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If these are example addresses, they should be changed. == There are 1 instance of lines with private range IPv4 addresses in the document. If these are generic example addresses, they should be changed to use any of the ranges defined in RFC 6890 (or successor): 192.0.2.x, 198.51.100.x or 203.0.113.x. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (October 2012) is 4211 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Informational ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == Unused Reference: 'I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles' is defined on line 145, but no explicit reference was found in the text == Outdated reference: A later version (-21) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 == Outdated reference: A later version (-23) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-19 Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 7 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan 4 Intended status: Informational October 2012 5 Expires: April 02, 2013 7 Responsible Grandparenting in the RPKI 8 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-grandparenting-00 10 Abstract 12 There are circumstances in RPKI operations where a resource holder's 13 parent may not be able to, or may not choose to, facilitate full and 14 proper registration of the holder's data. As in real life, the 15 holder may form a relationship with their grandparent who is willing 16 to aid the grandchild. This document describes simple procedures for 17 doing so. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on April 02, 2013. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/ 43 license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. 44 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 45 and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components 46 extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text 47 as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are 48 provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 53 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 3. What to Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 55 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 1. Introduction 62 There are circumstances in RPKI operations where a resource holder's 63 parent may not be able to, or may not choose to, facilitate full and 64 proper registration of the holder's data. As in real life, the 65 holder may form a relationship with their grandparent who is willing 66 to aid the grandchild. This document describes simple procedures for 67 doing so. 69 An example might be when provider A allowed a child, C, to move to 70 other provider(s) and keep their address space, either temporarily or 71 permanently, and C's child, G, wished to stay with provider A. 73 Or a child, C, in the process of going out of business might place 74 their grandchildren in precarious circumstances until they can re- 75 home. The grandparent, without disturbing the child's data, could 76 simply issue ROAs for the grandchildren, or issue certificates for 77 those willing to manage their own rpki data. 79 Certification Authorities with a large number of children, e.g. very 80 large ISPs or RIRs, might offer documented grandparenting processes 81 and/or agreements. This might reassure grandchildren with worries 82 about irresponsible parents. 84 Other examples occur in administrative hierarchies, such as large 85 organizations or military and other government hierarchies, when A's 86 child C wishes to manage their own data but does not wish the 87 technical or administrative burden of managing their children's, Gs', 88 data. 90 2. Suggested Reading 92 It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, see [RFC6480], 93 ROAs, see [RFC6482], BGPSEC Router Certificates, see [I-D.ietf-sidr- 94 bgpsec-pki-profiles], and the operational guidance for origin 95 validation, [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops]. 97 3. What to Do 99 A hypothetical example might be that A has the rights to 10.0.0.0/8, 100 has delegated 10.42.0.0/16 to their child C, who delegated 10.42.2.0/ 101 23 to their child G. C has changed providers and kept, with A's 102 consent, 10.42.0.0/16, but G wishes to stay with A and keep 10.42.2.0 103 /23. 105 Perhaps there are also AS resources involved, and G wishes to issue 106 Router Certificates for their AS(s). 108 Managing RPKI data in such relationships is simple, but should be 109 done carefully. 111 First, using whatever administrative and/or contractual procedures 112 are appropriate in the local hierarchy, the grandparent, A, should 113 ensure their relationship to the grandchild, G, and that G has the 114 right to the resources which they wish to have registered. These are 115 local matters between A and G. 117 Although A has the rights over their child's, C's, resources, it 118 would be prudent and polite to ensure that C agrees to A forming a 119 relationship to G. Again, these are local matters between A, C, and 120 G. Often, no one outside of one of these bi-lateral relationships 121 actually knows the agreement between the parties. 123 Then, it is trivial within the RPKI for A to certify G's data, even 124 though it is a subset of the resources A delegated to C. A may 125 certify G's resources, or issue one or more EE certificates and ROAs 126 for G's resources. Which is done is a local matter between A and G. 128 4. Security Considerations 130 This operational practice presents no technical security threats 131 beyond those of the relevant RPKI specifications. 133 There are threats of social engineering by G, lying to A about their 134 relationship to and rights gained from C. 136 There are also threats of social engineering by C, attempting to 137 prevent A from giving rights to G which G legitimately deserves. 139 5. IANA Considerations 141 This document has no IANA Considerations. 143 6. References 145 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] 146 Reynolds, M., Turner, S. and S. Kent, "A Profile for 147 BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, 148 and Certification Requests", Internet-Draft draft-ietf- 149 sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03, April 2012. 151 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] 152 Bush, R., "RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation", 153 Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-19, August 2012. 155 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 156 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. 158 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S. and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 159 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. 161 Author's Address 163 Randy Bush 164 Internet Initiative Japan 165 5147 Crystal Springs 166 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 167 US 169 Email: randy@psg.com