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(129 more instances...) Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document seems to lack a disclaimer for pre-RFC5378 work, but may have content which was first submitted before 10 November 2008. If you have contacted all the original authors and they are all willing to grant the BCP78 rights to the IETF Trust, then this is fine, and you can ignore this comment. If not, you may need to add the pre-RFC5378 disclaimer. (See the Legal Provisions document at https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.) -- The document date (June 29, 2007) is 6146 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2050 (Obsoleted by RFC 7020) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2985 ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 2986 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 3280 (Obsoleted by RFC 5280) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 4158 Summary: 7 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 7 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDR G. Huston 3 Internet-Draft G. Michaelson 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans 5 Expires: December 31, 2007 APNIC 6 June 29, 2007 8 A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates 9 draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-07.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any 14 applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware 15 have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes 16 aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 24 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 25 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 26 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2007. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 40 Abstract 42 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 43 the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" 44 of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System 45 Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization 46 of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of- 47 use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the 48 issued Resource Certificate. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 54 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 55 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 56 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8 65 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 71 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 72 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 73 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 74 3.9.10. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 75 3.9.11. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 76 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13 77 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 78 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 79 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 80 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 81 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 82 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 83 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 84 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 85 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 86 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 87 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 88 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 89 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 90 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 91 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 92 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 93 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 17 94 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 18 95 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 96 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 97 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 98 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 20 99 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 100 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 22 101 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 102 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 103 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 104 10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 105 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 106 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27 107 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 108 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30 110 1. Introduction 112 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 113 use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. 114 These Resource Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to 115 the PKIX profile [RFC3280], and also conform to the constraints 116 specified in this profile. Resource Certificates attest that the 117 issuer has granted the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of 118 IP addresses and Autonomous System numbers. 120 A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer 121 that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject 122 of the certificate. The binding is identified by the association of 123 the subject's private key with the subject's public key contained in 124 the Resource Certificate, signed by the private key of the 125 certificate's issuer. 127 In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number 128 resources within this context, it is intended that Resource 129 Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the 130 public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a 131 number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an 132 entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource 133 Certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and 134 the subject's public key that is being certified by the issuer 135 corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair 136 that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the 137 number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the 138 certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or 139 assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public 140 number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI 141 structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one 142 'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a 143 certificate authority operating at the apex of a resource 144 distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate. 146 Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can 147 be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer-subject certificate 148 chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor certificate 149 authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional 150 constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully 151 encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject 152 certificate chain. 154 Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of 155 secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an 156 IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, 157 allowing relying parties to verify legitimacy and correctness of 158 routing information. Related use contexts include validation of 159 Internet Routing Registry objects, validation of routing requests, 160 and detection of potential unauthorised use of IP addresses. 162 This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource 163 Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. 164 Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to 165 this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. 167 1.1. Terminology 169 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 170 described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 171 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509 172 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet 173 Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing 174 Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" 175 [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management 176 policy documents. 178 The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 179 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 180 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 182 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 184 The framework for describing an association between the subject of a 185 certificate and the resources currently under the subject's current 186 control is described in [RFC3779]. 188 There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in 189 this profile: 191 1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL 192 extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate 193 profile further specifies that the use of this certificate 194 extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be 195 marked as CRITICAL. 197 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 198 set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix 199 masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile 200 MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in 201 the resource extension field. 203 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 204 validity includes the condition that the resources described in 205 the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the 206 certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a 207 resource set (called here the "issuer's resource set") that must 208 encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this 209 context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be 210 the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. 212 A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a 213 sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the 214 subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next 215 certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certificate 216 authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource 217 extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's 218 issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence 219 of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in 220 the resource extension. 222 3. Resource Certificate Fields 224 A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, 225 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields 226 listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, 227 all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST 228 NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value 229 is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource 230 Certificates. 232 3.1. Version 234 Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field 235 MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this 236 field is 2). 238 3.2. Serial number 240 The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per 241 Issuer. 243 3.3. Signature Algorithm 245 This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on 246 this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with 247 RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 248 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 249 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055]. 251 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 252 both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken 253 when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 255 3.4. Issuer 257 This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the 258 certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 260 If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of 261 the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the 262 issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the 263 immediate superior certificate. 265 This field MUST be non-empty. 267 3.5. Subject 269 This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been 270 allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 272 In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and 273 each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using 274 a subject name that is unique per issuer. 276 This field MUST be non-empty. 278 3.6. Valid From 280 The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this 281 profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of 282 certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], 283 Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always 284 encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as 285 UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as 286 GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280]. 288 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 289 this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior 290 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 291 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 292 other than the current time. 294 3.7. Valid To 296 The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the 297 certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime 298 of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the 299 issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs 300 conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's 301 "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 302 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats 303 are defined in [RFC3280]. 305 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 306 this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior 307 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 308 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 309 other than the current time. 311 Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a 312 certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity 313 interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the 314 issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is 315 anticipated that a CA may have valid grounds to issue a certificate 316 with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the 317 CA's certificate. 319 3.8. Subject Public Key Info 321 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with 322 which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, 323 accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is 324 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024 325 bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that 326 the key size of keys that are intended to be used at the apex of a 327 certificate issuance hierarchy, and their immediate subordinates, 328 SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. Immediate subordinates 329 of these certificates, when used in the context of continued levels 330 of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. 332 In the application of this profile to certification of public number 333 resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the 334 Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits in their 335 issued certificates, and that their immediate subordinate certificate 336 authorities also use a key size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate 337 certificates MAY use a key size of 1024 bits. 339 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 340 both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken 341 when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 343 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 345 As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate 346 is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate- 347 using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical 348 extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension 349 MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280]. 351 The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming 352 Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise. 354 3.9.1. Basic Constraints 356 The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the 357 certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification 358 paths that include this certificate. 360 The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit 361 is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue 362 resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the 363 subject is permitted be a CA). 365 The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST 366 NOT be present. 368 The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the 369 Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the subject is 370 a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise. 372 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 374 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 375 certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate 376 certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all 377 Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. 379 The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in 380 the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of 381 immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the 382 subject of this certificate). 384 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 385 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as 386 described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280]. 388 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 390 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 391 certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by 392 providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate 393 path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource 394 Certificates. The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all 395 Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self- 396 signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and 397 authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present. This 398 extension is non-critical. 400 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 401 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as 402 described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 404 3.9.4. Key Usage 406 This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical 407 extension, and it MUST be present. 409 In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits 410 are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to TRUE. 412 In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and 413 MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. 415 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 417 This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) 418 associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile 419 uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access 420 mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references 421 a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. 423 In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, 424 implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the 425 distributionPoint sub-field MUST be present. The Reasons sub-field 426 MUST be omitted. 428 The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT 429 contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST 430 be of type URI. In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified 431 to be all certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key 432 pair. The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a 433 single DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY 434 contain more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the 435 DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of 436 this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs 437 MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI. 439 This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. There is one 440 exception; where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a 441 "self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted. 443 3.9.6. Authority Information Access 445 This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the 446 certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA, 447 where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a 448 single reference object to publication location of the immediate 449 superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA 450 distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" 451 certificate, the authority key identifier SHOULD be omitted. 453 This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred 454 URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified 455 with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST 456 reference the point of publication of the certificate where this 457 issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). 458 Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be 459 included in the value sequence of this extension. 461 When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate 462 certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA 463 field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re- 464 issuance necessarily implies a requirement to re-issue all 465 subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a 466 persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies 467 that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates 468 to the same subject, and use the same publication name as previously 469 issued certificates. In this way subordinate certificates can 470 maintain a constant AIA field value and need not be re-issued due 471 solely to a re-issue of the superior certificate. The issuers' 472 policy with respect to the persistence of name objects of issued 473 certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's Certificate Practice 474 Statement. 476 This extension is non-critical. 478 3.9.7. Subject Information Access 480 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services 481 relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension 482 appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information 483 and service collection will include all current valid certificates 484 that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the 485 subject's corresponding private key. 487 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The 488 preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be 489 specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the 490 subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an 491 object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a 492 trailing '/' in the URI. 494 Other access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be 495 included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of 496 URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences for 497 access methods, with the first method in the sequence being the most 498 preferred. 500 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- 501 critical. 503 For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this 504 field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it references 505 the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the 506 End Entity certificate can be accessed. The id-ad- 507 signedObjectRepository OID is used when the subject is an End Entity 508 and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a 509 repository. 511 id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } 513 id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 } 515 3.9.8. Certificate Policies 517 This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using 518 the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field 519 MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource 520 Certificates. 522 PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. 524 This extension MUST be present and it is critical. 526 3.9.9. Subject Alternate Name 528 This is an optional extension, and MAY contain an X.501 Name as 529 supplied by the subject in the Certificate Request, or as assigned by 530 the issuer. 532 3.9.10. IP Resources 534 This field contains the list of IP address resources as per 535 [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a 536 particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates 537 describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, 538 the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 539 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 540 extensions. 542 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 544 3.9.11. AS Resources 546 This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779], 547 or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported 548 in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 549 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 550 extensions. 552 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 554 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 556 Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), 557 consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect 558 CRLs are supported in this profile. The scope of the CRL MUST be 559 "all certificates issued by this CA using a given key pair". The 560 contents of the CRL are a list of all non-expired certificates issued 561 by the CA using a given key pair that have been revoked by the CA. 563 An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one 564 regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's 565 validity period. 567 This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. 569 The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with 570 different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the 571 key pair used by the CA. 573 No CRL fields other than those listed here are permitted in CRLs 574 issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields 575 MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a 576 single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the 577 "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA. 579 4.1. Version 581 Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the 582 integer value of this field is 1). 584 4.2. Issuer Name 586 The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is 587 also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in 588 the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer. 590 4.3. This Update 592 This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The 593 value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the 594 year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the 595 year 2050 or later. 597 4.4. Next Update 599 This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued. 600 The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through 601 the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in 602 the year 2050 or later. 604 4.5. Signature 606 This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. This 607 profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA 608 (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA- 609 512. This field MUST be present. 611 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 612 both the CRL Issuer and relying parties, indicating that care should 613 be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 615 4.6. Revoked Certificate List 617 When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate 618 list MUST be absent. 620 For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST 621 be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, 622 and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL. 624 4.6.1. Serial Number 626 The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate. 628 4.6.2. Revocation Date 630 The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a 631 future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for 632 dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime 633 for dates in the year 2050 or later. 635 4.7. CRL Extensions 637 The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The 638 following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be 639 present in a CRL. 641 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier 643 The authority key identifier extension provides a means of 644 identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to 645 sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier 646 method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 647 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 649 This extension is non-critical. 651 4.7.2. CRL Number 653 The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence 654 number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension 655 allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes 656 another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs 657 issued by the CA with the same scope. 659 This extension is non-critical. 661 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile 663 A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or 664 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF). There is no requirement 665 for a CA Issuer to support both request formats, and the choice of 666 formats is a matter for the Issuer and Subject to resolve. 668 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile 670 This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to 671 Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, 672 formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority 673 as the initial step in issuing a certificate. 675 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 676 (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. 678 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 679 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 680 certificate. 682 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 684 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 685 that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo: 687 Version 688 This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0. 690 Subject 691 The CA SHOULD consider this name as the subject's suggestion, but 692 the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, as the subject name 693 MUST be unique per issuer in certificates issued by this issuer. 694 This field MAY be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a 695 subject name that is unique in the context of certificates issued 696 by this issuer. 698 SubjectPublicKeyInfo 699 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm 700 with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, 701 and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field 702 also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public 703 key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the 704 DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey. 706 Attributes 707 [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where 708 the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key. 710 The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest 711 attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3 712 Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate 713 requests is specified in Section 5.3. 715 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 716 that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object: 718 signatureAlgorithm 719 This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA 720 (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 721 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 722 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } 723 [RFC4055]. 725 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive 726 for both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should 727 be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 729 5.2. CRMF Profile 731 This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) 732 specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates. 733 A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the 734 CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in 735 issuing a certificate. 737 This request MAY be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 738 (RA), acting under the direction of a subject. 740 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 741 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 742 certificate. 744 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 746 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 747 that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: 749 Version 750 This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version 751 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted. 753 SerialNumber 754 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 755 omitted in this profile. 757 SigningAlgorithm 758 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 759 omitted in this profile. 761 Issuer 762 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 763 profile. 765 Validity 766 This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a 767 Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If 768 specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with 769 dates as determined by the CA. 771 Subject As the subject name is assigned by the CA, this field MAY be 772 omitted, in which case the subject name will be generated by the 773 CA. If specified, the CA SHOULD consider this as the subject's 774 suggestion, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion. 776 PublicKey 777 This field MUST be present. 779 extensions 780 This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The 781 profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in 782 Section 5.3. 784 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields 786 The following control fields are supported in this profile: 788 Authenticator Control 789 It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the 790 subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211] 791 is that the Authenticator Control field be used. 793 [Note - not for publication: The method of generation and 794 authentication of this field is not specified in this document. 795 It is assumed that the Certificate Issuer and subject have 796 securely exchanged credentials using some other mechanism and the 797 Authenticator Control shall reference these credentials. The 798 desirable properties include the ability to validate the subject 799 and the authenticity of the provided public key. An alternative 800 is to remove this control field from this profile and defer 801 authentication of the request to some unspecified external 802 mechanism.] 804 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests 806 The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate 807 Request. Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate 808 Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on 809 these extensions.: 811 BasicConstraints 812 If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity 813 certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in the 814 issued certificate. 816 The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource 817 Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this 818 profile. 820 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit 821 is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue 822 resource certificates within this overall framework. 824 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity 825 certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity 826 certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension. 828 SubjectKeyIdentifier 829 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 830 profile. 832 AuthorityKeyIdentifier 833 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 834 profile. 836 KeyUsage 837 The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and 838 CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the 839 BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified. 841 SubjectInformationAccess 842 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and the field 843 value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. If the CA is not able to 844 honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the 845 Certificate Request. 847 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and 848 services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the 849 SIA extension appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, 850 this information and service collection will include all current 851 valid certificates that have been issued by this subject that are 852 signed with the subject's corresponding private key. 854 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The 855 preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST 856 be specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository 857 when the subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI MUST 858 reference an object collection rather than an individual object 859 and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI. Other access method URIs 860 that reference the same location MAY also be included in the value 861 sequence of this extension. The ordering of URIs in this sequence 862 reflect the subject's relative preferences for access methods, 863 with the first method in the sequence being the most preferred by 864 the Subject. 866 SubjectAlternateName 867 This field MAY be present, and the CA MAY use this as the 868 SubjectAltName in the issued Certificate. 870 CRLDistributionPoints 871 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 872 profile. 874 AuthorityInformationAccess 875 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 876 profile. 878 CertificatePolicies 879 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 880 profile. 882 With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the 883 SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any 884 requested field. 886 6. Resource Certificate Validation 888 This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. 889 This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of 890 [RFC3280]: 892 To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other 893 things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n 894 certificates) satisfies the following conditions: 896 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 897 issuer of certificate x+1; 899 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 901 3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and 903 4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid. 905 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates 907 The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate 908 framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number 909 resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top- 910 down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from 911 a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct 912 recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these 913 recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform 914 further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in 915 that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has 916 only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. 917 there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and 918 corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct 919 or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in 920 question (i.e. no loops in the model). 922 The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor CA 923 is a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the 924 resource certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of 925 trust models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional 926 caveat on the general applicability of trust models and PKIX 927 frameworks, namely that in forming a validation path to a trust 928 anchor CA, the sequence of certificates MUST preserve the resource 929 extension validation property, as described in Section 6.2, and the 930 validation of the first certificate in the validation path not only 931 involves the verification that the certificate was issued by a trust 932 anchor CA, but also that the resource set described in the 933 certificate MUST be encompassed by the trust anchor CA's resource 934 set, as described in Section 6.2. 936 The trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a trust 937 anchor, includes the following: 938 1. the trusted issuer name, 939 2. the trusted public key algorithm, 940 3. the trusted public key, 941 4. optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated with the 942 public key, and 943 5. a resource set, consisting of a set of IPv4 resources, IPv6 944 resources and AS number resources. 946 The trust anchor information may be provided to the path processing 947 procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate. 949 6.2. Resource Extension Validation 951 The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical 952 extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded 953 representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a 954 prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. 956 Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS 957 number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource 958 Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This 959 validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource 960 sets: 962 more specific: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, 963 A and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP 964 addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is 965 larger than range A. 967 equal: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, 968 A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same 969 collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. 970 The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779]is equivalent to this 971 "equality" comparison. 972 encompass: Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X 973 "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or 974 AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more 975 specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the 976 set X. 978 Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an 979 ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is issued by 980 a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the 981 subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, 982 implies that the resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass" 983 the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1, and the resources 984 described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources 985 described in certificate 1. 987 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation 989 Validation of signed resource data using a target resource 990 certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or 991 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a 992 certificate that has been issued by a trust anchor, and 'n' is the 993 target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions 994 hold: 996 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 997 the signature algorithm 999 2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and 1000 To values. 1002 3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and 1003 contains field values as specified in this profile for all field 1004 values that MUST be present. 1006 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present in this profile is 1007 present in the certificate. 1009 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 1010 certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate 1011 Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself 1012 valid. 1014 6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource 1015 extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer 1016 is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) 1018 7. The Certificate Path originates with a certificate issued by a 1019 trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the 1020 Certificate Path where the Subject of Certificate x in the 1021 Certificate Path matches the Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the 1022 Certificate Path. 1024 A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any 1025 chosen order. 1027 Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally 1028 maintained cache, maintained by a regular top-down synchronization 1029 pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource 1030 distribution hierarchy, via reference to Issued certificates and 1031 their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, 1032 validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line 1033 certificate access using the AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the 1034 certificate retrieval process. 1036 There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that 1037 are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as 1038 means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. 1039 Some further heuristics may be required to halt the certificate path 1040 validation process in order to avoid some of the issues associated 1041 with attempts to validate such structures. It is suggested that 1042 implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a 1043 validation failure if the certificate path length exceeds a pre- 1044 determined configuration parameter. 1046 7. Security Considerations 1048 The Security Considerations of [RFC3280] and [RFC3779]apply to 1049 Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use. 1051 A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms 1052 of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in 1053 the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same 1054 resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the 1055 status of resource allocations and assignments then the information 1056 conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the 1057 allocation and assignment databases. 1059 8. IANA Considerations 1061 [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA 1062 considerations stated in this version of the document.] 1064 9. Acknowledgements 1066 The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from 1067 Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo 1068 Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of 1069 this document. 1071 10. Normative References 1073 [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 1074 September 1981. 1076 [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and 1077 J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", 1078 BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. 1080 [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object 1081 Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, 1082 November 2000. 1084 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 1085 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, 1086 November 2000. 1088 [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet 1089 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 1090 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, 1091 April 2002. 1093 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 1094 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 1096 [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 1097 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in 1098 the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 1099 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, 1100 June 2005. 1102 [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. 1103 Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 1104 Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005. 1106 [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 1107 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, 1108 September 2005. 1110 [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing 1111 Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. 1113 [rsync] Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006, 1114 . 1116 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate 1118 The following is an example Resource Certificate. 1120 Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer 1122 Data: 1123 Version: 3 1124 Serial: 3 1125 Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1126 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1127 E=ca@apnic.net 1128 Validity: 1129 Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT 1130 Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT 1131 Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources 1132 Subject Key Identifier: 1133 86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d: 1134 8b:97:49:14 1135 Subject Key Identifier g(SKI): 1136 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ 1137 Subject Public Key Info: 1138 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 1139 RSA Public Key: Modulus: 1140 c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1: 1141 59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a: 1142 0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3: 1143 f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb: 1144 b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4: 1146 5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe: 1147 e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e: 1148 4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c: 1149 56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5: 1150 c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba: 1151 dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c: 1152 f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d: 1153 92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03: 1154 d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87: 1155 24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27: 1156 03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7 1157 RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537 1158 Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE 1159 Subject Info Access: 1160 caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1161 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1162 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1163 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ/ 1164 Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign 1165 CRL Distribution Points: 1166 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1167 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1168 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1169 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1170 Authority Info Access: caIssuers - 1171 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1172 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1173 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.cer 1174 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1175 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02: 1176 51:c2:a9:1c 1177 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1178 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1179 Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 1180 IPv4: 202.12.27.0-202.12.29.255, 202.12.31.0/24, 1181 203.119.0.0/24, 203.119.42.0/23 1182 IPv6: 2001:dc0::/32 1183 ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370 1184 Signature: 1185 c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b: 1186 4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59: 1187 0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2: 1188 a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7: 1189 11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3: 1190 92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28: 1191 f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f: 1192 e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51: 1193 26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0: 1195 4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12: 1196 5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4: 1197 81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28: 1198 33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3: 1199 bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c: 1200 1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54: 1201 52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d 1203 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List 1205 The following is an example Certificate Revocation List. 1207 CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1209 Data: 1210 Version: 2 1211 Signature Algorithm: 1212 Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1213 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1214 E=ca@apnic.net 1215 This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1216 Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1217 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1218 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05: 1219 07:02:51:c2:a9:1c 1220 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1221 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1222 CRLNumber: 4 1223 Revoked Certificates: 1 1224 Serial Number: 1 1225 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT 1226 Serial Number: 2 1227 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT 1228 Serial Number: 4 1229 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT 1230 Signature: 1231 b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46: 1232 0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12: 1233 f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27: 1234 17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a: 1235 f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09: 1236 d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e: 1237 b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54: 1238 66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29: 1239 6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2: 1240 d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12: 1241 cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8: 1242 c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c: 1243 d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a: 1244 09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da: 1245 02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d: 1246 59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f: 1247 34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02: 1248 d9 1250 Authors' Addresses 1252 Geoff Huston 1253 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1255 Email: gih@apnic.net 1256 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1258 George Michaelson 1259 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1261 Email: ggm@apnic.net 1262 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1264 Robert Loomans 1265 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1267 Email: robertl@apnic.net 1268 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1270 Full Copyright Statement 1272 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 1274 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 1275 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 1276 retain all their rights. 1278 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an 1279 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS 1280 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND 1281 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS 1282 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF 1283 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED 1284 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 1286 Intellectual Property 1288 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 1289 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 1290 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 1291 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 1292 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 1293 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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