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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein 5 Expires: September 12, 2014 Dragon Research Labs 6 March 11, 2014 8 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol 9 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-00 11 Abstract 13 In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems of BGP 14 announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to 15 receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6480) prefix origin 16 data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to 17 deliver validated prefix origin data to routers. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2014. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 60 5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 62 5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 63 5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 64 5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 65 5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 66 5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 67 5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 68 5.10. Router Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 69 5.11. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 70 6. Protocol Timing Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 71 7. Protocol Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 72 8. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 73 8.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 74 8.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 75 8.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 76 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 77 9. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 78 9.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 79 9.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 80 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 81 9.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 82 10. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 83 11. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 84 12. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 85 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 86 14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 87 15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 88 16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 89 16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 90 16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 91 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 93 1. Introduction 95 In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes) 96 of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to 97 receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] 98 cryptographically validated prefix origin data from a trusted cache. 99 This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin 100 data to routers. The design is intentionally constrained to be 101 usable on much of the current generation of ISP router platforms. 103 Section 3 describes the deployment structure, and Section 4 then 104 presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the 105 protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected PDU 106 sequences are described in Section 8. The transport protocol options 107 are described in Section 9. Section 10 details how routers and 108 caches are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 11 109 describes likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and 110 IANA considerations end the document. 112 The protocol is extensible in order to support new PDUs with new 113 semantics, if deployment experience indicates they are needed. PDUs 114 are versioned should deployment experience call for change. 116 For an implementation (not interoperability) report, see 117 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-impl] 119 1.1. Requirements Language 121 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 122 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 123 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] 124 only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in 125 lower or mixed case as English words, without special meaning. 127 2. Glossary 129 The following terms are used with special meaning. 131 Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a 132 distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet 133 Registries (RIRs), National Internet Registries (NIRs), and ISPs; 134 see [RFC6481]. 136 Cache: A coalesced copy of the RPKI, which is periodically fetched/ 137 refreshed directly or indirectly from the Global RPKI using the 138 [RFC5781] protocol/tools. Relying party software is used to 139 gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache. 141 Trusting this cache further is a matter between the provider of 142 the cache and a relying party. 144 Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer which 145 wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a 146 cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates 147 its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. As a 148 cache is receiving, new incoming data and implicit deletes are 149 associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the 150 fetch is complete. A Serial Number is not commensurate between 151 caches, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache 152 server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too 153 much detail on the topic. 155 Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a session 156 identifier to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to 157 bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will 158 generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session 159 knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with 160 that of the cache. 162 3. Deployment Structure 164 Deployment of the RPKI to reach routers has a three-level structure 165 as follows: 167 Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a 168 distributed set of servers, RPKI publication repositories, e.g., 169 the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs, see [RFC6481]. 171 Local Caches: A local set of one or more collected and verified 172 caches. A relying party, e.g., router or other client, MUST have 173 a trust relationship with, and a trusted transport channel to, any 174 authoritative cache(s) it uses. 176 Routers: A router fetches data from a local cache using the protocol 177 described in this document. It is said to be a client of the 178 cache. There MAY be mechanisms for the router to assure itself of 179 the authenticity of the cache and to authenticate itself to the 180 cache. 182 4. Operational Overview 184 A router establishes and keeps open a connection to one or more 185 caches with which it has client/server relationships. It is 186 configured with a semi-ordered list of caches, and establishes a 187 connection to the most preferred cache, or set of caches, which 188 accept the connections. 190 The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or 191 set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches 192 and the Global RPKI. 194 Periodically, the router sends to the cache the Serial Number of the 195 highest numbered data it has received from that cache, i.e., the 196 router's current Serial Number. When a router establishes a new 197 connection to a cache, or wishes to reset a current relationship, it 198 sends a Reset Query. 200 The Cache responds with all data records which have Serial Numbers 201 greater than that in the router's query. This may be the null set, 202 in which case the End of Data PDU is still sent. Note that 'greater' 203 must take wrap-around into account, see [RFC1982]. 205 When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets 206 its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the End of 207 Data PDU. 209 When the cache updates its database, it sends a Notify message to 210 every currently connected router. This is a hint that now would be a 211 good time for the router to poll for an update, but is only a hint. 212 The protocol requires the router to poll for updates periodically in 213 any case. 215 Strictly speaking, a router could track a cache simply by asking for 216 a complete data set every time it updates, but this would be very 217 inefficient. The Serial Number based incremental update mechanism 218 allows an efficient transfer of just the data records which have 219 changed since last update. As with any update protocol based on 220 incremental transfers, the router must be prepared to fall back to a 221 full transfer if for any reason the cache is unable to provide the 222 necessary incremental data. Unlike some incremental transfer 223 protocols, this protocol requires the router to make an explicit 224 request to start the fallback process; this is deliberate, as the 225 cache has no way of knowing whether the router has also established 226 sessions with other caches that may be able to provide better 227 service. 229 As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin 230 Attestations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers' 231 clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour. 233 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) 235 The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of 236 exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in 237 Section 8. 239 Fields with unspecified content MUST be zero on transmission and MAY 240 be ignored on receipt. 242 5.1. Fields of a PDU 244 PDUs contain the following data elements: 246 Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 1, 247 denoting the version of this protocol. 249 PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the 250 PDU, e.g., IPv4 Prefix, etc. 252 Serial Number: The Serial Number of the RPKI Cache when this set of 253 PDUs was received from an upstream cache server or gathered from 254 the Global RPKI. A cache increments its Serial Number when 255 completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or 256 the Global RPKI. 258 Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session 259 ID to identify the instance of the cache and to bind it to the 260 sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will generate. 261 This allows the router to restart a failed session knowing that 262 the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with that of the 263 cache. If, at any time, either the router or the cache finds the 264 value of the session identifier is not the same as the other's, 265 they MUST completely drop the session and the router MUST flush 266 all data learned from that cache. 268 Should a cache erroneously reuse a Session ID so that a router 269 does not realize that the session has changed (old session ID and 270 new session ID have same numeric value), the router may become 271 confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the 272 router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the 273 Serial Numbers are also reused. If the Serial Numbers in the old 274 and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to 275 the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the 276 problem. If, however, the Serial Numbers are close, the cache may 277 respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring 278 the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain 279 that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state 280 that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache 281 Response may tell the router to drop a record which the router 282 does not hold, or may tell the router to add a record which the 283 router already has. In such cases, a router will detect the error 284 and reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay 285 out of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any 286 data currently held by the router. 288 Using persistent storage for the session identifier or a clock- 289 based scheme for generating session identifiers should avoid the 290 risk of session identifier collisions. 292 The Session ID might be a pseudo-random value, a strictly 293 increasing value if the cache has reliable storage, etc. 295 Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer which has as its value the count 296 of the bytes in the entire PDU, including the eight bytes of 297 header which end with the length field. 299 Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an 300 announcement and 0 for a withdrawal. For a Prefix PDU (IPv4 or 301 IPv6), the flag indicates whether this PDU announces a new right 302 to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously announced right; 303 a withdraw effectively deletes one previously announced Prefix PDU 304 with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System 305 Number (ASN). Similarly, for a Router Key PDU, the flag indicates 306 whether this PDU announces a new Router Key or deletes one 307 previously announced Router Key PDU with the exact same AS 308 Numbers, subjectKeyIdentifier, and subjectPublicKeyInfo. 310 Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest 311 prefix allowed for the prefix. 313 Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix 314 allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the Prefix 315 Length element. 317 Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA. 319 Autonomous System Number: ASN allowed to announce this prefix, a 320 32-bit unsigned integer. 322 Zero: Fields shown as zero or reserved MUST be zero. The value of 323 such a field MUST be ignored on receipt. 325 5.2. Serial Notify 327 The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data. 329 The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are 330 commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed. 332 Upon receipt of a Serial Notify PDU, the router MAY issue an 333 immediate Serial Query or Reset Query without waiting for the Refresh 334 Interval timer to expire. 336 Serial Notify is the only message that the cache can send that is not 337 in response to a message from the router. 339 0 8 16 24 31 340 .-------------------------------------------. 341 | Protocol | PDU | | 342 | Version | Type | Session ID | 343 | 1 | 0 | | 344 +-------------------------------------------+ 345 | | 346 | Length=12 | 347 | | 348 +-------------------------------------------+ 349 | | 350 | Serial Number | 351 | | 352 `-------------------------------------------' 354 5.3. Serial Query 356 Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all 357 payload PDUs which have Serial Numbers higher than the Serial Number 358 in the Serial Query. 360 The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU 361 (Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the 362 changes since the Serial Number specified by the router. If there 363 have been no changes since the router last queried, the cache sends 364 an End Of Data PDU. 366 If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router, 367 perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in 368 the Serial Query, then it responds with a Cache Reset PDU 369 (Section 5.9). 371 The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to 372 ensure that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., the cache 373 session has not been changed. 375 0 8 16 24 31 376 .-------------------------------------------. 377 | Protocol | PDU | | 378 | Version | Type | Session ID | 379 | 1 | 1 | | 380 +-------------------------------------------+ 381 | | 382 | Length=12 | 383 | | 384 +-------------------------------------------+ 385 | | 386 | Serial Number | 387 | | 388 `-------------------------------------------' 390 5.4. Reset Query 392 Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the 393 total active, current, non-withdrawn database. The cache responds 394 with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.5). 396 0 8 16 24 31 397 .-------------------------------------------. 398 | Protocol | PDU | | 399 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 400 | 1 | 2 | | 401 +-------------------------------------------+ 402 | | 403 | Length=8 | 404 | | 405 `-------------------------------------------' 407 5.5. Cache Response 409 Cache Response: The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs. 410 When replying to a Serial Query request (Section 5.3), the cache 411 sends the set of all data records it has with Serial Numbers greater 412 than that sent by the client router. When replying to a Reset Query, 413 the cache sends the set of all data records it has; in this case, the 414 withdraw/announce field in the payload PDUs MUST have the value 1 415 (announce). 417 In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells 418 the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation. 419 In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same 420 reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., 421 the cache session has not changed. 423 0 8 16 24 31 424 .-------------------------------------------. 425 | Protocol | PDU | | 426 | Version | Type | Session ID | 427 | 1 | 3 | | 428 +-------------------------------------------+ 429 | | 430 | Length=8 | 431 | | 432 `-------------------------------------------' 434 5.6. IPv4 Prefix 436 0 8 16 24 31 437 .-------------------------------------------. 438 | Protocol | PDU | | 439 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 440 | 1 | 4 | | 441 +-------------------------------------------+ 442 | | 443 | Length=20 | 444 | | 445 +-------------------------------------------+ 446 | | Prefix | Max | | 447 | Flags | Length | Length | zero | 448 | | 0..32 | 0..32 | | 449 +-------------------------------------------+ 450 | | 451 | IPv4 Prefix | 452 | | 453 +-------------------------------------------+ 454 | | 455 | Autonomous System Number | 456 | | 457 `-------------------------------------------' 459 The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and 460 0 for a withdrawal. 462 In the RPKI, nothing prevents a signing certificate from issuing two 463 identical ROAs. In this case, there would be no semantic difference 464 between the objects, merely a process redundancy. 466 In the RPKI, there is also an actual need for what might appear to a 467 router as identical IPvX PDUs. This can occur when an upstream 468 certificate is being reissued or there is an address ownership 469 transfer up the validation chain. The ROA would be identical in the 470 router sense, i.e., have the same {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN}, but a 471 different validation path in the RPKI. This is important to the 472 RPKI, but not to the router. 474 The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to 475 have one and only one IPvX PDU for a unique {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, 476 ASN} at any one point in time. Should the router client receive an 477 IPvX PDU with a {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} identical to one it 478 already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received 479 error. 481 5.7. IPv6 Prefix 483 0 8 16 24 31 484 .-------------------------------------------. 485 | Protocol | PDU | | 486 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 487 | 1 | 6 | | 488 +-------------------------------------------+ 489 | | 490 | Length=32 | 491 | | 492 +-------------------------------------------+ 493 | | Prefix | Max | | 494 | Flags | Length | Length | zero | 495 | | 0..128 | 0..128 | | 496 +-------------------------------------------+ 497 | | 498 +--- ---+ 499 | | 500 +--- IPv6 Prefix ---+ 501 | | 502 +--- ---+ 503 | | 504 +-------------------------------------------+ 505 | | 506 | Autonomous System Number | 507 | | 508 `-------------------------------------------' 510 Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic. 512 5.8. End of Data 514 End of Data: The cache tells the router it has no more data for the 515 request. 517 The Session ID MUST be the same as that of the corresponding Cache 518 Response which began the, possibly null, sequence of data PDUs. 520 0 8 16 24 31 521 .-------------------------------------------. 522 | Protocol | PDU | | 523 | Version | Type | Session ID | 524 | 1 | 7 | | 525 +-------------------------------------------+ 526 | | 527 | Length=24 | 528 | | 529 +-------------------------------------------+ 530 | | 531 | Serial Number | 532 | | 533 +-------------------------------------------+ 534 | | 535 | Refresh Interval | 536 | | 537 +-------------------------------------------+ 538 | | 539 | Retry Interval | 540 | | 541 +-------------------------------------------+ 542 | | 543 | Expire Interval | 544 | | 545 `-------------------------------------------' 547 The Refresh Interval, Retry Interval, and Expire Interval are all 548 32-bit elapsed times measured in seconds, and express the timing 549 parameters that the cache expects the router to use to decide when 550 next to send the cache another Serial Query or Reset Query PDU. See 551 Section 6 for an explanation of the use and the range of allowed 552 values for these parameters. 554 5.9. Cache Reset 556 The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the 557 cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the Serial 558 Number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to 559 issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache. 561 0 8 16 24 31 562 .-------------------------------------------. 563 | Protocol | PDU | | 564 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 565 | 1 | 8 | | 566 +-------------------------------------------+ 567 | | 568 | Length=8 | 569 | | 570 `-------------------------------------------' 572 5.10. Router Key 574 0 8 16 24 31 575 .-------------------------------------------. 576 | Protocol | PDU | | | 577 | Version | Type | Flags | AS Count | 578 | 1 | 9 | | | 579 +-------------------------------------------+ 580 | | 581 | Length | 582 | | 583 +-------------------------------------------+ 584 | | 585 | Subject Key Identifier | 586 | 20 octets | 587 | | 588 +-------------------------------------------+ 589 | | 590 | AS Numbers | 591 | | 592 +-------------------------------------------+ 593 | | 594 | Subject Public Key Info | 595 | | 596 `-------------------------------------------' 598 In addition to the normal boilerplate fields of an RPKI-Router PDU, 599 the Router Key PDU has the following fields. 601 Subject Key Identifier is the 20-octet subjectKeyIdentifier (SKI) 602 value for the Router Key, as described in [RFC6487]. 604 AS Numbers contains one or more Autonomous System Numbers. The 605 number of ASNs is specified in the AS Count field. To simplify 606 comparision, the ASNs within this field MUST be sorted into 607 increasing numerical order considered as unsigned big-endian 608 32-bit integers. 610 Subject Public Key Info is the Router Key's subjectPublicKeyInfo as 611 described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 612 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag 613 and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. 615 5.11. Error Report 617 This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other. 619 Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs. 621 The Error Code is described in Section 12. 623 If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated 624 with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST 625 be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST be zero. 627 An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an 628 erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be 629 dropped. 631 If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e., too 632 long to be any legal PDU other than another Error Report, or a 633 possibly corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated. 635 The diagnostic text is optional; if not present, the Length of Error 636 Text field MUST be zero. If error text is present, it MUST be a 637 string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3269]). 639 0 8 16 24 31 640 .-------------------------------------------. 641 | Protocol | PDU | | 642 | Version | Type | Error Code | 643 | 1 | 10 | | 644 +-------------------------------------------+ 645 | | 646 | Length | 647 | | 648 +-------------------------------------------+ 649 | | 650 | Length of Encapsulated PDU | 651 | | 652 +-------------------------------------------+ 653 | | 654 ~ Copy of Erroneous PDU ~ 655 | | 656 +-------------------------------------------+ 657 | | 658 | Length of Error Text | 659 | | 660 +-------------------------------------------+ 661 | | 662 | Arbitrary Text | 663 | of | 664 ~ Error Diagnostic Message ~ 665 | | 666 `-------------------------------------------' 668 6. Protocol Timing Parameters 670 Since the data the cache distributes via the rpki-rtr protocol are 671 retrieved from the Global RPKI system at intervals which are only 672 known to the cache, only the cache can really know how frequently it 673 makes sense for the router to poll the cache, or how long the data 674 are likely to remain valid (or, at least, unchanged). For this 675 reason, as well as to allow the cache some control over the load 676 placed on it by its client routers, the End Of Data PDU includes 677 three values that allow the router to communicate timing parameters 678 to the router. 680 Refresh Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait 681 before next attempting to poll the cache, using a Serial Query or 682 Reset Query PDU. Note that receipt of a Serial Notify PDU 683 overrides this interval and allows the router to issue an 684 immediate query without waiting for the Refresh Interval to 685 expire. Countdown for this timer starts upon receipt of the 686 containing End Of Data PDU. 688 Minimum allowed value: 120 seconds (two minutes). 690 Maximum allowed value: 86400 seconds (one day). 692 Recommended default: 3600 seconds (one hour). 694 Retry Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait 695 before retrying a failed Serial Query or Reset Query. Countdown 696 for this timer starts upon failure of the query, and restarts 697 after each subsequent failure until a query succeeds. 699 Minimum allowed value: 120 seconds (two minutes). 701 Maximum allowed value: 7200 seconds (two hours). 703 Recommended default: 600 seconds (ten minutes). 705 Expire Interval: This parameter tells the router how long it can 706 continue to use the current version of the data while unable to 707 perform a sucessful query. Countdown for this timer starts upon 708 receipt of the containing End Of Data PDU. 710 Minimum allowed value: 600 seconds (ten minutes). 712 Maximum allowed value: 172800 seconds (two days). 714 Recommended default: 7200 seconds (two hours). 716 If the router has never issued a succesful query against a particular 717 cache, it retry periodically using the default Retry Interval, above. 719 7. Protocol Version Negotiation 721 A router MUST start each transport session by issuing either a Reset 722 Query or a Serial Query. This query will tell the cache which 723 version of this protocol the router implements. 725 If a cache which supports version 1 receieves a query from a router 726 which specifies version 0, the cache MUST downgrade to protocol 727 version 0 [RFC6810] or terminate the session. 729 If a router which supports version 1 sends a query to a cache which 730 only supports version 0, one of two things will happen. 732 1. The cache may terminate the connection, perhaps with a version 0 733 Error Report PDU. In this case the router MAY retry the 734 connection using protocol version 0. 736 2. The cache may reply with a version 0 response. In this case the 737 router MUST either downgrade to version 0 or terminate the 738 connection. 740 In any of the downgraded combinations above, the new features of 741 version 1 will not be available. 743 8. Protocol Sequences 745 The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into three conversations as 746 follows: 748 8.1. Start or Restart 750 Cache Router 751 ~ ~ 752 | <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data (or Serial Query) 753 | | 754 | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request 755 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more 756 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix 757 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs 758 | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data 759 | | and sends new serial 760 ~ ~ 762 When a transport session is first established, the router MAY send a 763 Reset Query and the cache responds with a data sequence of all data 764 it contains. 766 Alternatively, if the router has significant unexpired data from a 767 broken session with the same cache, it MAY start with a Serial Query 768 containing the Session ID from the previous session to ensure the 769 Serial Numbers are commensurate. 771 This Reset Query sequence is also used when the router receives a 772 Cache Reset, chooses a new cache, or fears that it has otherwise lost 773 its way. 775 The router MUST send either a Reset Query or a Serial Query when 776 starting a transport session, in order to confirm that router and 777 cache are speaking compatible versions of the protocol. See 778 Section 7 for details on version negotiation. 780 To limit the length of time a cache must keep the data necessary to 781 generate incremental updates, a router MUST send either a Serial 782 Query or a Reset Query periodically. This also acts as a keep-alive 783 at the application layer. See Section 6 for details on the required 784 polling frequency. 786 8.2. Typical Exchange 788 Cache Router 789 ~ ~ 790 | -------- Notify ----------> | (optional) 791 | | 792 | <----- Serial Query ------- | R requests data 793 | | 794 | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request 795 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more 796 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix 797 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs 798 | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data 799 | | and sends new serial 800 ~ ~ 802 The cache server SHOULD send a notify PDU with its current Serial 803 Number when the cache's serial changes, with the expectation that the 804 router MAY then issue a Serial Query earlier than it otherwise might. 805 This is analogous to DNS NOTIFY in [RFC1996]. The cache MUST rate 806 limit Serial Notifies to no more frequently than one per minute. 808 When the transport layer is up and either a timer has gone off in the 809 router, or the cache has sent a Notify, the router queries for new 810 data by sending a Serial Query, and the cache sends all data newer 811 than the serial in the Serial Query. 813 To limit the length of time a cache must keep old withdraws, a router 814 MUST send either a Serial Query or a Reset Query periodially. See 815 Section 6 for details on the required polling frequency. 817 8.3. No Incremental Update Available 818 Cache Router 819 ~ ~ 820 | <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data 821 | ------- Cache Reset ------> | C cannot supply update 822 | | from specified serial 823 | <------ Reset Query ------- | R requests new data 824 | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request 825 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more 826 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix 827 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs 828 | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data 829 | | and sends new serial 830 ~ ~ 832 The cache may respond to a Serial Query with a Cache Reset, informing 833 the router that the cache cannot supply an incremental update from 834 the Serial Number specified by the router. This might be because the 835 cache has lost state, or because the router has waited too long 836 between polls and the cache has cleaned up old data that it no longer 837 believes it needs, or because the cache has run out of storage space 838 and had to expire some old data early. Regardless of how this state 839 arose, the cache replies with a Cache Reset to tell the router that 840 it cannot honor the request. When a router receives this, the router 841 SHOULD attempt to connect to any more preferred caches in its cache 842 list. If there are no more preferred caches, it MUST issue a Reset 843 Query and get an entire new load from the cache. 845 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available 847 Cache Router 848 ~ ~ 849 | <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data 850 | ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available 851 ~ ~ 853 Cache Router 854 ~ ~ 855 | <----- Reset Query ------- | R requests data 856 | ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available 857 ~ ~ 859 The cache may respond to either a Serial Query or a Reset Query 860 informing the router that the cache cannot supply any update at all. 861 The most likely cause is that the cache has lost state, perhaps due 862 to a restart, and has not yet recovered. While it is possible that a 863 cache might go into such a state without dropping any of its active 864 sessions, a router is more likely to see this behavior when it 865 initially connects and issues a Reset Query while the cache is still 866 rebuilding its database. 868 When a router receives this kind of error, the router SHOULD attempt 869 to connect to any other caches in its cache list, in preference 870 order. If no other caches are available, the router MUST issue 871 periodic Reset Queries until it gets a new usable load from the 872 cache. 874 9. Transport 876 The transport-layer session between a router and a cache carries the 877 binary PDUs in a persistent session. 879 To prevent cache spoofing and DoS attacks by illegitimate routers, it 880 is highly desirable that the router and the cache be authenticated to 881 each other. Integrity protection for payloads is also desirable to 882 protect against monkey-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately, 883 there is no protocol to do so on all currently used platforms. 884 Therefore, as of the writing of this document, there is no mandatory- 885 to-implement transport which provides authentication and integrity 886 protection. 888 To reduce exposure to dropped but non-terminated sessions, both 889 caches and routers SHOULD enable keep-alives when available in the 890 chosen transport protocol. 892 It is expected that, when the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) 893 [RFC5925] is available on all platforms deployed by operators, it 894 will become the mandatory-to-implement transport. 896 Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP 897 using a port, rpki-rtr (323); see Section 14. Operators SHOULD use 898 procedural means, e.g., access control lists (ACLs), to reduce the 899 exposure to authentication issues. 901 Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO, SSHv2, TCP MD5, or IPsec 902 transport. 904 If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on 905 the same trusted and controlled network. 907 If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the 908 following more protected protocols. 910 Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO transport [RFC5925] over the 911 rpki-rtr port. 913 Caches and routers MAY use SSHv2 transport [RFC4252] using a the 914 normal SSH port. For an example, see Section 9.1. 916 Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the 917 rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO 918 [RFC5925]. 920 Caches and routers MAY use IPsec transport [RFC4301] using the rpki- 921 rtr port. 923 Caches and routers MAY use TLS transport [RFC5246] using a port, 924 rpki-rtr-tls (324); see Section 14. 926 9.1. SSH Transport 928 To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport 929 connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and 930 server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The 931 client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the 932 application, as described in the SSH authentication protocol 933 [RFC4252]. Once the application has been successfully authenticated, 934 the client invokes the "ssh-connection" service, also known as the 935 SSH connection protocol. 937 After the ssh-connection service is established, the client opens a 938 channel of type "session", which results in an SSH session. 940 Once the SSH session has been established, the application invokes 941 the application transport as an SSH subsystem called "rpki-rtr". 942 Subsystem support is a feature of SSH version 2 (SSHv2) and is not 943 included in SSHv1. Running this protocol as an SSH subsystem avoids 944 the need for the application to recognize shell prompts or skip over 945 extraneous information, such as a system message that is sent at 946 shell start-up. 948 It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of 949 band by some reasonably secured means. 951 Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA and Digital 952 Signature Algorithm (DSA) authentication and SHOULD accept Elliptic 953 Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) authentication. User 954 authentication MUST be supported; host authentication MAY be 955 supported. Implementations MAY support password authentication. 956 Client routers SHOULD verify the public key of the cache to avoid 957 monkey-in-the-middle attacks. 959 9.2. TLS Transport 961 Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side 962 certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache in order to 963 allow the cache to manage the load by rejecting connections from 964 unauthorized routers. In principle, any type of certificate and 965 certificate authority (CA) may be used; however, in general, cache 966 operators will wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue 967 certificates to each authorized router. This simplifies credential 968 rollover; any unrevoked, unexpired certificate from the proper CA may 969 be used. 971 Certificates used to authenticate client routers in this protocol 972 MUST include a subjectAltName extension [RFC5280] containing one or 973 more iPAddress identities; when authenticating the router's 974 certificate, the cache MUST check the IP address of the TLS 975 connection against these iPAddress identities and SHOULD reject the 976 connection if none of the iPAddress identities match the connection. 978 Routers MUST also verify the cache's TLS server certificate, using 979 subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to avoid 980 monkey-in-the-middle attacks. The rules and guidelines defined in 981 [RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations: 983 Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity 984 in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED in rpki-rtr server 985 and client implementations which use TLS. Certification 986 authorities which issue rpki-rtr server certificates MUST support 987 the DNS-ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be 988 present in rpki-rtr server certificates. 990 DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the 991 wildcard character "*". 993 rpki-rtr implementations which use TLS MUST NOT use CN-ID 994 identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server certificate's 995 subject name, but MUST NOT be used for authentication within the 996 rules described in [RFC6125]. 998 The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" to the DNS 999 name of the rpki-rtr cache. 1001 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport 1003 If TCP MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at 1004 least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per Section 4.5 of [RFC2385]. 1005 Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least 1006 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. 1008 Key rollover with TCP MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD 1009 support [RFC4808]. 1011 9.4. TCP-AO Transport 1013 Implementations MUST support key lengths of at least 80 printable 1014 ASCII bytes. Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences 1015 of at least 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. Message Authentication 1016 Code (MAC) lengths of at least 96 bits MUST be supported, per 1017 Section 5.1 of [RFC5925]. 1019 The cryptographic algorithms and associcated parameters described in 1020 [RFC5926] MUST be supported. 1022 10. Router-Cache Setup 1024 A cache has the public authentication data for each router it is 1025 configured to support. 1027 A router may be configured to peer with a selection of caches, and a 1028 cache may be configured to support a selection of routers. Each must 1029 have the name of, and authentication data for, each peer. In 1030 addition, in a router, this list has a non-unique preference value 1031 for each server. This preference merely denotes proximity, not 1032 trust, preferred belief, etc. The client router attempts to 1033 establish a session with each potential serving cache in preference 1034 order, and then starts to load data from the most preferred cache to 1035 which it can connect and authenticate. The router's list of caches 1036 has the following elements: 1038 Preference: An unsigned integer denoting the router's preference to 1039 connect to that cache; the lower the value, the more preferred. 1041 Name: The IP address or fully qualified domain name of the cache. 1043 Key: Any needed public key of the cache. 1045 MyKey: Any needed private key or certificate of this client. 1047 Due to the distributed nature of the RPKI, caches simply cannot be 1048 rigorously synchronous. A client may hold data from multiple caches 1049 but MUST keep the data marked as to source, as later updates MUST 1050 affect the correct data. 1052 Just as there may be more than one covering ROA from a single cache, 1053 there may be multiple covering ROAs from multiple caches. The 1054 results are as described in [RFC6811]. 1056 If data from multiple caches are held, implementations MUST NOT 1057 distinguish between data sources when performing validation. 1059 When a more preferred cache becomes available, if resources allow, it 1060 would be prudent for the client to start fetching from that cache. 1062 The client SHOULD attempt to maintain at least one set of data, 1063 regardless of whether it has chosen a different cache or established 1064 a new connection to the previous cache. 1066 A client MAY drop the data from a particular cache when it is fully 1067 in sync with one or more other caches. 1069 A client SHOULD delete the data from a cache when it has been unable 1070 to refresh from that cache for a configurable timer value. The 1071 default for that value is twice the polling period for that cache. 1073 If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using, or otherwise 1074 decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the 1075 previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other 1076 caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of 1077 connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache. 1079 11. Deployment Scenarios 1081 For illustration, we present three likely deployment scenarios. 1083 Small End Site: The small multihomed end site may wish to outsource 1084 the RPKI cache to one or more of their upstream ISPs. They would 1085 exchange authentication material with the ISP using some out-of- 1086 band mechanism, and their router(s) would connect to the cache(s) 1087 of one or more upstream ISPs. The ISPs would likely deploy caches 1088 intended for customer use separately from the caches with which 1089 their own BGP speakers peer. 1091 Large End Site: A larger multihomed end site might run one or more 1092 caches, arranging them in a hierarchy of client caches, each 1093 fetching from a serving cache which is closer to the Global RPKI. 1094 They might configure fall-back peerings to upstream ISP caches. 1096 ISP Backbone: A large ISP would likely have one or more redundant 1097 caches in each major point of presence (PoP), and these caches 1098 would fetch from each other in an ISP-dependent topology so as not 1099 to place undue load on the Global RPKI. 1101 Experience with large DNS cache deployments has shown that complex 1102 topologies are ill-advised as it is easy to make errors in the graph, 1103 e.g., not maintain a loop-free condition. 1105 Of course, these are illustrations and there are other possible 1106 deployment strategies. It is expected that minimizing load on the 1107 Global RPKI servers will be a major consideration. 1109 To keep load on Global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is 1110 recommended that primary caches which load from the distributed 1111 Global RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g., on the hour. 1112 Choose a random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60 and 1113 jitter the inter-fetch timing. 1115 12. Error Codes 1117 This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors 1118 expect additions to the list during development of the initial 1119 implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error codes 1120 are listed; see Section 14. Errors which are considered fatal SHOULD 1121 cause the session to be dropped. 1123 0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to 1124 be corrupt in a manner not specified by other error codes. 1126 1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced 1127 some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran 1128 out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera). 1130 2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good 1131 working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a 1132 Reset Query because it has no useful data available at this time. 1133 This is likely to be a temporary error, and most likely indicates 1134 that the cache has not yet completed pulling down an initial 1135 current data set from the Global RPKI system after some kind of 1136 event that invalidated whatever data it might have previously held 1137 (reboot, network partition, et cetera). 1139 3: Invalid Request (fatal): The cache server believes the client's 1140 request to be invalid. 1142 4: Unsupported Protocol Version (fatal): The Protocol Version is not 1143 known by the receiver of the PDU. 1145 5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the 1146 receiver of the PDU. 1148 6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0 1149 but a record for the {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple does not 1150 exist in the receiver's database. 1152 7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has an 1153 identical {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple as a PDU which is 1154 still active in the router. 1156 13. Security Considerations 1158 As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of 1159 security interest are described in the relevant sections. This 1160 section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections. 1162 Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described 1163 in Section 11 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be 1164 given consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation 1165 process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to 1166 be out of band. 1168 Cache Peer Identification: The router initiates a transport session 1169 to a cache, which it identifies by either IP address or fully 1170 qualified domain name. Be aware that a DNS or address spoofing 1171 attack could make the correct cache unreachable. No session would 1172 be established, as the authorization keys would not match. 1174 Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or 1175 transport, trust. That is, the IANA root trust anchor is 1176 distributed to all caches through some out-of-band means, and can 1177 then be used by each cache to validate certificates and ROAs all 1178 the way down the tree. The inter-cache relationships are based on 1179 this object security model; hence, the inter-cache transport can 1180 be lightly protected. 1182 But, this protocol document assumes that the routers cannot do the 1183 validation cryptography. Hence, the last link, from cache to 1184 router, is secured by server authentication and transport-level 1185 security. This is dangerous, as server authentication and 1186 transport have very different threat models than object security. 1188 So, the strength of the trust relationship and the transport 1189 between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're 1190 betting your routing on this. 1192 While we cannot say the cache must be on the same LAN, if only due 1193 to the issue of an enterprise wanting to off-load the cache task 1194 to their upstream ISP(s), locality, trust, and control are very 1195 critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in 1196 the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM) 1197 transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be 1198 topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data 1199 are needed to bootstrap a router's access to a cache. 1201 The identity of the cache server SHOULD be verified and 1202 authenticated by the router client, and vice versa, before any 1203 data are exchanged. 1205 Transports which cannot provide the necessary authentication and 1206 integrity (see Section 9) must rely on network design and 1207 operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/ 1208 corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 9, TCP-AO is the 1209 long-term plan. Protocols which provide integrity and 1210 authenticity SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used 1211 as the transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same 1212 trusted, controlled network. 1214 14. IANA Considerations 1216 IANA has assigned "well-known" TCP Port Numbers to the RPKI-Router 1217 Protocol for the following, see Section 9: 1219 rpki-rtr 1220 rpki-rtr-tls 1222 IANA has created a registry for tuples of Protocol Version / PDU 1223 Type, each of which may range from 0 to 255. The name of the 1224 registry is "rpki-rtr-pdu". The policy for adding to the registry is 1225 RFC Required per [RFC5226], either Standards Track or Experimental. 1226 The initial entries are as follows: 1228 Protocol PDU 1229 Version Type Description 1230 -------- ---- --------------- 1231 0 0 Serial Notify 1232 0 1 Serial Query 1233 0 2 Reset Query 1234 0 3 Cache Response 1235 0 4 IPv4 Prefix 1236 0 6 IPv6 Prefix 1237 0 7 End of Data 1238 0 8 Cache Reset 1239 0 10 Error Report 1240 0 255 Reserved 1242 IANA has created a registry for Error Codes 0 to 255. The name of 1243 the registry is "rpki-rtr-error". The policy for adding to the 1244 registry is Expert Review per [RFC5226], where the responsible IESG 1245 Area Director should appoint the Expert Reviewer. The initial 1246 entries are as follows: 1248 Error 1249 Code Description 1250 ----- ---------------- 1251 0 Corrupt Data 1252 1 Internal Error 1253 2 No Data Available 1254 3 Invalid Request 1255 4 Unsupported Protocol Version 1256 5 Unsupported PDU Type 1257 6 Withdrawal of Unknown Record 1258 7 Duplicate Announcement Received 1259 255 Reserved 1261 IANA has added an SSH Connection Protocol Subsystem Name, as defined 1262 in [RFC4250], of "rpki-rtr". 1264 15. Acknowledgments 1266 The authors wish to thank Steve Bellovin, Rex Fernando, Paul Hoffman, 1267 Russ Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, Sandy Murphy, Robert 1268 Raszuk, John Scudder, Ruediger Volk, and David Ward. Particular 1269 thanks go to Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary 1270 fields. 1272 16. References 1274 16.1. Normative References 1276 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] 1277 Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature 1278 Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-05 (work in 1279 progress), September 2013. 1281 [RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982, 1282 August 1996. 1284 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 1285 Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. 1287 [RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 1288 Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998. 1290 [RFC3269] Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for 1291 Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and 1292 Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269, April 2002. 1294 [RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) 1295 Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006. 1297 [RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) 1298 Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006. 1300 [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the 1301 Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. 1303 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 1304 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26, 1305 May 2008. 1307 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 1308 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. 1310 [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP 1311 Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010. 1313 [RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms 1314 for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, 1315 June 2010. 1317 [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and 1318 Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity 1319 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 1320 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer 1321 Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. 1323 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 1324 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 1325 2012. 1327 [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 1328 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, 1329 January 2013. 1331 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 1332 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January 1333 2013. 1335 16.2. Informative References 1337 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-impl] 1338 Bush, R., Austein, R., Patel, K., Gredler, H., and M. 1339 Waehlisch, "RPKI Router Implementation Report", draft- 1340 ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-impl-05 (work in progress), December 1341 2013. 1343 [RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone 1344 Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, August 1996. 1346 [RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5", RFC 1347 4808, March 2007. 1349 [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI 1350 Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010. 1352 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 1353 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. 1355 [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 1356 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, 1357 February 2012. 1359 Authors' Addresses 1361 Randy Bush 1362 Internet Initiative Japan 1363 5147 Crystal Springs 1364 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 1365 US 1367 Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 1368 Email: randy@psg.com 1370 Rob Austein 1371 Dragon Research Labs 1373 Email: sra@hactrn.net