificate. The value of this field is an X.501 name. 233 3.5. Subject 235 This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been 236 allocated / assigned. The value of this field is an X.500 name. In 237 this profile the subject name is determined by the Issuer. 239 This field MUST be non-empty. 241 3.6. Valid From 243 The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this 244 profile the "Valid From" time is to be no earlier than the time of 245 certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], 246 Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always 247 encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as 248 UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as 249 GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280]. 251 3.7. Valid To 253 The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the 254 certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime 255 of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the 256 Issuer and the Subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs 257 conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's 258 "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 259 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats 260 are defined in [RFC3280]. 262 3.8. Subject Public Key Info 264 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with 265 which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and 266 thus the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. A minimum 267 key size of 1024 bits is mandated in this profile. Regional Registry 268 CAs MUST use a key size of 2048 bits. 270 [Note - not for publication. One alternative option is to specify 271 "no less than 2048 bits" and allow for longer key sizes. On the 272 other hand it may be preferable to move to EC-DSA instead of RSA, in 273 which case allowing for the option of longer RSA key sizes may be 274 considered inappropriate.] 276 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 278 As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate 279 is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate 280 using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical 281 extension it does not recognize; however, a non-critical extension 282 MAY be ignored if it is not recognized [RFC3280]. 284 The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming 285 Resource Certificate. 287 3.9.1. Basic Constraints 289 The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the 290 certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification 291 paths that include this certificate. 293 The Issuer determines whether the cA boolean is set. If this bit is 294 set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue resources 295 certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the subject is 296 permitted be a CA). 298 The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST 299 NOT be present. 301 The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the 302 Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present. 304 [note - not for publication. It is unclear whether the CA bit should 305 be set on in all cases. 307 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 309 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 310 certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate 311 certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all 312 Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. 314 The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in 315 the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of 316 certificates issued by the subject of this certificate. 318 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 319 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as 320 described in Section 4.2.1.2 of[RFC3280]. 322 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 324 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 325 certificates that are signed by a particular issuer's private key, by 326 providing a hash value of the corresponding Issuer's public key. To 327 facilitate path construction, this extension MUST appear in all 328 Resource Certificates. The keyIdentifier subfield MUST be present. 329 The authorityCertIssuer and authorityCertSerialNumber subfields MAY 330 be present. This extension is non-critical. 332 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 333 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as 334 described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 336 3.9.4. Key Usage 338 This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical 339 extension, and it MUST be present. 341 In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits 342 are set to TRUE. In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature 343 bit MUST be set and MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. 345 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 347 This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) 348 associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile 349 uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access 350 mechanism is a single "rsync" URL that references a single inclusive 351 CRL for each issuer. 353 In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, 354 implying at the CRLIssuer subfield MUST be omitted, and the 355 distributionPoint subfield MUST be present. The Reasons subfield 356 MUST be omitted. 358 The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT 359 contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST 360 be of type URI. Furthermore, as the scope of the CRL is all 361 certificates issued by this issuer, the sequence of distributionPoint 362 values MUST contain only a single DistributionPointName set. The 363 DistributionPointName set MAY contain more than one URI value. An 364 rsync URI MUST be present in the DistributionPointName set. 366 This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. 368 [NOTE - not for publication. The reason for the specification of an 369 RSYNC URI as a MUST in this profile is to ensure that relying parties 370 who wish to maintain a local copy of a synchronized repository are 371 not forced to maintain a retrieval capability using a potentially 372 unbounded set of URI types. The profile is attempting to ensure that 373 rsync should be all that is required to perform a repository 374 synchronization operation. A more restrictive potential condition 375 here (and also in the SIA and AIA extensions) is that one and only 376 one RSYNC URI is permitted. This would reduce some of the potential 377 variations in certificates and also stress that certificate access 378 and use by relying parties is critically dependent on RSYNC access, 379 and that other forms of access are not necessarily available to 380 relying parties.] 382 3.9.6. Authority Information Access 384 This field (AIA) identifies the location of all certificates that are 385 issued by this Issuer that are signed with the Issuer's private key 386 that signed this certificate. This profile uses a URI form of object 387 identification. The preferred URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and 388 an rsync URI MUST be specified with an accessMethod value of id-ad- 389 caIssuers. Other access method URIs MAY also be included in the 390 value sequence of this extension. 392 This field MUST be present, and is non-critical. 394 [Note - not for publication rfc3280 defines only two OIDs for the 395 access method, id-ad-caIssuers and id-ad-ocsp. It would appear that 396 id-ad-ocsp is not relevant here in that OCSP is not included as part 397 of the resource certificate profile - which leaves id-ad-caIssuers. 398 The text in 4.2.2.1 of RFC3280 notes that: "the id-ad-caIssuers OID 399 is used when the additional information lists CAs that have issued 400 certificates superior to the CA that issued the certificate 401 containing this extension. The referenced CA issuers description is 402 intended to aid certificate users in the selection of a certification 403 path that terminates at a point trusted by the certificate user" 404 However there is no intention to require that such a list be included 405 in this subfield in this profile. The question is: What accessMethod 406 OID should be used here in the Access Description?] 408 3.9.7. Subject Information Access 410 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services 411 relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension 412 appears that relate to the subject public key that is certified in 413 this certificate. Where the Subject is a CA for Resource 414 Certificates this information and service collection will include all 415 current valid certificates that have been issued by this subject that 416 are signed with the subject's corresponding private key. This 417 profile uses a URI form of location identification. The preferred 418 URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an rsync URI SHOULD be 419 specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the 420 subject of the certificate is a CA. Other access method URIs MAY 421 also be included in the value sequence of this extension. 423 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- 424 critical. Where the subject is not a CA this field MUST NOT be 425 present. 427 [Note - not for publication. RFC3280 defines only two OIDs for the 428 access method, id-ad-caRepository and id-ad-timeStamping, with the 429 difference being whether the subject is a CA or not. The access 430 method id-ad-caRepository appears to be appropriate where the subject 431 is a CA. Where the subject is NOT a CA would it be useful to have 432 the SIA extension point to where the subject stores digital objects 433 that have been signed by the subject? If this were considered to be 434 desirable, then the id-ad-timeStamping appears to be inappropriate in 435 this context. The general question is: What accessMethod OID should 436 be used here in the Access Description? The approach currently used 437 in this draft is that SIA should only be present for CAs and must be 438 absent in the case of End Entity certificates.] 440 3.9.8. Certificate Policies 442 This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using 443 the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field 444 MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource 445 Certificates. 447 PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. 449 This extension MUST be present and it is critical. 451 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name 453 This is an optional extension, and MAY contain an X.501 Name as 454 supplied by the subject in the Certificate Request or as assigned by 455 the Issuer CA. 457 3.9.10. IP Resources 459 This field contains the list of IP address resources as per 460 [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a 461 particular AFI value and an optional SAFI value. All Resource 462 Certificates MUST include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources 463 extension, or both extensions. 465 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 467 3.9.11. AS Resources 469 This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779], 470 or may specify the "inherit" element. All Resource Certificates MUST 471 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 472 extensions. RDI values are NOT supported in this profile and MUST 473 NOT be used. 475 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 477 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 479 Each Resource CA MUST issue a version 2Certificate Revocation List 480 (CRL), consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no 481 indirect CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL 482 MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA". The contents of the 483 CRL are a list of all unexpired certificates issued by the CA that 484 have been revoked by the CA. 486 An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one 487 regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's 488 validity period. 490 This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. 492 The profile does not allow the issuance of multiple current CRLs with 493 different scope by a single CA. 495 No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs 496 issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields 497 MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a 498 single CA are present in a certificate repository, the CRL with the 499 highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other extant 500 CRLs issued by this CA.. 502 4.1. Version 504 Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the 505 integer value of this field is 1). 507 4.2. Issuer Name 509 The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is 510 also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in 511 the Resource Certificates. 513 4.3. This Update 515 This is the date and time that this CRL was issued. The value of 516 this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the year 517 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the year 518 2050 or later. 520 4.4. Next Update 522 This is the date and time by which the next CRL will be issued. The 523 value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the 524 year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the 525 year 2050 or later. 527 4.5. Signature 529 This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. The 530 signature algorithm MUST be SHA-256 with RSA. This field MUST be 531 present. 533 4.6. Revoked Certificate List 535 When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate 536 list MUST be absent. 538 For each revoked resource certificate ONLY the following fields MUST 539 be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile. 541 4.6.1. Serial Number 543 The serial number of the revoked certificate. 545 4.6.2. Revocation Date 547 The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a 548 future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for 549 dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime 550 for dates in the year 2050 or later. 552 4.7. CRL Extensions 554 The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The 555 following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be 556 present in a CRL. 558 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier 560 The authority key identifier extension provides a means of 561 identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to 562 sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier 563 method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 564 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 566 This extension is non-critical. 568 4.7.2. CRL Number 570 The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence 571 number for a given CA. This extension allows users to easily 572 determine when a particular CRL supersedes another CRL. The higher 573 CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs issued by the CA within 574 the scope of this profile. 576 This extension is non-critical. 578 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile 580 This profile refines the specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to 581 Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, 582 formatted according to the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF), 583 is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in issuing a 584 certificate. 586 [Note - not for publication. RFC2986 references PKCS #10: 587 Certification Request Syntax Specification, Version 1.7. Given the 588 relative wide support of CMC, the extension of PKCS#10 that is 589 roughly equivalent to CMP, then it would appear that a CMC profile 590 should also be included here. It is unclear at this point whether a 591 PCKS#10 profile is also necessary in this profile.] 593 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 594 (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. 596 [Note - not for publication: There are no profile-based 597 qualifications regarding Proof-of-Possession. This may be refined in 598 subsequent iterations of this draft.] 600 5.1. Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 602 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 603 that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: 605 Version 606 This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version 607 3 Certificate. 609 SerialNumber 610 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 611 omitted in this profile. 613 SigningAlgorithm 614 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 615 omitted in this profile. 617 Issuer 618 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 619 profile. 621 Validity 622 This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a 623 Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If 624 specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with 625 dates as determined by the CA. 627 Subject As the subject name is assigned by the CA, this field MAY be 628 omitted, in which case the subject name will be generated by the 629 CA. If specified, the CA SHOULD consider this as the subject's 630 suggestion, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion. 632 PublicKey 633 This field MUST be present. 635 This profile applies the following additional constraints to X509 v3 636 Certificate extension fields that may appear in a Certificate 637 Request: 639 BasicConstraints 640 If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA. 642 The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource 643 Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this 644 profile. 646 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit 647 is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue 648 resources certificates within this overall framework. 650 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set of off (End Entity 651 certificate request). 653 [Note - not for publication. There are some potential variants on 654 this model, where the CA bit may be considered as being set in all 655 circumstances. For example, if the generation of signed resource 656 objects, such as routing origination authorities requires the 657 generation of special purpose resource certificates whose validity 658 dates are implicitly the validity dates of the associated 659 authority, then the subject needs to be able to issue certificates 660 - i.e. there is a CA requirement. In this version of the draft 661 this is left as a subject suggestion in the request that the CA 662 may, or may not, honor in the issued certificate. In this model 663 all the entities are CAs, except for the users of ROA signing 664 shadow certs. In both cases, the CA knows the intended purpose 665 (i.e. issue to others: CA, issue shadow to yourself: non-CA). ] 667 SubjectKeyIdentifier 668 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 669 profile. 671 AuthorityKeyIdentifier 672 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 673 profile. 675 KeyUsage 676 The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and 677 CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the 678 BasicConstraints SubjectType subfield, when specified. 680 CRLDistributionPoints 681 This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA 682 issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit 683 set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. 685 If specified, this field contains a sequence of URIs that 686 references a CRL that will be published by the subject for 687 subordinate certificates. This sequence MUST include a rsync URI. 688 This field MAY be honoured by the CA if present. 690 If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning 691 then the CA MUST generate a CRLDistributionPoint URL based on out- 692 of-band information that has been passed between the CA and the 693 requester. 695 [Note - not for publication. The issue of where and how to 696 specify where the subject will publish the CRL if the CA bit is 697 set and honored by the issuer is described here as information 698 that is either provided in this field in the certificate request 699 or provided via an "out-of-band" exchange. An alternative is to 700 say that this field MUST be provided if the CA bit is set in the 701 request.] 703 AuthorityInformationAccess 704 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 705 profile. 707 SubjectInformationAccess 708 This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA 709 issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit 710 set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. 712 If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single 713 rsync URL that references a single publication point that will be 714 used by the subject for all certificates that published by the 715 subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the 716 CA. 718 If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning 719 then the CA MUST generate a SIA URL based on out-of-band 720 information that has been passed between the CA and the requester. 722 [Note not for publication - the same considerations with respect 723 to the CRL DistributionPoints apply to this field as well. i.e. if 724 this field is missing than it is also an option for the Issuer to 725 deny the request and not issue a certificate if the issued 726 certificate was to have the CA bit set.] 728 CertificatePolicies 729 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 730 profile. 732 SubjectAlternateName 733 This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the 734 SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. 736 IPResources 737 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 738 profile. 740 ASResources 741 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 742 profile. 744 With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to 745 alter any requested field. 747 5.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields 749 The following control fields are supported in this profile: 751 Authenticator Control 752 It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the 753 subject in a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211] 754 is that the Authenticator Control field be used. 756 [Note - not for publication: The method of generation and 757 authentication of this field is to be specified. The desirable 758 properties include the ability to validate the subject and the 759 authenticity of the provided public key.] 761 Resource Class 762 The profile defines an additional control for Resource Certificate 763 Requests, namely a Resource Class control. 764 The Subject MUST specify a Resource Class value as specified by 765 the CA to which the request refers. The CA will issue a 766 certificate with the IPAddress and AS Number resources that match 767 the subject's right-of-use of these resources with the class of 768 resources specified by the Resource Class control value. 770 [Note - not for publication: This specification of the resource 771 class is related the various forms of resource allocation which 772 imply that an entity may be the holder of resources with differing 773 validation dates and differing validation paths, even when the 774 entity is the recipient of resources allocated from a single 775 'upstream' issuing registry. Due to this consideration it may not 776 be possible to issue a single certificate with an all-encompassing 777 resource set. Alternatively it is possible to define a structure 778 where there is no Resource Class specified and the issuer issues a 779 set of spanning certificates for all resources held by the subject 780 (i.e. all resources that fall under the subject's "right-of-use")] 782 6. Resource Certificate Validation 784 This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. 785 This refines the generic procedure described in [RFC3280]: 787 To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other 788 things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n 789 certificates) satisfies the following conditions: 791 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 792 issuer of certificate x+1; 794 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 796 3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and 798 4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate was valid at the time 799 in question. 801 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates 803 The trust model used in the resource certificate framework in the 804 context of validation of assertions of public number resources in 805 public-use contexts is a top-down delegated CA model that mirrors the 806 delegation of resources from a registry distribution point to the 807 entities that are the direct recipients of these resources. Within 808 the trust model these recipient entities may, in turn, operate a 809 registry and perform further allocations or assignments. This is a 810 strict hierarchy, in that any number resource and a corresponding 811 recipient entity has only one 'parent' issuing registry for that 812 number resource (i.e. there is always a unique parent entity for any 813 resource and corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is 814 not a direct or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the 815 recipient entity in question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy). The 816 only exception to the "no loop" condition are the nominated trust 817 anchors, where a self-signed certificate is issued. 819 At the time of preparing this draft there are proposed to be multiple 820 roots of this public number resource hierarchy, corresponding to 821 multiple trust anchors. These trust anchors are the self-signed 822 certificates that are issued by the Regional Internet Registries. 823 Each self-signed certificate issued by a RIR contains a resource set 824 that describes those resources where the RIR is administratively 825 responsible. There MUST NOT be overlap of resources in the IP 826 resource extensions across the collection of RIR self-signed 827 certificates. This implies that a validation path for any valid 828 certificate is unique, in the sense that the path will terminate with 829 a single trust anchor. 831 Cross-certification of these trust anchors, where one trust anchor 832 entity issues a certificate with a subject of another trust anchor is 833 not seen as providing any further substance to the integrity or ease 834 of validation in this trust model, so cross-certification is not used 835 in the trust anchor structure for this Resource Certificate 836 framework. 838 The adoption of a single trust anchor as a unique distinguished root 839 of this certificate hierarchy is a potential future option here, and 840 within the proposed framework some care has been taken not to 841 preclude the potential for a single distinguished root for this 842 certificate framework that could issue a certificate to each RIR with 843 a resource extension that matches the resource sets that fall under 844 the administrative responsibility of each RIR. 846 6.2. Resource Extension Validation 848 The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical 849 extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded 850 representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a 851 prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. 853 Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS 854 number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource 855 Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This 856 validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource 857 sets: 859 more specific Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A 860 and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP 861 addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is 862 larger than range A. 864 equal Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, 865 A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same 866 collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. 867 The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this 868 "equality" comparison. 870 Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an 871 ordered certification path of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is a trust 872 anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, implies that each of the 873 contiguous resource sets of IP addresses and AS Numbers described in 874 certificate x, for 'x' is greater than , are more specific or equal 875 to the resources described in certificate x-1. 877 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation 879 Validation of signed resource data using a target resource 880 certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or 881 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a trust 882 anchor, and 'n' is the target certificate) verifying that all of the 883 following conditions hold: 885 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 886 the signature algorithm 888 2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and 889 To values. 891 3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and 892 contains field values as specified in this profile for all field 893 values that MUST be present. 895 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the 896 certificate. 898 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 899 certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate 900 Revocation List, and the CRL is itself valid. 902 6. That the resource extension data is equal to or more specific 903 than the resource extension data contained in a valid certificate 904 where this Issuer is the Subject (the previous certificate in the 905 ordered sequence) 907 7. The Certificate Path originates at a trust anchor, and there 908 exists a signing chain across the Certificate Path where the 909 Subject of Certificate x in the Certificate Path matches the 910 Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certificate Path. 912 Validation of a certificate may perform these tests in any chosen 913 order. 915 A Resource Certificate may have a number of potential parent 916 certificates, where a potential parent certificate is one where the 917 subject name matches the issuer name of the resource certificate. A 918 candidate parent certificate is any member of the parent certificate 919 set where the resource extension validity constraint is satisfied, 920 and a valid candidate parent certificate is any candidate parent 921 certificate that also matches validity conditions 1 through 6. A 922 valid parent certificate is a valid candidate parent certificate that 923 also matches validity condition 7. 925 Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found on a single 926 repository, maintained by a regular top-down walk from the Root Trust 927 Anchors via Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward 928 pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, validation may be performed 929 using a bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the 930 AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process. 932 There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that 933 are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as 934 means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. 935 Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation 936 process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts 937 to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of 938 Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if 939 the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration 940 parameter. 942 In the context of Resource Certificates that are generated in respect 943 of public resources and with the framework of the associated resource 944 distribution process, it is suggested that this configuration 945 parameter of maximum certificate path length be set to a value of 946 100. (There is no particular reason for suggesting this value other 947 than the observation that it appears to be comfortably longer than 948 any real distribution chain for public number resources, without 949 being too long so as to pose potential DOS concerns for relying 950 parties performing a validation operation.) 952 7. Security Considerations 954 [to be completed] 956 8. IANA Considerations 958 [An OID for a resource class option in a certificate request may need 959 to be defined.] 961 9. Acknowledgements 963 The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from 964 Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo 965 Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of 966 this document. 968 10. Normative References 970 [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 971 September 1981. 973 [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and 974 J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", 975 BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. 977 [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet 978 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 979 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, 980 April 2002. 982 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 983 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 985 [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 986 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in 987 the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 988 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, 989 June 2005. 991 [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. 992 Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 993 Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005. 995 [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 996 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, 997 September 2005. 999 [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing 1000 Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. 1002 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate 1004 The following is an example Resource Certificate. 1006 Certificate Name: UDkyh1nUjIjk5_WpdkZMh3KuvYo-25f7.crt 1008 Data: 1009 Version: 3 1010 Serial: 9719 (0x25f7) 1011 Signature Algorithm: 1012 Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1013 Issuer: CN=APNIC-AP-IANA 1014 Validity: 1015 Not Before: Fri May 12 05:37:43 2006 GMT 1016 Not After: Thu Aug 10 05:37:43 2006 GMT 1017 Subject: CN=FC9B85ADDF5B 1018 Subject Public Key Info: 1019 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 1020 RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) 1021 Modulus (1024 bit): 1022 00:f2:e5:63:d6:e3:89:45:47:02:13:90:b7:e5:39: 1023 a3:f0:8c:3b:27:0d:d1:90:92:46:9b:45:d0:52:34: 1024 f1:7c:c7:34:9f:be:d0:41:18:ab:35:43:62:89:2e: 1025 3e:32:ab:01:e2:86:76:2a:44:83:49:4c:83:02:b4: 1026 0c:2a:b0:b2:82:c6:35:24:7b:16:7a:35:42:36:15: 1027 18:50:fe:8b:7f:c9:04:18:69:6b:ed:59:0d:61:ea: 1028 20:ef:cd:19:30:9f:ce:b8:4a:f5:fb:ad:81:42:ab: 1029 57:72:0c:47:b0:d8:30:c0:0c:5b:52:dc:aa:94:95: 1030 3e:fe:44:ac:d5:b0:f4:d5:cb 1031 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) 1032 X509v3 extensions: 1033 Basic Constraints: 1035 CA:TRUE 1036 Subject Key Identifier: 1037 keyid: 50:39:32:87:59:D4:8C:88:E4:E7:F5:A9: 1038 76:46:4C:87:72:AE:BD:8A 1039 Authority Key Identifier: 1040 keyid: 19:54:CD:F2:81:C6:4E:31:09:6D:3A:15: 1041 E6:88:39:30:21:A6:56:73 1042 Key Usage: critical 1043 Certificate Sign, CRL Sign 1044 CRL Distribution Points: 1045 URI:rsync://rsync.apnic.net/repository/ 1046 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1047 GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM/ 1048 GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM.crl 1049 Authority Information Access: 1050 CA Issuers - URI:rsync://rsync.apnic.net/repository/ 1051 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1052 GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM 1053 Subject Information Access: 1054 CA Repository - URI:rsync://rsync.apnic.net/repository/ 1055 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1056 GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM/ 1057 UDkyh1nUjIjk5_WpdkZMh3KuvYo 1058 Certificate Policies: critical 1059 Policy: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 1060 ipAddrBlock: critical 1061 192.0.0.0/24 1062 autonomousSysNum: critical 1063 64512 1064 Subject Alternative Name: 1065 DirName:/CN= 1067 Signature: 1068 72:27:9c:bc:a8:7f:c0:f0:27:62:a1:1f:55:b3:c7:b1:31:c9:fc: 1069 42:84:71:30:3b:0d:c0:d6:ad:79:b1:f6:1d:14:e8:f3:0f:f3:dd: 1070 40:3d:ae:28:a6:33:96:b6:d3:7d:d2:f3:ac:d3:8e:d4:2e:ad:ab: 1071 71:4d:05:74:20:ed:bc:e3:bd:85:7f:af:8b:70:3e:b8:90:b6:2d: 1072 a5:e3:9d:2a:c8:a9:9b:73:3c:03:43:d2:b8:d2:4e:68:34:eb:db: 1073 3c:44:eb:eb:1e:3b:03:d9:3b:e0:64:a6:31:90:9b:2c:4a:26:8e: 1074 0e:36:4c:ee:c8:e9:29:6b:78:61:87:05:e2:f9 1076 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List 1078 The following is an example Certificate Revocation List. 1080 Certificate Name: GVTN8oHGTjEJbToV5og5MCGmVnM.crl 1082 Data: 1083 Version: 2 1084 Issuer: CN=APNIC-AP-IANA 1085 Effective Date: Fri May 12 05:37:43 2006 GMT 1086 Next Update: Fri May 26 05:37:43 2006 GMT 1087 Signature algorithn 1088 Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1089 CRL V2 Extensions: 1090 Authority Key Identifier: 1091 Keyid: 19:54:cd:f2:81:c6:4e:31:09:6d:3a:15: 1092 e6:88:39:30:21:a6:56:73 1093 Certificate Issuer: 1094 CN=APNIC-AP-IANA 1095 Certificate Serial Number: 1b 1096 CRL Number: 1097 1097 Revocation List: 1098 Revoked Certificates 1099 Serial Number: 0b 1100 Revocation Date: Mon May 8 05:10:19 2006 GMT 1101 Serial Number: 0c 1102 Revocation Date: Mon May 8 05:10:19 2006 GMT 1104 Authors' Addresses 1106 Geoff Huston 1107 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1109 Email: gih@apnic.net 1110 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1112 Robert Loomans 1113 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1115 Email: robertl@apnic.net 1116 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1118 George Michaelson 1119 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1121 Email: ggm@apnic.net 1122 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1124 Full Copyright Statement 1126 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). 1128 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 1129 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 1130 retain all their rights. 1132 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an 1133 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS 1134 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET 1135 ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 1136 INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE 1137 INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED 1138 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 1140 Intellectual Property 1142 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 1143 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 1144 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 1145 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 1146 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 1147 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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