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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein 5 Expires: October 6, 2014 Dragon Research Labs 6 April 4, 2014 8 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol 9 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-01 11 Abstract 13 In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems of BGP 14 announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to 15 receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RFC 6480) prefix origin 16 data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to 17 deliver validated prefix origin data to routers. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 6, 2014. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 60 5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 62 5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 63 5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 64 5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 65 5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 66 5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 67 5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 68 5.10. Router Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 69 5.11. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 70 6. Protocol Timing Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 71 7. Protocol Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 72 8. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 73 8.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 74 8.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 75 8.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 76 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 77 9. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 78 9.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 79 9.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 80 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 81 9.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 82 10. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 83 11. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 84 12. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 85 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 86 14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 87 15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 88 16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 89 16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 90 16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 91 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 93 1. Introduction 95 In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes) 96 of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to 97 receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] 98 cryptographically validated prefix origin data from a trusted cache. 99 This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin 100 data to routers. The design is intentionally constrained to be 101 usable on much of the current generation of ISP router platforms. 103 Section 3 describes the deployment structure, and Section 4 then 104 presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the 105 protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected PDU 106 sequences are described in Section 8. The transport protocol options 107 are described in Section 9. Section 10 details how routers and 108 caches are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 11 109 describes likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and 110 IANA considerations end the document. 112 The protocol is extensible in order to support new PDUs with new 113 semantics, if deployment experience indicates they are needed. PDUs 114 are versioned should deployment experience call for change. 116 For an implementation (not interoperability) report, see 117 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-impl] 119 1.1. Requirements Language 121 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 122 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 123 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] 124 only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in 125 lower or mixed case as English words, without special meaning. 127 2. Glossary 129 The following terms are used with special meaning. 131 Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a 132 distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet 133 Registries (RIRs), National Internet Registries (NIRs), and ISPs; 134 see [RFC6481]. 136 Cache: A coalesced copy of the RPKI, which is periodically fetched/ 137 refreshed directly or indirectly from the Global RPKI using the 138 [RFC5781] protocol/tools. Relying party software is used to 139 gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache. 141 Trusting this cache further is a matter between the provider of 142 the cache and a relying party. 144 Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer which 145 wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a 146 cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates 147 its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. As a 148 cache is receiving, new incoming data and implicit deletes are 149 associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the 150 fetch is complete. A Serial Number is not commensurate between 151 caches, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache 152 server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too 153 much detail on the topic. 155 Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a session 156 identifier to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to 157 bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will 158 generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session 159 knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with 160 that of the cache. 162 3. Deployment Structure 164 Deployment of the RPKI to reach routers has a three-level structure 165 as follows: 167 Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a 168 distributed set of servers, RPKI publication repositories, e.g., 169 the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs, see [RFC6481]. 171 Local Caches: A local set of one or more collected and verified 172 caches. A relying party, e.g., router or other client, MUST have 173 a trust relationship with, and a trusted transport channel to, any 174 authoritative cache(s) it uses. 176 Routers: A router fetches data from a local cache using the protocol 177 described in this document. It is said to be a client of the 178 cache. There MAY be mechanisms for the router to assure itself of 179 the authenticity of the cache and to authenticate itself to the 180 cache. 182 4. Operational Overview 184 A router establishes and keeps open a connection to one or more 185 caches with which it has client/server relationships. It is 186 configured with a semi-ordered list of caches, and establishes a 187 connection to the most preferred cache, or set of caches, which 188 accept the connections. 190 The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or 191 set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches 192 and the Global RPKI. 194 Periodically, the router sends to the cache the Serial Number of the 195 highest numbered data it has received from that cache, i.e., the 196 router's current Serial Number. When a router establishes a new 197 connection to a cache, or wishes to reset a current relationship, it 198 sends a Reset Query. 200 The Cache responds with all data records which have Serial Numbers 201 greater than that in the router's query. This may be the null set, 202 in which case the End of Data PDU is still sent. Note that 'greater' 203 must take wrap-around into account, see [RFC1982]. 205 When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets 206 its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the End of 207 Data PDU. 209 When the cache updates its database, it sends a Notify message to 210 every currently connected router. This is a hint that now would be a 211 good time for the router to poll for an update, but is only a hint. 212 The protocol requires the router to poll for updates periodically in 213 any case. 215 Strictly speaking, a router could track a cache simply by asking for 216 a complete data set every time it updates, but this would be very 217 inefficient. The Serial Number based incremental update mechanism 218 allows an efficient transfer of just the data records which have 219 changed since last update. As with any update protocol based on 220 incremental transfers, the router must be prepared to fall back to a 221 full transfer if for any reason the cache is unable to provide the 222 necessary incremental data. Unlike some incremental transfer 223 protocols, this protocol requires the router to make an explicit 224 request to start the fallback process; this is deliberate, as the 225 cache has no way of knowing whether the router has also established 226 sessions with other caches that may be able to provide better 227 service. 229 As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin 230 Attestations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers' 231 clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour. 233 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) 235 The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of 236 exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in 237 Section 8. 239 Fields with unspecified content MUST be zero on transmission and MAY 240 be ignored on receipt. 242 5.1. Fields of a PDU 244 PDUs contain the following data elements: 246 Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 1, 247 denoting the version of this protocol. 249 PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the 250 PDU, e.g., IPv4 Prefix, etc. 252 Serial Number: The Serial Number of the RPKI Cache when this set of 253 PDUs was received from an upstream cache server or gathered from 254 the Global RPKI. A cache increments its Serial Number when 255 completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or 256 the Global RPKI. 258 Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session 259 ID to identify the instance of the cache and to bind it to the 260 sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will generate. 261 This allows the router to restart a failed session knowing that 262 the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with that of the 263 cache. If, at any time, either the router or the cache finds the 264 value of the session identifier is not the same as the other's, 265 they MUST completely drop the session and the router MUST flush 266 all data learned from that cache. 268 Should a cache erroneously reuse a Session ID so that a router 269 does not realize that the session has changed (old session ID and 270 new session ID have same numeric value), the router may become 271 confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the 272 router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the 273 Serial Numbers are also reused. If the Serial Numbers in the old 274 and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to 275 the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the 276 problem. If, however, the Serial Numbers are close, the cache may 277 respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring 278 the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain 279 that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state 280 that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache 281 Response may tell the router to drop a record which the router 282 does not hold, or may tell the router to add a record which the 283 router already has. In such cases, a router will detect the error 284 and reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay 285 out of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any 286 data currently held by the router. 288 Using persistent storage for the session identifier or a clock- 289 based scheme for generating session identifiers should avoid the 290 risk of session identifier collisions. 292 The Session ID might be a pseudo-random value, a strictly 293 increasing value if the cache has reliable storage, etc. 295 Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer which has as its value the count 296 of the bytes in the entire PDU, including the eight bytes of 297 header which end with the length field. 299 Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an 300 announcement and 0 for a withdrawal. For a Prefix PDU (IPv4 or 301 IPv6), the flag indicates whether this PDU announces a new right 302 to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously announced right; 303 a withdraw effectively deletes one previously announced Prefix PDU 304 with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System 305 Number (ASN). Similarly, for a Router Key PDU, the flag indicates 306 whether this PDU announces a new Router Key or deletes one 307 previously announced Router Key PDU with the exact same AS Number, 308 subjectKeyIdentifier, and subjectPublicKeyInfo. 310 Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest 311 prefix allowed for the prefix. 313 Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix 314 allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the Prefix 315 Length element. 317 Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA. 319 Autonomous System Number: ASN allowed to announce this prefix, a 320 32-bit unsigned integer. 322 Zero: Fields shown as zero or reserved MUST be zero. The value of 323 such a field MUST be ignored on receipt. 325 5.2. Serial Notify 327 The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data. 329 The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are 330 commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed. 332 Upon receipt of a Serial Notify PDU, the router MAY issue an 333 immediate Serial Query or Reset Query without waiting for the Refresh 334 Interval timer to expire. 336 Serial Notify is the only message that the cache can send that is not 337 in response to a message from the router. 339 0 8 16 24 31 340 .-------------------------------------------. 341 | Protocol | PDU | | 342 | Version | Type | Session ID | 343 | 1 | 0 | | 344 +-------------------------------------------+ 345 | | 346 | Length=12 | 347 | | 348 +-------------------------------------------+ 349 | | 350 | Serial Number | 351 | | 352 `-------------------------------------------' 354 5.3. Serial Query 356 Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all 357 payload PDUs which have Serial Numbers higher than the Serial Number 358 in the Serial Query. 360 The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU 361 (Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the 362 changes since the Serial Number specified by the router. If there 363 have been no changes since the router last queried, the cache sends 364 an End Of Data PDU. 366 If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router, 367 perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in 368 the Serial Query, then it responds with a Cache Reset PDU 369 (Section 5.9). 371 The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to 372 ensure that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., the cache 373 session has not been changed. 375 0 8 16 24 31 376 .-------------------------------------------. 377 | Protocol | PDU | | 378 | Version | Type | Session ID | 379 | 1 | 1 | | 380 +-------------------------------------------+ 381 | | 382 | Length=12 | 383 | | 384 +-------------------------------------------+ 385 | | 386 | Serial Number | 387 | | 388 `-------------------------------------------' 390 5.4. Reset Query 392 Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the 393 total active, current, non-withdrawn database. The cache responds 394 with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.5). 396 0 8 16 24 31 397 .-------------------------------------------. 398 | Protocol | PDU | | 399 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 400 | 1 | 2 | | 401 +-------------------------------------------+ 402 | | 403 | Length=8 | 404 | | 405 `-------------------------------------------' 407 5.5. Cache Response 409 Cache Response: The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs. 410 When replying to a Serial Query request (Section 5.3), the cache 411 sends the set of all data records it has with Serial Numbers greater 412 than that sent by the client router. When replying to a Reset Query, 413 the cache sends the set of all data records it has; in this case, the 414 withdraw/announce field in the payload PDUs MUST have the value 1 415 (announce). 417 In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells 418 the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation. 419 In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same 420 reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., 421 the cache session has not changed. 423 0 8 16 24 31 424 .-------------------------------------------. 425 | Protocol | PDU | | 426 | Version | Type | Session ID | 427 | 1 | 3 | | 428 +-------------------------------------------+ 429 | | 430 | Length=8 | 431 | | 432 `-------------------------------------------' 434 5.6. IPv4 Prefix 436 0 8 16 24 31 437 .-------------------------------------------. 438 | Protocol | PDU | | 439 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 440 | 1 | 4 | | 441 +-------------------------------------------+ 442 | | 443 | Length=20 | 444 | | 445 +-------------------------------------------+ 446 | | Prefix | Max | | 447 | Flags | Length | Length | zero | 448 | | 0..32 | 0..32 | | 449 +-------------------------------------------+ 450 | | 451 | IPv4 Prefix | 452 | | 453 +-------------------------------------------+ 454 | | 455 | Autonomous System Number | 456 | | 457 `-------------------------------------------' 459 The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and 460 0 for a withdrawal. 462 In the RPKI, nothing prevents a signing certificate from issuing two 463 identical ROAs. In this case, there would be no semantic difference 464 between the objects, merely a process redundancy. 466 In the RPKI, there is also an actual need for what might appear to a 467 router as identical IPvX PDUs. This can occur when an upstream 468 certificate is being reissued or there is an address ownership 469 transfer up the validation chain. The ROA would be identical in the 470 router sense, i.e., have the same {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN}, but a 471 different validation path in the RPKI. This is important to the 472 RPKI, but not to the router. 474 The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to 475 have one and only one IPvX PDU for a unique {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, 476 ASN} at any one point in time. Should the router client receive an 477 IPvX PDU with a {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} identical to one it 478 already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received 479 error. 481 5.7. IPv6 Prefix 483 0 8 16 24 31 484 .-------------------------------------------. 485 | Protocol | PDU | | 486 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 487 | 1 | 6 | | 488 +-------------------------------------------+ 489 | | 490 | Length=32 | 491 | | 492 +-------------------------------------------+ 493 | | Prefix | Max | | 494 | Flags | Length | Length | zero | 495 | | 0..128 | 0..128 | | 496 +-------------------------------------------+ 497 | | 498 +--- ---+ 499 | | 500 +--- IPv6 Prefix ---+ 501 | | 502 +--- ---+ 503 | | 504 +-------------------------------------------+ 505 | | 506 | Autonomous System Number | 507 | | 508 `-------------------------------------------' 510 Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic. 512 5.8. End of Data 514 End of Data: The cache tells the router it has no more data for the 515 request. 517 The Session ID MUST be the same as that of the corresponding Cache 518 Response which began the, possibly null, sequence of data PDUs. 520 0 8 16 24 31 521 .-------------------------------------------. 522 | Protocol | PDU | | 523 | Version | Type | Session ID | 524 | 1 | 7 | | 525 +-------------------------------------------+ 526 | | 527 | Length=24 | 528 | | 529 +-------------------------------------------+ 530 | | 531 | Serial Number | 532 | | 533 +-------------------------------------------+ 534 | | 535 | Refresh Interval | 536 | | 537 +-------------------------------------------+ 538 | | 539 | Retry Interval | 540 | | 541 +-------------------------------------------+ 542 | | 543 | Expire Interval | 544 | | 545 `-------------------------------------------' 547 The Refresh Interval, Retry Interval, and Expire Interval are all 548 32-bit elapsed times measured in seconds, and express the timing 549 parameters that the cache expects the router to use to decide when 550 next to send the cache another Serial Query or Reset Query PDU. See 551 Section 6 for an explanation of the use and the range of allowed 552 values for these parameters. 554 5.9. Cache Reset 556 The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the 557 cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the Serial 558 Number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to 559 issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache. 561 0 8 16 24 31 562 .-------------------------------------------. 563 | Protocol | PDU | | 564 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 565 | 1 | 8 | | 566 +-------------------------------------------+ 567 | | 568 | Length=8 | 569 | | 570 `-------------------------------------------' 572 5.10. Router Key 574 0 8 16 24 31 575 .-------------------------------------------. 576 | Protocol | PDU | | | 577 | Version | Type | Flags | zero | 578 | 1 | 9 | | | 579 +-------------------------------------------+ 580 | | 581 | Length | 582 | | 583 +-------------------------------------------+ 584 | | 585 | Subject Key Identifier | 586 | 20 octets | 587 | | 588 +-------------------------------------------+ 589 | | 590 | AS Number | 591 | | 592 +-------------------------------------------+ 593 | | 594 | Subject Public Key Info | 595 | | 596 `-------------------------------------------' 598 In addition to the normal boilerplate fields of an RPKI-Router PDU, 599 the Router Key PDU has the following fields. 601 Subject Key Identifier is the 20-octet subjectKeyIdentifier (SKI) 602 value for the Router Key, as described in [RFC6487]. 604 AS Number one Autonomous System Number. 606 Subject Public Key Info is the Router Key's subjectPublicKeyInfo as 607 described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 608 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag 609 and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. 611 The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to 612 have one and only one Router Key PDU for a unique {SKI, ASN, Subject 613 Public Key} at any one point in time. Should the router client 614 receive a Router Key PDU with a {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} 615 identical to one it already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate 616 Announcement Received error. 618 Note that a particular ASN may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs 619 with different Subject Public Key values, while a particular Subject 620 Public Key value may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs with 621 different ASNs. In the interest of keeping the announcement and 622 withdrawal semantics as simple as possible for the router, this 623 protocol makes no attempt to compress either of these cases. 625 Also note that it is possible, albeit very unlikely, for multiple 626 distinct Subject Public Key values to hash to the same SKI. For this 627 reason, implementations MUST compare Subject Public Key values as 628 well as SKIs when detecting duplicate PDUs. 630 5.11. Error Report 632 This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other. 634 Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs. 636 The Error Code is described in Section 12. 638 If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated 639 with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST 640 be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST be zero. 642 An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an 643 erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be 644 dropped. 646 If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e., too 647 long to be any legal PDU other than another Error Report, or a 648 possibly corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated. 650 The diagnostic text is optional; if not present, the Length of Error 651 Text field MUST be zero. If error text is present, it MUST be a 652 string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3269]). 654 0 8 16 24 31 655 .-------------------------------------------. 656 | Protocol | PDU | | 657 | Version | Type | Error Code | 658 | 1 | 10 | | 659 +-------------------------------------------+ 660 | | 661 | Length | 662 | | 663 +-------------------------------------------+ 664 | | 665 | Length of Encapsulated PDU | 666 | | 667 +-------------------------------------------+ 668 | | 669 ~ Copy of Erroneous PDU ~ 670 | | 671 +-------------------------------------------+ 672 | | 673 | Length of Error Text | 674 | | 675 +-------------------------------------------+ 676 | | 677 | Arbitrary Text | 678 | of | 679 ~ Error Diagnostic Message ~ 680 | | 681 `-------------------------------------------' 683 6. Protocol Timing Parameters 685 Since the data the cache distributes via the rpki-rtr protocol are 686 retrieved from the Global RPKI system at intervals which are only 687 known to the cache, only the cache can really know how frequently it 688 makes sense for the router to poll the cache, or how long the data 689 are likely to remain valid (or, at least, unchanged). For this 690 reason, as well as to allow the cache some control over the load 691 placed on it by its client routers, the End Of Data PDU includes 692 three values that allow the router to communicate timing parameters 693 to the router. 695 Refresh Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait 696 before next attempting to poll the cache, using a Serial Query or 697 Reset Query PDU. Note that receipt of a Serial Notify PDU 698 overrides this interval and allows the router to issue an 699 immediate query without waiting for the Refresh Interval to 700 expire. Countdown for this timer starts upon receipt of the 701 containing End Of Data PDU. 703 Minimum allowed value: 120 seconds (two minutes). 705 Maximum allowed value: 86400 seconds (one day). 707 Recommended default: 3600 seconds (one hour). 709 Retry Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait 710 before retrying a failed Serial Query or Reset Query. Countdown 711 for this timer starts upon failure of the query, and restarts 712 after each subsequent failure until a query succeeds. 714 Minimum allowed value: 120 seconds (two minutes). 716 Maximum allowed value: 7200 seconds (two hours). 718 Recommended default: 600 seconds (ten minutes). 720 Expire Interval: This parameter tells the router how long it can 721 continue to use the current version of the data while unable to 722 perform a sucessful query. Countdown for this timer starts upon 723 receipt of the containing End Of Data PDU. 725 Minimum allowed value: 600 seconds (ten minutes). 727 Maximum allowed value: 172800 seconds (two days). 729 Recommended default: 7200 seconds (two hours). 731 If the router has never issued a succesful query against a particular 732 cache, it retry periodically using the default Retry Interval, above. 734 7. Protocol Version Negotiation 736 A router MUST start each transport session by issuing either a Reset 737 Query or a Serial Query. This query will tell the cache which 738 version of this protocol the router implements. 740 If a cache which supports version 1 receieves a query from a router 741 which specifies version 0, the cache MUST downgrade to protocol 742 version 0 [RFC6810] or terminate the session. 744 If a router which supports version 1 sends a query to a cache which 745 only supports version 0, one of two things will happen. 747 1. The cache may terminate the connection, perhaps with a version 0 748 Error Report PDU. In this case the router MAY retry the 749 connection using protocol version 0. 751 2. The cache may reply with a version 0 response. In this case the 752 router MUST either downgrade to version 0 or terminate the 753 connection. 755 In any of the downgraded combinations above, the new features of 756 version 1 will not be available. 758 8. Protocol Sequences 760 The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into three conversations as 761 follows: 763 8.1. Start or Restart 765 Cache Router 766 ~ ~ 767 | <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data (or Serial Query) 768 | | 769 | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request 770 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more 771 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix 772 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs 773 | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data 774 | | and sends new serial 775 ~ ~ 777 When a transport session is first established, the router MAY send a 778 Reset Query and the cache responds with a data sequence of all data 779 it contains. 781 Alternatively, if the router has significant unexpired data from a 782 broken session with the same cache, it MAY start with a Serial Query 783 containing the Session ID from the previous session to ensure the 784 Serial Numbers are commensurate. 786 This Reset Query sequence is also used when the router receives a 787 Cache Reset, chooses a new cache, or fears that it has otherwise lost 788 its way. 790 The router MUST send either a Reset Query or a Serial Query when 791 starting a transport session, in order to confirm that router and 792 cache are speaking compatible versions of the protocol. See 793 Section 7 for details on version negotiation. 795 To limit the length of time a cache must keep the data necessary to 796 generate incremental updates, a router MUST send either a Serial 797 Query or a Reset Query periodically. This also acts as a keep-alive 798 at the application layer. See Section 6 for details on the required 799 polling frequency. 801 8.2. Typical Exchange 803 Cache Router 804 ~ ~ 805 | -------- Notify ----------> | (optional) 806 | | 807 | <----- Serial Query ------- | R requests data 808 | | 809 | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request 810 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more 811 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix 812 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs 813 | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data 814 | | and sends new serial 815 ~ ~ 817 The cache server SHOULD send a notify PDU with its current Serial 818 Number when the cache's serial changes, with the expectation that the 819 router MAY then issue a Serial Query earlier than it otherwise might. 820 This is analogous to DNS NOTIFY in [RFC1996]. The cache MUST rate 821 limit Serial Notifies to no more frequently than one per minute. 823 When the transport layer is up and either a timer has gone off in the 824 router, or the cache has sent a Notify, the router queries for new 825 data by sending a Serial Query, and the cache sends all data newer 826 than the serial in the Serial Query. 828 To limit the length of time a cache must keep old withdraws, a router 829 MUST send either a Serial Query or a Reset Query periodially. See 830 Section 6 for details on the required polling frequency. 832 8.3. No Incremental Update Available 833 Cache Router 834 ~ ~ 835 | <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data 836 | ------- Cache Reset ------> | C cannot supply update 837 | | from specified serial 838 | <------ Reset Query ------- | R requests new data 839 | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request 840 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | C sends zero or more 841 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | IPv4 and IPv6 Prefix 842 | ------- IPvX Prefix ------> | Payload PDUs 843 | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data 844 | | and sends new serial 845 ~ ~ 847 The cache may respond to a Serial Query with a Cache Reset, informing 848 the router that the cache cannot supply an incremental update from 849 the Serial Number specified by the router. This might be because the 850 cache has lost state, or because the router has waited too long 851 between polls and the cache has cleaned up old data that it no longer 852 believes it needs, or because the cache has run out of storage space 853 and had to expire some old data early. Regardless of how this state 854 arose, the cache replies with a Cache Reset to tell the router that 855 it cannot honor the request. When a router receives this, the router 856 SHOULD attempt to connect to any more preferred caches in its cache 857 list. If there are no more preferred caches, it MUST issue a Reset 858 Query and get an entire new load from the cache. 860 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available 862 Cache Router 863 ~ ~ 864 | <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data 865 | ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available 866 ~ ~ 868 Cache Router 869 ~ ~ 870 | <----- Reset Query ------- | R requests data 871 | ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available 872 ~ ~ 874 The cache may respond to either a Serial Query or a Reset Query 875 informing the router that the cache cannot supply any update at all. 876 The most likely cause is that the cache has lost state, perhaps due 877 to a restart, and has not yet recovered. While it is possible that a 878 cache might go into such a state without dropping any of its active 879 sessions, a router is more likely to see this behavior when it 880 initially connects and issues a Reset Query while the cache is still 881 rebuilding its database. 883 When a router receives this kind of error, the router SHOULD attempt 884 to connect to any other caches in its cache list, in preference 885 order. If no other caches are available, the router MUST issue 886 periodic Reset Queries until it gets a new usable load from the 887 cache. 889 9. Transport 891 The transport-layer session between a router and a cache carries the 892 binary PDUs in a persistent session. 894 To prevent cache spoofing and DoS attacks by illegitimate routers, it 895 is highly desirable that the router and the cache be authenticated to 896 each other. Integrity protection for payloads is also desirable to 897 protect against monkey-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately, 898 there is no protocol to do so on all currently used platforms. 899 Therefore, as of the writing of this document, there is no mandatory- 900 to-implement transport which provides authentication and integrity 901 protection. 903 To reduce exposure to dropped but non-terminated sessions, both 904 caches and routers SHOULD enable keep-alives when available in the 905 chosen transport protocol. 907 It is expected that, when the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) 908 [RFC5925] is available on all platforms deployed by operators, it 909 will become the mandatory-to-implement transport. 911 Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP 912 using a port, rpki-rtr (323); see Section 14. Operators SHOULD use 913 procedural means, e.g., access control lists (ACLs), to reduce the 914 exposure to authentication issues. 916 Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO, SSHv2, TCP MD5, or IPsec 917 transport. 919 If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on 920 the same trusted and controlled network. 922 If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the 923 following more protected protocols. 925 Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO transport [RFC5925] over the 926 rpki-rtr port. 928 Caches and routers MAY use SSHv2 transport [RFC4252] using a the 929 normal SSH port. For an example, see Section 9.1. 931 Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the 932 rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO 933 [RFC5925]. 935 Caches and routers MAY use IPsec transport [RFC4301] using the rpki- 936 rtr port. 938 Caches and routers MAY use TLS transport [RFC5246] using a port, 939 rpki-rtr-tls (324); see Section 14. 941 9.1. SSH Transport 943 To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport 944 connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and 945 server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The 946 client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the 947 application, as described in the SSH authentication protocol 948 [RFC4252]. Once the application has been successfully authenticated, 949 the client invokes the "ssh-connection" service, also known as the 950 SSH connection protocol. 952 After the ssh-connection service is established, the client opens a 953 channel of type "session", which results in an SSH session. 955 Once the SSH session has been established, the application invokes 956 the application transport as an SSH subsystem called "rpki-rtr". 957 Subsystem support is a feature of SSH version 2 (SSHv2) and is not 958 included in SSHv1. Running this protocol as an SSH subsystem avoids 959 the need for the application to recognize shell prompts or skip over 960 extraneous information, such as a system message that is sent at 961 shell start-up. 963 It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of 964 band by some reasonably secured means. 966 Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA and Digital 967 Signature Algorithm (DSA) authentication and SHOULD accept Elliptic 968 Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) authentication. User 969 authentication MUST be supported; host authentication MAY be 970 supported. Implementations MAY support password authentication. 971 Client routers SHOULD verify the public key of the cache to avoid 972 monkey-in-the-middle attacks. 974 9.2. TLS Transport 976 Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side 977 certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache in order to 978 allow the cache to manage the load by rejecting connections from 979 unauthorized routers. In principle, any type of certificate and 980 certificate authority (CA) may be used; however, in general, cache 981 operators will wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue 982 certificates to each authorized router. This simplifies credential 983 rollover; any unrevoked, unexpired certificate from the proper CA may 984 be used. 986 Certificates used to authenticate client routers in this protocol 987 MUST include a subjectAltName extension [RFC5280] containing one or 988 more iPAddress identities; when authenticating the router's 989 certificate, the cache MUST check the IP address of the TLS 990 connection against these iPAddress identities and SHOULD reject the 991 connection if none of the iPAddress identities match the connection. 993 Routers MUST also verify the cache's TLS server certificate, using 994 subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to avoid 995 monkey-in-the-middle attacks. The rules and guidelines defined in 996 [RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations: 998 Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity 999 in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED in rpki-rtr server 1000 and client implementations which use TLS. Certification 1001 authorities which issue rpki-rtr server certificates MUST support 1002 the DNS-ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be 1003 present in rpki-rtr server certificates. 1005 DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the 1006 wildcard character "*". 1008 rpki-rtr implementations which use TLS MUST NOT use CN-ID 1009 identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server certificate's 1010 subject name, but MUST NOT be used for authentication within the 1011 rules described in [RFC6125]. 1013 The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" to the DNS 1014 name of the rpki-rtr cache. 1016 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport 1018 If TCP MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at 1019 least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per Section 4.5 of [RFC2385]. 1020 Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least 1021 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. 1023 Key rollover with TCP MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD 1024 support [RFC4808]. 1026 9.4. TCP-AO Transport 1028 Implementations MUST support key lengths of at least 80 printable 1029 ASCII bytes. Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences 1030 of at least 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. Message Authentication 1031 Code (MAC) lengths of at least 96 bits MUST be supported, per 1032 Section 5.1 of [RFC5925]. 1034 The cryptographic algorithms and associcated parameters described in 1035 [RFC5926] MUST be supported. 1037 10. Router-Cache Setup 1039 A cache has the public authentication data for each router it is 1040 configured to support. 1042 A router may be configured to peer with a selection of caches, and a 1043 cache may be configured to support a selection of routers. Each must 1044 have the name of, and authentication data for, each peer. In 1045 addition, in a router, this list has a non-unique preference value 1046 for each server. This preference merely denotes proximity, not 1047 trust, preferred belief, etc. The client router attempts to 1048 establish a session with each potential serving cache in preference 1049 order, and then starts to load data from the most preferred cache to 1050 which it can connect and authenticate. The router's list of caches 1051 has the following elements: 1053 Preference: An unsigned integer denoting the router's preference to 1054 connect to that cache; the lower the value, the more preferred. 1056 Name: The IP address or fully qualified domain name of the cache. 1058 Key: Any needed public key of the cache. 1060 MyKey: Any needed private key or certificate of this client. 1062 Due to the distributed nature of the RPKI, caches simply cannot be 1063 rigorously synchronous. A client may hold data from multiple caches 1064 but MUST keep the data marked as to source, as later updates MUST 1065 affect the correct data. 1067 Just as there may be more than one covering ROA from a single cache, 1068 there may be multiple covering ROAs from multiple caches. The 1069 results are as described in [RFC6811]. 1071 If data from multiple caches are held, implementations MUST NOT 1072 distinguish between data sources when performing validation. 1074 When a more preferred cache becomes available, if resources allow, it 1075 would be prudent for the client to start fetching from that cache. 1077 The client SHOULD attempt to maintain at least one set of data, 1078 regardless of whether it has chosen a different cache or established 1079 a new connection to the previous cache. 1081 A client MAY drop the data from a particular cache when it is fully 1082 in sync with one or more other caches. 1084 A client SHOULD delete the data from a cache when it has been unable 1085 to refresh from that cache for a configurable timer value. The 1086 default for that value is twice the polling period for that cache. 1088 If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using, or otherwise 1089 decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the 1090 previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other 1091 caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of 1092 connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache. 1094 11. Deployment Scenarios 1096 For illustration, we present three likely deployment scenarios. 1098 Small End Site: The small multihomed end site may wish to outsource 1099 the RPKI cache to one or more of their upstream ISPs. They would 1100 exchange authentication material with the ISP using some out-of- 1101 band mechanism, and their router(s) would connect to the cache(s) 1102 of one or more upstream ISPs. The ISPs would likely deploy caches 1103 intended for customer use separately from the caches with which 1104 their own BGP speakers peer. 1106 Large End Site: A larger multihomed end site might run one or more 1107 caches, arranging them in a hierarchy of client caches, each 1108 fetching from a serving cache which is closer to the Global RPKI. 1109 They might configure fall-back peerings to upstream ISP caches. 1111 ISP Backbone: A large ISP would likely have one or more redundant 1112 caches in each major point of presence (PoP), and these caches 1113 would fetch from each other in an ISP-dependent topology so as not 1114 to place undue load on the Global RPKI. 1116 Experience with large DNS cache deployments has shown that complex 1117 topologies are ill-advised as it is easy to make errors in the graph, 1118 e.g., not maintain a loop-free condition. 1120 Of course, these are illustrations and there are other possible 1121 deployment strategies. It is expected that minimizing load on the 1122 Global RPKI servers will be a major consideration. 1124 To keep load on Global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is 1125 recommended that primary caches which load from the distributed 1126 Global RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g., on the hour. 1127 Choose a random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60 and 1128 jitter the inter-fetch timing. 1130 12. Error Codes 1132 This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors 1133 expect additions to the list during development of the initial 1134 implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error codes 1135 are listed; see Section 14. Errors which are considered fatal SHOULD 1136 cause the session to be dropped. 1138 0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to 1139 be corrupt in a manner not specified by other error codes. 1141 1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced 1142 some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran 1143 out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera). 1145 2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good 1146 working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a 1147 Reset Query because it has no useful data available at this time. 1148 This is likely to be a temporary error, and most likely indicates 1149 that the cache has not yet completed pulling down an initial 1150 current data set from the Global RPKI system after some kind of 1151 event that invalidated whatever data it might have previously held 1152 (reboot, network partition, et cetera). 1154 3: Invalid Request (fatal): The cache server believes the client's 1155 request to be invalid. 1157 4: Unsupported Protocol Version (fatal): The Protocol Version is not 1158 known by the receiver of the PDU. 1160 5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the 1161 receiver of the PDU. 1163 6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0 1164 but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple for an 1165 IPvX PDU, {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a Router Key 1166 PDU) does not exist in the receiver's database. 1168 7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has 1169 Flag=1 but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple 1170 for an IPvX PDU, {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a Router 1171 Key PDU) is already active in the router. 1173 13. Security Considerations 1175 As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of 1176 security interest are described in the relevant sections. This 1177 section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections. 1179 Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described 1180 in Section 11 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be 1181 given consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation 1182 process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to 1183 be out of band. 1185 Cache Peer Identification: The router initiates a transport session 1186 to a cache, which it identifies by either IP address or fully 1187 qualified domain name. Be aware that a DNS or address spoofing 1188 attack could make the correct cache unreachable. No session would 1189 be established, as the authorization keys would not match. 1191 Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or 1192 transport, trust. That is, the IANA root trust anchor is 1193 distributed to all caches through some out-of-band means, and can 1194 then be used by each cache to validate certificates and ROAs all 1195 the way down the tree. The inter-cache relationships are based on 1196 this object security model; hence, the inter-cache transport can 1197 be lightly protected. 1199 But, this protocol document assumes that the routers cannot do the 1200 validation cryptography. Hence, the last link, from cache to 1201 router, is secured by server authentication and transport-level 1202 security. This is dangerous, as server authentication and 1203 transport have very different threat models than object security. 1205 So, the strength of the trust relationship and the transport 1206 between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're 1207 betting your routing on this. 1209 While we cannot say the cache must be on the same LAN, if only due 1210 to the issue of an enterprise wanting to off-load the cache task 1211 to their upstream ISP(s), locality, trust, and control are very 1212 critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in 1213 the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM) 1214 transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be 1215 topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data 1216 are needed to bootstrap a router's access to a cache. 1218 The identity of the cache server SHOULD be verified and 1219 authenticated by the router client, and vice versa, before any 1220 data are exchanged. 1222 Transports which cannot provide the necessary authentication and 1223 integrity (see Section 9) must rely on network design and 1224 operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/ 1225 corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 9, TCP-AO is the 1226 long-term plan. Protocols which provide integrity and 1227 authenticity SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used 1228 as the transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same 1229 trusted, controlled network. 1231 14. IANA Considerations 1233 IANA has assigned "well-known" TCP Port Numbers to the RPKI-Router 1234 Protocol for the following, see Section 9: 1236 rpki-rtr 1237 rpki-rtr-tls 1239 IANA has created a registry for tuples of Protocol Version / PDU 1240 Type, each of which may range from 0 to 255. The name of the 1241 registry is "rpki-rtr-pdu". The policy for adding to the registry is 1242 RFC Required per [RFC5226], either Standards Track or Experimental. 1243 The initial entries are as follows: 1245 Protocol PDU 1246 Version Type Description 1247 -------- ---- --------------- 1248 0 0 Serial Notify 1249 0 1 Serial Query 1250 0 2 Reset Query 1251 0 3 Cache Response 1252 0 4 IPv4 Prefix 1253 0 6 IPv6 Prefix 1254 0 7 End of Data 1255 0 8 Cache Reset 1256 0 10 Error Report 1257 0 255 Reserved 1259 IANA has created a registry for Error Codes 0 to 255. The name of 1260 the registry is "rpki-rtr-error". The policy for adding to the 1261 registry is Expert Review per [RFC5226], where the responsible IESG 1262 Area Director should appoint the Expert Reviewer. The initial 1263 entries are as follows: 1265 Error 1266 Code Description 1267 ----- ---------------- 1268 0 Corrupt Data 1269 1 Internal Error 1270 2 No Data Available 1271 3 Invalid Request 1272 4 Unsupported Protocol Version 1273 5 Unsupported PDU Type 1274 6 Withdrawal of Unknown Record 1275 7 Duplicate Announcement Received 1276 255 Reserved 1278 IANA has added an SSH Connection Protocol Subsystem Name, as defined 1279 in [RFC4250], of "rpki-rtr". 1281 15. Acknowledgments 1283 The authors wish to thank Steve Bellovin, Tim Bruijnzeels, Rex 1284 Fernando, Paul Hoffman, Russ Housley, Pradosh Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, 1285 David Mandelberg, Sandy Murphy, Robert Raszuk, John Scudder, Ruediger 1286 Volk, Matthias Waehlisch, and David Ward. Particular thanks go to 1287 Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary fields. 1289 16. References 1291 16.1. Normative References 1293 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] 1294 Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature 1295 Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-06 (work in 1296 progress), March 2014. 1298 [RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982, 1299 August 1996. 1301 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 1302 Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. 1304 [RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 1305 Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998. 1307 [RFC3269] Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for 1308 Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and 1309 Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269, April 2002. 1311 [RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) 1312 Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006. 1314 [RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) 1315 Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006. 1317 [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the 1318 Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. 1320 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 1321 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26, 1322 May 2008. 1324 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 1325 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. 1327 [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP 1328 Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010. 1330 [RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms 1331 for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, 1332 June 2010. 1334 [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and 1335 Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity 1336 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 1337 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer 1338 Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. 1340 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 1341 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 1342 2012. 1344 [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 1345 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, 1346 January 2013. 1348 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 1349 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January 1350 2013. 1352 16.2. Informative References 1354 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-impl] 1355 Bush, R., Austein, R., Patel, K., Gredler, H., and M. 1356 Waehlisch, "RPKI Router Implementation Report", draft- 1357 ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-impl-05 (work in progress), December 1358 2013. 1360 [RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone 1361 Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, August 1996. 1363 [RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5", RFC 1364 4808, March 2007. 1366 [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI 1367 Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010. 1369 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 1370 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. 1372 [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 1373 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, 1374 February 2012. 1376 Authors' Addresses 1378 Randy Bush 1379 Internet Initiative Japan 1380 5147 Crystal Springs 1381 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 1382 US 1384 Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 1385 Email: randy@psg.com 1387 Rob Austein 1388 Dragon Research Labs 1390 Email: sra@hactrn.net