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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Unused Reference: 'RFC4360' is defined on line 203, but no explicit reference was found in the text ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 7999 == Outdated reference: A later version (-11) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07 Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 4 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group T. King 3 Internet-Draft D. Kopp 4 Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX 5 Expires: June 11, 2017 A. Lambrianidis 6 AMS-IX 7 A. Fenioux 8 France-IX 9 December 8, 2016 11 Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers 12 draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light-01 14 Abstract 16 This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation 17 State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] 18 to signal prefix origin validation results from a route-server to its 19 peers. Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can 20 use this information in their local routing decision process. 22 Requirements Language 24 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 25 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to 26 be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all 27 upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English 28 words, without normative meaning. 30 Status of This Memo 32 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 33 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 35 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 36 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 37 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 38 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 40 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 41 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 42 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 43 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 45 This Internet-Draft will expire on June 11, 2017. 47 Copyright Notice 49 Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 50 document authors. All rights reserved. 52 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 53 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 54 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 55 publication of this document. Please review these documents 56 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 57 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 58 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 59 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 60 described in the Simplified BSD License. 62 Table of Contents 64 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 65 2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route- 66 Server to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 67 3. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 68 3.1. Local Routing Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 69 3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation 70 State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 71 3.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not 72 Available at a Route-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 73 3.4. Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 74 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 75 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 76 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 77 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 78 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 79 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 81 1. Introduction 83 RPKI-based prefix origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant 84 operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to 85 boost acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and ultimately 86 increase the security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may 87 provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at the route-server 88 [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. The result of this prefix origin 89 validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin 90 Validation State Extended Community as introduced in 91 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]. 93 Peers receiving the prefix origin validation result from the route- 94 server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision 95 process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic 96 engineering purposes of a particular route. 98 2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to 99 Peers 101 The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined 102 in [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]) is utilized for 103 signaling prefix origin validation result from a route-server to 104 peers. 106 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] proposes an encoding of 107 the prefix origin validation result [RFC6811] as follows: 109 +-------+-----------+ 110 | Value | Meaning | 111 +-------+-----------+ 112 | 0 | Valid | 113 | 1 | Not found | 114 | 2 | Invalid | 115 +-------+-----------+ 117 Table 1 119 This encoding is re-used. Route-servers providing RPKI-based prefix 120 origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix 121 origin validation result (see [RFC6811]). 123 3. Operational Recommendations 125 3.1. Local Routing Decision Process 127 A peer receiving prefix origin validation results from the route 128 server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision 129 process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the 130 rules as described in section 5 [RFC6811]. 132 A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route 133 server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS. 135 3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State 136 Extended Community 138 An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the 139 BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the 140 extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers. 141 This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing 142 prefix origin validation or not. 144 Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes 145 tagged with arbitrary prefix origin validation results via a route- 146 server, influencing maliciously the decision process of other route- 147 server peers. 149 3.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not Available at 150 a Route-Server 152 In case information about the validity of a BGP prefix origin is not 153 available at the route-server (e.g., error in the ROA cache, CPU 154 overload) the route-server MUST NOT add the BGP Prefix Origin 155 Validation State Extended Community to the route. 157 3.4. Error Handling at Peers 159 A route sent by a route-server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP 160 Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community. 162 A peer receiving a route from a route-server containing more than one 163 BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only 164 consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the 165 validation result field and disregard the other values. Values 166 larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded. 168 4. IANA Considerations 170 None. 172 5. Security Considerations 174 A route-server could be misused to spread malicious prefix origin 175 validation results. However, peers have to trust the route-server 176 anyway as it collects and redistributes BGP routing information to 177 other peers. 179 To countermeasure DDoS attacks, it is widespread to provide 180 blackholing services at IXPs (see RFC 7999 [RFC7999]). Peers are 181 using blackholing to drop traffic, typically by announcing smaller 182 subnets, which are unter attack. Assuming, for practical reasons, 183 peers will not reflect these announcements in their ROAs. In such 184 situations, the RPKI validation status for a prefixes, providing a 185 ROA, would be "Invalid". Given that other peers evaluating the RPKI 186 status, this leads to a degradation of prefixes being blackholed. 187 It's recommended that peers validating the RPKI status use a adopted 188 classification for such prefixes. 190 The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not 191 pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route- 192 servers and peers. 194 6. References 196 6.1. Normative References 198 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 199 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 200 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 201 . 203 [RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended 204 Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360, 205 February 2006, . 207 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 208 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, 209 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 210 . 212 [RFC7999] King, T., Dietzel, C., Snijders, J., Doering, G., and G. 213 Hankins, "BLACKHOLE Community", RFC 7999, 214 DOI 10.17487/RFC7999, October 2016, 215 . 217 6.2. Informative References 219 [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server] 220 Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker, 221 "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix- 222 bgp-route-server-12 (work in progress), June 2016. 224 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] 225 Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R. 226 Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended 227 Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07 228 (work in progress), November 2015. 230 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 231 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 232 February 2012, . 234 Authors' Addresses 236 Thomas King 237 DE-CIX Management GmbH 238 Lichtstrasse 43i 239 Cologne 50825 240 DE 242 Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net 244 Daniel Kopp 245 DE-CIX Management GmbH 246 Lichtstrasse 43i 247 Cologne 50825 248 DE 250 Email: daniel.kopp@de-cix.net 252 Aristidis Lambrianidis 253 Amsterdam Internet Exchange 254 Frederiksplein 42 255 Amsterdam 1017 XN 256 NL 258 Email: aristidis.lambrianidis@ams-ix.net 260 Arnaud Fenioux 261 France-IX 262 88 Avenue Des Ternes 263 Paris 75017 264 FR 266 Email: afenioux@franceix.net