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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDR G. Huston 3 Internet-Draft G. Michaelson 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans 5 Expires: January 29, 2008 APNIC 6 July 28, 2007 8 A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates 9 draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-08.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any 14 applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware 15 have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes 16 aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 24 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 25 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 26 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 29, 2008. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 40 Abstract 42 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 43 the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" 44 of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System 45 Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization 46 of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of- 47 use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the 48 issued certificate. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 54 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 55 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 56 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8 65 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 71 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 72 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 73 3.9.9. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 74 3.9.10. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 75 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 13 76 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 77 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 78 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 79 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 80 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 81 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 82 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 83 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 84 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 85 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 86 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 87 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 88 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 89 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 90 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 91 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 92 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 17 93 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 18 94 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 95 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 96 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 97 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 20 98 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 99 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 22 100 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 101 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 102 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 103 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 104 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 105 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 106 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 107 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27 108 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 109 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30 111 1. Introduction 113 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 114 use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. 115 Such certificates are termed here "Resource Certificates." Resource 116 Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile 117 [RFC3280], and also conform to the constraints specified in this 118 profile. Resource Certificates attest that the issuer has granted 119 the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of IP addresses and 120 Autonomous System numbers. 122 A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer 123 that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject 124 of the issued certificate. The binding is identified by the 125 association of the subject's private key with the subject's public 126 key contained in the Resource Certificate, as signed by the private 127 key of the certificate's issuer. 129 In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number 130 resources within this context, it is intended that Resource 131 Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the 132 public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a 133 number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an 134 entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource 135 Certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and 136 the subject's public key that is being certified by the issuer 137 corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair 138 that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the 139 number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the 140 certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or 141 assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public 142 number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI 143 structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one 144 'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a 145 certificate authority operating at the apex of a resource 146 distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate. 148 Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can 149 be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer-subject certificate 150 chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor certificate 151 authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional 152 constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully 153 encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject 154 certificate chain. 156 Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of 157 secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an 158 IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, 159 allowing relying parties to verify legitimacy and correctness of 160 routing information. Related use contexts include validation of 161 Internet Routing Registry objects, validation of routing requests, 162 and detection of potential unauthorised use of IP addresses. 164 This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource 165 Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. 166 Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to 167 this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. 169 1.1. Terminology 171 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 172 described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 173 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509 174 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet 175 Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing 176 Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" 177 [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management 178 policy documents. 180 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 181 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 182 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 184 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 186 The framework for describing an association between the subject of a 187 certificate and the resources currently under the subject's control 188 is described in [RFC3779]. 190 There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in 191 this profile: 193 1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL 194 extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate 195 profile further specifies that the use of this certificate 196 extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be 197 marked as CRITICAL. 199 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 200 set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix 201 masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile 202 MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in 203 the resource extension field. 205 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 206 validity includes the condition that the resources described in 207 the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the 208 certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a 209 resource set (called here the "issuer's resource set") that must 210 encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this 211 context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be 212 the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. 214 A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a 215 sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the 216 subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next 217 certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certificate 218 authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource 219 extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's 220 issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence 221 of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in 222 the resource extension. 224 3. Resource Certificate Fields 226 A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, 227 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields 228 listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, 229 all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST 230 NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value 231 is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource 232 Certificates. 234 3.1. Version 236 Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field 237 MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this 238 field is 2). 240 3.2. Serial number 242 The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per 243 Issuer. 245 3.3. Signature Algorithm 247 This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on 248 this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with 249 RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 250 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 251 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055]. 253 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 254 both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken 255 when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 257 3.4. Issuer 259 This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the 260 certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 262 If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of 263 the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the 264 issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the 265 immediate superior certificate. 267 This field MUST be non-empty. 269 3.5. Subject 271 This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been 272 allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 274 In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and 275 each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using 276 a subject name that is unique per issuer. 278 This field MUST be non-empty. 280 3.6. Valid From 282 The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this 283 profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of 284 certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], 285 Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always 286 encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as 287 UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as 288 GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280]. 290 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 291 this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior 292 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 293 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 294 other than the current time. 296 3.7. Valid To 298 The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the 299 certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime 300 of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the 301 issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs 302 conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's 303 "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 304 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats 305 are defined in [RFC3280]. 307 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 308 this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior 309 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 310 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 311 other than the current time. 313 Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a 314 certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity 315 interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the 316 issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is 317 anticipated that a CA may have valid grounds to issue a certificate 318 with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the 319 CA's certificate. 321 3.8. Subject Public Key Info 323 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with 324 which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, 325 accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is 326 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024 327 bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that 328 the key size of keys that are intended to be used at the apex of a 329 certificate issuance hierarchy, and their immediate subordinates, 330 SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. Immediate subordinates 331 of these certificates, when used in the context of continued levels 332 of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. 334 In the application of this profile to certification of public number 335 resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the 336 Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits in their 337 issued certificates, and that their immediate subordinate certificate 338 authorities also use a key size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate 339 certificates MAY use a key size of 1024 bits. 341 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 342 both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken 343 when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 345 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 347 As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate 348 is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate- 349 using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical 350 extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension 351 MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280]. 353 The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming 354 Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise. 356 3.9.1. Basic Constraints 358 The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the 359 certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification 360 paths that include this certificate. 362 The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit 363 is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue 364 resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the 365 subject is permitted be a CA). 367 The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST 368 NOT be present. 370 The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the 371 Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the subject is 372 a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise. 374 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 376 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 377 certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate 378 certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all 379 Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. 381 The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in 382 the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of 383 immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the 384 subject of this certificate). 386 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 387 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as 388 described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280]. 390 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 392 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 393 certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by 394 providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate 395 path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource 396 Certificates. The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all 397 Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self- 398 signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and 399 authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present. This 400 extension is non-critical. 402 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 403 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as 404 described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 406 3.9.4. Key Usage 408 This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical 409 extension, and it MUST be present. 411 In certificates issued to CAs only the keyCertSign and CRLSign bits 412 are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to TRUE. 414 In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and 415 MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. 417 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 419 This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) 420 associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile 421 uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access 422 mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references 423 a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. 425 In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, 426 implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the 427 distributionPoint sub-field MUST be present. The Reasons sub-field 428 MUST be omitted. 430 The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT 431 contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST 432 be of type URI. 434 In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all 435 certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key pair. 437 The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single 438 DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain 439 more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the 440 DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of 441 this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs 442 MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI. 444 This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. There is one 445 exception; where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a 446 "self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted. 448 3.9.6. Authority Information Access 450 This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the 451 certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA, 452 where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a 453 single reference object to publication location of the immediate 454 superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA 455 distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" 456 certificate, the authority key identifier SHOULD be omitted. 458 This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred 459 URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified 460 with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST 461 reference the point of publication of the certificate where this 462 issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). 463 Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be 464 included in the value sequence of this extension. 466 When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate 467 certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA 468 field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re- 469 issuance necessarily implies a requirement to re-issue all 470 subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a 471 persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies 472 that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates 473 to the same subject in the publication repository, and use the same 474 publication name as previously issued certificates. In this way 475 subordinate certificates can maintain a constant AIA field value and 476 need not be re-issued due solely to a re-issue of the superior 477 certificate. The issuers' policy with respect to the persistence of 478 name objects of issued certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's 479 Certificate Practice Statement. 481 This extension is non-critical. 483 3.9.7. Subject Information Access 485 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services 486 relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension 487 appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information 488 and service collection will include all current valid certificates 489 that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the 490 subject's corresponding private key. 492 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The 493 preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be 494 specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the 495 subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an 496 object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a 497 trailing '/' in the URI. 499 Other access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be 500 included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of 501 URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences for 502 access methods, with the first method in the sequence being the most 503 preferred. 505 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- 506 critical. 508 For End Entity certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this 509 field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it references 510 the location where objects signed by the key pair associated with the 511 End Entity certificate can be accessed. The id-ad- 512 signedObjectRepository OID is used when the subject is an End Entity 513 and it publishes objects signed with the matching private key in a 514 repository. 516 id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } 518 id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 } 520 3.9.8. Certificate Policies 522 This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using 523 the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field 524 MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource 525 Certificates. 527 PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. 529 This extension MUST be present and it is critical. 531 3.9.9. IP Resources 533 This field contains the list of IP address resources as per 534 [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a 535 particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates 536 describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, 537 the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 538 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 539 extensions. 541 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 543 3.9.10. AS Resources 545 This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779], 546 or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported 547 in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 548 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 549 extensions. 551 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 553 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 555 Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), 556 consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect 557 CRLs are supported in this profile. 559 An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one 560 regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's 561 validity period. 563 This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. 565 The scope of the CRL MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA 566 using a given key pair". The contents of the CRL are a list of all 567 non-expired certificates issued by the CA using a given key pair that 568 have been revoked by the CA. 570 The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with 571 different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the 572 key pair used by the CA. 574 No CRL fields other than those listed here are permitted in CRLs 575 issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields 576 MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a 577 single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the 578 "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA. 580 4.1. Version 582 Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the 583 integer value of this field is 1). 585 4.2. Issuer Name 587 The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is 588 also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in 589 the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer. 591 4.3. This Update 593 This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The 594 value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the 595 year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the 596 year 2050 or later. 598 4.4. Next Update 600 This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued. 601 The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through 602 the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in 603 the year 2050 or later. 605 4.5. Signature 607 This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. This 608 profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA 609 (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA- 610 512. This field MUST be present. 612 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 613 both the CRL Issuer and relying parties, indicating that care should 614 be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 616 4.6. Revoked Certificate List 618 When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate 619 list MUST be absent. 621 For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST 622 be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, 623 and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL. 625 4.6.1. Serial Number 627 The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate. 629 4.6.2. Revocation Date 631 The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a 632 future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for 633 dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime 634 for dates in the year 2050 or later. 636 4.7. CRL Extensions 638 The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The 639 following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be 640 present in a CRL. 642 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier 644 The authority key identifier extension provides a means of 645 identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to 646 sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier 647 method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 648 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 650 This extension is non-critical. 652 4.7.2. CRL Number 654 The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence 655 number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension 656 allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes 657 another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs 658 issued by the CA with the same scope. 660 This extension is non-critical. 662 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile 664 A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or 665 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF). A CA Issuer MUST support 666 PKCS#10 and a CA Issuer may, with mutual consent of the subject, 667 support CRMF. 669 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile 671 This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to 672 Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, 673 formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority 674 as the initial step in issuing a certificate. 676 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 677 (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. 679 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 680 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 681 certificate. 683 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 685 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 686 that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo: 688 Version 689 This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0. 691 Subject 692 This field is optional. If present, the value of this field 693 SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject 694 name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this 695 issuer. If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY 696 consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested 697 subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, 698 as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates 699 issued by this issuer. 701 SubjectPublicKeyInfo 702 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm 703 with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, 704 and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field 705 also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public 706 key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the 707 DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey. 709 Attributes 710 [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where 711 the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key. 713 The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest 714 attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3 715 Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate 716 requests is specified in Section 5.3. 718 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 719 that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object: 721 signatureAlgorithm 722 This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA 723 (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 724 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 725 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } 726 [RFC4055]. 728 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive 729 for both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should 730 be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 732 5.2. CRMF Profile 734 This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) 735 specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates. 736 A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the 737 CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in 738 issuing a certificate. 740 This request MAY be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 741 (RA), acting under the direction of a subject. 743 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 744 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 745 certificate. 747 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 749 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 750 that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: 752 Version 753 This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version 754 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted. 756 SerialNumber 757 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 758 omitted in this profile. 760 SigningAlgorithm 761 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 762 omitted in this profile. 764 Issuer 765 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 766 profile. 768 Validity 769 This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a 770 Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If 771 specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with 772 dates as determined by the CA. 774 Subject 775 This field is optional. If present, the value of this field 776 SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject 777 name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this 778 issuer. If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY 779 consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested 780 subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, 781 as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates 782 issued by this issuer. 784 PublicKey 785 This field MUST be present. 787 extensions 788 This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The 789 profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in 790 Section 5.3. 792 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields 794 The following control fields are supported in this profile: 796 Authenticator Control 797 It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the 798 subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211] 799 is that the Authenticator Control field be used. 801 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests 803 The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate 804 Request. Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate 805 Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on 806 these extensions.: 808 BasicConstraints 809 If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity 810 certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in the 811 issued certificate. 813 The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource 814 Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this 815 profile. 817 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit 818 is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue 819 resource certificates within this overall framework. 821 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity 822 certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity 823 certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension. 825 SubjectKeyIdentifier 826 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 827 profile. 829 AuthorityKeyIdentifier 830 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 831 profile. 833 KeyUsage 834 The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of CertificateSigning and 835 CRLSigning if present, as long as this is consistent with the 836 BasicConstraints SubjectType sub field, when specified. 838 SubjectInformationAccess 839 This field MAY be present when the subject is a CA, and the field 840 value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. If the CA is not able to 841 honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the 842 Certificate Request. 844 If the field is not present, then the CA shall interpret the 845 request as a request by the subject entity to publish subordinate 846 certificates via the CA, and the CA will place the publication 847 point in the SIA field of the issued certificate. 849 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and 850 services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the 851 SIA extension appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, 852 this information and service collection will include all current 853 valid certificates that have been issued by this subject that are 854 signed with the subject's corresponding private key. 856 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. An RSYNC 857 URI MUST be specified, with an access method value of id-ad- 858 caRepository when the subject of the certificate is a CA. The 859 RSYNC URI MUST reference an object collection rather than an 860 individual object and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI. Other 861 access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be 862 included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of 863 URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences 864 for access methods, with the first method in the sequence being 865 the most preferred by the Subject. 867 CRLDistributionPoints 868 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 869 profile. 871 AuthorityInformationAccess 872 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 873 profile. 875 CertificatePolicies 876 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 877 profile. 879 With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the 880 SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any 881 requested field. 883 6. Resource Certificate Validation 885 This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. 886 This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of 887 [RFC3280]: 889 To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other 890 things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n 891 certificates) satisfies the following conditions: 893 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 894 issuer of certificate x+1; 896 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 898 3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and 900 4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid. 902 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates 904 The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate 905 framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number 906 resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top- 907 down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from 908 a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct 909 recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these 910 recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform 911 further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in 912 that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has 913 only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. 914 there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and 915 corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct 916 or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in 917 question (i.e. no loops in the model). 919 The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor CA 920 is a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the 921 resource certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of 922 trust models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional 923 caveat on the general applicability of trust models and PKIX 924 frameworks, namely that in forming a validation path to a trust 925 anchor CA, the sequence of certificates MUST preserve the resource 926 extension validation property, as described in Section 6.2, and the 927 validation of the first certificate in the validation path not only 928 involves the verification that the certificate was issued by a trust 929 anchor CA, but also that the resource set described in the 930 certificate MUST be encompassed by the trust anchor CA's resource 931 set, as described in Section 6.2. 933 The trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a trust 934 anchor, includes the following: 935 1. the trusted issuer name, 936 2. the trusted public key algorithm, 937 3. the trusted public key, 938 4. optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated with the 939 public key, and 940 5. a resource set, consisting of a set of IPv4 resources, IPv6 941 resources and AS number resources. 943 The trust anchor information may be provided to the path processing 944 procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate. 946 6.2. Resource Extension Validation 948 The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical 949 extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded 950 representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a 951 prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. 953 Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS 954 number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource 955 Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This 956 validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource 957 sets: 959 more specific: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, 960 A and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP 961 addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is 962 larger than range A. 964 equal: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, 965 A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same 966 collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. 967 The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779] is equivalent to this 968 "equality" comparison. 969 encompass: Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X 970 "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or 971 AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more 972 specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the 973 set X. 975 Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an 976 ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is issued by 977 a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the 978 subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, 979 implies that the resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass" 980 the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1, and the resources 981 described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources 982 described in certificate 1. 984 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation 986 Validation of signed resource data using a target resource 987 certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or 988 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a 989 certificate that has been issued by a trust anchor, and 'n' is the 990 target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions 991 hold: 993 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 994 the signature algorithm 996 2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and 997 To values. 999 3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and 1000 contains field values as specified in this profile for all field 1001 values that MUST be present. 1003 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present in this profile is 1004 present in the certificate. 1006 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 1007 certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate 1008 Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself 1009 valid. 1011 6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource 1012 extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer 1013 is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) 1015 7. The Certificate Path originates with a certificate issued by a 1016 trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the 1017 Certificate Path where the Subject of Certificate x in the 1018 Certificate Path matches the Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the 1019 Certificate Path. 1021 A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any 1022 chosen order. 1024 Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally 1025 maintained cache, maintained by a regular top-down synchronization 1026 pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource 1027 distribution hierarchy, via reference to Issued certificates and 1028 their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, 1029 validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line 1030 certificate access using the AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the 1031 certificate retrieval process. 1033 There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that 1034 are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as 1035 means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. 1036 Some further heuristics may be required to halt the certificate path 1037 validation process in order to avoid some of the issues associated 1038 with attempts to validate such structures. It is suggested that 1039 implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a 1040 validation failure if the certificate path length exceeds a pre- 1041 determined configuration parameter. 1043 7. Security Considerations 1045 The Security Considerations of [RFC3280] and [RFC3779]apply to 1046 Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use. 1048 A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms 1049 of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in 1050 the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same 1051 resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the 1052 status of resource allocations and assignments then the information 1053 conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the 1054 allocation and assignment databases. 1056 8. IANA Considerations 1058 [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA 1059 considerations stated in this version of the document.] 1061 9. Acknowledgements 1063 The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from 1064 Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo 1065 Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of 1066 this document. 1068 10. References 1070 10.1. Normative References 1072 [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 1073 September 1981. 1075 [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and 1076 J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", 1077 BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. 1079 [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet 1080 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 1081 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, 1082 April 2002. 1084 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 1085 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 1087 [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 1088 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in 1089 the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 1090 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, 1091 June 2005. 1093 [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 1094 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, 1095 September 2005. 1097 [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing 1098 Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. 1100 10.2. Informative References 1102 [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object 1103 Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, 1104 November 2000. 1106 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 1107 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, 1108 November 2000. 1110 [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. 1111 Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 1112 Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005. 1114 [rsync] Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006, 1115 . 1117 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate 1119 The following is an example Resource Certificate. 1121 Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer 1123 Data: 1124 Version: 3 1125 Serial: 3 1126 Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1127 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1128 E=ca@apnic.net 1129 Validity: 1130 Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT 1131 Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT 1132 Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources 1133 Subject Key Identifier: 1134 86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d: 1135 8b:97:49:14 1136 Subject Key Identifier g(SKI): 1137 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ 1138 Subject Public Key Info: 1139 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 1140 RSA Public Key: Modulus: 1141 c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1: 1142 59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a: 1143 0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3: 1144 f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb: 1146 b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4: 1147 5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe: 1148 e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e: 1149 4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c: 1150 56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5: 1151 c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba: 1152 dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c: 1153 f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d: 1154 92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03: 1155 d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87: 1156 24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27: 1157 03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7 1158 RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537 1159 Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE 1160 Subject Info Access: 1161 caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1162 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1163 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1164 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ/ 1165 Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign 1166 CRL Distribution Points: 1167 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1168 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1169 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1170 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1171 Authority Info Access: caIssuers - 1172 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1173 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1174 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.cer 1175 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1176 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02: 1177 51:c2:a9:1c 1178 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1179 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1180 Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 1181 IPv4: 192.0.2.0/24, 1182 IPv6: 2001:DB8::/32 1183 ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370 1184 Signature: 1185 c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b: 1186 4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59: 1187 0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2: 1188 a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7: 1189 11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3: 1190 92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28: 1191 f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f: 1192 e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51: 1193 26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0: 1195 4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12: 1196 5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4: 1197 81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28: 1198 33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3: 1199 bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c: 1200 1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54: 1201 52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d 1203 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List 1205 The following is an example Certificate Revocation List. 1207 CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1209 Data: 1210 Version: 2 1211 Signature Algorithm: 1212 Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1213 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1214 E=ca@apnic.net 1215 This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1216 Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1217 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1218 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05: 1219 07:02:51:c2:a9:1c 1220 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1221 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1222 CRLNumber: 4 1223 Revoked Certificates: 1 1224 Serial Number: 1 1225 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT 1226 Serial Number: 2 1227 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT 1228 Serial Number: 4 1229 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT 1230 Signature: 1231 b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46: 1232 0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12: 1233 f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27: 1234 17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a: 1235 f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09: 1236 d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e: 1237 b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54: 1238 66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29: 1239 6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2: 1240 d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12: 1241 cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8: 1242 c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c: 1243 d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a: 1244 09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da: 1245 02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d: 1246 59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f: 1247 34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02: 1248 d9 1250 Authors' Addresses 1252 Geoff Huston 1253 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1255 Email: gih@apnic.net 1256 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1258 George Michaelson 1259 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1261 Email: ggm@apnic.net 1262 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1264 Robert Loomans 1265 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1267 Email: robertl@apnic.net 1268 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1270 Full Copyright Statement 1272 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 1274 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 1275 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 1276 retain all their rights. 1278 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an 1279 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS 1280 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND 1281 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS 1282 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF 1283 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED 1284 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 1286 Intellectual Property 1288 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 1289 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 1290 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 1291 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 1292 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 1293 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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