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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDR G. Huston 3 Internet-Draft G. Michaelson 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Loomans 5 Expires: February 2, 2009 APNIC 6 August 1, 2008 8 A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates 9 draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-11.txt 11 Status of this Memo 13 By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any 14 applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware 15 have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes 16 aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. 18 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 19 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 20 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 21 Drafts. 23 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 24 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 25 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 26 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 28 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 29 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 31 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 32 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on February 2, 2009. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). 40 Abstract 42 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 43 the purposes of supporting validation of assertions of "right-to-use" 44 of an Internet Number Resource (IP Addresses and Autonomous System 45 Numbers). This profile is used to convey the issuer's authorization 46 of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of- 47 use" of the IP addresses and AS numbers that are described in the 48 issued certificate. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 54 2. Describing Resources in Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 55 3. Resource Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 56 3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 3.2. Serial number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 3.3. Signature Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 3.4. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 60 3.5. Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 3.6. Valid From . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 3.7. Valid To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 3.8. Subject Public Key Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields . . . . . 8 65 3.9.1. Basic Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 66 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 68 3.9.4. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 3.9.6. Authority Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 71 3.9.7. Subject Information Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 72 3.9.8. Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 73 3.9.9. IP Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 74 3.9.10. AS Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 75 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile . . . . . . . . . 14 76 4.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 77 4.2. Issuer Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 78 4.3. This Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 79 4.4. Next Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 80 4.5. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 81 4.6. Revoked Certificate List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 82 4.6.1. Serial Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 83 4.6.2. Revocation Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 84 4.7. CRL Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 85 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 86 4.7.2. CRL Number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 87 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 88 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 89 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template 90 Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 91 5.2. CRMF Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 92 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields . . 18 93 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields . . . . . 19 94 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate 95 Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 96 6. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 97 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates . . . . . . . . . 22 98 6.2. Resource Extension Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 99 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 23 100 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 101 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 102 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 103 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 104 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 105 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 106 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 107 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List . . . . . . . . . 28 108 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 109 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 31 111 1. Introduction 113 This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for 114 use in the context of certification of IP Addresses and AS Numbers. 115 Such certificates are termed here "Resource Certificates." Resource 116 Certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile 117 [RFC5280], and also conform to the constraints specified in this 118 profile. Resource Certificates attest that the issuer has granted 119 the subject a "right-to-use" for a listed set of IP addresses and 120 Autonomous System numbers. 122 A Resource Certificate describes an action by a certificate issuer 123 that binds a list of IP Address blocks and AS Numbers to the subject 124 of the issued certificate. The binding is identified by the 125 association of the subject's private key with the subject's public 126 key contained in the Resource Certificate, as signed by the private 127 key of the certificate's issuer. 129 In the context of the public Internet, and the use of public number 130 resources within this context, it is intended that Resource 131 Certificates are used in a manner that is explicitly aligned to the 132 public number resource distribution function. Specifically, when a 133 number resource is allocated or assigned by a number registry to an 134 entity, this allocation is described by an associated Resource 135 Certificate. This certificate is issued by the number registry, and 136 the subject's public key that is being certified by the issuer 137 corresponds to the public key part of a public / private key pair 138 that was generated by the same entity who is the recipient of the 139 number assignment or allocation. A critical extension to the 140 certificate enumerates the IP Resources that were allocated or 141 assigned by the issuer to the entity. In the context of the public 142 number distribution function, this corresponds to a hierarchical PKI 143 structure, where Resource Certificates are only issued in one 144 'direction' and there is a single unique path of certificates from a 145 certificate authority operating at the apex of a resource 146 distribution hierarchy to a valid certificate. 148 Validation of a Resource Certificate in such a hierarchical PKI can 149 be undertaken by establishing a valid issuer-subject certificate 150 chain from a certificate issued by a trust anchor certificate 151 authority to the certificate [RFC4158], with the additional 152 constraint of ensuring that each subject's listed resources are fully 153 encompassed by those of the issuer at each step in the issuer-subject 154 certificate chain. 156 Resource Certificates may be used in the context of the operation of 157 secure inter-domain routing protocols to convey a right-to-use of an 158 IP number resource that is being passed within the routing protocol, 159 allowing relying parties to verify legitimacy and correctness of 160 routing information. Related use contexts include validation of 161 Internet Routing Registry objects, validation of routing requests, 162 and detection of potential unauthorised use of IP addresses. 164 This profile defines those fields that are used in a Resource 165 Certificate that MUST be present for the certificate to be valid. 166 Relying Parties SHOULD check that a Resource Certificate conforms to 167 this profile as a requisite for validation of a Resource Certificate. 169 1.1. Terminology 171 It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts 172 described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 173 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509 174 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], "Internet 175 Protocol" [RFC0791], "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing 176 Architecture" [RFC4291], "Internet Registry IP Allocation Guidelines" 177 [RFC2050], and related regional Internet registry address management 178 policy documents. 180 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 181 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 182 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119. 184 2. Describing Resources in Certificates 186 The framework for describing an association between the subject of a 187 certificate and the resources currently under the subject's control 188 is described in [RFC3779]. 190 There are three aspects of this resource extension that are noted in 191 this profile: 193 1. RFC 3779 notes that a resource extension SHOULD be a CRITICAL 194 extension to the X.509 Certificate. This Resource Certificate 195 profile further specifies that the use of this certificate 196 extension MUST be used in all Resource Certificates and MUST be 197 marked as CRITICAL. 199 2. RFC 3779 defines a sorted canonical form of describing a resource 200 set, with maximal spanning ranges and maximal spanning prefix 201 masks as appropriate. All valid certificates in this profile 202 MUST use this sorted canonical form of resource description in 203 the resource extension field. 205 3. A test of the resource extension in the context of certificate 206 validity includes the condition that the resources described in 207 the immediate superior certificate in the PKI hierarchy (the 208 certificate where this certificate's issuer is the subject) has a 209 resource set (called here the "issuer's resource set") that must 210 encompass the resource set of the issued certificate. In this 211 context "encompass" allows for the issuer's resource set to be 212 the same as, or a strict superset of, any subject's resource set. 214 A test of certificate validity entails the identification of a 215 sequence of valid certificates in an issuer-subject chain (where the 216 subject field of one certificate appears as the issuer in the next 217 certificate in the sequence) from a trust anchor certificate 218 authority to the certificate being validated, and that the resource 219 extensions in this certificate sequence from the trust anchor's 220 issued certificate to the certificate being validated form a sequence 221 of encompassing relationships in terms of the resources described in 222 the resource extension. 224 3. Resource Certificate Fields 226 A Resource Certificate is a valid X.509 v3 public key certificate, 227 consistent with the PKIX profile [RFC5280], containing the fields 228 listed in this section. Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, 229 all the fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field MUST 230 NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate. Where a field value 231 is specified here this value MUST be used in conforming Resource 232 Certificates. 234 3.1. Version 236 Resource Certificates are X.509 Version 3 certificates. This field 237 MUST be present, and the Version MUST be 3 (i.e. the value of this 238 field is 2). 240 3.2. Serial number 242 The serial number value is a positive integer that is unique per 243 Issuer. 245 3.3. Signature Algorithm 247 This field describes the algorithm used to compute the signature on 248 this certificate. This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with 249 RSA (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 250 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 251 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } [RFC4055]. 253 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 254 both the Certificate Authority and relying parties, indicating that 255 care should be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key 256 size. 258 3.4. Issuer 260 This field identifies the entity that has signed and issued the 261 certificate. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 263 If the certificate is a subordinate certificate issued by virtue of 264 the "cA" bit set in the immediate superior certificate, then the 265 issuer name MUST correspond to the subject name as contained in the 266 immediate superior certificate. 268 This field MUST be non-empty. 270 3.5. Subject 272 This field identifies the entity to whom the resource has been 273 allocated / assigned. The value of this field is a valid X.501 name. 275 In this profile the subject name is determined by the issuer, and 276 each distinct entity certified by the issuer MUST be identified using 277 a subject name that is unique per issuer. 279 This field MUST be non-empty. 281 3.6. Valid From 283 The starting time at which point the certificate is valid. In this 284 profile the "Valid From" time SHOULD be no earlier than the time of 285 certificate generation. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280], 286 Certification Authorities (CAs) conforming to this profile MUST 287 always encode the certificate's "Valid From" date through the year 288 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as 289 GeneralizedTime. These two time formats are defined in [RFC5280]. 291 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 292 this field that pre-dates the same field value in any superior 293 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 294 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 295 other than the current time. 297 3.7. Valid To 299 The Valid To time is the date and time at which point in time the 300 certificate's validity ends. It represents the anticipated lifetime 301 of the resource allocation / assignment arrangement between the 302 issuer and the subject. As per Section 4.1.2.5 of [RFC5280], CAs 303 conforming to this profile MUST always encode the certificate's 304 "Valid To" date through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and dates in 2050 305 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. These two time formats 306 are defined in [RFC5280]. 308 In this profile, it is valid for a certificate to have a value for 309 this field that post-dates the same field value in any superior 310 certificate. However, it is not valid to infer from this information 311 that a certificate was, or will be, valid at any particular time 312 other than the current time. 314 CAs are typically advised against issuing a certificate with a 315 validity interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's 316 certificate that will be used to validate the issued certificate. 317 However, in the context of this profile, it is anticipated that a CA 318 may have valid grounds to issue a certificate with a validity 319 interval that exceeds the validity interval of the CA's certificate. 321 3.8. Subject Public Key Info 323 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm with 324 which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, and, 325 accordingly, the OID for the public key algorithm is 326 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. The key size MUST be a minimum size of 1024 327 bits. In the context of certifying resources it is recommended that 328 the key size of keys that are intended to be used at the apex of a 329 certificate issuance hierarchy, and their immediate subordinates, 330 SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. Immediate subordinates 331 of these certificates, when used in the context of continued levels 332 of high trust, SHOULD use a minimum key size of 2048 bits. 334 In the application of this profile to certification of public number 335 resources, it would be consistent with this recommendation that the 336 Regional Internet Registries use a key size of 2048 bits in their 337 issued certificates, and that their immediate subordinate certificate 338 authorities also use a key size of 2048 bits. All other subordinate 339 certificates MAY use a key size of 1024 bits. 341 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 342 both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should be taken 343 when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 345 3.9. Resource Certificate Version 3 Extension Fields 347 As noted in Section 4.2 of [RFC5280], each extension in a certificate 348 is designated as either critical or non-critical. A certificate- 349 using system MUST reject the certificate if it encounters a critical 350 extension it does not recognise; however, a non-critical extension 351 MAY be ignored if it is not recognised [RFC5280]. 353 The following X.509 V3 extensions MUST be present in a conforming 354 Resource Certificate, except where explicitly noted otherwise. 356 3.9.1. Basic Constraints 358 The basic constraints extension identifies whether the subject of the 359 certificate is a CA and the maximum depth of valid certification 360 paths that include this certificate. 362 The issuer determines whether the "cA" boolean is set. If this bit 363 is set, then it indicates that the subject is allowed to issue 364 resources certificates within this overall framework (i.e. the 365 subject is permitted be a CA). 367 The Path Length Constraint is not specified in this profile and MUST 368 NOT be present. 370 The Basic Constraints extension field is a critical extension in the 371 Resource Certificate profile, and MUST be present when the subject is 372 a CA, and MUST NOT be present otherwise. 374 3.9.2. Subject Key Identifier 376 The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying 377 certificates that contain a particular public key. To facilitate 378 certification path construction, this extension MUST appear in all 379 Resource Certificates. This extension is non-critical. 381 The value of the subject key identifier MUST be the value placed in 382 the key identifier field of the Authority Key Identifier extension of 383 immediate subordinate certificates (all certificates issued by the 384 subject of this certificate). 386 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 387 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the subject public key, as 388 described in Section 4.2.1.2 of [RFC5280]. 390 3.9.3. Authority Key Identifier 392 The authority key identifier extension provides a means of 393 identifying certificates that are signed by the issuer's private key, 394 by providing a hash value of the issuer's public key. To facilitate 395 path construction, this extension MUST appear in all Resource 396 Certificates. The keyIdentifier sub field MUST be present in all 397 Resource Certificates, with the exception of a CA who issues a "self- 398 signed" certificate. The authorityCertIssuer and 399 authorityCertSerialNumber sub fields MUST NOT be present. This 400 extension is non-critical. 402 The Key Identifier used here is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value 403 of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string of the issuer's public key, as 404 described in Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280]. 406 3.9.4. Key Usage 408 This describes the purpose of the certificate. This is a critical 409 extension, and it MUST be present. 411 In certificates issued to Certificate Authorities only the 412 keyCertSign and CRLSign bits are set to TRUE and MUST be the only 413 bits set to TRUE. 415 In end-entity certificates the digitalSignature bit MUST be set and 416 MUST be the only bit set to TRUE. 418 3.9.5. CRL Distribution Points 420 This field (CRLDP) identifies the location(s) of the CRL(s) 421 associated with certificates issued by this Issuer. This profile 422 uses the URI form of object identification. The preferred URI access 423 mechanism is a single RSYNC URI ("rsync://") [rsync] that references 424 a single inclusive CRL for each issuer. 426 In this profile the certificate issuer is also the CRL issuer, 427 implying at the CRLIssuer sub field MUST be omitted, and the 428 distributionPoint sub-field MUST be present. The Reasons sub-field 429 MUST be omitted. 431 The distributionPoint MUST contain general names, and MUST NOT 432 contain a nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. The type of the general name MUST 433 be of type URI. 435 In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all 436 certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key pair. 438 The sequence of distributionPoint values MUST contain only a single 439 DistributionPointName set. The DistributionPointName set MAY contain 440 more than one URI value. An RSYNC URI MUST be present in the 441 DistributionPointName set, and reference the most recent instance of 442 this issuer's certificate revocation list. Other access form URIs 443 MAY be used in addition to the RSYNC URI. 445 This extension MUST be present and it is non-critical. There is one 446 exception; where a CA distributes its public key in the form of a 447 "self-signed" certificate, the CRLDP MUST be omitted. 449 3.9.6. Authority Information Access 451 This field (AIA) identifies the point of publication of the 452 certificate that is issued by the issuer's immediate superior CA, 453 where this certificate's issuer is the subject. In this profile a 454 single reference object to publication location of the immediate 455 superior certificate MUST be used, except in the case where a CA 456 distributes its public key in the form of a "self-signed" 457 certificate, the AIA field SHOULD be omitted. 459 This profile uses a URI form of object identification. The preferred 460 URI access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified 461 with an accessMethod value of id-ad-caIssuers. The URI MUST 462 reference the point of publication of the certificate where this 463 issuer is the subject (the issuer's immediate superior certificate). 464 Other access method URIs referencing the same object MAY also be 465 included in the value sequence of this extension. 467 When an Issuer re-issues a CA certificate, the subordinate 468 certificates need to reference this new certificate via the AIA 469 field. In order to avoid the situation where a certificate re- 470 issuance necessarily implies a requirement to re-issue all 471 subordinate certificates, CA Certificate issuers SHOULD use a 472 persistent URL name scheme for issued certificates. This implies 473 that re-issued certificates overwrite previously issued certificates 474 to the same subject in the publication repository, and use the same 475 publication name as previously issued certificates. In this way 476 subordinate certificates can maintain a constant AIA field value and 477 need not be re-issued due solely to a re-issue of the superior 478 certificate. The issuers' policy with respect to the persistence of 479 name objects of issued certificates MUST be specified in the Issuer's 480 Certificate Practice Statement. 482 This extension is non-critical. 484 3.9.7. Subject Information Access 486 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and services 487 relating to the subject of the certificate in which the SIA extension 488 appears. Where the Subject is a CA in this profile, this information 489 and service collection will include all current valid certificates 490 that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the 491 subject's corresponding private key. 493 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. The 494 preferred URI access mechanism is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be 495 specified, with an access method value of id-ad-caRepository when the 496 subject of the certificate is a CA. The RSYNC URI must reference an 497 object collection rather than an individual object and MUST use a 498 trailing '/' in the URI. 500 Other access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be 501 included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of 502 URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences for 503 access methods, with the first method in the sequence being the most 504 preferred. 506 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and is non- 507 critical. 509 For End Entity (EE) certificates, where the subject is not a CA, this 510 field MAY be present, and is non-critical. If present, it either 511 references the location where objects signed by the key pair 512 associated with the EE certificate can be accessed, or, in the case 513 of single-use EE certificates it references the location of the 514 single object that has been signed by the corresponding key pair. 516 When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes objects signed 517 with the matching private key in a repository, the directory where 518 these signed objects is published is referenced the id-ad- 519 signedObjectRepository OID. 521 id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 48 } 523 id-ad-signedObjectRepository OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 9 } 525 When the subject is an End Entity, and it publishes a single object 526 signed with the matching private key, the location where this signed 527 object is published is referenced the id-ad-signedObject OID. 529 id-ad-signedObject OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 11 } 531 This profile requires the use of repository publication manifests 532 [ID.SIDR-MANIFESTS] to list all signed objects that are deposited in 533 the repository publication point associated with a CA or an EE. The 534 publication point of the manifest for a CA or EE is placed in the SIA 535 extension of the CA or EE certificate. This profile uses a URI form 536 of manifest identification for the accessLocation. The preferred URI 537 access mechanisms is "rsync", and an RSYNC URI MUST be specified. 538 Other accessDescription fields may exist with this id-ad-Manifest 539 accessMethod, where the accessLocation value indicates alternate URI 540 access mechanisms for the same manifest object. 542 id-ad-rpkiManifest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 10 } 544 CA certificates MUST include in the SIA an accessMethod OID of id-ad- 545 rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to the 546 subject's published manifest object as an object URL. 548 When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple 549 objects, EE certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID 550 of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the associated access location refers to 551 the publication point of the objects that are verified using this EE 552 certificate. 554 When an EE certificate is used to sign a single object, the EE 555 certificate MUST include in the SIA an access method OID of id-ad- 556 signedObject, where the associated access location refers to the 557 publication point of the single object that is verified using this EE 558 certificate. In this case, the SIA MUST NOT include the access 559 method OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest. 561 3.9.8. Certificate Policies 563 This extension MUST reference the Resource Certificate Policy, using 564 the OID Policy Identifier value of "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2". This field 565 MUST be present and MUST contain only this value for Resource 566 Certificates. 568 PolicyQualifiers MUST NOT be used in this profile. 570 This extension MUST be present and it is critical. 572 3.9.9. IP Resources 574 This field contains the list of IP address resources as per 575 [RFC3779]. The value may specify the "inherit" element for a 576 particular AFI value. In the context of resource certificates 577 describing public number resources for use in the public Internet, 578 the SAFI value MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 579 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 580 extensions. 582 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 584 3.9.10. AS Resources 586 This field contains the list of AS number resources as per [RFC3779], 587 or may specify the "inherit" element. RDI values are NOT supported 588 in this profile and MUST NOT be used. All Resource Certificates MUST 589 include an IP Resources extension, an AS Resources extension, or both 590 extensions. 592 This extension, if present, MUST be marked critical. 594 4. Resource Certificate Revocation List Profile 596 Each CA MUST issue a version 2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL), 597 consistent with [RFC5280]. The CRL issuer is the CA, and no indirect 598 CRLs are supported in this profile. 600 An entry MUST NOT be removed from the CRL until it appears on one 601 regularly scheduled CRL issued beyond the revoked certificate's 602 validity period. 604 This profile does not allow issuance of Delta CRLs. 606 The scope of the CRL MUST be "all certificates issued by this CA 607 using a given key pair". The contents of the CRL are a list of all 608 non-expired certificates issued by the CA using a given key pair that 609 have been revoked by the CA. 611 The profile allows the issuance of multiple current CRLs with 612 different scope by a single CA, with the scope being defined by the 613 key pair used by the CA. 615 No CRL fields other than those listed here are permitted in CRLs 616 issued under this profile. Unless otherwise indicated, these fields 617 MUST be present in the CRL. Where two or more CRLs issued by a 618 single CA with the same scope, the CRL with the highest value of the 619 "CRL Number" field supersedes all other CRLs issued by this CA. 621 4.1. Version 623 Resource Certificate Revocation Lists are Version 2 certificates (the 624 integer value of this field is 1). 626 4.2. Issuer Name 628 The value of this field is the X.501 name of the issuing CA who is 629 also the signer of the CRL, and is identical to the Issuer name in 630 the Resource Certificates that are issued by this issuer. 632 4.3. This Update 634 This field contains the date and time that this CRL was issued. The 635 value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through the 636 year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in the 637 year 2050 or later. 639 4.4. Next Update 641 This is the date and time by which the next CRL SHOULD be issued. 642 The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for dates through 643 the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime for dates in 644 the year 2050 or later. 646 4.5. Signature 648 This field contains the algorithm used to sign this CRL. This 649 profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA 650 (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or SHA- 651 512. This field MUST be present. 653 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive for 654 both the CRL Issuer and relying parties, indicating that care should 655 be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 657 4.6. Revoked Certificate List 659 When there are no revoked certificates, then the revoked certificate 660 list MUST be absent. 662 For each revoked resource certificate only the following fields MUST 663 be present. No CRL entry extensions are supported in this profile, 664 and CRL entry extensions MUST NOT be present in a CRL. 666 4.6.1. Serial Number 668 The issuer's serial number of the revoked certificate. 670 4.6.2. Revocation Date 672 The time the certificate was revoked. This time SHOULD NOT be a 673 future date. The value of this field MUST be encoded as UTCTime for 674 dates through the year 2049, and MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime 675 for dates in the year 2050 or later. 677 4.7. CRL Extensions 679 The X.509 v2 CRL format allows extensions to be placed in a CRL. The 680 following extensions are supported in this profile, and MUST be 681 present in a CRL. 683 4.7.1. Authority Key Identifier 685 The authority key identifier extension provides a means of 686 identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to 687 sign a CRL. Conforming CRL issuers MUST use the key identifier 688 method. The syntax for this CRL extension is defined in section 689 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280]. 691 This extension is non-critical. 693 4.7.2. CRL Number 695 The CRL Number extension conveys a monotonically increasing sequence 696 number of positive integers for a given CA and scope. This extension 697 allows users to easily determine when a particular CRL supersedes 698 another CRL. The highest CRL Number value supersedes all other CRLs 699 issued by the CA with the same scope. 701 This extension is non-critical. 703 5. Resource Certificate Request Profile 705 A resource certificate request MAY use either of PKCS#10 or 706 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF). A CA Issuer MUST support 707 PKCS#10 and a CA Issuer may, with mutual consent of the subject, 708 support CRMF. 710 5.1. PCKS#10 Profile 712 This profile refines the specification in [RFC2986], as it relates to 713 Resource Certificates. A Certificate Request Message object, 714 formatted according to PKCS#10, is passed to a CA as the initial step 715 in issuing a certificate. 717 This request may be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 718 (RA), acting under the direction of a Subject. 720 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 721 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 722 certificate. 724 5.1.1. PKCS#10 Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 726 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 727 that may appear in a CertificationRequestInfo: 729 Version 730 This field is mandatory and MUST have the value 0. 732 Subject 733 This field is optional. If present, the value of this field 734 SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject 735 name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this 736 issuer. If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY 737 consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested 738 subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, 739 as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates 740 issued by this issuer. 742 SubjectPublicKeyInfo 743 This field specifies the subject's public key and the algorithm 744 with which the key is used. The public key algorithm MUST be RSA, 745 and the OID for the algorithm is 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1. This field 746 also includes a bit-string representation of the entity's public 747 key. For the RSA public-key algorithm the bit string contains the 748 DER encoding of a value of PKCS #1 type RSAPublicKey. 750 Attributes 751 [RFC2986] defines the attributes field as key-value pairs where 752 the key is an OID and the value's structure depends on the key. 754 The only attribute used in this profile is the ExtensionRequest 755 attribute as defined in [RFC2985]. This attribute contains X509v3 756 Certificate Extensions. The profile for extensions in certificate 757 requests is specified in Section 5.3. 759 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 760 that MAY appear in a CertificationRequest Object: 762 signatureAlgorithm 763 This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256 with RSA 764 (sha256WithRSAEncryption), and allows for the use of SHA-384 or 765 SHA-512. Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one of the 766 OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 } 767 [RFC4055]. 768 It is noted that larger key sizes are computationally expensive 769 for both the CA and relying parties, indicating that care should 770 be taken when deciding to use larger than the minimum key size. 772 5.2. CRMF Profile 774 This profile refines the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) 775 specification in [RFC4211], as it relates to Resource Certificates. 776 A Certificate Request Message object, formatted according to the 777 CRMF, is passed to a CA as the initial step in issuing a certificate. 779 This request MAY be conveyed to the CA via a Registration Authority 780 (RA), acting under the direction of a subject. 782 With the exception of the public key related fields, the CA is 783 permitted to alter any requested field when issuing a corresponding 784 certificate. 786 5.2.1. CRMF Resource Certificate Request Template Fields 788 This profile applies the following additional constraints to fields 789 that may appear in a Certificate Request Template: 791 Version 792 This field MAY be absent, or MAY specify the request of a Version 793 3 Certificate. It SHOULD be omitted. 795 SerialNumber 796 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 797 omitted in this profile. 799 SigningAlgorithm 800 As per [RFC4211], this field is assigned by the CA and MUST be 801 omitted in this profile. 803 Issuer 804 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 805 profile. 807 Validity 808 This field MAY be omitted. If omitted, the CA will issue a 809 Certificate with Validity dates as determined by the CA. If 810 specified, then the CA MAY override the requested values with 811 dates as determined by the CA. 813 Subject 814 This field is optional. If present, the value of this field 815 SHOULD be empty, in which case the issuer MUST generate a subject 816 name that is unique in the context of certificates issued by this 817 issuer. If the value of this field is non-empty, then the CA MAY 818 consider the value of this field as the subject's suggested 819 subject name, but the CA is NOT bound to honour this suggestion, 820 as the subject name MUST be unique per issuer in certificates 821 issued by this issuer. 823 PublicKey 824 This field MUST be present. 826 extensions 827 This attribute contains X509v3 Certificate Extensions. The 828 profile for extensions in certificate requests is specified in 829 Section 5.3. 831 5.2.2. Resource Certificate Request Control Fields 833 The following control fields are supported in this profile: 835 Authenticator Control 836 It is noted that the intended model of authentication of the 837 subject is a long term one, and the advice as offered in [RFC4211] 838 is that the Authenticator Control field be used. 840 5.3. Certificate Extension Attributes in Certificate Requests 842 The following extensions MAY appear in a PKCS#10 or CRMF Certificate 843 Request. Any other extensions MUST NOT appear in a Certificate 844 Request. This profile places the following additional constraints on 845 these extensions.: 847 BasicConstraints 848 If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity 849 certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in the 850 issued certificate. 852 The Path Length Constraint is not supported in this Resource 853 Certificate Profile, and this field MUST be omitted in this 854 profile. 856 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to on. If this bit 857 is set, then it indicates that the Subject is allowed to issue 858 resource certificates within this overall framework. 860 The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity 861 certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity 862 certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension. 864 SubjectKeyIdentifier 865 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 866 profile. 868 AuthorityKeyIdentifier 869 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 870 profile. 872 KeyUsage 873 The CA MAY honor KeyUsage extensions of keyCertSign and cRLSign if 874 present, as long as this is consistent with the BasicConstraints 875 SubjectType sub field, when specified. 877 SubjectInformationAccess 878 This field MUST be present when the subject is a CA, and the field 879 value SHOULD be honoured by the CA. If the CA is not able to 880 honor the requested field value, then the CA MUST reject the 881 Certificate Request. 883 This field (SIA) identifies the location of information and 884 services relating to the subject of the certificate in which the 885 SIA extension appears. 887 Where the subject is a CA in this profile, this information and 888 service collection will include all current valid certificates 889 that have been issued by this subject that are signed with the 890 subject's corresponding private key. 892 This profile uses a URI form of location identification. An RSYNC 893 URI MUST be specified, with an access method value of id-ad- 894 caRepository when the subject of the certificate is a CA. The 895 RSYNC URI MUST reference an object collection rather than an 896 individual object and MUST use a trailing '/' in the URI. Other 897 access method URIs that reference the same location MAY also be 898 included in the value sequence of this extension. The ordering of 899 URIs in this sequence reflect the subject's relative preferences 900 for access methods, with the first method in the sequence being 901 the most preferred by the Subject. 903 A request for a CA certificate MUST include in the SIA of the 904 request the id-ad-caRepository access method, and also MUST 905 include in the SIA of the request the accessMethod OID of id-ad- 906 rpkiManifest, where the associated accessLocation refers to the 907 subject's published manifest object as an object URL. 908 When an EE certificate is intended for use in verifying multiple 909 objects, the certificate request for the EE certificate MUST 910 include in the SIA of the request an access method OID of id-ad- 911 signedObjectRepository, and also MUST include in the SIA of the 912 request an access method OID of id-ad-rpkiManifest, where the 913 associated access location refers to the publication point of the 914 objects that are verified using this EE certificate. 916 When an EE certificate is used to sign a single object, the 917 certificate request for the EE certificate MUST include in the SIA 918 of the request an access method OID of id-ad-signedObject, where 919 the associated access location refers to the publication point of 920 the single object that is verified using this EE certificate, and 921 MUST NOT include an id-ad-rpkiManifest access method OID in the 922 SIA of the request. 924 CRLDistributionPoints 925 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 926 profile. 928 AuthorityInformationAccess 929 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 930 profile. 932 CertificatePolicies 933 This field is assigned by the CA and MUST be omitted in this 934 profile. 936 With the exceptions of the publicKey field and the 937 SubjectInformationAccess field, the CA is permitted to alter any 938 requested field. 940 6. Resource Certificate Validation 942 This section describes the Resource Certificate validation procedure. 943 This refines the generic procedure described in section 6 of 944 [RFC5280]: 946 To meet this goal, the path validation process verifies, among other 947 things, that a prospective certification path (a sequence of n 948 certificates) satisfies the following conditions: 950 1. for all x in {1, ..., n-1}, the subject of certificate x is the 951 issuer of certificate x+1; 953 2. certificate 1 is issued by a trust anchor; 955 3. certificate n is the certificate to be validated; and 957 4. for all x in {1, ..., n}, the certificate is valid. 959 6.1. Trust Anchors for Resource Certificates 961 The trust model that may be used in the resource certificate 962 framework in the context of validation of assertions of public number 963 resources in public-use contexts is one that readily maps to a top- 964 down delegated CA model that mirrors the delegation of resources from 965 a registry distribution point to the entities that are the direct 966 recipients of these resources. Within this trust model these 967 recipient entities may, in turn, operate a registry and perform 968 further allocations or assignments. This is a strict hierarchy, in 969 that any number resource and a corresponding recipient entity has 970 only one 'parent' issuing registry for that number resource (i.e. 971 there is always a unique parent entity for any resource and 972 corresponding entity), and that the issuing registry is not a direct 973 or indirect subordinate recipient entity of the recipient entity in 974 question (i.e. no loops in the model). 976 The more general consideration is that selection of a trust anchor CA 977 is a task undertaken by relying parties. The structure of the 978 resource certificate profile admits potentially the same variety of 979 trust models as the PKIX profile. There is only one additional 980 caveat on the general applicability of trust models and PKIX 981 frameworks, namely that in forming a validation path to a trust 982 anchor CA, the sequence of certificates MUST preserve the resource 983 extension validation property, as described in Section 6.2, and the 984 validation of the first certificate in the validation path not only 985 involves the verification that the certificate was issued by a trust 986 anchor CA, but also that the resource set described in the 987 certificate MUST be encompassed by the trust anchor CA's resource 988 set, as described in Section 6.2. 990 The trust anchor information, describing a CA that serves as a trust 991 anchor, includes the following: 992 1. the trusted issuer name, 993 2. the trusted public key algorithm, 994 3. the trusted public key, 995 4. optionally, the trusted public key parameters associated with the 996 public key, and 997 5. a resource set, consisting of a set of IPv4 resources, IPv6 998 resources and AS number resources. 1000 The trust anchor information may be provided to the path processing 1001 procedure in the form of a self-signed certificate. 1003 6.2. Resource Extension Validation 1005 The IP resource extension definition [RFC3779] defines a critical 1006 extensions for Internet number resources. These are ASN.1 encoded 1007 representations of the IPv4 and IPv6 address range (either as a 1008 prefix/length, or start-end pair) and the AS number set. 1010 Valid Resource Certificates MUST have a valid IP address and/or AS 1011 number resource extension. In order to validate a Resource 1012 Certificate the resource extension must also be validated. This 1013 validation process relies on definitions of comparison of resource 1014 sets: 1016 more specific: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, 1017 A and B, A is "more specific" than B if range B includes all IP 1018 addresses or AS numbers described by range A, and if range B is 1019 larger than range A. 1021 equal: Given two IP address or AS number contiguous ranges, A and B, 1022 A is "equal" to B if range A describes precisely the same 1023 collection of IP addresses or AS numbers as described by range B. 1024 The definition of "inheritance" in [RFC3779] is equivalent to this 1025 "equality" comparison. 1026 encompass: Given two IP address and AS number sets X and Y, X 1027 "encompasses" Y if, for every contiguous range of IP addresses or 1028 AS numbers elements in set Y, the range element is either more 1029 specific than or equal to a contiguous range element within the 1030 set X. 1032 Validation of a certificate's resource extension in the context of an 1033 ordered certificate sequence of {1,2, ... , n} where '1'is issued by 1034 a trust anchor and 'n' is the target certificate, and where the 1035 subject of certificate 'x' is the issuer of certificate 'x' + 1, 1036 implies that the resources described in certificate 'x' "encompass" 1037 the resources described in certificate 'x' + 1, and the resources 1038 described in the trust anchor information "encompass" the resources 1039 described in certificate 1. 1041 6.3. Resource Certificate Path Validation 1043 Validation of signed resource data using a target resource 1044 certificate consists of assembling an ordered sequence (or 1045 'Certificate Path') of certificates ({1,2,...n} where '1' is a 1046 certificate that has been issued by a trust anchor, and 'n' is the 1047 target certificate) verifying that all of the following conditions 1048 hold: 1050 1. The certificate can be verified using the Issuer's public key and 1051 the signature algorithm 1053 2. The current time lies within the certificate's Validity From and 1054 To values. 1056 3. The certificate contains all fields that MUST be present and 1057 contains field values as specified in this profile for all field 1058 values that MUST be present. 1060 4. No field value that MUST NOT be present in this profile is 1061 present in the certificate. 1063 5. The Issuer has not revoked the certificate by placing the 1064 certificate's serial number on the Issuer's current Certificate 1065 Revocation List, and the Certificate Revocation List is itself 1066 valid. 1068 6. That the resource extension data is "encompassed" by the resource 1069 extension data contained in a valid certificate where this Issuer 1070 is the Subject (the previous certificate in the ordered sequence) 1072 7. The Certificate Path originates with a certificate issued by a 1073 trust anchor, and there exists a signing chain across the 1074 Certificate Path where the Subject of Certificate x in the 1075 Certificate Path matches the Issuer in Certificate x+1 in the 1076 Certificate Path. 1078 A certificate validation algorithm may perform these tests in any 1079 chosen order. 1081 Certificates and CRLs used in this process may be found in a locally 1082 maintained cache, maintained by a regular top-down synchronization 1083 pass, seeded with the CAs who operate at the apex of the resource 1084 distribution hierarchy, via reference to Issued certificates and 1085 their SIA fields as forward pointers, plus the CRLDP. Alternatively, 1086 validation may be performed using a bottom-up process with on-line 1087 certificate access using the AIA and CRLDP pointers to guide the 1088 certificate retrieval process. 1090 There exists the possibility of encountering certificate paths that 1091 are arbitrarily long, or attempting to generate paths with loops as 1092 means of creating a potential DOS attack on a certificate validator. 1093 Some further heuristics may be required to halt the certificate path 1094 validation process in order to avoid some of the issues associated 1095 with attempts to validate such structures. It is suggested that 1096 implementations of Resource Certificate validation MAY halt with a 1097 validation failure if the certificate path length exceeds a pre- 1098 determined configuration parameter. 1100 7. Security Considerations 1102 The Security Considerations of [RFC5280] and [RFC3779]apply to 1103 Resource Certificates as defined by this profile, and their use. 1105 A Resource Certificate PKI cannot in and of itself resolve any forms 1106 of ambiguity relating to uniqueness of assertions of rights of use in 1107 the event that two or more valid certificates encompass the same 1108 resource. If the issuance of resource certificates is aligned to the 1109 status of resource allocations and assignments then the information 1110 conveyed in a certificate is no better than the information in the 1111 allocation and assignment databases. 1113 8. IANA Considerations 1115 [Note to IANA, to be removed prior to publication: there are no IANA 1116 considerations stated in this version of the document.] 1118 9. Acknowledgements 1120 The authors would like to acknowledge the valued contributions from 1121 Stephen Kent, Robert Kisteleki, Randy Bush, Russ Housley, Ricardo 1122 Patara and Rob Austein in the preparation and subsequent review of 1123 this document. The document also reflects review comments received 1124 from Sean Turner. 1126 10. References 1128 10.1. Normative References 1130 [RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, 1131 September 1981. 1133 [RFC2050] Hubbard, K., Kosters, M., Conrad, D., Karrenberg, D., and 1134 J. Postel, "INTERNET REGISTRY IP ALLOCATION GUIDELINES", 1135 BCP 12, RFC 2050, November 1996. 1137 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 1138 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004. 1140 [RFC4055] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional 1141 Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in 1142 the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate 1143 and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 4055, 1144 June 2005. 1146 [RFC4211] Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure 1147 Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, 1148 September 2005. 1150 [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing 1151 Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006. 1153 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 1154 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 1155 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 1156 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 1158 10.2. Informative References 1160 [ID.SIDR-MANIFESTS] 1161 Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, 1162 "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", 1163 Work in progress: Internet 1164 Drafts draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-manifests-00.txt, 1165 January 2008. 1167 [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object 1168 Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, 1169 November 2000. 1171 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 1172 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, 1173 November 2000. 1175 [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. 1176 Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: 1177 Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005. 1179 [rsync] Tridgell, A., "rsync", April 2006, 1180 . 1182 Appendix A. Example Resource Certificate 1184 The following is an example Resource Certificate. 1186 Certificate Name: hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ-3.cer 1188 Data: 1189 Version: 3 1190 Serial: 3 1191 Signature Algorithm: Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1192 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1193 E=ca@apnic.net 1194 Validity: 1195 Not Before: Thu Jul 27 06:34:04 2006 GMT 1196 Not After: Fri Jul 27 06:34:04 2007 GMT 1197 Subject: CN=APNIC own-use network resources 1198 Subject Key Identifier: 1199 86:ef:5f:74:30:6a:eb:49:ab:93:b7:0f:46:e5:f6:0d: 1200 8b:97:49:14 1201 Subject Key Identifier g(SKI): 1202 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ 1203 Subject Public Key Info: 1204 Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption 1205 RSA Public Key: Modulus: 1206 c1:25:a1:b0:db:89:83:a0:fc:f1:c0:e4:7b:93:76:c1: 1207 59:b7:0d:ac:25:25:ed:88:ce:00:03:ea:99:1a:9a:2a: 1208 0e:10:2e:5f:c0:45:87:47:81:7b:1d:4d:44:aa:65:a3: 1209 f8:07:84:32:ea:04:70:27:05:2b:79:26:e6:e6:3a:cb: 1210 b2:9a:65:6c:c1:4e:d7:35:fb:f6:41:1e:8b:1c:b8:e4: 1211 5a:3a:d6:d0:7b:82:9a:23:03:f8:05:4c:68:42:67:fe: 1212 e7:45:d9:2c:a6:d1:b3:da:cf:ad:77:c5:80:d2:e3:1e: 1213 4d:e8:bf:a2:f2:44:10:b2:2f:61:bc:f4:89:31:54:7c: 1214 56:47:d5:b1:c3:48:26:95:93:c9:6f:70:14:4d:ac:a5: 1215 c2:8e:3d:1f:6d:f8:d4:93:9d:14:c7:15:c7:34:8e:ba: 1216 dd:70:b3:c2:2b:08:78:59:97:dd:e4:34:c7:d8:de:5c: 1217 f7:94:6f:95:59:ba:29:65:f5:98:15:8f:8e:57:59:5d: 1218 92:1f:64:2f:b5:3d:69:2e:69:83:c2:10:c6:aa:8e:03: 1219 d5:69:11:bd:0d:b5:d8:27:6c:74:2f:60:47:dd:2e:87: 1220 24:c2:36:68:2b:3c:fd:bd:22:57:a9:4d:e8:86:3c:27: 1221 03:ce:f0:03:2e:59:ce:05:a7:41:3f:2f:64:50:dd:e7 1222 RSA Public Key: Exponent: 65537 1223 Basic Constraints: CA: TRUE 1224 Subject Info Access: 1225 caRepository - rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1226 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1227 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1228 hu9fdDBq60mrk7cPRuX2DYuXSRQ/ 1229 Key Usage: keyCertSign, cRLSign 1230 CRL Distribution Points: 1231 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1232 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1233 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw/ 1234 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1235 Authority Info Access: caIssuers - 1236 rsync://repository.apnic.net/APNIC/ 1237 pvpjvwUeQix2e54X8fGbhmdYMo0/ 1238 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.cer 1239 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1240 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05:07:02: 1242 51:c2:a9:1c 1243 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1244 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1245 Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2 1246 IPv4: 192.0.2.0/24, 1247 IPv6: 2001:DB8::/32 1248 ASNum: 4608, 4777, 9545, 18366-18370 1249 Signature: 1250 c5:e7:b2:f3:62:cb:e3:bc:50:1e:6b:90:13:19:f4:5b: 1251 4a:1c:1c:ab:b5:de:b1:a4:22:e0:28:f5:3b:d0:8c:59: 1252 0f:85:f2:06:a6:ae:22:e6:d0:99:fe:cb:eb:1d:6a:e2: 1253 a3:f1:a2:25:95:ec:a7:7d:96:35:dc:16:a7:2f:f5:b7: 1254 11:ba:97:05:57:5f:5d:07:5a:c8:19:c8:27:d3:f7:a3: 1255 92:66:cb:98:2d:e1:7f:a8:25:96:ab:af:ed:87:02:28: 1256 f5:ae:b6:e3:0c:f7:18:82:70:82:f4:76:54:06:b9:9f: 1257 e1:a5:f7:ae:72:dd:ee:f0:d4:d2:78:bb:61:73:cf:51: 1258 26:9f:ea:e8:20:49:06:ba:0c:ac:1d:f6:07:b8:63:a0: 1259 4d:3d:8e:12:84:3a:d0:ec:94:7e:02:db:d4:85:cf:12: 1260 5c:7b:12:1a:52:ab:3c:ba:00:f2:71:e7:f0:fd:b3:f4: 1261 81:e8:a7:cb:07:ca:3a:a4:24:fe:dc:bb:51:16:6a:28: 1262 33:40:a4:64:60:75:0e:c8:06:c8:5f:e5:98:be:16:a3: 1263 bc:19:e7:b3:4f:00:0a:8e:81:33:dd:4c:a0:fb:f5:1c: 1264 1f:1d:3f:b5:90:8b:ec:98:67:76:95:56:8a:94:45:54: 1265 52:3d:1c:69:4c:6f:8a:9f:09:ec:ef:b0:a9:bc:cf:9d 1267 Appendix B. Example Certificate Revocation List 1269 The following is an example Certificate Revocation List. 1271 CRL Name: q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw.crl 1273 Data: 1274 Version: 2 1275 Signature Algorithm: 1276 Hash: SHA256, Encryption: RSA 1277 Issuer: CN=Demo Production APNIC CA - Not for real use, 1278 E=ca@apnic.net 1279 This Update: Thu Jul 27 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1280 Next Update: Fri Jul 28 06:30:34 2006 GMT 1281 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier: 1282 ab:ae:88:ad:64:86:b8:11:3b:8e:ac:7c:3c:05: 1283 07:02:51:c2:a9:1c 1284 Authority Key Identifier: Key Identifier g(AKI): 1285 q66IrWSGuBE7jqx8PAUHAlHCqRw 1286 CRLNumber: 4 1287 Revoked Certificates: 1 1288 Serial Number: 1 1289 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:10:19 2006 GMT 1290 Serial Number: 2 1291 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:12:25 2006 GMT 1292 Serial Number: 4 1293 Revocation Date: Mon Jul 17 05:40:39 2006 GMT 1294 Signature: 1295 b2:5a:e8:7c:bd:a8:00:0f:03:1a:17:fd:40:2c:46: 1296 0e:d5:64:87:e7:e7:bc:10:7d:b6:3e:39:21:a9:12: 1297 f4:5a:d8:b8:d4:bd:57:1a:7d:2f:7c:0d:c6:4f:27: 1298 17:c8:0e:ae:8c:89:ff:00:f7:81:97:c3:a1:6a:0a: 1299 f7:d2:46:06:9a:d1:d5:4d:78:e1:b7:b0:58:4d:09: 1300 d6:7c:1e:a0:40:af:86:5d:8c:c9:48:f6:e6:20:2e: 1301 b9:b6:81:03:0b:51:ac:23:db:9f:c1:8e:d6:94:54: 1302 66:a5:68:52:ee:dd:0f:10:5d:21:b8:b8:19:ff:29: 1303 6f:51:2e:c8:74:5c:2a:d2:c5:fa:99:eb:c5:c2:a2: 1304 d0:96:fc:54:b3:ba:80:4b:92:7f:85:54:76:c9:12: 1305 cb:32:ea:1d:12:7b:f8:f9:a2:5c:a1:b1:06:8e:d8: 1306 c5:42:61:00:8c:f6:33:11:29:df:6e:b2:cc:c3:7c: 1307 d3:f3:0c:8d:5c:49:a5:fb:49:fd:e7:c4:73:68:0a: 1308 09:0e:6d:68:a9:06:52:3a:36:4f:19:47:83:59:da: 1309 02:5b:2a:d0:8a:7a:33:0a:d5:ce:be:b5:a2:7d:8d: 1310 59:a1:9d:ee:60:ce:77:3d:e1:86:9a:84:93:90:9f: 1311 34:a7:02:40:59:3a:a5:d1:18:fb:6f:fc:af:d4:02: 1312 d9 1314 Authors' Addresses 1316 Geoff Huston 1317 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1318 33 Park Rd. 1319 Milton, QLD 4064 1320 Australia 1322 Email: gih@apnic.net 1323 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1325 George Michaelson 1326 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1327 33 Park Rd. 1328 Milton, QLD 4064 1329 Australia 1331 Email: ggm@apnic.net 1332 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1334 Robert Loomans 1335 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 1336 33 Park Rd. 1337 Milton, QLD 4064 1338 Australia 1340 Email: robertl@apnic.net 1341 URI: http://www.apnic.net 1343 Full Copyright Statement 1345 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). 1347 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions 1348 contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors 1349 retain all their rights. 1351 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an 1352 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS 1353 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND 1354 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS 1355 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF 1356 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED 1357 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 1359 Intellectual Property 1361 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 1362 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 1363 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 1364 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 1365 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 1366 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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