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(127 more instances...) Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but may have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008. If you have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing to grant the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you can ignore this comment. If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378 disclaimer. (See the Legal Provisions document at https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.) -- The document date (February 20, 2007) is 6273 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2050 (Obsoleted by RFC 7020) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2985 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2986 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3280 (Obsoleted by RFC 5280) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 4158 Summary: 7 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 7 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDR G. Huston 3 Internet-Draft G. Michaelson 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans 5 Expires: August 24, 2007 APNIC 6 February 20, 2007 8 A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates 9 draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-04.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any 14 applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware 15 have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes 16 aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 24 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 25 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 26 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 24, 2007. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 40 Abstract 42 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 43 the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" 44 of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System 45 Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization 46 of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of- 47 use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the 48 associated Resource Certificate. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 54 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 55 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 56 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8 65 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 71 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 72 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 73 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 74 3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 75 3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 76 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13 77 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 78 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 79 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 80 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 81 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 82 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 83 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 84 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 85 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 86 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 87 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 88 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 89 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 90 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 91 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 92 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 93 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 17 94 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 17 95 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 96 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 97 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 98 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 21 99 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 100 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 22 101 7. Example Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 102 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 103 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 104 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 105 11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 106 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 107 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27 108 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 109 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30 111 1. Introduction 113 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 114 use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. 115 These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to 116 the PKIX profile [RFC3280] and also conform to the constraints 117 specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the 118 issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of 119 IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers. 121 A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer 122 that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject 123 of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of 124 the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in 125 the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the 126 certificate's issuer. 128 In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number 129 resources within this context, it is intended that Resource 130 Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the 131 public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a 132 number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an 133 entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource 134 Certificate. This Certificate is issued by the number registry, and 135 the subject's public key that is being certified by the Issuer 136 corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair 137 that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the 138 number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the 139 certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or 140 assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public 141 number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI 142 structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one 143 'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificated from a 144 "Root" Certificate Authority to a valid certificate. 146 Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can 147 be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer - subject certificate 148 chain from a trust anchor certificate authority to the certificate 149 [RFC4158], with the additional constraint of ensuring that each 150 subject's listed resources are fully encompassed by those of the 151 issuer at each step in the issuer-subject chain. 153 Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of 154 secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an 155 IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, 156 to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related 157 use contexts include validation of Internet Routing Registry objects, 158 validation of routing requests, and detection of potential 159 unauthorised used of IP addresses. 161 This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource 162 Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. 163 Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to 164 this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. 166 1.1. Terminology 168 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 169 described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 170 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509 171 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet 172 Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing 173 Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" 174 [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management 175 policy documents. 177 The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 178 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 179 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 181 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 183 The framework for describing an association between the subject of a 184 certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current 185 control is described in [RFC3779]. 187 There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in 188 this profile: 190 1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL 191 extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate 192 profile further specifies that the use of this certificate 193 extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be 194 marked as CRITICAL. 196 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 197 set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix 198 masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile 199 MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in 200 the resource extension field. 202 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 203 validity includes the condition that the resources described in 204 the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the 205 certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a 206 resource set (called here the "Issuer's resource set") that must 207 encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this 208 context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be 209 the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. 210 The constraints imposed by this profile a certificate furthermore 211 require that a the encompassing issuer's resource set be 212 described in a single certificate, and not in two or more 213 certificates. 215 A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a 216 sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the 217 subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next 218 certificate in the sequence) from one, and only one, trust anchor to 219 the certificate being validated, and that the resource extensions in 220 this certificate sequence from the trust anchor to the certificate 221 form a sequence of encompassing relationships. 223 3. Resource Certificate Fields 225 A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, 226 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields 227 listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, 228 all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST 229 NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value 230 is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource 231 Certificates. 233 3.1. Version 235 Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field 236 MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this 237 field is 2). 239 3.2. Serial number 241 The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per 242 Issuer. 244 3.3. Signature Algorithm 246 This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on 247 this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with 248 RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 249 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 250 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 11 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055]. 252 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 253 both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be 254 taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 256 3.4. Issuer 258 This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the 259 certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 261 If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of 262 the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the 263 issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the 264 immediate superior certificate. 266 This field MUST be non-empty. 268 3.5. Subject 270 This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been 271 allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 273 In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and 274 each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using 275 a subject name that is unique per issuer. 277 This field MUST be non-empty. 279 3.6. Valid From 281 The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this 282 profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of 283 certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], 284 Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always 285 encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as 286 UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as 287 GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280]. 289 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 290 this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior 291 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 292 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 293 other than the current time. 295 3.7. Valid To 297 The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the 298 certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime 299 of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the 300 issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs 301 conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's 302 "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 303 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats 304 are defined in [RFC3280]. 306 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 307 this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior 308 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 309 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 310 other than the current time. 312 Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a 313 certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity 314 interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the 315 issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is 316 anticipated that a CA may have good reason to issue a certificate 317 with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the 318 CA's certificate. 320 3.8. Subject Public Key Info 322 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with 323 which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, 324 accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is 325 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024 326 bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that 327 certificates that are intended to be used as root certificates, and 328 their immediate subordinates SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 329 bits. Immediate subordinates of these certificates, when used in the 330 context of continued level of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key 331 size of 2048 bits. 333 In the application of this profile to certification of public number 334 resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the 335 Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits, and that 336 their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key 337 size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key 338 size of 1024 bits. 340 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 341 both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be 342 taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 344 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 346 As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate 347 is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate- 348 using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical 349 extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension 350 MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280]. 352 The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming 353 Resource Certificate. 355 3.9.1. Basic Constraints 357 The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the 358 certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification 359 paths that include this certificate. 361 The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit 362 is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue 363 resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the 364 subject is permitted be a CA). 366 The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST 367 NOT be present. 369 The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the 370 Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present. 372 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 374 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 375 certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate 376 certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all 377 Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. 379 The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in 380 the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of 381 immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the 382 subject of this certificate). 384 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 385 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as 386 described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280]. 388 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 390 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 391 certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by 392 providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate 393 path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource 394 Certificates. The keyIdentifier subfield MUST be present in all 395 Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self- 396 signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and 397 authorityCertSerialNumber subfields MUST NOT be present. This 398 extension is non-critical. 400 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 401 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as 402 described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 404 3.9.4. Key Usage 406 This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical 407 extension, and it MUST be present. 409 In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits 410 are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to TRUE. 412 In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and 413 MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. 415 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 417 This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) 418 associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile 419 uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access 420 mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references 421 a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. 423 In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, 424 implying at the CRLIssuer subfield MUST be omitted, and the 425 distributionPoint subfield MUST be present. The Reasons subfield 426 MUST be omitted. 428 The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT 429 contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST 430 be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified 431 to be all certificates issued by this issuer. The sequence of 432 distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single 433 DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain 434 more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the 435 DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of 436 this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs 437 MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI. 439 This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. 441 3.9.6. Authority Information Access 443 This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the 444 certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA, 445 where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a 446 single reference object to publication location of the immediate 447 superior certificate MUST be used. 449 This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred 450 URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified 451 with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST 452 reference the point of publication of the certificate where this 453 issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). 454 Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be 455 included in the value sequence of this extension. 457 When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate,the subordinate 458 certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA 459 field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re- 460 issuance in and of itself implies a requirement to re-issue all 461 subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a 462 persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies 463 that re-issued certificates overwrite prevously issued certificates 464 to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously 465 issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can 466 maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due 467 solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers' 468 policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued 469 certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice 470 Statement. 472 Alternatively, if the certificate issuer does not maintain a 473 persistent URL for the must recent issued certificate for each 474 subject, then the entity who is subject of a certificate MAY keep the 475 most recent copy of the superior's issued certificate in the 476 subject's publication space, and set the AIA to reference this 477 subject-maintained copy of the immediate superior certificate. 479 In the case of self-signed certificates that undertake the role of a 480 "root" trust anchor within a certificate hierarchy the AIA extension 481 field SHOULD be omitted. In all other cases this field MUST be 482 present, and is non-critical. 484 3.9.7. Subject Information Access 486 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services 487 relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension 488 appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information 489 and service collection will include all current valid certificates 490 that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the 491 subject's corresponding private key. 493 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The 494 preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be 495 specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the 496 subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an 497 object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a 498 trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs that reference the 499 same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this 500 extension. 502 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- 503 critical. 505 For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this 506 field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it references 507 the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the 508 End Entity certificate can be accessed. The id-ad- 509 signedObjectRepository OID is used when the subject is an End Entity 510 and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a 511 repository. 513 id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } 515 id-ad-signedObjectRepositor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 } 517 3.9.8. Certificate Policies 519 This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using 520 the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field 521 MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource 522 Certificates. 524 PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. 526 This extension MUST be present and it is critical. 528 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name 530 This is an optional extension, and MAY contain an X.501 Name as 531 supplied by the subject in the Certificate Request, or as assigned by 532 the issuer. 534 3.9.10. IP Resources 536 This field contains the list of IP address resources as per 537 [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a 538 particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates 539 describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, 540 the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 541 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 542 extensions. 544 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 546 3.9.11. AS Resources 548 This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779], 549 or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported 550 in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 551 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 552 extensions. 554 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 556 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 558 Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), 559 consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect 560 CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL MUST be 561 "all certificates issued by this CA". The contents of the CRL are a 562 list of all non-expired certificates issued by the CA that have been 563 revoked by the CA. 565 An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one 566 regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's 567 validity period. 569 This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. 571 The profile does not allow the issuance of multiple current CRLs with 572 different scope by a single CA. 574 No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs 575 issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields 576 MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a 577 single CA are present in a certificate repository, the CRL with the 578 highest value of the "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs 579 issued by this CA. 581 4.1. Version 583 Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the 584 integer value of this field is 1). 586 4.2. Issuer Name 588 The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is 589 also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in 590 the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer. 592 4.3. This Update 594 This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The 595 value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the 596 year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the 597 year 2050 or later. 599 4.4. Next Update 601 This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued. 602 The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through 603 the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in 604 the year 2050 or later. 606 4.5. Signature 608 This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. The 609 signature algorithm MUST be SHA-256 with RSA. This field MUST be 610 present. 612 4.6. Revoked Certificate List 614 When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate 615 list MUST be absent. 617 For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST 618 be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, 619 and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL. 621 4.6.1. Serial Number 623 The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate. 625 4.6.2. Revocation Date 627 The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a 628 future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for 629 dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime 630 for dates in the year 2050 or later. 632 4.7. CRL Extensions 634 The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The 635 following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be 636 present in a CRL. 638 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier 640 The authority key identifier extension provides a means of 641 identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to 642 sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier 643 method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 644 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 646 This extension is non-critical. 648 4.7.2. CRL Number 650 The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence 651 number for a given CA. This extension allows users to easily 652 determine when a particular CRL supersedes another CRL. The highest 653 CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs issued by the CA within 654 the scope of this profile. 656 This extension is non-critical. 658 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile 660 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile 662 This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to 663 Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, 664 formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority 665 as the initial step in issuing a certificate. 667 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 668 (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. 670 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 671 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 672 certificate. 674 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 676 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 677 that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo: 679 Version 680 This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0. 682 Subject 683 The CA SHOULD consider this name as the subject's suggestion, but 684 the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name 685 MUST be unique per issuer in certificates issued by this issuer. 686 This field MAY be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a 687 subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued 688 by this issuer. 690 SubjectPublicKeyInfo 691 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm 692 with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, 693 and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field 694 also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public 695 key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the 696 DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey. 698 Attributes 699 [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where 700 the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key. 702 The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest 703 attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3 704 Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate 705 requests is specified in Section 5.3. 707 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 708 that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object: 710 signatureAlgorithm 711 Must be SHA-256 with RSA encryption (sha256WithRSAEncryption). 712 Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be the OID value 713 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 715 5.2. CRMF Profile 717 This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) 718 specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates. 719 A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the 720 CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in 721 issuing a certificate. 723 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 724 (RA), acting under the direction of a subject. 726 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 727 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 728 certificate.. 730 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 732 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 733 that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: 735 Version 736 This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version 737 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted. 739 SerialNumber 740 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 741 omitted in this profile. 743 SigningAlgorithm 744 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 745 omitted in this profile. 747 Issuer 748 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 749 profile. 751 Validity 752 This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a 753 Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If 754 specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with 755 dates as determined by the CA. 757 Subject As the subject name is assigned by the CA, this field MAY be 758 omitted, in which case the subject name will be generated by the 759 CA. If specified, the CA SHOULD consider this as the subject's 760 suggestion, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion. 762 PublicKey 763 This field MUST be present. 765 extensions 766 This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The 767 profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in 768 Section 5.3. 770 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields 772 The following control fields are supported in this profile: 774 Authenticator Control 775 It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the 776 subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211] 777 is that the Authenticator Control field be used. 779 [Note - not for publication: The method of generation and 780 authentication of this field is not specified in this document. 781 It is assumed that the Certificate Issuer and subject have 782 securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the 783 Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials. The 784 desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject 785 and the authenticity of the provided public key.] 787 Resource Class 788 The profile defines an additional control for Resource Certificate 789 Requests, namely a Resource Class control. 791 The Subject MUST specify a Resource Class value as specified by 792 the CA to which the request refers. The CA will issue a 793 certificate with the IP Address and AS Number resources that match 794 the subject's right-of-use of these resources within the class of 795 resources specified by the Resource Class control value. 797 [Note - not for publication: This specification of the resource 798 class is related the various forms of resource allocation which 799 imply that an entity may be the holder of resources with differing 800 validation dates and differing validation paths, even when the 801 entity is the recipient of resources allocated from a single 802 'upstream' issuing registry. Due to this consideration it may not 803 be possible to issue a single certificate with an all-encompassing 804 resource set. Alternatively it is possible to define a structure 805 where there is no Resource Class specified and the issuer issues a 806 set of spanning certificates for all resources held by the subject 807 (i.e. all resources that fall under the subject's "right-of-use")] 809 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests 811 This profile allows the following extensions to appear in a PKCS#10 812 and CRMF Certificate Request: 814 BasicConstraints 815 If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA. 817 The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource 818 Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this 819 profile. 821 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit 822 is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue 823 resource certificates within this overall framework. 825 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set of off (End Entity 826 certificate request). 828 SubjectKeyIdentifier 829 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 830 profile. 832 AuthorityKeyIdentifier 833 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 834 profile. 836 KeyUsage 837 The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and 838 CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the 839 BasicConstraints SubjectType subfield, when specified. 841 SubjectInformationAccess 842 This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA 843 issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit 844 set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. 846 If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single 847 RSYNC URI that references a single publication point that will be 848 used by the subject for all certificates that published by the 849 subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the 850 CA. 852 If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning 853 then the CA MUST generate a URI value for the 854 SubjectInformationAccess field based on out-of-band information 855 that has been passed between the CA and the requester. 857 [Note not for publication - if this field is missing than it is 858 also an option for the Issuer to deny the request and not issue a 859 certificate if the issued certificate was to have the CA bit set.] 861 SubjectAlternateName 862 This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the 863 SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. 865 CRLDistributionPoints 866 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 867 profile. 869 AuthorityInformationAccess 870 This field is assigned by the CA and MAY be omitted in this 871 profile. If specified the CA MAY choose to use this value as the 872 AIA field. 874 SubjectInformationAccess 875 This field MAY be honoured by the CA on the condition that the CA 876 issues a certificate with the BasicConstraints SubjectType CA bit 877 set and the KeyUsage set to CertificateSigning and CRLSigning. 879 If specified, this field contains a URI of the form of a single 880 rsync URL that references a single publication point that will be 881 used by the subject for all certificates that published by the 882 subject for subordinate certificates, and MUST be honoured by the 883 CA. 885 If this field is omitted and KeyUsage is set to CertificateSigning 886 then the CA MUST generate a SIA URL based on out-of-band 887 information that has been passed between the CA and the requester. 889 [Note not for publication - the same considerations with respect 890 to the CRL DistributionPoints apply to this field as well. i.e. if 891 this field is missing than it is also an option for the Issuer to 892 deny the request and not issue a certificate if the issued 893 certificate was to have the CA bit set.] 895 CertificatePolicies 896 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 897 profile. 899 SubjectAlternateName 900 This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the 901 SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. 903 IPResources 904 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 905 profile. 907 ASResources 908 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 909 profile. 911 With the exception of the publicKey field, the CA is permitted to 912 alter any requested field. 914 6. Resource Certificate Validation 916 This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. 917 This refines the generic procedure described insection 6 of 918 [RFC3280]: 920 To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other 921 things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n 922 certificates) satisfies the following conditions: 924 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 925 issuer of certificate x+1; 927 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 929 3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and 931 4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid. 933 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates 935 The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate 936 framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number 937 resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top- 938 down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from 939 a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct 940 recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these 941 recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform 942 further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in 943 that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has 944 only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. 945 there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and 946 corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct 947 or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in 948 question (i.e. no loops in the hierarchy). The only exception to the 949 "no loop" condition would be where a putative trust anchor may issue 950 a self-signed root certificate. 952 The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor is 953 a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the resource 954 certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of trust 955 models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional caveat on 956 the general applicability of trust models and PKIX frameworks, namely 957 that in forming a validation path to a trust anchor, the sequence of 958 certificates MUST preserve the resource extension validation 959 property, as described in Section 6.2. 961 6.2. Resource Extension Validation 963 The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical 964 extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded 965 representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a 966 prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. 968 Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS 969 number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource 970 Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This 971 validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource 972 sets: 974 more specific Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A 975 and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP 976 addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is 977 larger than range A. 979 equal Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, 980 A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same 981 collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. 982 The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this 983 "equality" comparison. 984 encompass Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X 985 "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or 986 AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more 987 specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the 988 set X. 990 Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an 991 ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is a trust 992 anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the subject of 993 certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, implies that 994 the resources described in certificate 'x', for 'x' is greater than 995 1, "encompass" the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1. 997 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation 999 Validation of signed resource data using a target resource 1000 certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or 1001 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a trust 1002 anchor, and 'n' is the target certificate) verifying that all of the 1003 following conditions hold: 1005 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 1006 the signature algorithm 1008 2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and 1009 To values. 1011 3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and 1012 contains field values as specified in this profile for all field 1013 values that MUST be present. 1015 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the 1016 certificate. 1018 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 1019 certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate 1020 Revocation List, and the CRL is itself valid. 1022 6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource 1023 extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer 1024 is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) 1026 7. The Certificate Path originates at a trust anchor, and there 1027 exists a signing chain across the Certificate Path where the 1028 Subject of Certificate x in the Certificate Path matches the 1029 Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the Certificate Path. 1031 A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any 1032 chosen order. 1034 Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally 1035 maintained repository, maintained by a regular top-down 1036 synchronization pass from the Root Trust Anchors via reference to 1037 Issuer certificates and their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus 1038 the CRLDP. Alternatively, validation may be performed using a 1039 bottom-up process with on-line certificate access using the AIA and 1040 CRLDP pointers to guide the certificate retrieval process. 1042 There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that 1043 are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as 1044 means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. 1045 Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation 1046 process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts 1047 to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of 1048 Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if 1049 the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration 1050 parameter. 1052 7. Example Use Cases 1054 [1 - signing a Route Registry Object] [2 - signing a Route 1055 Origination Authority - note validity time] [3 - performing a 1056 resource (sub) allocation - An example of this in situations where 1057 there are contractual period differences between the entity and its 1058 resource supplier, and the entity and its resource allocation 1059 subjects.] 1061 8. Security Considerations 1063 [To be completed] 1065 9. IANA Considerations 1067 [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA 1068 considerations stated in this version of the document.] 1070 10. Acknowledgements 1072 The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from 1073 Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo 1074 Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of 1075 this document. 1077 11. Normative References 1079 [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 1080 September 1981. 1082 [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and 1083 J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", 1084 BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. 1086 [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object 1087 Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, 1088 November 2000. 1090 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 1091 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, 1092 November 2000. 1094 [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet 1095 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 1096 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, 1097 April 2002. 1099 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 1100 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 1102 [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 1103 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in 1104 the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 1105 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, 1106 June 2005. 1108 [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. 1109 Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 1110 Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005. 1112 [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 1113 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, 1114 September 2005. 1116 [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing 1117 Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. 1119 [rsync] Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006, 1120 . 1122 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate 1124 The following is an example Resource Certificate. 1126 Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer 1128 Data: 1129 Version: 3 1130 Serial: 3 1131 Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1132 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1133 E=ca@apnic.net 1134 Validity: 1135 Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT 1136 Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT 1137 Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources 1138 Subject Key Identifier: 1139 86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d: 1140 8b:97:49:14 1141 Subject Key Identifier g(SKI): 1142 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ 1143 Subject Public Key Info: 1144 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 1145 RSA Public Key: Modulus: 1147 c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1: 1148 59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a: 1149 0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3: 1150 f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb: 1151 b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4: 1152 5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe: 1153 e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e: 1154 4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c: 1155 56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5: 1156 c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba: 1157 dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c: 1158 f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d: 1159 92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03: 1160 d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87: 1161 24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27: 1162 03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7 1163 RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537 1164 Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE 1165 Subject Info Access: 1166 caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1167 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1168 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1169 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ 1170 Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign 1171 CRL Distribution Points: 1172 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1173 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1174 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1175 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1176 Authority Info Access: caIssuers - 1177 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1178 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1179 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1180 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1181 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02: 1182 51:c2:a9:1c 1183 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1184 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1185 Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 1186 IPv4: 202.12.27.0-202.12.29.255, 202.12.31.0/24, 1187 203.119.0.0/24, 203.119.42.0/23 1188 IPv6: 2001:dc0::/32 1189 ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370 1190 Signature: 1191 c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b: 1192 4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59: 1193 0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2: 1194 a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7: 1196 11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3: 1197 92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28: 1198 f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f: 1199 e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51: 1200 26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0: 1201 4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12: 1202 5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4: 1203 81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28: 1204 33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3: 1205 bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c: 1206 1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54: 1207 52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d 1209 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List 1211 The following is an example Certificate Revocation List. 1213 CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1215 Data: 1216 Version: 2 1217 Signature Algorithm: 1218 Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1219 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1220 E=ca@apnic.net 1221 This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1222 Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1223 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1224 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05: 1225 07:02:51:c2:a9:1c 1226 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1227 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1228 CRLNumber: 4 1229 Revoked Certificates: 1 1230 Serial Number: 1 1231 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT 1232 Serial Number: 2 1233 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT 1234 Serial Number: 4 1235 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT 1236 Signature: 1237 b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46: 1238 0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12: 1239 f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27: 1240 17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a: 1241 f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09: 1242 d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e: 1243 b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54: 1244 66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29: 1245 6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2: 1246 d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12: 1247 cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8: 1248 c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c: 1249 d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a: 1250 09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da: 1251 02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d: 1252 59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f: 1253 34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02: 1254 d9 1256 Authors' Addresses 1258 Geoff Huston 1259 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1261 Email: gih@apnic.net 1262 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1264 George Michaelson 1265 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1267 Email: ggm@apnic.net 1268 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1270 Robert Loomans 1271 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1273 Email: robertl@apnic.net 1274 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1276 Full Copyright Statement 1278 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 1280 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 1281 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 1282 retain all their rights. 1284 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an 1285 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS 1286 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND 1287 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS 1288 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF 1289 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED 1290 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 1292 Intellectual Property 1294 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 1295 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 1296 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 1297 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 1298 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 1299 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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