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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDR G. Huston 3 Internet-Draft G. Michaelson 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans 5 Expires: May 17, 2008 APNIC 6 November 14, 2007 8 A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates 9 draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-09.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any 14 applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware 15 have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes 16 aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 24 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 25 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 26 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 17, 2008. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 40 Abstract 42 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 43 the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" 44 of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System 45 Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization 46 of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of- 47 use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the 48 issued certificate. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 54 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 55 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 56 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 9 65 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 68 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 71 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 72 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 73 3.9.9. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 74 3.9.10. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 75 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 14 76 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 77 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 78 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 79 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 80 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 81 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 82 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 83 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 84 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 85 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 86 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 87 5. Manifest Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 88 6. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 89 6.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 90 6.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 91 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 92 6.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 93 6.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 18 94 6.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 19 95 6.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 96 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 97 7. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 98 7.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 21 99 7.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 100 7.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 23 101 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 102 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 103 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 104 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 105 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 106 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 107 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 108 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 27 109 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 110 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 30 112 1. Introduction 114 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 115 use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. 116 Such certificates are termed here "Resource Certificates." Resource 117 Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile 118 [RFC3280], and also conform to the constraints specified in this 119 profile. Resource Certificates attest that the issuer has granted 120 the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of IP addresses and 121 Autonomous System numbers. 123 A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer 124 that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject 125 of the issued certificate. The binding is identified by the 126 association of the subject's private key with the subject's public 127 key contained in the Resource Certificate, as signed by the private 128 key of the certificate's issuer. 130 In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number 131 resources within this context, it is intended that Resource 132 Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the 133 public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a 134 number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an 135 entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource 136 Certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and 137 the subject's public key that is being certified by the issuer 138 corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair 139 that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the 140 number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the 141 certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or 142 assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public 143 number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI 144 structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one 145 'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a 146 certificate authority operating at the apex of a resource 147 distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate. 149 Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can 150 be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer-subject certificate 151 chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor certificate 152 authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional 153 constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully 154 encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject 155 certificate chain. 157 Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of 158 secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an 159 IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, 160 allowing relying parties to verify legitimacy and correctness of 161 routing information. Related use contexts include validation of 162 Internet Routing Registry objects, validation of routing requests, 163 and detection of potential unauthorised use of IP addresses. 165 This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource 166 Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. 167 Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to 168 this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. 170 1.1. Terminology 172 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 173 described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 174 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC3280], "X.509 175 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet 176 Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing 177 Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" 178 [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management 179 policy documents. 181 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 182 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 183 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 185 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 187 The framework for describing an association between the subject of a 188 certificate and the resources currently under the subject's control 189 is described in [RFC3779]. 191 There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in 192 this profile: 194 1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL 195 extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate 196 profile further specifies that the use of this certificate 197 extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be 198 marked as CRITICAL. 200 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 201 set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix 202 masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile 203 MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in 204 the resource extension field. 206 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 207 validity includes the condition that the resources described in 208 the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the 209 certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a 210 resource set (called here the "issuer's resource set") that must 211 encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this 212 context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be 213 the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. 215 A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a 216 sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the 217 subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next 218 certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certificate 219 authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource 220 extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's 221 issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence 222 of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in 223 the resource extension. 225 3. Resource Certificate Fields 227 A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, 228 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC3280], containing the fields 229 listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, 230 all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST 231 NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value 232 is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource 233 Certificates. 235 3.1. Version 237 Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field 238 MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this 239 field is 2). 241 3.2. Serial number 243 The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per 244 Issuer. 246 3.3. Signature Algorithm 248 This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on 249 this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with 250 RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 251 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 252 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055]. 254 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 255 both the Certiciate Authority and relying parties, indicating that 256 care should be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key 257 size. 259 3.4. Issuer 261 This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the 262 certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 264 If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of 265 the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the 266 issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the 267 immediate superior certificate. 269 This field MUST be non-empty. 271 3.5. Subject 273 This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been 274 allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 276 In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and 277 each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using 278 a subject name that is unique per issuer. 280 This field MUST be non-empty. 282 3.6. Valid From 284 The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this 285 profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of 286 certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], 287 Certificate Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST always 288 encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 2049 as 289 UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as 290 GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC3280]. 292 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 293 this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior 294 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 295 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 296 other than the current time. 298 3.7. Valid To 300 The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the 301 certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime 302 of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the 303 issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC3280], CAs 304 conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's 305 "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 306 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats 307 are defined in [RFC3280]. 309 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 310 this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior 311 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 312 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 313 other than the current time. 315 Certificate Authorities typically are advised against issuing a 316 certificate with a validity interval that exceeds the validity 317 interval of the CA certificate that will be used to validate the 318 issued certificate. However, in the context of this profile, it is 319 anticipated that a CA may have valid grounds to issue a certificate 320 with a validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the 321 CA's certificate. 323 3.8. Subject Public Key Info 325 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with 326 which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, 327 accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is 328 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024 329 bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that 330 the key size of keys that are intended to be used at the apex of a 331 certificate issuance hierarchy, and their immediate subordinates, 332 SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. Immediate subordinates 333 of these certificates, when used in the context of continued levels 334 of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. 336 In the application of this profile to certification of public number 337 resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the 338 Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits in their 339 issued certificates, and that their immediate subordinate certificate 340 authorities also use a key size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate 341 certificates MAY use a key size of 1024 bits. 343 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 344 both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken 345 when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 347 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 349 As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC3280], each extension in a certificate 350 is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate- 351 using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical 352 extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension 353 MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC3280]. 355 The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming 356 Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise. 358 3.9.1. Basic Constraints 360 The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the 361 certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification 362 paths that include this certificate. 364 The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit 365 is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue 366 resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the 367 subject is permitted be a CA). 369 The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST 370 NOT be present. 372 The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the 373 Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the subject is 374 a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise. 376 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 378 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 379 certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate 380 certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all 381 Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. 383 The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in 384 the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of 385 immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the 386 subject of this certificate). 388 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 389 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as 390 described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC3280]. 392 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 394 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 395 certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, by 396 providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate 397 path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource 398 Certificates. The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all 399 Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self- 400 signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and 401 authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present. This 402 extension is non-critical. 404 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 405 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as 406 described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 408 3.9.4. Key Usage 410 This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical 411 extension, and it MUST be present. 413 In certificates issued to Certicate Authorities only the keyCertSign 414 and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE and MUST be the only bits set to 415 TRUE. 417 In end-entity certificates the digitialSignature bit MUST be set and 418 MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. 420 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 422 This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) 423 associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile 424 uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access 425 mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references 426 a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. 428 In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, 429 implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the 430 distributionPoint sub-field MUST be present. The Reasons sub-field 431 MUST be omitted. 433 The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT 434 contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST 435 be of type URI. 437 In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all 438 certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key pair. 440 The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single 441 DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain 442 more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the 443 DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of 444 this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs 445 MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI. 447 This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. There is one 448 exception; where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a 449 "self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted. 451 3.9.6. Authority Information Access 453 This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the 454 certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA, 455 where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a 456 single reference object to publication location of the immediate 457 superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA 458 distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" 459 certificate, the authority key identifier SHOULD be omitted. 461 This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred 462 URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified 463 with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST 464 reference the point of publication of the certificate where this 465 issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). 466 Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be 467 included in the value sequence of this extension. 469 When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate 470 certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA 471 field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re- 472 issuance necessarily implies a requirement to re-issue all 473 subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a 474 persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies 475 that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates 476 to the same subject in the publication repository, and use the same 477 publication name as previously issued certificates. In this way 478 subordinate certificates can maintain a constant AIA field value and 479 need not be re-issued due solely to a re-issue of the superior 480 certificate. The issuers' policy with respect to the persistence of 481 name objects of issued certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's 482 Certificate Practice Statement. 484 This extension is non-critical. 486 3.9.7. Subject Information Access 488 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services 489 relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension 490 appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information 491 and service collection will include all current valid certificates 492 that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the 493 subject's corresponding private key. 495 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The 496 preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be 497 specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the 498 subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an 499 object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a 500 trailing '/' in the URI. 502 Other access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be 503 included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of 504 URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences for 505 access methods, with the first method in the sequence being the most 506 preferred. 508 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- 509 critical. 511 For End Entity (EE) certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this 512 field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it either 513 references the location where objects signed by the key pair 514 associated with the EE certificate can be accessed, or, in the case 515 of single-use EE certificates it references the location of the 516 single object that has been signed by the corresponding key pair. 518 When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes objects signed 519 with the matching private key in a repository, the directory where 520 these signed objects is published is referenced the id-ad- 521 signedObjectRepository OID. 523 id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } 525 id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 } 527 When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes a single object 528 signed with the matching private key, the location where this signed 529 objects is published is referenced the id-ad-signedObject OID. 531 id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 } 533 This profile allows the use of repository publication manifests to 534 list all signed objects that are deposited in the repository 535 publication point assocaited with a CA or an EE. The publication 536 point of the manifest for a CA or EE is placed in the SIA extension 537 of the CA or EE certificate. This profile uses a URI form of 538 manifest identification for the accessLocation. The preferred URI 539 access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified. 540 Other accessDescription fields may exist with this id-ad-Manifest 541 accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate URI 542 access mechanisms for the same manifest object. 544 id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 } 546 3.9.8. Certificate Policies 548 This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using 549 the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field 550 MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource 551 Certificates. 553 PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. 555 This extension MUST be present and it is critical. 557 3.9.9. IP Resources 559 This field contains the list of IP address resources as per 560 [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a 561 particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates 562 describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, 563 the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 564 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 565 extensions. 567 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 569 3.9.10. AS Resources 571 This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779], 572 or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported 573 in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 574 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 575 extensions. 577 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 579 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 581 Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), 582 consistent with [RFC3280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect 583 CRLs are supported in this profile. 585 An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one 586 regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's 587 validity period. 589 This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. 591 The scope of the CRL MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA 592 using a given key pair". The contents of the CRL are a list of all 593 non-expired certificates issued by the CA using a given key pair that 594 have been revoked by the CA. 596 The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with 597 different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the 598 key pair used by the CA. 600 No CRL fields other than those listed here are permitted in CRLs 601 issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields 602 MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a 603 single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the 604 "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA. 606 4.1. Version 608 Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the 609 integer value of this field is 1). 611 4.2. Issuer Name 613 The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is 614 also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in 615 the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer. 617 4.3. This Update 619 This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The 620 value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the 621 year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the 622 year 2050 or later. 624 4.4. Next Update 626 This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued. 627 The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through 628 the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in 629 the year 2050 or later. 631 4.5. Signature 633 This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. This 634 profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA 635 (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA- 636 512. This field MUST be present. 638 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 639 both the CRL Issuer and relying parties, indicating that care should 640 be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 642 4.6. Revoked Certificate List 644 When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate 645 list MUST be absent. 647 For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST 648 be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, 649 and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL. 651 4.6.1. Serial Number 653 The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate. 655 4.6.2. Revocation Date 657 The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a 658 future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for 659 dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime 660 for dates in the year 2050 or later. 662 4.7. CRL Extensions 664 The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The 665 following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be 666 present in a CRL. 668 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier 670 The authority key identifier extension provides a means of 671 identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to 672 sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier 673 method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 674 4.2.1.1 of [RFC3280]. 676 This extension is non-critical. 678 4.7.2. CRL Number 680 The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence 681 number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension 682 allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes 683 another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs 684 issued by the CA with the same scope. 686 This extension is non-critical. 688 5. Manifest Profile 690 6. Resource Certificate Request Profile 692 A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or 693 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF). A CA Issuer MUST support 694 PKCS#10 and a CA Issuer may, with mutual consent of the subject, 695 support CRMF. 697 6.1. PCKS#10 Profile 699 This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to 700 Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, 701 formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a Certificate Authority 702 as the initial step in issuing a certificate. 704 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 705 (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. 707 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 708 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 709 certificate. 711 6.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 713 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 714 that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo: 716 Version 717 This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0. 719 Subject 720 This field is optional. If present, the value of this field 721 SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject 722 name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this 723 issuer. If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY 724 consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested 725 subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, 726 as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates 727 issued by this issuer. 729 SubjectPublicKeyInfo 730 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm 731 with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, 732 and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field 733 also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public 734 key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the 735 DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey. 737 Attributes 738 [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where 739 the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key. 741 The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest 742 attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3 743 Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate 744 requests is specified in Section 6.3. 746 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 747 that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object: 749 signatureAlgorithm 750 This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA 751 (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 752 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 753 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } 754 [RFC4055]. 755 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive 756 for both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should 757 be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 759 6.2. CRMF Profile 761 This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) 762 specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates. 763 A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the 764 CRMF, is passed to a Certificate Authority as the initial step in 765 issuing a certificate. 767 This request MAY be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 768 (RA), acting under the direction of a subject. 770 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 771 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 772 certificate. 774 6.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 776 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 777 that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: 779 Version 780 This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version 781 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted. 783 SerialNumber 784 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 785 omitted in this profile. 787 SigningAlgorithm 788 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 789 omitted in this profile. 791 Issuer 792 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 793 profile. 795 Validity 796 This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a 797 Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If 798 specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with 799 dates as determined by the CA. 801 Subject 802 This field is optional. If present, the value of this field 803 SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject 804 name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this 805 issuer. If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY 806 consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested 807 subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, 808 as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates 809 issued by this issuer. 811 PublicKey 812 This field MUST be present. 814 extensions 815 This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The 816 profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in 817 Section 6.3. 819 6.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields 821 The following control fields are supported in this profile: 823 Authenticator Control 824 It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the 825 subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211] 826 is that the Authenticator Control field be used. 828 6.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests 830 The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate 831 Request. Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate 832 Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on 833 these extensions.: 835 BasicConstraints 836 If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity 837 certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in the 838 issued certificate. 840 The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource 841 Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this 842 profile. 844 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit 845 is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue 846 resource certificates within this overall framework. 848 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity 849 certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity 850 certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension. 852 SubjectKeyIdentifier 853 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 854 profile. 856 AuthorityKeyIdentifier 857 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 858 profile. 860 KeyUsage 861 The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign and cRLSign if 862 present, as long as this is consistent with the BasicConstraints 863 SubjectType sub field, when specified. 865 SubjectInformationAccess 866 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and the field 867 value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. If the CA is not able to 868 honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the 869 Certificate Request. 871 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and 872 services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the 873 SIA extension appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, 874 this information and service collection will include all current 875 valid certificates that have been issued by this subject that are 876 signed with the subject's corresponding private key. 878 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. An RSYNC 879 URI MUST be specified, with an access method value of id-ad- 880 caRepository when the subject of the certificate is a CA. The 881 RSYNC URI MUST reference an object collection rather than an 882 individual object and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI. Other 883 access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be 884 included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of 885 URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences 886 for access methods, with the first method in the sequence being 887 the most preferred by the Subject. 889 CRLDistributionPoints 890 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 891 profile. 893 AuthorityInformationAccess 894 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 895 profile. 897 CertificatePolicies 898 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 899 profile. 901 With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the 902 SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any 903 requested field. 905 7. Resource Certificate Validation 907 This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. 908 This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of 909 [RFC3280]: 911 To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other 912 things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n 913 certificates) satisfies the following conditions: 915 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 916 issuer of certificate x+1; 918 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 920 3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and 922 4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid. 924 7.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates 926 The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate 927 framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number 928 resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top- 929 down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from 930 a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct 931 recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these 932 recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform 933 further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in 934 that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has 935 only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. 936 there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and 937 corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct 938 or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in 939 question (i.e. no loops in the model). 941 The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor CA 942 is a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the 943 resource certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of 944 trust models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional 945 caveat on the general applicability of trust models and PKIX 946 frameworks, namely that in forming a validation path to a trust 947 anchor CA, the sequence of certificates MUST preserve the resource 948 extension validation property, as described in Section 7.2, and the 949 validation of the first certificate in the validation path not only 950 involves the verification that the certificate was issued by a trust 951 anchor CA, but also that the resource set described in the 952 certificate MUST be encompassed by the trust anchor CA's resource 953 set, as described in Section 7.2. 955 The trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a trust 956 anchor, includes the following: 957 1. the trusted issuer name, 958 2. the trusted public key algorithm, 959 3. the trusted public key, 960 4. optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated with the 961 public key, and 962 5. a resource set, consisting of a set of IPv4 resources, IPv6 963 resources and AS number resources. 965 The trust anchor information may be provided to the path processing 966 procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate. 968 7.2. Resource Extension Validation 970 The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical 971 extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded 972 representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a 973 prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. 975 Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS 976 number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource 977 Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This 978 validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource 979 sets: 981 more specific: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, 982 A and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP 983 addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is 984 larger than range A. 986 equal: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, 987 A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same 988 collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. 989 The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779] is equivalent to this 990 "equality" comparison. 991 encompass: Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X 992 "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or 993 AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more 994 specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the 995 set X. 997 Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an 998 ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is issued by 999 a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the 1000 subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, 1001 implies that the resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass" 1002 the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1, and the resources 1003 described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources 1004 described in certificate 1. 1006 7.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation 1008 Validation of signed resource data using a target resource 1009 certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or 1010 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a 1011 certificate that has been issued by a trust anchor, and 'n' is the 1012 target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions 1013 hold: 1015 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 1016 the signature algorithm 1018 2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and 1019 To values. 1021 3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and 1022 contains field values as specified in this profile for all field 1023 values that MUST be present. 1025 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present in this profile is 1026 present in the certificate. 1028 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 1029 certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate 1030 Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself 1031 valid. 1033 6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource 1034 extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer 1035 is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) 1037 7. The Certificate Path originates with a certificate issued by a 1038 trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the 1039 Certificate Path where the Subject of Certificate x in the 1040 Certificate Path matches the Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the 1041 Certificate Path. 1043 A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any 1044 chosen order. 1046 Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally 1047 maintained cache, maintained by a regular top-down synchronization 1048 pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource 1049 distribution hierarchy, via reference to Issued certificates and 1050 their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, 1051 validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line 1052 certificate access using the AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the 1053 certificate retrieval process. 1055 There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that 1056 are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as 1057 means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. 1058 Some further heuristics may be required to halt the certificate path 1059 validation process in order to avoid some of the issues associated 1060 with attempts to validate such structures. It is suggested that 1061 implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a 1062 validation failure if the certificate path length exceeds a pre- 1063 determined configuration parameter. 1065 8. Security Considerations 1067 The Security Considerations of [RFC3280] and [RFC3779]apply to 1068 Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use. 1070 A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms 1071 of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in 1072 the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same 1073 resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the 1074 status of resource allocations and assignments then the information 1075 conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the 1076 allocation and assignment databases. 1078 9. IANA Considerations 1080 [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA 1081 considerations stated in this version of the document.] 1083 10. Acknowledgements 1085 The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from 1086 Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo 1087 Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of 1088 this document. The document also reflects review comments received 1089 from Sean Turner. 1091 11. References 1093 11.1. Normative References 1095 [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 1096 September 1981. 1098 [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and 1099 J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", 1100 BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. 1102 [RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet 1103 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 1104 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, 1105 April 2002. 1107 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 1108 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 1110 [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 1111 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in 1112 the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 1113 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, 1114 June 2005. 1116 [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 1117 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, 1118 September 2005. 1120 [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing 1121 Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. 1123 11.2. Informative References 1125 [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object 1126 Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, 1127 November 2000. 1129 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 1130 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, 1131 November 2000. 1133 [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. 1134 Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 1135 Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005. 1137 [rsync] Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006, 1138 . 1140 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate 1142 The following is an example Resource Certificate. 1144 Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer 1146 Data: 1147 Version: 3 1148 Serial: 3 1149 Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1150 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1151 E=ca@apnic.net 1152 Validity: 1153 Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT 1154 Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT 1155 Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources 1156 Subject Key Identifier: 1157 86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d: 1158 8b:97:49:14 1159 Subject Key Identifier g(SKI): 1160 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ 1161 Subject Public Key Info: 1162 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 1163 RSA Public Key: Modulus: 1164 c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1: 1165 59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a: 1166 0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3: 1167 f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb: 1168 b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4: 1169 5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe: 1170 e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e: 1171 4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c: 1172 56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5: 1173 c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba: 1174 dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c: 1175 f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d: 1176 92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03: 1177 d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87: 1178 24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27: 1179 03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7 1180 RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537 1181 Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE 1182 Subject Info Access: 1183 caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1184 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1185 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1186 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ/ 1187 Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign 1188 CRL Distribution Points: 1189 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1190 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1191 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1192 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1193 Authority Info Access: caIssuers - 1194 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1195 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1196 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.cer 1197 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1198 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02: 1199 51:c2:a9:1c 1200 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1201 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1202 Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 1203 IPv4: 192.0.2.0/24, 1204 IPv6: 2001:DB8::/32 1205 ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370 1206 Signature: 1207 c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b: 1208 4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59: 1209 0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2: 1210 a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7: 1211 11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3: 1212 92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28: 1213 f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f: 1214 e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51: 1215 26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0: 1216 4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12: 1217 5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4: 1218 81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28: 1219 33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3: 1220 bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c: 1221 1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54: 1222 52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d 1224 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List 1226 The following is an example Certificate Revocation List. 1228 CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1230 Data: 1231 Version: 2 1232 Signature Algorithm: 1233 Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1234 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1235 E=ca@apnic.net 1236 This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1237 Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1238 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1239 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05: 1240 07:02:51:c2:a9:1c 1241 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1242 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1243 CRLNumber: 4 1244 Revoked Certificates: 1 1245 Serial Number: 1 1246 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT 1247 Serial Number: 2 1248 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT 1249 Serial Number: 4 1250 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT 1251 Signature: 1252 b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46: 1253 0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12: 1254 f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27: 1255 17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a: 1256 f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09: 1257 d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e: 1258 b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54: 1259 66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29: 1260 6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2: 1261 d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12: 1262 cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8: 1263 c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c: 1264 d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a: 1265 09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da: 1266 02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d: 1267 59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f: 1268 34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02: 1269 d9 1271 Authors' Addresses 1273 Geoff Huston 1274 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1276 Email: gih@apnic.net 1277 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1279 George Michaelson 1280 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1282 Email: ggm@apnic.net 1283 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1285 Robert Loomans 1286 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1288 Email: robertl@apnic.net 1289 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1291 Full Copyright Statement 1293 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). 1295 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 1296 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 1297 retain all their rights. 1299 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an 1300 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS 1301 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND 1302 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS 1303 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF 1304 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED 1305 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 1307 Intellectual Property 1309 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 1310 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 1311 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 1312 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 1313 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 1314 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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