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(127 more instances...) Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but may have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008. If you have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing to grant the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you can ignore this comment. If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378 disclaimer. (See the Legal Provisions document at https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.) -- The document date (February 11, 2007) is 6285 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2050 (Obsoleted by RFC 7020) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2985 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2986 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3280 (Obsoleted by RFC 5280) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 4158 Summary: 7 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 7 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDR G. Huston 3 Internet-Draft G. Michaelson 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans 5 Expires: August 15, 2007 APNIC 6 February 11, 2007 8 A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates 9 draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-03.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any 14 applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware 15 have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes 16 aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 24 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 25 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 26 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 15, 2007. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 40 Abstract 42 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 43 the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" 44 of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System 45 Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization 46 of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of- 47 use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the 48 associated Resource Certificate. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 54 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 55 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 56 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8 65 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 71 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 72 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 73 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 74 3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 75 3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 76 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13 77 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 78 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 79 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 80 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 81 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 82 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 83 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 84 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 85 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 86 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 87 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 88 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 89 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 90 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 91 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 92 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 93 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 16 94 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 17 95 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 96 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 97 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 98 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 21 99 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 100 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 22 101 7. Example Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 102 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 103 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 104 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 105 11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 106 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 107 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27 108 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 109 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 29 111 1. Introduction 113 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 114 use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. 115 These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to 116 the PKIX profile [RFC3280] and also conform to the constraints 117 specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the 118 issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of 119 IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers. 121 A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer 122 that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject 123 of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of 124 the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in 125 the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the 126 certificate's issuer. 128 In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number 129 resources within this context, it is intended that Resource 130 Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the 131 public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a 132 number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an 133 entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource 134 Certificate. This Certificate is issued by the number registry, and 135 the subject's public key that is being certified by the Issuer 136 corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair 137 that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the 138 number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the 139 certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or 140 assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public 141 number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI 142 structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one 143 'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificated from a 144 "Root" Certificate Authority to a valid certificate. 146 Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can 147 be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer - subject certificate 148 chain from a trust anchor certificate authority to the certificate 149 [RFC4158], with the additional constraint of ensuring that each 150 subject's listed resources are fully encompassed by those of the 151 issuer at each step in the issuer-subject chain. 153 Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of 154 secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an 155 IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, 156 to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related 157 use contexts include validation of Internet Routing Registry objects, 158 validation of routing requests, and detection of potential 159 unauthorised used of IP addresses. 161 This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource 162 Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. 163 Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to 164 this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. 166 1.1. Terminology 168 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 169 described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 170 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509 171 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet 172 Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing 173 Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" 174 [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management 175 policy documents. 177 The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 178 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 179 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 181 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 183 The framework for describing an association between the subject of a 184 certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current 185 control is described in [RFC3779]. 187 There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in 188 this profile: 190 1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL 191 extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate 192 profile further specifies that the use of this certificate 193 extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be 194 marked as CRITICAL. 196 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 197 set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix 198 masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile 199 MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in 200 the resource extension field. 202 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 203 validity includes the condition that the resources described in 204 the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the 205 certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a 206 resource set (called here the "Issuer's resource set") that must 207 encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this 208 context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be 209 the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. 210 The constraints imposed by this profile a certificate furthermore 211 require that a the encompassing issuer's resource set be 212 described in a single certificate, and not in two or more 213 certificates. 215 A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a 216 sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the 217 subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next 218 certificate in the sequence) from one, and only one, trust anchor to 219 the certificate being validated, and that the resource extensions in 220 this certificate sequence from the trust anchor to the certificate 221 form a sequence of encompassing relationships. 223 3. Resource Certificate Fields 225 A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, 226 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields 227 listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, 228 all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST 229 NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value 230 is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource 231 Certificates. 233 3.1. Version 235 Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field 236 MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this 237 field is 2). 239 3.2. Serial number 241 The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per 242 Issuer. 244 3.3. Signature Algorithm 246 This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on 247 this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with 248 RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 249 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 250 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 11 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055]. 252 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 253 both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be 254 taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 256 3.4. Issuer 258 This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the 259 certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 261 If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of 262 the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the 263 issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the 264 immediate superior certificate. 266 This field MUST be non-empty. 268 3.5. Subject 270 This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been 271 allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 273 In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and 274 each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using 275 a subject name that is unique per issuer. 277 This field MUST be non-empty. 279 3.6. Valid From 281 The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this 282 profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of 283 certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], 284 Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always 285 encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as 286 UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as 287 GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280]. 289 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 290 this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior 291 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 292 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 293 other than the current time. 295 3.7. Valid To 297 The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the 298 certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime 299 of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the 300 issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs 301 conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's 302 "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 303 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats 304 are defined in [RFC3280]. 306 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 307 this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior 308 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 309 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 310 other than the current time. 312 Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a 313 certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity 314 interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the 315 issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is 316 anticipated that a CA may have good reason to issue a certificate 317 with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the 318 CA's certificate. 320 3.8. Subject Public Key Info 322 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with 323 which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, 324 accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is 325 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024 326 bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that 327 certificates that are intended to be used as root certificates, and 328 their immediate subordinates SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 329 bits. Immediate subordinates of these certificates, when used in the 330 context of continued level of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key 331 size of 2048 bits. 333 In the application of this profile to certification of public number 334 resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the 335 Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits, and that 336 their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key 337 size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key 338 size of 1024 bits. 340 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 341 both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be 342 taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 344 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 346 As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate 347 is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate- 348 using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical 349 extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension 350 MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280]. 352 The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming 353 Resource Certificate. 355 3.9.1. Basic Constraints 357 The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the 358 certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification 359 paths that include this certificate. 361 The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit 362 is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue 363 resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the 364 subject is permitted be a CA). 366 The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST 367 NOT be present. 369 The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the 370 Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present. 372 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 374 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 375 certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate 376 certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all 377 Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. 379 The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in 380 the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of 381 immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the 382 subject of this certificate). 384 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 385 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as 386 described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280]. 388 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 390 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 391 certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by 392 providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate 393 path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource 394 Certificates. The keyIdentifier subfield MUST be present in all 395 Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self- 396 signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and 397 authorityCertSerialNumber subfields MUST NOT be present. This 398 extension is non-critical. 400 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 401 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as 402 described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 404 3.9.4. Key Usage 406 This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical 407 extension, and it MUST be present. 409 In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits 410 are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to TRUE. 412 In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and 413 MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. 415 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 417 This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) 418 associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile 419 uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access 420 mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references 421 a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. 423 In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, 424 implying at the CRLIssuer subfield MUST be omitted, and the 425 distributionPoint subfield MUST be present. The Reasons subfield 426 MUST be omitted. 428 The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT 429 contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST 430 be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified 431 to be all certificates issued by this issuer. The sequence of 432 distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single 433 DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain 434 more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the 435 DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of 436 this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs 437 MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI. 439 This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. 441 3.9.6. Authority Information Access 443 This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the 444 certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA, 445 where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a 446 single reference object to publication location of the immediate 447 superior certificate MUST be used. 449 This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred 450 URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified 451 with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST 452 reference the point of publication of the certificate where this 453 issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). 454 Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be 455 included in the value sequence of this extension. 457 When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate,the subordinate 458 certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA 459 field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re- 460 issuance in and of itself implies a requirement to re-issue all 461 subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a 462 persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies 463 that re-issued certificates overwrite prevously issued certificates 464 to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously 465 issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can 466 maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due 467 solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers' 468 policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued 469 certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice 470 Statement. 472 Alternatively, if the certificate issuer does not maintain a 473 persistent URL for the must recent issued certificate for each 474 subject, then the entity who is subject of a certificate MAY keep the 475 most recent copy of the superior's issued certificate in the 476 subject's publication space, and set the AIA to reference this 477 subject-maintained copy of the immediate superior certificate. 479 In the case of self-signed certificates that undertake the role of a 480 "root" trust anchor within a certificate hierarchy the AIA extension 481 field SHOULD be omitted. In all other cases this field MUST be 482 present, and is non-critical. 484 3.9.7. Subject Information Access 486 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services 487 relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension 488 appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information 489 and service collection will include all current valid certificates 490 that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the 491 subject's corresponding private key. 493 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The 494 preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be 495 specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the 496 subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an 497 object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a 498 trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs that reference the 499 same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this 500 extension. 502 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- 503 critical. For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a 504 CA, this field MUST NOT be present. 506 3.9.8. Certificate Policies 508 This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using 509 the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field 510 MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource 511 Certificates. 513 PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. 515 This extension MUST be present and it is critical. 517 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name 519 This is an optional extension, and MAY contain an X.501 Name as 520 supplied by the subject in the Certificate Request, or as assigned by 521 the issuer. 523 3.9.10. IP Resources 525 This field contains the list of IP address resources as per 526 [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a 527 particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates 528 describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, 529 the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 530 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 531 extensions. 533 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 535 3.9.11. AS Resources 537 This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779], 538 or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported 539 in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 540 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 541 extensions. 543 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 545 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 547 Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), 548 consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect 549 CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL MUST be 550 "all certificates issued by this CA". The contents of the CRL are a 551 list of all non-expired certificates issued by the CA that have been 552 revoked by the CA. 554 An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one 555 regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's 556 validity period. 558 This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. 560 The profile does not allow the issuance of multiple current CRLs with 561 different scope by a single CA. 563 No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs 564 issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields 565 MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a 566 single CA are present in a certificate repository, the CRL with the 567 highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs 568 issued by this CA. 570 4.1. Version 572 Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the 573 integer value of this field is 1). 575 4.2. Issuer Name 577 The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is 578 also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in 579 the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer. 581 4.3. This Update 583 This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The 584 value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the 585 year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the 586 year 2050 or later. 588 4.4. Next Update 590 This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued. 591 The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through 592 the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in 593 the year 2050 or later. 595 4.5. Signature 597 This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. The 598 signature algorithm MUST be SHA-256 with RSA. This field MUST be 599 present. 601 4.6. Revoked Certificate List 603 When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate 604 list MUST be absent. 606 For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST 607 be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, 608 and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL. 610 4.6.1. Serial Number 612 The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate. 614 4.6.2. Revocation Date 616 The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a 617 future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for 618 dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime 619 for dates in the year 2050 or later. 621 4.7. CRL Extensions 623 The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The 624 following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be 625 present in a CRL. 627 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier 629 The authority key identifier extension provides a means of 630 identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to 631 sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier 632 method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 633 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 635 This extension is non-critical. 637 4.7.2. CRL Number 639 The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence 640 number for a given CA. This extension allows users to easily 641 determine when a particular CRL supersedes another CRL. The highest 642 CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs issued by the CA within 643 the scope of this profile. 645 This extension is non-critical. 647 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile 649 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile 651 This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to 652 Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, 653 formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority 654 as the initial step in issuing a certificate. 656 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 657 (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. 659 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 660 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 661 certificate. 663 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 665 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 666 that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo: 668 Version 669 This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0. 671 Subject 672 The CA SHOULD consider this name as the subject's suggestion, but 673 the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name 674 MUST be unique per issuer in certificates issued by this issuer. 675 This field MAY be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a 676 subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued 677 by this issuer. 679 SubjectPublicKeyInfo 680 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm 681 with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, 682 and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field 683 also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public 684 key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the 685 DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey. 687 Attributes 688 [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where 689 the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key. 691 The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest 692 attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3 693 Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate 694 requests is specified in Section 5.3. 696 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 697 that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object: 699 signatureAlgorithm 700 Must be SHA-256 with RSA encryption (sha256WithRSAEncryption). 701 Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be the OID value 702 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 704 5.2. CRMF Profile 706 This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) 707 specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates. 708 A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the 709 CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in 710 issuing a certificate. 712 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 713 (RA), acting under the direction of a subject. 715 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 716 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 717 certificate.. 719 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 721 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 722 that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: 724 Version 725 This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version 726 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted. 728 SerialNumber 729 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 730 omitted in this profile. 732 SigningAlgorithm 733 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 734 omitted in this profile. 736 Issuer 737 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 738 profile. 740 Validity 741 This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a 742 Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If 743 specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with 744 dates as determined by the CA. 746 Subject As the subject name is assigned by the CA, this field MAY be 747 omitted, in which case the subject name will be generated by the 748 CA. If specified, the CA SHOULD consider this as the subject's 749 suggestion, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion. 751 PublicKey 752 This field MUST be present. 754 extensions 755 This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The 756 profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in 757 Section 5.3. 759 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields 761 The following control fields are supported in this profile: 763 Authenticator Control 764 It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the 765 subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211] 766 is that the Authenticator Control field be used. 768 [Note - not for publication: The method of generation and 769 authentication of this field is not specified in this document. 770 It is assumed that the Certificate Issuer and subject have 771 securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the 772 Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials. The 773 desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject 774 and the authenticity of the provided public key.] 776 Resource Class 777 The profile defines an additional control for Resource Certificate 778 Requests, namely a Resource Class control. 780 The Subject MUST specify a Resource Class value as specified by 781 the CA to which the request refers. The CA will issue a 782 certificate with the IP Address and AS Number resources that match 783 the subject's right-of-use of these resources within the class of 784 resources specified by the Resource Class control value. 786 [Note - not for publication: This specification of the resource 787 class is related the various forms of resource allocation which 788 imply that an entity may be the holder of resources with differing 789 validation dates and differing validation paths, even when the 790 entity is the recipient of resources allocated from a single 791 'upstream' issuing registry. Due to this consideration it may not 792 be possible to issue a single certificate with an all-encompassing 793 resource set. Alternatively it is possible to define a structure 794 where there is no Resource Class specified and the issuer issues a 795 set of spanning certificates for all resources held by the subject 796 (i.e. all resources that fall under the subject's "right-of-use")] 798 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests 800 This profile allows the following extensions to appear in a PKCS#10 801 and CRMF Certificate Request: 803 BasicConstraints 804 If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA. 806 The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource 807 Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this 808 profile. 810 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit 811 is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue 812 resource certificates within this overall framework. 814 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set of off (End Entity 815 certificate request). 817 SubjectKeyIdentifier 818 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 819 profile. 821 AuthorityKeyIdentifier 822 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 823 profile. 825 KeyUsage 826 The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and 827 CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the 828 BasicConstraints SubjectType subfield, when specified. 830 SubjectInformationAccess 831 This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA 832 issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit 833 set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. 835 If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single 836 RSYNC URI that references a single publication point that will be 837 used by the subject for all certificates that published by the 838 subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the 839 CA. 841 If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning 842 then the CA MUST generate a URI value for the 843 SubjectInformationAccess field based on out-of-band information 844 that has been passed between the CA and the requester. 846 [Note not for publication - if this field is missing than it is 847 also an option for the Issuer to deny the request and not issue a 848 certificate if the issued certificate was to have the CA bit set.] 850 SubjectAlternateName 851 This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the 852 SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. 854 CRLDistributionPoints 855 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 856 profile. 858 AuthorityInformationAccess 859 This field is assigned by the CA and MAY be omitted in this 860 profile. If specified the CA MAY choose to use this value as the 861 AIA field. 863 SubjectInformationAccess 864 This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA 865 issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit 866 set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. 868 If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single 869 rsync URL that references a single publication point that will be 870 used by the subject for all certificates that published by the 871 subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the 872 CA. 874 If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning 875 then the CA MUST generate a SIA URL based on out-of-band 876 information that has been passed between the CA and the requester. 878 [Note not for publication - the same considerations with respect 879 to the CRL DistributionPoints apply to this field as well. i.e. if 880 this field is missing than it is also an option for the Issuer to 881 deny the request and not issue a certificate if the issued 882 certificate was to have the CA bit set.] 884 CertificatePolicies 885 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 886 profile. 888 SubjectAlternateName 889 This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the 890 SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. 892 IPResources 893 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 894 profile. 896 ASResources 897 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 898 profile. 900 With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to 901 alter any requested field. 903 6. Resource Certificate Validation 905 This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. 906 This refines the generic procedure described insection 6 of 907 [RFC3280]: 909 To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other 910 things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n 911 certificates) satisfies the following conditions: 913 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 914 issuer of certificate x+1; 916 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 918 3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and 920 4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid. 922 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates 924 The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate 925 framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number 926 resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top- 927 down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from 928 a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct 929 recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these 930 recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform 931 further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in 932 that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has 933 only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. 934 there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and 935 corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct 936 or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in 937 question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy). The only exception to the 938 "no loop" condition would be where a putative trust anchor may issue 939 a self-signed root certificate. 941 The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor is 942 a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the resource 943 certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of trust 944 models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional caveat on 945 the general applicability of trust models and PKIX frameworks, namely 946 that in forming a validation path to a trust anchor, the sequence of 947 certificates MUST preserve the resource extension validation 948 property, as described in Section 6.2. 950 6.2. Resource Extension Validation 952 The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical 953 extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded 954 representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a 955 prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. 957 Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS 958 number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource 959 Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This 960 validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource 961 sets: 963 more specific Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A 964 and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP 965 addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is 966 larger than range A. 968 equal Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, 969 A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same 970 collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. 971 The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this 972 "equality" comparison. 973 encompass Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X 974 "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or 975 AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more 976 specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the 977 set X. 979 Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an 980 ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is a trust 981 anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the subject of 982 certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, implies that 983 the resources described in certificate 'x', for 'x' is greater than 984 1, "encompass" the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1. 986 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation 988 Validation of signed resource data using a target resource 989 certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or 990 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a trust 991 anchor, and 'n' is the target certificate) verifying that all of the 992 following conditions hold: 994 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 995 the signature algorithm 997 2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and 998 To values. 1000 3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and 1001 contains field values as specified in this profile for all field 1002 values that MUST be present. 1004 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the 1005 certificate. 1007 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 1008 certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate 1009 Revocation List, and the CRL is itself valid. 1011 6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource 1012 extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer 1013 is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) 1015 7. The Certificate Path originates at a trust anchor, and there 1016 exists a signing chain across the Certificate Path where the 1017 Subject of Certificate x in the Certificate Path matches the 1018 Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certificate Path. 1020 A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any 1021 chosen order. 1023 Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally 1024 maintained repository, maintained by a regular top-down 1025 synchronization pass from the Root Trust Anchors via reference to 1026 Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus 1027 the CRLDP. Alternatively, validation may be performed using a 1028 bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the AIA and 1029 CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process. 1031 There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that 1032 are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as 1033 means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. 1034 Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation 1035 process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts 1036 to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of 1037 Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if 1038 the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration 1039 parameter. 1041 7. Example Use Cases 1043 [1 - signing a Route Registry Object] [2 - signing a Route 1044 Origination Authority - note validity time] [3 - performing a 1045 resource (sub) allocation - An example of this in situations where 1046 there are contractual period differences between the entity and its 1047 resource supplier, and the entity and its resource allocation 1048 subjects.] 1050 8. Security Considerations 1052 [To be completed] 1054 9. IANA Considerations 1056 [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA 1057 considerations stated in this version of the document.] 1059 10. Acknowledgements 1061 The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from 1062 Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo 1063 Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of 1064 this document. 1066 11. Normative References 1068 [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 1069 September 1981. 1071 [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and 1072 J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", 1073 BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. 1075 [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object 1076 Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, 1077 November 2000. 1079 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 1080 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, 1081 November 2000. 1083 [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet 1084 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 1085 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, 1086 April 2002. 1088 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 1089 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 1091 [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 1092 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in 1093 the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 1094 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, 1095 June 2005. 1097 [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. 1098 Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 1099 Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005. 1101 [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 1102 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, 1103 September 2005. 1105 [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing 1106 Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. 1108 [rsync] Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006, 1109 . 1111 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate 1113 The following is an example Resource Certificate. 1115 Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer 1117 Data: 1118 Version: 3 1119 Serial: 3 1120 Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1121 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1122 E=ca@apnic.net 1123 Validity: 1124 Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT 1125 Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT 1126 Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources 1127 Subject Key Identifier: 1128 86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d: 1129 8b:97:49:14 1130 Subject Key Identifier g(SKI): 1131 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ 1132 Subject Public Key Info: 1133 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 1134 RSA Public Key: Modulus: 1135 c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1: 1136 59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a: 1137 0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3: 1138 f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb: 1139 b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4: 1140 5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe: 1141 e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e: 1142 4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c: 1143 56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5: 1144 c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba: 1145 dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c: 1146 f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d: 1147 92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03: 1149 d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87: 1150 24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27: 1151 03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7 1152 RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537 1153 Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE 1154 Subject Info Access: 1155 caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1156 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1157 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1158 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ 1159 Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign 1160 CRL Distribution Points: 1161 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1162 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1163 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1164 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1165 Authority Info Access: caIssuers - 1166 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1167 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1168 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1169 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1170 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02: 1171 51:c2:a9:1c 1172 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1173 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1174 Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 1175 IPv4: 202.12.27.0-202.12.29.255, 202.12.31.0/24, 1176 203.119.0.0/24, 203.119.42.0/23 1177 IPv6: 2001:dc0::/32 1178 ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370 1179 Signature: 1180 c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b: 1181 4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59: 1182 0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2: 1183 a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7: 1184 11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3: 1185 92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28: 1186 f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f: 1187 e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51: 1188 26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0: 1189 4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12: 1190 5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4: 1191 81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28: 1192 33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3: 1193 bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c: 1194 1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54: 1195 52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d 1197 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List 1199 The following is an example Certificate Revocation List. 1200 CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1202 Data: 1203 Version: 2 1204 Signature Algorithm: 1205 Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1206 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1207 E=ca@apnic.net 1208 This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1209 Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1210 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1211 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05: 1212 07:02:51:c2:a9:1c 1213 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1214 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1215 CRLNumber: 4 1216 Revoked Certificates: 1 1217 Serial Number: 1 1218 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT 1219 Serial Number: 2 1220 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT 1221 Serial Number: 4 1222 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT 1223 Signature: 1224 b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46: 1225 0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12: 1226 f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27: 1227 17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a: 1228 f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09: 1229 d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e: 1230 b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54: 1231 66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29: 1232 6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2: 1233 d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12: 1234 cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8: 1235 c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c: 1236 d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a: 1237 09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da: 1238 02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d: 1239 59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f: 1240 34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02: 1241 d9 1243 Authors' Addresses 1245 Geoff Huston 1246 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1248 Email: gih@apnic.net 1249 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1251 George Michaelson 1252 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1254 Email: ggm@apnic.net 1255 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1257 Robert Loomans 1258 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1260 Email: robertl@apnic.net 1261 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1263 Full Copyright Statement 1265 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 1267 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 1268 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 1269 retain all their rights. 1271 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an 1272 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS 1273 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND 1274 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS 1275 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF 1276 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED 1277 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 1279 Intellectual Property 1281 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 1282 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 1283 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 1284 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 1285 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 1286 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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