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(127 more instances...) Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but may have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008. If you have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing to grant the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you can ignore this comment. If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378 disclaimer. (See the Legal Provisions document at https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.) -- The document date (April 10, 2007) is 6226 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2050 (Obsoleted by RFC 7020) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2985 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2986 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3280 (Obsoleted by RFC 5280) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 4158 Summary: 7 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 7 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDR G. Huston 3 Internet-Draft G. Michaelson 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans 5 Expires: October 12, 2007 APNIC 6 April 10, 2007 8 A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates 9 draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-06.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any 14 applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware 15 have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes 16 aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 24 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 25 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 26 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2007. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 40 Abstract 42 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 43 the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" 44 of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System 45 Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization 46 of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of- 47 use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the 48 associated Resource Certificate. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 54 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 55 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 56 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8 65 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 71 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 72 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 73 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 74 3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 75 3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 76 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13 77 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 78 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 79 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 80 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 81 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 82 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 83 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 84 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 85 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 86 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 87 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 88 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 89 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 90 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 91 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 92 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 93 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 17 94 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 18 95 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 96 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 97 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 98 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 21 99 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 100 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 23 101 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 102 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 103 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 104 10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 105 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 106 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27 107 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 108 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30 110 1. Introduction 112 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 113 use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. 114 These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to 115 the PKIX profile [RFC3280] and also conform to the constraints 116 specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the 117 issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of 118 IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers. 120 A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer 121 that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject 122 of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of 123 the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in 124 the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the 125 certificate's issuer. 127 In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number 128 resources within this context, it is intended that Resource 129 Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the 130 public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a 131 number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an 132 entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource 133 Certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and 134 the subject's public key that is being certified by the Issuer 135 corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair 136 that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the 137 number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the 138 certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or 139 assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public 140 number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI 141 structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one 142 'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a 143 Certificate Authority operating at the apex of a resource 144 distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate. 146 Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can 147 be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer - subject certificate 148 chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor Certificate 149 Authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional 150 constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully 151 encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject 152 chain. 154 Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of 155 secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an 156 IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, 157 to verify legitimacy and correctness of routing information. Related 158 use contexts include validation of Internet Routing Registry objects, 159 validation of routing requests, and detection of potential 160 unauthorised used of IP addresses. 162 This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource 163 Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. 164 Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to 165 this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. 167 1.1. Terminology 169 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 170 described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 171 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509 172 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet 173 Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing 174 Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" 175 [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management 176 policy documents. 178 The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 179 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 180 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 182 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 184 The framework for describing an association between the subject of a 185 certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current 186 control is described in [RFC3779]. 188 There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in 189 this profile: 191 1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL 192 extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate 193 profile further specifies that the use of this certificate 194 extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be 195 marked as CRITICAL. 197 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 198 set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix 199 masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile 200 MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in 201 the resource extension field. 203 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 204 validity includes the condition that the resources described in 205 the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the 206 certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a 207 resource set (called here the "Issuer's resource set") that must 208 encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this 209 context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be 210 the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. 212 A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a 213 sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the 214 subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next 215 certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certificate 216 authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource 217 extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's 218 issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence 219 of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in 220 the resource extension. 222 3. Resource Certificate Fields 224 A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, 225 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields 226 listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, 227 all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST 228 NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value 229 is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource 230 Certificates. 232 3.1. Version 234 Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field 235 MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this 236 field is 2). 238 3.2. Serial number 240 The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per 241 Issuer. 243 3.3. Signature Algorithm 245 This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on 246 this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with 247 RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 248 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 249 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055]. 251 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 252 both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be 253 taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 255 3.4. Issuer 257 This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the 258 certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 260 If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of 261 the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the 262 issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the 263 immediate superior certificate. 265 This field MUST be non-empty. 267 3.5. Subject 269 This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been 270 allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 272 In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and 273 each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using 274 a subject name that is unique per issuer. 276 This field MUST be non-empty. 278 3.6. Valid From 280 The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this 281 profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of 282 certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], 283 Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always 284 encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as 285 UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as 286 GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280]. 288 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 289 this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior 290 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 291 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 292 other than the current time. 294 3.7. Valid To 296 The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the 297 certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime 298 of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the 299 issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs 300 conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's 301 "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 302 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats 303 are defined in [RFC3280]. 305 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 306 this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior 307 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 308 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 309 other than the current time. 311 Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a 312 certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity 313 interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the 314 issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is 315 anticipated that a CA may have good reason to issue a certificate 316 with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the 317 CA's certificate. 319 3.8. Subject Public Key Info 321 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with 322 which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, 323 accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is 324 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024 325 bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that 326 the key size of keys that are intended to be used at the apex of a 327 certificate issuance hierarchy, and their immediate subordinates, 328 SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. Immediate subordinates 329 of these certificates, when used in the context of continued levels 330 of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. 332 In the application of this profile to certification of public number 333 resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the 334 Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits, and that 335 their immediate subordinate certificate authorities also use a key 336 size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate certificates MAY use a key 337 size of 1024 bits. 339 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 340 both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should be 341 taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 343 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 345 As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate 346 is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate- 347 using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical 348 extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension 349 MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280]. 351 The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming 352 Resource Certificate. 354 3.9.1. Basic Constraints 356 The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the 357 certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification 358 paths that include this certificate. 360 The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit 361 is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue 362 resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the 363 subject is permitted be a CA). 365 The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST 366 NOT be present. 368 The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the 369 Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present. 371 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 373 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 374 certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate 375 certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all 376 Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. 378 The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in 379 the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of 380 immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the 381 subject of this certificate). 383 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 384 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as 385 described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280]. 387 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 389 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 390 certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by 391 providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate 392 path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource 393 Certificates. The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all 394 Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self- 395 signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and 396 authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present. This 397 extension is non-critical. 399 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 400 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as 401 described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 403 3.9.4. Key Usage 405 This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical 406 extension, and it MUST be present. 408 In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits 409 are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to TRUE. 411 In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and 412 MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. 414 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 416 This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) 417 associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile 418 uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access 419 mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references 420 a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. 422 In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, 423 implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the 424 distributionPoint sub field MUST be present. The Reasons sub field 425 MUST be omitted. 427 The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT 428 contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST 429 be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified 430 to be all certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key 431 pair. The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a 432 single DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY 433 contain more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the 434 DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of 435 this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs 436 MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI. 438 This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. There is one 439 exception; where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a 440 "self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted. 442 3.9.6. Authority Information Access 444 This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the 445 certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA, 446 where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a 447 single reference object to publication location of the immediate 448 superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA 449 distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" 450 certificate, the authority key identifier SHOULD be omitted. 452 This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred 453 URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified 454 with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST 455 reference the point of publication of the certificate where this 456 issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). 457 Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be 458 included in the value sequence of this extension. 460 When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate 461 certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA 462 field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re- 463 issuance in and of itself implies a requirement to re-issue all 464 subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a 465 persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies 466 that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates 467 to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously 468 issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can 469 maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due 470 solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers' 471 policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued 472 certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice 473 Statement. 475 Alternatively, if the certificate issuer does not maintain a 476 persistent URL for the must recent issued certificate for each 477 subject, then the entity who is subject of a certificate MAY keep the 478 most recent copy of the superior's issued certificate in the 479 subject's publication space, and set the AIA to reference this 480 subject-maintained copy of the immediate superior certificate. 482 This extension is non-critical. 484 3.9.7. Subject Information Access 486 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services 487 relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension 488 appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information 489 and service collection will include all current valid certificates 490 that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the 491 subject's corresponding private key. 493 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The 494 preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be 495 specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the 496 subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an 497 object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a 498 trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs that reference the 499 same location MAY also be included in the value sequence of this 500 extension. The ordering of URIs in this sequence reflect the 501 subject's relative preferences for access methods, with the first 502 method in the sequence being the most preferred. 504 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- 505 critical. 507 For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this 508 field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it references 509 the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the 510 End Entity certificate can be accessed. The id-ad- 511 signedObjectRepository OID is used when the subject is an End Entity 512 and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a 513 repository. 515 id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } 517 id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 } 519 3.9.8. Certificate Policies 521 This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using 522 the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field 523 MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource 524 Certificates. 526 PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. 528 This extension MUST be present and it is critical. 530 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name 532 This is an optional extension, and MAY contain an X.501 Name as 533 supplied by the subject in the Certificate Request, or as assigned by 534 the issuer. 536 3.9.10. IP Resources 538 This field contains the list of IP address resources as per 539 [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a 540 particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates 541 describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, 542 the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 543 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 544 extensions. 546 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 548 3.9.11. AS Resources 550 This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779], 551 or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported 552 in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 553 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 554 extensions. 556 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 558 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 560 Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), 561 consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect 562 CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL MUST be 563 "all certificates issued by this CA using a given key pair". The 564 contents of the CRL are a list of all non-expired certificates issued 565 by the CA using a given key pair that have been revoked by the CA. 567 An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one 568 regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's 569 validity period. 571 This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. 573 The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with 574 different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the 575 key pair used by the CA. 577 No CRL fields other than those listed below are allowed in CRLs 578 issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields 579 MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a 580 single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the 581 "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA. 583 4.1. Version 585 Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the 586 integer value of this field is 1). 588 4.2. Issuer Name 590 The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is 591 also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in 592 the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer. 594 4.3. This Update 596 This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The 597 value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the 598 year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the 599 year 2050 or later. 601 4.4. Next Update 603 This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued. 604 The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through 605 the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in 606 the year 2050 or later. 608 4.5. Signature 610 This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. This 611 profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA 612 (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA- 613 512. This field MUST be present. 615 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 616 both the CRL Issuer and replying parties, indicating that care should 617 be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 619 4.6. Revoked Certificate List 621 When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate 622 list MUST be absent. 624 For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST 625 be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, 626 and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL. 628 4.6.1. Serial Number 630 The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate. 632 4.6.2. Revocation Date 634 The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a 635 future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for 636 dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime 637 for dates in the year 2050 or later. 639 4.7. CRL Extensions 641 The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The 642 following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be 643 present in a CRL. 645 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier 647 The authority key identifier extension provides a means of 648 identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to 649 sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier 650 method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 651 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 653 This extension is non-critical. 655 4.7.2. CRL Number 657 The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence 658 number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension 659 allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes 660 another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs 661 issued by the CA with the same scope. 663 This extension is non-critical. 665 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile 667 A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or 668 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF). There is no requirement 669 for a CA Issuer to support both request formats, and the choice of 670 formats is a matter for the Issuer and Subject to resolve. 672 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile 674 This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to 675 Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, 676 formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority 677 as the initial step in issuing a certificate. 679 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 680 (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. 682 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 683 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 684 certificate. 686 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 688 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 689 that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo: 691 Version 692 This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0. 694 Subject 695 The CA SHOULD consider this name as the subject's suggestion, but 696 the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name 697 MUST be unique per issuer in certificates issued by this issuer. 698 This field MAY be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a 699 subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued 700 by this issuer. 702 SubjectPublicKeyInfo 703 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm 704 with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, 705 and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field 706 also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public 707 key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the 708 DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey. 710 Attributes 711 [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where 712 the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key. 714 The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest 715 attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3 716 Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate 717 requests is specified in Section 5.3. 719 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 720 that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object: 722 signatureAlgorithm 723 This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA 724 (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 725 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 726 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } 727 [RFC4055]. 728 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive 729 for both the CA and replying parties, indicating that care should 730 be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 732 5.2. CRMF Profile 734 This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) 735 specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates. 736 A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the 737 CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in 738 issuing a certificate. 740 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 741 (RA), acting under the direction of a subject. 743 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 744 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 745 certificate.. 747 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 749 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 750 that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: 752 Version 753 This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version 754 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted. 756 SerialNumber 757 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 758 omitted in this profile. 760 SigningAlgorithm 761 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 762 omitted in this profile. 764 Issuer 765 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 766 profile. 768 Validity 769 This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a 770 Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If 771 specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with 772 dates as determined by the CA. 774 Subject As the subject name is assigned by the CA, this field MAY be 775 omitted, in which case the subject name will be generated by the 776 CA. If specified, the CA SHOULD consider this as the subject's 777 suggestion, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion. 779 PublicKey 780 This field MUST be present. 782 extensions 783 This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The 784 profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in 785 Section 5.3. 787 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields 789 The following control fields are supported in this profile: 791 Authenticator Control 792 It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the 793 subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211] 794 is that the Authenticator Control field be used. 796 [Note - not for publication: The method of generation and 797 authentication of this field is not specified in this document. 798 It is assumed that the Certificate Issuer and subject have 799 securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the 800 Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials. The 801 desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject 802 and the authenticity of the provided public key. An alternative 803 is to remove this control field from this profile and defer 804 authentication of the request to some unspecified external 805 mechanism.] 807 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests 809 The following extensions may appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate 810 Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on 811 these extensions.: 813 BasicConstraints 814 If this is omitted then this field is assigned by the CA. 816 The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource 817 Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this 818 profile. 820 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit 821 is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue 822 resource certificates within this overall framework. 824 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set of off (End Entity 825 certificate request). 827 SubjectKeyIdentifier 828 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 829 profile. 831 AuthorityKeyIdentifier 832 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 833 profile. 835 KeyUsage 836 The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and 837 CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the 838 BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified. 840 SubjectInformationAccess 841 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and the field 842 value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. If the CA is not able to 843 honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the 844 Certificate Request. 846 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and 847 services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the 848 SIA extension appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, 849 this information and service collection will include all current 850 valid certificates that have been issued by this subject that are 851 signed with the subject's corresponding private key. 853 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The 854 preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST 855 be specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository 856 when the subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI MUST 857 reference an object collection rather than an individual object 858 and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs 859 that reference the same location MAY also be included in the value 860 sequence of this extension. The ordering of URIs in this sequence 861 reflect the subject's relative preferences for access methods, 862 with the first method in the sequence being the most preferred by 863 the Subject. 865 SubjectAlternateName 866 This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the 867 SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. 869 CRLDistributionPoints 870 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 871 profile. 873 AuthorityInformationAccess 874 This field is assigned by the CA and MAY be omitted in this 875 profile. If specified the CA MAY choose to use this value as the 876 AIA field. 878 CertificatePolicies 879 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 880 profile. 882 IPResources 883 This field is assigned by the CA if omitted by the requestor, and 884 shall be interpreted as a request to certify all IP Resources 885 assigned to the requestor within the context of this CA. If 886 present, this is to be interpreted as the maximal span of IP 887 Resources to be certified by the CA, and the CA may reduce this to 888 the certified IP Resource set based on the IP Resources assigned 889 to the requestor under this CA. 891 ASResources 892 This field is assigned by the CA if omitted by the requestor, and 893 shall be interpreted as a request to certify all AS Resources 894 assigned to the requestor within the context of this CA. If 895 present, this is to be interpreted as the maximal span of AS 896 Resources to be certified by the CA, and the CA may reduce this to 897 the certified AS Resource set based on the AS Resources assigned 898 to the requestor under this CA. 900 With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the 901 SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any 902 requested field. 904 6. Resource Certificate Validation 906 This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. 907 This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of 909 [RFC3280]: 911 To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other 912 things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n 913 certificates) satisfies the following conditions: 915 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 916 issuer of certificate x+1; 918 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 920 3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and 922 4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid. 924 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates 926 The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate 927 framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number 928 resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top- 929 down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from 930 a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct 931 recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these 932 recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform 933 further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in 934 that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has 935 only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. 936 there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and 937 corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct 938 or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in 939 question (i.e. no loops in the model). 941 The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor CA 942 is a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the 943 resource certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of 944 trust models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional 945 caveat on the general applicability of trust models and PKIX 946 frameworks, namely that in forming a validation path to a trust 947 anchor CA, the sequence of certificates MUST preserve the resource 948 extension validation property, as described in Section 6.2, and the 949 validation of the first certificate in the validation path not only 950 involves the verification that the certificate was issued by a trust 951 anchor CA, but also that the resource set described in the 952 certificate MUST be encompassed by the trust anchor CA's resource 953 set, as described in Section 6.2. 955 The trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a trust 956 anchor, includes the following: 958 1. the trusted issuer name, 959 2. the trusted public key algorithm, 960 3. the trusted public key, 961 4. optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated with the 962 public key, and 963 5. a resource set, consisting of a set of IPv4 resources, IPv6 964 resources and AS number resources. 966 The trust anchor information may be provided to the path processing 967 procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate. 969 6.2. Resource Extension Validation 971 The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical 972 extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded 973 representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a 974 prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. 976 Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS 977 number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource 978 Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This 979 validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource 980 sets: 982 more specific: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, 983 A and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP 984 addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is 985 larger than range A. 987 equal: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, 988 A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same 989 collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. 990 The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this 991 "equality" comparison. 992 encompass: Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X 993 "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or 994 AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more 995 specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the 996 set X. 998 Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an 999 ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is issued by 1000 a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the 1001 subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, 1002 implies that the resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass" 1003 the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1, and the resources 1004 described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources 1005 described in certificate 1. 1007 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation 1009 Validation of signed resource data using a target resource 1010 certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or 1011 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a 1012 certificate that has been issued by a trust anchor, and 'n' is the 1013 target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions 1014 hold: 1016 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 1017 the signature algorithm 1019 2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and 1020 To values. 1022 3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and 1023 contains field values as specified in this profile for all field 1024 values that MUST be present. 1026 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present is present in the 1027 certificate. 1029 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 1030 certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate 1031 Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself 1032 valid. 1034 6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource 1035 extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer 1036 is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) 1038 7. The Certificate Path originates with a certificate issued by a 1039 trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the 1040 Certificate Path where the Subject of Certificate x in the 1041 Certificate Path matches the Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the 1042 Certificate Path. 1044 A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any 1045 chosen order. 1047 Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally 1048 maintained cache, maintained by a regular top-down synchronization 1049 pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource 1050 distribution hierarchy, via reference to Issued certificates and 1051 their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, 1052 validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line 1053 certificate access using the AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the 1054 certificate retrieval process. 1056 There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that 1057 are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as 1058 means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. 1059 Some further heuristics may be required to halt the validation 1060 process in order to avoid some of the issues associated with attempts 1061 to validate such structures. It is suggested that implementations of 1062 Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a validation failure if 1063 the certificate path length exceeds a pre-determined configuration 1064 parameter. 1066 7. Security Considerations 1068 The Security Considerations of [RFC3280] and [RFC3779]apply to 1069 Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use. 1071 A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms 1072 of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in 1073 the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same 1074 resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the 1075 status of resource allocations and assignments then the information 1076 conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the 1077 allocation and assignment databases. 1079 8. IANA Considerations 1081 [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA 1082 considerations stated in this version of the document.] 1084 9. Acknowledgements 1086 The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from 1087 Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo 1088 Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of 1089 this document. 1091 10. Normative References 1093 [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 1094 September 1981. 1096 [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and 1097 J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", 1098 BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. 1100 [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object 1101 Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, 1102 November 2000. 1104 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 1105 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, 1106 November 2000. 1108 [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet 1109 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 1110 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, 1111 April 2002. 1113 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 1114 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 1116 [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 1117 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in 1118 the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 1119 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, 1120 June 2005. 1122 [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. 1123 Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 1124 Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005. 1126 [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 1127 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, 1128 September 2005. 1130 [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing 1131 Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. 1133 [rsync] Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006, 1134 . 1136 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate 1138 The following is an example Resource Certificate. 1140 Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer 1142 Data: 1143 Version: 3 1144 Serial: 3 1145 Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1146 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1147 E=ca@apnic.net 1148 Validity: 1149 Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT 1150 Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT 1151 Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources 1152 Subject Key Identifier: 1153 86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d: 1154 8b:97:49:14 1155 Subject Key Identifier g(SKI): 1156 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ 1157 Subject Public Key Info: 1158 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 1159 RSA Public Key: Modulus: 1160 c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1: 1161 59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a: 1162 0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3: 1163 f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb: 1164 b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4: 1165 5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe: 1166 e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e: 1167 4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c: 1168 56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5: 1169 c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba: 1170 dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c: 1171 f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d: 1172 92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03: 1173 d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87: 1174 24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27: 1175 03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7 1176 RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537 1177 Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE 1178 Subject Info Access: 1179 caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1180 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1181 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1182 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ/ 1183 Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign 1184 CRL Distribution Points: 1185 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1186 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1187 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1188 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1189 Authority Info Access: caIssuers - 1190 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1191 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1192 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.cer 1193 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1194 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02: 1196 51:c2:a9:1c 1197 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1198 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1199 Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 1200 IPv4: 202.12.27.0-202.12.29.255, 202.12.31.0/24, 1201 203.119.0.0/24, 203.119.42.0/23 1202 IPv6: 2001:dc0::/32 1203 ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370 1204 Signature: 1205 c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b: 1206 4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59: 1207 0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2: 1208 a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7: 1209 11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3: 1210 92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28: 1211 f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f: 1212 e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51: 1213 26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0: 1214 4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12: 1215 5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4: 1216 81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28: 1217 33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3: 1218 bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c: 1219 1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54: 1220 52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d 1222 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List 1224 The following is an example Certificate Revocation List. 1226 CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1228 Data: 1229 Version: 2 1230 Signature Algorithm: 1231 Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1232 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1233 E=ca@apnic.net 1234 This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1235 Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1236 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1237 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05: 1238 07:02:51:c2:a9:1c 1239 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1240 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1241 CRLNumber: 4 1242 Revoked Certificates: 1 1243 Serial Number: 1 1244 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT 1245 Serial Number: 2 1246 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT 1247 Serial Number: 4 1248 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT 1249 Signature: 1250 b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46: 1251 0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12: 1252 f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27: 1253 17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a: 1254 f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09: 1255 d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e: 1256 b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54: 1257 66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29: 1258 6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2: 1259 d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12: 1260 cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8: 1261 c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c: 1262 d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a: 1263 09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da: 1264 02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d: 1265 59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f: 1266 34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02: 1267 d9 1269 Authors' Addresses 1271 Geoff Huston 1272 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1274 Email: gih@apnic.net 1275 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1277 George Michaelson 1278 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1280 Email: ggm@apnic.net 1281 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1283 Robert Loomans 1284 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1286 Email: robertl@apnic.net 1287 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1289 Full Copyright Statement 1291 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 1293 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 1294 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 1295 retain all their rights. 1297 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an 1298 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS 1299 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND 1300 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS 1301 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF 1302 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED 1303 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 1305 Intellectual Property 1307 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 1308 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 1309 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 1310 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 1311 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 1312 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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