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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan 4 Intended status: Standards Track R. Austein 5 Expires: September 6, 2015 Dragon Research Labs 6 March 5, 2015 8 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol 9 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-03 11 Abstract 13 In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems and 14 Autonomous System Paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple 15 but reliable mechanism to receive Resource Public Key Infrastructure 16 (RFC 6480) prefix origin data and router keys from a trusted cache. 17 This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin 18 data and router keys to routers. 20 Status of This Memo 22 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 23 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 25 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 26 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 27 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 28 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 30 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 31 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 32 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 33 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 35 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2015. 37 Copyright Notice 39 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 40 document authors. All rights reserved. 42 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 43 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 44 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 45 publication of this document. Please review these documents 46 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 47 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 48 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 49 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 50 described in the Simplified BSD License. 52 Table of Contents 54 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 2. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 3. Deployment Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 4. Operational Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 5.1. Fields of a PDU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 5.2. Serial Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 62 5.3. Serial Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 63 5.4. Reset Query . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 64 5.5. Cache Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 65 5.6. IPv4 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 66 5.7. IPv6 Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 67 5.8. End of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 68 5.9. Cache Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 69 5.10. Router Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 70 5.11. Error Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 71 6. Protocol Timing Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 72 7. Protocol Version Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 73 8. Protocol Sequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 74 8.1. Start or Restart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 75 8.2. Typical Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 76 8.3. No Incremental Update Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 77 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 78 9. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 79 9.1. SSH Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 80 9.2. TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 81 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 82 9.4. TCP-AO Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 83 10. Router-Cache Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 84 11. Deployment Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 85 12. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 86 13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 87 14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 88 15. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 89 16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 90 16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 91 16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 92 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 94 1. Introduction 96 In order to verifiably validate the origin Autonomous Systems (ASes) 97 and AS paths of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable 98 mechanism to receive cryptographically validated Resource Public Key 99 Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] prefix origin data and router keys 100 from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver 101 validated prefix origin data and router keys to routers. The design 102 is intentionally constrained to be usable on much of the current 103 generation of ISP router platforms. 105 Section 3 describes the deployment structure, and Section 4 then 106 presents an operational overview. The binary payloads of the 107 protocol are formally described in Section 5, and the expected PDU 108 sequences are described in Section 8. The transport protocol options 109 are described in Section 9. Section 10 details how routers and 110 caches are configured to connect and authenticate. Section 11 111 describes likely deployment scenarios. The traditional security and 112 IANA considerations end the document. 114 The protocol is extensible in order to support new PDUs with new 115 semantics, if deployment experience indicates they are needed. PDUs 116 are versioned should deployment experience call for change. 118 For an implementation (not interoperability) report on use of this 119 protocol with prefix origin data, see [RFC7128]. 121 1.1. Requirements Language 123 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 124 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 125 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] 126 only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in 127 lower or mixed case as English words, without special meaning. 129 2. Glossary 131 The following terms are used with special meaning. 133 Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a 134 distributed set of servers at the IANA, Regional Internet 135 Registries (RIRs), National Internet Registries (NIRs), and ISPs; 136 see [RFC6481]. 138 Cache: A coalesced copy of the RPKI, which is periodically fetched/ 139 refreshed directly or indirectly from the Global RPKI using the 140 [RFC5781] protocol/tools. Relying party software is used to 141 gather and validate the distributed data of the RPKI into a cache. 143 Trusting this cache further is a matter between the provider of 144 the cache and a relying party. 146 Serial Number: A 32-bit strictly increasing unsigned integer which 147 wraps from 2^32-1 to 0. It denotes the logical version of a 148 cache. A cache increments the value when it successfully updates 149 its data from a parent cache or from primary RPKI data. As a 150 cache is receiving, new incoming data and implicit deletes are 151 associated with the new serial but MUST NOT be sent until the 152 fetch is complete. A Serial Number is not commensurate between 153 caches, nor need it be maintained across resets of the cache 154 server. See [RFC1982] on DNS Serial Number Arithmetic for too 155 much detail on the topic. 157 Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a session 158 identifier to uniquely identify the instance of the cache and to 159 bind it to the sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will 160 generate. This allows the router to restart a failed session 161 knowing that the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with 162 that of the cache. 164 3. Deployment Structure 166 Deployment of the RPKI to reach routers has a three-level structure 167 as follows: 169 Global RPKI: The authoritative data of the RPKI are published in a 170 distributed set of servers, RPKI publication repositories, e.g., 171 the IANA, RIRs, NIRs, and ISPs, see [RFC6481]. 173 Local Caches: A local set of one or more collected and verified 174 caches. A relying party, e.g., router or other client, MUST have 175 a trust relationship with, and a trusted transport channel to, any 176 authoritative cache(s) it uses. 178 Routers: A router fetches data from a local cache using the protocol 179 described in this document. It is said to be a client of the 180 cache. There MAY be mechanisms for the router to assure itself of 181 the authenticity of the cache and to authenticate itself to the 182 cache. 184 4. Operational Overview 186 A router establishes and keeps open a connection to one or more 187 caches with which it has client/server relationships. It is 188 configured with a semi-ordered list of caches, and establishes a 189 connection to the most preferred cache, or set of caches, which 190 accept the connections. 192 The router MUST choose the most preferred, by configuration, cache or 193 set of caches so that the operator may control load on their caches 194 and the Global RPKI. 196 Periodically, the router sends to the cache the Serial Number of the 197 highest numbered data it has received from that cache, i.e., the 198 router's current Serial Number. When a router establishes a new 199 connection to a cache, or wishes to reset a current relationship, it 200 sends a Reset Query. 202 The Cache responds with all data records which have Serial Numbers 203 greater than that in the router's query. This may be the null set, 204 in which case the End of Data PDU is still sent. Note that 'greater' 205 must take wrap-around into account, see [RFC1982]. 207 When the router has received all data records from the cache, it sets 208 its current Serial Number to that of the Serial Number in the End of 209 Data PDU. 211 When the cache updates its database, it sends a Notify message to 212 every currently connected router. This is a hint that now would be a 213 good time for the router to poll for an update, but is only a hint. 214 The protocol requires the router to poll for updates periodically in 215 any case. 217 Strictly speaking, a router could track a cache simply by asking for 218 a complete data set every time it updates, but this would be very 219 inefficient. The Serial Number based incremental update mechanism 220 allows an efficient transfer of just the data records which have 221 changed since last update. As with any update protocol based on 222 incremental transfers, the router must be prepared to fall back to a 223 full transfer if for any reason the cache is unable to provide the 224 necessary incremental data. Unlike some incremental transfer 225 protocols, this protocol requires the router to make an explicit 226 request to start the fallback process; this is deliberate, as the 227 cache has no way of knowing whether the router has also established 228 sessions with other caches that may be able to provide better 229 service. 231 As a cache server must evaluate certificates and ROAs (Route Origin 232 Attestations; see [RFC6480]), which are time dependent, servers' 233 clocks MUST be correct to a tolerance of approximately an hour. 235 5. Protocol Data Units (PDUs) 237 The exchanges between the cache and the router are sequences of 238 exchanges of the following PDUs according to the rules described in 239 Section 8. 241 Fields with unspecified content MUST be zero on transmission and MAY 242 be ignored on receipt. 244 5.1. Fields of a PDU 246 PDUs contain the following data elements: 248 Protocol Version: An eight-bit unsigned integer, currently 1, 249 denoting the version of this protocol. 251 PDU Type: An eight-bit unsigned integer, denoting the type of the 252 PDU, e.g., IPv4 Prefix, etc. 254 Serial Number: The Serial Number of the RPKI Cache when this set of 255 PDUs was received from an upstream cache server or gathered from 256 the Global RPKI. A cache increments its Serial Number when 257 completing a rigorously validated update from a parent cache or 258 the Global RPKI. 260 Session ID: When a cache server is started, it generates a Session 261 ID to identify the instance of the cache and to bind it to the 262 sequence of Serial Numbers that cache instance will generate. 263 This allows the router to restart a failed session knowing that 264 the Serial Number it is using is commensurate with that of the 265 cache. If, at any time, either the router or the cache finds the 266 value of the session identifier is not the same as the other's, 267 they MUST completely drop the session and the router MUST flush 268 all data learned from that cache. 270 Should a cache erroneously reuse a Session ID so that a router 271 does not realize that the session has changed (old session ID and 272 new session ID have same numeric value), the router may become 273 confused as to the content of the cache. The time it takes the 274 router to discover it is confused will depend on whether the 275 Serial Numbers are also reused. If the Serial Numbers in the old 276 and new sessions are different enough, the cache will respond to 277 the router's Serial Query with a Cache Reset, which will solve the 278 problem. If, however, the Serial Numbers are close, the cache may 279 respond with a Cache Response, which may not be enough to bring 280 the router into sync. In such cases, it's likely but not certain 281 that the router will detect some discrepancy between the state 282 that the cache expects and its own state. For example, the Cache 283 Response may tell the router to drop a record which the router 284 does not hold, or may tell the router to add a record which the 285 router already has. In such cases, a router will detect the error 286 and reset the session. The one case in which the router may stay 287 out of sync is when nothing in the Cache Response contradicts any 288 data currently held by the router. 290 Using persistent storage for the session identifier or a clock- 291 based scheme for generating session identifiers should avoid the 292 risk of session identifier collisions. 294 The Session ID might be a pseudo-random value, a strictly 295 increasing value if the cache has reliable storage, etc. 297 Length: A 32-bit unsigned integer which has as its value the count 298 of the bytes in the entire PDU, including the eight bytes of 299 header which end with the length field. 301 Flags: The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an 302 announcement and 0 for a withdrawal. For a Prefix PDU (IPv4 or 303 IPv6), the flag indicates whether this PDU announces a new right 304 to announce the prefix or withdraws a previously announced right; 305 a withdraw effectively deletes one previously announced Prefix PDU 306 with the exact same Prefix, Length, Max-Len, and Autonomous System 307 Number (ASN). Similarly, for a Router Key PDU, the flag indicates 308 whether this PDU announces a new Router Key or deletes one 309 previously announced Router Key PDU with the exact same AS Number, 310 subjectKeyIdentifier, and subjectPublicKeyInfo. 312 Prefix Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the shortest 313 prefix allowed for the prefix. 315 Max Length: An 8-bit unsigned integer denoting the longest prefix 316 allowed by the prefix. This MUST NOT be less than the Prefix 317 Length element. 319 Prefix: The IPv4 or IPv6 prefix of the ROA. 321 Autonomous System Number: A 32-bit unsigned integer representing an 322 ASN allowed to announce a prefix or associated with a router key. 324 Subject Key Identifier: 20-octet Subject Key Identifier (SKI) value 325 of a router key, as described in [RFC6487]. 327 Subject Public Key Info: a router key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, 328 as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full 329 ASN.1 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the 330 ASN.1 tag and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. 332 Zero: Fields shown as zero or reserved MUST be zero. The value of 333 such a field MUST be ignored on receipt. 335 5.2. Serial Notify 337 The cache notifies the router that the cache has new data. 339 The Session ID reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are 340 commensurate, i.e., the cache session has not been changed. 342 Upon receipt of a Serial Notify PDU, the router MAY issue an 343 immediate Serial Query or Reset Query without waiting for the Refresh 344 Interval timer to expire. 346 Serial Notify is the only message that the cache can send that is not 347 in response to a message from the router. 349 0 8 16 24 31 350 .-------------------------------------------. 351 | Protocol | PDU | | 352 | Version | Type | Session ID | 353 | 1 | 0 | | 354 +-------------------------------------------+ 355 | | 356 | Length=12 | 357 | | 358 +-------------------------------------------+ 359 | | 360 | Serial Number | 361 | | 362 `-------------------------------------------' 364 5.3. Serial Query 366 Serial Query: The router sends Serial Query to ask the cache for all 367 payload PDUs which have Serial Numbers higher than the Serial Number 368 in the Serial Query. 370 The cache replies to this query with a Cache Response PDU 371 (Section 5.5) if the cache has a, possibly null, record of the 372 changes since the Serial Number specified by the router. If there 373 have been no changes since the router last queried, the cache sends 374 an End Of Data PDU. 376 If the cache does not have the data needed to update the router, 377 perhaps because its records do not go back to the Serial Number in 378 the Serial Query, then it responds with a Cache Reset PDU 379 (Section 5.9). 381 The Session ID tells the cache what instance the router expects to 382 ensure that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., the cache 383 session has not been changed. 385 0 8 16 24 31 386 .-------------------------------------------. 387 | Protocol | PDU | | 388 | Version | Type | Session ID | 389 | 1 | 1 | | 390 +-------------------------------------------+ 391 | | 392 | Length=12 | 393 | | 394 +-------------------------------------------+ 395 | | 396 | Serial Number | 397 | | 398 `-------------------------------------------' 400 5.4. Reset Query 402 Reset Query: The router tells the cache that it wants to receive the 403 total active, current, non-withdrawn database. The cache responds 404 with a Cache Response PDU (Section 5.5). 406 0 8 16 24 31 407 .-------------------------------------------. 408 | Protocol | PDU | | 409 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 410 | 1 | 2 | | 411 +-------------------------------------------+ 412 | | 413 | Length=8 | 414 | | 415 `-------------------------------------------' 417 5.5. Cache Response 419 Cache Response: The cache responds with zero or more payload PDUs. 420 When replying to a Serial Query request (Section 5.3), the cache 421 sends the set of all data records it has with Serial Numbers greater 422 than that sent by the client router. When replying to a Reset Query, 423 the cache sends the set of all data records it has; in this case, the 424 withdraw/announce field in the payload PDUs MUST have the value 1 425 (announce). 427 In response to a Reset Query, the new value of the Session ID tells 428 the router the instance of the cache session for future confirmation. 430 In response to a Serial Query, the Session ID being the same 431 reassures the router that the Serial Numbers are commensurate, i.e., 432 the cache session has not changed. 434 0 8 16 24 31 435 .-------------------------------------------. 436 | Protocol | PDU | | 437 | Version | Type | Session ID | 438 | 1 | 3 | | 439 +-------------------------------------------+ 440 | | 441 | Length=8 | 442 | | 443 `-------------------------------------------' 445 5.6. IPv4 Prefix 447 0 8 16 24 31 448 .-------------------------------------------. 449 | Protocol | PDU | | 450 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 451 | 1 | 4 | | 452 +-------------------------------------------+ 453 | | 454 | Length=20 | 455 | | 456 +-------------------------------------------+ 457 | | Prefix | Max | | 458 | Flags | Length | Length | zero | 459 | | 0..32 | 0..32 | | 460 +-------------------------------------------+ 461 | | 462 | IPv4 Prefix | 463 | | 464 +-------------------------------------------+ 465 | | 466 | Autonomous System Number | 467 | | 468 `-------------------------------------------' 470 The lowest order bit of the Flags field is 1 for an announcement and 471 0 for a withdrawal. 473 In the RPKI, nothing prevents a signing certificate from issuing two 474 identical ROAs. In this case, there would be no semantic difference 475 between the objects, merely a process redundancy. 477 In the RPKI, there is also an actual need for what might appear to a 478 router as identical IPvX PDUs. This can occur when an upstream 479 certificate is being reissued or there is an address ownership 480 transfer up the validation chain. The ROA would be identical in the 481 router sense, i.e., have the same {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN}, but a 482 different validation path in the RPKI. This is important to the 483 RPKI, but not to the router. 485 The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to 486 have one and only one IPvX PDU for a unique {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, 487 ASN} at any one point in time. Should the router client receive an 488 IPvX PDU with a {Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} identical to one it 489 already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate Announcement Received 490 error. 492 5.7. IPv6 Prefix 494 0 8 16 24 31 495 .-------------------------------------------. 496 | Protocol | PDU | | 497 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 498 | 1 | 6 | | 499 +-------------------------------------------+ 500 | | 501 | Length=32 | 502 | | 503 +-------------------------------------------+ 504 | | Prefix | Max | | 505 | Flags | Length | Length | zero | 506 | | 0..128 | 0..128 | | 507 +-------------------------------------------+ 508 | | 509 +--- ---+ 510 | | 511 +--- IPv6 Prefix ---+ 512 | | 513 +--- ---+ 514 | | 515 +-------------------------------------------+ 516 | | 517 | Autonomous System Number | 518 | | 519 `-------------------------------------------' 521 Analogous to the IPv4 Prefix PDU, it has 96 more bits and no magic. 523 5.8. End of Data 525 End of Data: The cache tells the router it has no more data for the 526 request. 528 The Session ID MUST be the same as that of the corresponding Cache 529 Response which began the, possibly null, sequence of data PDUs. 531 0 8 16 24 31 532 .-------------------------------------------. 533 | Protocol | PDU | | 534 | Version | Type | Session ID | 535 | 1 | 7 | | 536 +-------------------------------------------+ 537 | | 538 | Length=24 | 539 | | 540 +-------------------------------------------+ 541 | | 542 | Serial Number | 543 | | 544 +-------------------------------------------+ 545 | | 546 | Refresh Interval | 547 | | 548 +-------------------------------------------+ 549 | | 550 | Retry Interval | 551 | | 552 +-------------------------------------------+ 553 | | 554 | Expire Interval | 555 | | 556 `-------------------------------------------' 558 The Refresh Interval, Retry Interval, and Expire Interval are all 559 32-bit elapsed times measured in seconds, and express the timing 560 parameters that the cache expects the router to use to decide when 561 next to send the cache another Serial Query or Reset Query PDU. See 562 Section 6 for an explanation of the use and the range of allowed 563 values for these parameters. 565 5.9. Cache Reset 567 The cache may respond to a Serial Query informing the router that the 568 cache cannot provide an incremental update starting from the Serial 569 Number specified by the router. The router must decide whether to 570 issue a Reset Query or switch to a different cache. 572 0 8 16 24 31 573 .-------------------------------------------. 574 | Protocol | PDU | | 575 | Version | Type | reserved = zero | 576 | 1 | 8 | | 577 +-------------------------------------------+ 578 | | 579 | Length=8 | 580 | | 581 `-------------------------------------------' 583 5.10. Router Key 585 0 8 16 24 31 586 .-------------------------------------------. 587 | Protocol | PDU | | | 588 | Version | Type | Flags | zero | 589 | 1 | 9 | | | 590 +-------------------------------------------+ 591 | | 592 | Length | 593 | | 594 +-------------------------------------------+ 595 | | 596 | Subject Key Identifier | 597 | 20 octets | 598 | | 599 +-------------------------------------------+ 600 | | 601 | AS Number | 602 | | 603 +-------------------------------------------+ 604 | | 605 | Subject Public Key Info | 606 | | 607 `-------------------------------------------' 609 The cache server MUST ensure that it has told the router client to 610 have one and only one Router Key PDU for a unique {SKI, ASN, Subject 611 Public Key} at any one point in time. Should the router client 612 receive a Router Key PDU with a {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} 613 identical to one it already has active, it SHOULD raise a Duplicate 614 Announcement Received error. 616 Note that a particular ASN may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs 617 with different Subject Public Key values, while a particular Subject 618 Public Key value may appear in multiple Router Key PDUs with 619 different ASNs. In the interest of keeping the announcement and 620 withdrawal semantics as simple as possible for the router, this 621 protocol makes no attempt to compress either of these cases. 623 Also note that it is possible, albeit very unlikely, for multiple 624 distinct Subject Public Key values to hash to the same SKI. For this 625 reason, implementations MUST compare Subject Public Key values as 626 well as SKIs when detecting duplicate PDUs. 628 5.11. Error Report 630 This PDU is used by either party to report an error to the other. 632 Error reports are only sent as responses to other PDUs. 634 The Error Code is described in Section 12. 636 If the error is generic (e.g., "Internal Error") and not associated 637 with the PDU to which it is responding, the Erroneous PDU field MUST 638 be empty and the Length of Encapsulated PDU field MUST be zero. 640 An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for an Error Report PDU. If an 641 erroneous Error Report PDU is received, the session SHOULD be 642 dropped. 644 If the error is associated with a PDU of excessive length, i.e., too 645 long to be any legal PDU other than another Error Report, or a 646 possibly corrupt length, the Erroneous PDU field MAY be truncated. 648 The diagnostic text is optional; if not present, the Length of Error 649 Text field MUST be zero. If error text is present, it MUST be a 650 string in UTF-8 encoding (see [RFC3269]). 652 0 8 16 24 31 653 .-------------------------------------------. 654 | Protocol | PDU | | 655 | Version | Type | Error Code | 656 | 1 | 10 | | 657 +-------------------------------------------+ 658 | | 659 | Length | 660 | | 661 +-------------------------------------------+ 662 | | 663 | Length of Encapsulated PDU | 664 | | 665 +-------------------------------------------+ 666 | | 667 ~ Copy of Erroneous PDU ~ 668 | | 669 +-------------------------------------------+ 670 | | 671 | Length of Error Text | 672 | | 673 +-------------------------------------------+ 674 | | 675 | Arbitrary Text | 676 | of | 677 ~ Error Diagnostic Message ~ 678 | | 679 `-------------------------------------------' 681 6. Protocol Timing Parameters 683 Since the data the cache distributes via the rpki-rtr protocol are 684 retrieved from the Global RPKI system at intervals which are only 685 known to the cache, only the cache can really know how frequently it 686 makes sense for the router to poll the cache, or how long the data 687 are likely to remain valid (or, at least, unchanged). For this 688 reason, as well as to allow the cache some control over the load 689 placed on it by its client routers, the End Of Data PDU includes 690 three values that allow the cache to communicate timing parameters to 691 the router. 693 Refresh Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait 694 before next attempting to poll the cache, using a Serial Query or 695 Reset Query PDU. The router SHOULD NOT poll the cache sooner than 696 indicated by this parameter. Note that receipt of a Serial Notify 697 PDU overrides this interval and allows the router to issue an 698 immediate query without waiting for the Refresh Interval to 699 expire. Countdown for this timer starts upon receipt of the 700 containing End Of Data PDU. 702 Minimum allowed value: 1 second. 704 Maximum allowed value: 86400 seconds (one day). 706 Recommended default: 3600 seconds (one hour). 708 Retry Interval: This parameter tells the router how long to wait 709 before retrying a failed Serial Query or Reset Query. The router 710 SHOULD NOT retry sooner than indicated by this parameter. 711 Countdown for this timer starts upon failure of the query, and 712 restarts after each subsequent failure until a query succeeds. 714 Minimum allowed value: 1 second. 716 Maximum allowed value: 7200 seconds (two hours). 718 Recommended default: 600 seconds (ten minutes). 720 Expire Interval: This parameter tells the router how long it can 721 continue to use the current version of the data while unable to 722 perform a successful query. The router MUST NOT retain the data 723 past the time indicated by this parameter. Countdown for this 724 timer starts upon receipt of the containing End Of Data PDU. 726 Minimum allowed value: 600 seconds (ten minutes). 728 Maximum allowed value: 172800 seconds (two days). 730 Recommended default: 7200 seconds (two hours). 732 If the router has never issued a successful query against a 733 particular cache, it SHOULD retry periodically using the default 734 Retry Interval, above. 736 7. Protocol Version Negotiation 738 A router MUST start each transport session by issuing either a Reset 739 Query or a Serial Query. This query will tell the cache which 740 version of this protocol the router implements. 742 If a cache which supports version 1 receives a query from a router 743 which specifies version 0, the cache MUST downgrade to protocol 744 version 0 [RFC6810] or terminate the session. 746 If a router which supports version 1 sends a query to a cache which 747 only supports version 0, one of two things will happen. 749 1. The cache may terminate the connection, perhaps with a version 0 750 Error Report PDU. In this case the router MAY retry the 751 connection using protocol version 0. 753 2. The cache may reply with a version 0 response. In this case the 754 router MUST either downgrade to version 0 or terminate the 755 connection. 757 In any of the downgraded combinations above, the new features of 758 version 1 will not be available. 760 8. Protocol Sequences 762 The sequences of PDU transmissions fall into three conversations as 763 follows: 765 8.1. Start or Restart 767 Cache Router 768 ~ ~ 769 | <----- Reset Query -------- | R requests data (or Serial Query) 770 | | 771 | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request 772 | ------- Payload PDU ------> | C sends zero or more 773 | ------- Payload PDU ------> | IPv4 Prefix, IPv6 Prefix, 774 | ------- Payload PDU ------> | or Router Key PDUs 775 | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data 776 | | and sends new serial 777 ~ ~ 779 When a transport session is first established, the router MAY send a 780 Reset Query and the cache responds with a data sequence of all data 781 it contains. 783 Alternatively, if the router has significant unexpired data from a 784 broken session with the same cache, it MAY start with a Serial Query 785 containing the Session ID from the previous session to ensure the 786 Serial Numbers are commensurate. 788 This Reset Query sequence is also used when the router receives a 789 Cache Reset, chooses a new cache, or fears that it has otherwise lost 790 its way. 792 The router MUST send either a Reset Query or a Serial Query when 793 starting a transport session, in order to confirm that router and 794 cache are speaking compatible versions of the protocol. See 795 Section 7 for details on version negotiation. 797 To limit the length of time a cache must keep the data necessary to 798 generate incremental updates, a router MUST send either a Serial 799 Query or a Reset Query periodically. This also acts as a keep-alive 800 at the application layer. See Section 6 for details on the required 801 polling frequency. 803 8.2. Typical Exchange 805 Cache Router 806 ~ ~ 807 | -------- Notify ----------> | (optional) 808 | | 809 | <----- Serial Query ------- | R requests data 810 | | 811 | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request 812 | ------- Payload PDU ------> | C sends zero or more 813 | ------- Payload PDU ------> | IPv4 Prefix, IPv6 Prefix, 814 | ------- Payload PDU ------> | or Router Key PDUs 815 | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data 816 | | and sends new serial 817 ~ ~ 819 The cache server SHOULD send a notify PDU with its current Serial 820 Number when the cache's serial changes, with the expectation that the 821 router MAY then issue a Serial Query earlier than it otherwise might. 822 This is analogous to DNS NOTIFY in [RFC1996]. The cache MUST rate 823 limit Serial Notifies to no more frequently than one per minute. 825 When the transport layer is up and either a timer has gone off in the 826 router, or the cache has sent a Notify, the router queries for new 827 data by sending a Serial Query, and the cache sends all data newer 828 than the serial in the Serial Query. 830 To limit the length of time a cache must keep old withdraws, a router 831 MUST send either a Serial Query or a Reset Query periodically. See 832 Section 6 for details on the required polling frequency. 834 8.3. No Incremental Update Available 835 Cache Router 836 ~ ~ 837 | <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data 838 | ------- Cache Reset ------> | C cannot supply update 839 | | from specified serial 840 | <------ Reset Query ------- | R requests new data 841 | ----- Cache Response -----> | C confirms request 842 | ------- Payload PDU ------> | C sends zero or more 843 | ------- Payload PDU ------> | IPv4 Prefix, IPv6 Prefix, 844 | ------- Payload PDU ------> | or Router Key PDUs 845 | ------ End of Data ------> | C sends End of Data 846 | | and sends new serial 847 ~ ~ 849 The cache may respond to a Serial Query with a Cache Reset, informing 850 the router that the cache cannot supply an incremental update from 851 the Serial Number specified by the router. This might be because the 852 cache has lost state, or because the router has waited too long 853 between polls and the cache has cleaned up old data that it no longer 854 believes it needs, or because the cache has run out of storage space 855 and had to expire some old data early. Regardless of how this state 856 arose, the cache replies with a Cache Reset to tell the router that 857 it cannot honor the request. When a router receives this, the router 858 SHOULD attempt to connect to any more preferred caches in its cache 859 list. If there are no more preferred caches, it MUST issue a Reset 860 Query and get an entire new load from the cache. 862 8.4. Cache Has No Data Available 864 Cache Router 865 ~ ~ 866 | <----- Serial Query ------ | R requests data 867 | ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available 868 ~ ~ 870 Cache Router 871 ~ ~ 872 | <----- Reset Query ------- | R requests data 873 | ---- Error Report PDU ----> | C No Data Available 874 ~ ~ 876 The cache may respond to either a Serial Query or a Reset Query 877 informing the router that the cache cannot supply any update at all. 878 The most likely cause is that the cache has lost state, perhaps due 879 to a restart, and has not yet recovered. While it is possible that a 880 cache might go into such a state without dropping any of its active 881 sessions, a router is more likely to see this behavior when it 882 initially connects and issues a Reset Query while the cache is still 883 rebuilding its database. 885 When a router receives this kind of error, the router SHOULD attempt 886 to connect to any other caches in its cache list, in preference 887 order. If no other caches are available, the router MUST issue 888 periodic Reset Queries until it gets a new usable load from the 889 cache. 891 9. Transport 893 The transport-layer session between a router and a cache carries the 894 binary PDUs in a persistent session. 896 To prevent cache spoofing and DoS attacks by illegitimate routers, it 897 is highly desirable that the router and the cache be authenticated to 898 each other. Integrity protection for payloads is also desirable to 899 protect against monkey-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Unfortunately, 900 there is no protocol to do so on all currently used platforms. 901 Therefore, as of the writing of this document, there is no mandatory- 902 to-implement transport which provides authentication and integrity 903 protection. 905 To reduce exposure to dropped but non-terminated sessions, both 906 caches and routers SHOULD enable keep-alives when available in the 907 chosen transport protocol. 909 It is expected that, when the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) 910 [RFC5925] is available on all platforms deployed by operators, it 911 will become the mandatory-to-implement transport. 913 Caches and routers MUST implement unprotected transport over TCP 914 using a port, rpki-rtr (323); see Section 14. Operators SHOULD use 915 procedural means, e.g., access control lists (ACLs), to reduce the 916 exposure to authentication issues. 918 Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO, SSHv2, TCP MD5, or IPsec 919 transport. 921 If unprotected TCP is the transport, the cache and routers MUST be on 922 the same trusted and controlled network. 924 If available to the operator, caches and routers MUST use one of the 925 following more protected protocols. 927 Caches and routers SHOULD use TCP-AO transport [RFC5925] over the 928 rpki-rtr port. 930 Caches and routers MAY use SSHv2 transport [RFC4252] using a the 931 normal SSH port. For an example, see Section 9.1. 933 Caches and routers MAY use TCP MD5 transport [RFC2385] using the 934 rpki-rtr port. Note that TCP MD5 has been obsoleted by TCP-AO 935 [RFC5925]. 937 Caches and routers MAY use IPsec transport [RFC4301] using the rpki- 938 rtr port. 940 Caches and routers MAY use TLS transport [RFC5246] using a port, 941 rpki-rtr-tls (324); see Section 14. 943 9.1. SSH Transport 945 To run over SSH, the client router first establishes an SSH transport 946 connection using the SSHv2 transport protocol, and the client and 947 server exchange keys for message integrity and encryption. The 948 client then invokes the "ssh-userauth" service to authenticate the 949 application, as described in the SSH authentication protocol 950 [RFC4252]. Once the application has been successfully authenticated, 951 the client invokes the "ssh-connection" service, also known as the 952 SSH connection protocol. 954 After the ssh-connection service is established, the client opens a 955 channel of type "session", which results in an SSH session. 957 Once the SSH session has been established, the application invokes 958 the application transport as an SSH subsystem called "rpki-rtr". 959 Subsystem support is a feature of SSH version 2 (SSHv2) and is not 960 included in SSHv1. Running this protocol as an SSH subsystem avoids 961 the need for the application to recognize shell prompts or skip over 962 extraneous information, such as a system message that is sent at 963 shell start-up. 965 It is assumed that the router and cache have exchanged keys out of 966 band by some reasonably secured means. 968 Cache servers supporting SSH transport MUST accept RSA and Digital 969 Signature Algorithm (DSA) authentication and SHOULD accept Elliptic 970 Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) authentication. User 971 authentication MUST be supported; host authentication MAY be 972 supported. Implementations MAY support password authentication. 973 Client routers SHOULD verify the public key of the cache to avoid 974 monkey-in-the-middle attacks. 976 9.2. TLS Transport 978 Client routers using TLS transport MUST present client-side 979 certificates to authenticate themselves to the cache in order to 980 allow the cache to manage the load by rejecting connections from 981 unauthorized routers. In principle, any type of certificate and 982 certificate authority (CA) may be used; however, in general, cache 983 operators will wish to create their own small-scale CA and issue 984 certificates to each authorized router. This simplifies credential 985 rollover; any unrevoked, unexpired certificate from the proper CA may 986 be used. 988 Certificates used to authenticate client routers in this protocol 989 MUST include a subjectAltName extension [RFC5280] containing one or 990 more iPAddress identities; when authenticating the router's 991 certificate, the cache MUST check the IP address of the TLS 992 connection against these iPAddress identities and SHOULD reject the 993 connection if none of the iPAddress identities match the connection. 995 Routers MUST also verify the cache's TLS server certificate, using 996 subjectAltName dNSName identities as described in [RFC6125], to avoid 997 monkey-in-the-middle attacks. The rules and guidelines defined in 998 [RFC6125] apply here, with the following considerations: 1000 Support for DNS-ID identifier type (that is, the dNSName identity 1001 in the subjectAltName extension) is REQUIRED in rpki-rtr server 1002 and client implementations which use TLS. Certification 1003 authorities which issue rpki-rtr server certificates MUST support 1004 the DNS-ID identifier type, and the DNS-ID identifier type MUST be 1005 present in rpki-rtr server certificates. 1007 DNS names in rpki-rtr server certificates SHOULD NOT contain the 1008 wildcard character "*". 1010 rpki-rtr implementations which use TLS MUST NOT use CN-ID 1011 identifiers; a CN field may be present in the server certificate's 1012 subject name, but MUST NOT be used for authentication within the 1013 rules described in [RFC6125]. 1015 The client router MUST set its "reference identifier" to the DNS 1016 name of the rpki-rtr cache. 1018 9.3. TCP MD5 Transport 1020 If TCP MD5 is used, implementations MUST support key lengths of at 1021 least 80 printable ASCII bytes, per Section 4.5 of [RFC2385]. 1022 Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences of at least 1023 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. 1025 Key rollover with TCP MD5 is problematic. Cache servers SHOULD 1026 support [RFC4808]. 1028 9.4. TCP-AO Transport 1030 Implementations MUST support key lengths of at least 80 printable 1031 ASCII bytes. Implementations MUST also support hexadecimal sequences 1032 of at least 32 characters, i.e., 128 bits. Message Authentication 1033 Code (MAC) lengths of at least 96 bits MUST be supported, per 1034 Section 5.1 of [RFC5925]. 1036 The cryptographic algorithms and associated parameters described in 1037 [RFC5926] MUST be supported. 1039 10. Router-Cache Setup 1041 A cache has the public authentication data for each router it is 1042 configured to support. 1044 A router may be configured to peer with a selection of caches, and a 1045 cache may be configured to support a selection of routers. Each must 1046 have the name of, and authentication data for, each peer. In 1047 addition, in a router, this list has a non-unique preference value 1048 for each server. This preference merely denotes proximity, not 1049 trust, preferred belief, etc. The client router attempts to 1050 establish a session with each potential serving cache in preference 1051 order, and then starts to load data from the most preferred cache to 1052 which it can connect and authenticate. The router's list of caches 1053 has the following elements: 1055 Preference: An unsigned integer denoting the router's preference to 1056 connect to that cache; the lower the value, the more preferred. 1058 Name: The IP address or fully qualified domain name of the cache. 1060 Key: Any needed public key of the cache. 1062 MyKey: Any needed private key or certificate of this client. 1064 Due to the distributed nature of the RPKI, caches simply cannot be 1065 rigorously synchronous. A client may hold data from multiple caches 1066 but MUST keep the data marked as to source, as later updates MUST 1067 affect the correct data. 1069 Just as there may be more than one covering ROA from a single cache, 1070 there may be multiple covering ROAs from multiple caches. The 1071 results are as described in [RFC6811]. 1073 If data from multiple caches are held, implementations MUST NOT 1074 distinguish between data sources when performing validation. 1076 When a more preferred cache becomes available, if resources allow, it 1077 would be prudent for the client to start fetching from that cache. 1079 The client SHOULD attempt to maintain at least one set of data, 1080 regardless of whether it has chosen a different cache or established 1081 a new connection to the previous cache. 1083 A client MAY drop the data from a particular cache when it is fully 1084 in sync with one or more other caches. 1086 A client SHOULD delete the data from a cache when it has been unable 1087 to refresh from that cache for a configurable timer value. The 1088 default for that value is twice the polling period for that cache. 1090 If a client loses connectivity to a cache it is using, or otherwise 1091 decides to switch to a new cache, it SHOULD retain the data from the 1092 previous cache until it has a full set of data from one or more other 1093 caches. Note that this may already be true at the point of 1094 connection loss if the client has connections to more than one cache. 1096 11. Deployment Scenarios 1098 For illustration, we present three likely deployment scenarios. 1100 Small End Site: The small multihomed end site may wish to outsource 1101 the RPKI cache to one or more of their upstream ISPs. They would 1102 exchange authentication material with the ISP using some out-of- 1103 band mechanism, and their router(s) would connect to the cache(s) 1104 of one or more upstream ISPs. The ISPs would likely deploy caches 1105 intended for customer use separately from the caches with which 1106 their own BGP speakers peer. 1108 Large End Site: A larger multihomed end site might run one or more 1109 caches, arranging them in a hierarchy of client caches, each 1110 fetching from a serving cache which is closer to the Global RPKI. 1111 They might configure fall-back peerings to upstream ISP caches. 1113 ISP Backbone: A large ISP would likely have one or more redundant 1114 caches in each major point of presence (PoP), and these caches 1115 would fetch from each other in an ISP-dependent topology so as not 1116 to place undue load on the Global RPKI. 1118 Experience with large DNS cache deployments has shown that complex 1119 topologies are ill-advised as it is easy to make errors in the graph, 1120 e.g., not maintain a loop-free condition. 1122 Of course, these are illustrations and there are other possible 1123 deployment strategies. It is expected that minimizing load on the 1124 Global RPKI servers will be a major consideration. 1126 To keep load on Global RPKI services from unnecessary peaks, it is 1127 recommended that primary caches which load from the distributed 1128 Global RPKI not do so all at the same times, e.g., on the hour. 1129 Choose a random time, perhaps the ISP's AS number modulo 60 and 1130 jitter the inter-fetch timing. 1132 12. Error Codes 1134 This section contains a preliminary list of error codes. The authors 1135 expect additions to the list during development of the initial 1136 implementations. There is an IANA registry where valid error codes 1137 are listed; see Section 14. Errors which are considered fatal SHOULD 1138 cause the session to be dropped. 1140 0: Corrupt Data (fatal): The receiver believes the received PDU to 1141 be corrupt in a manner not specified by other error codes. 1143 1: Internal Error (fatal): The party reporting the error experienced 1144 some kind of internal error unrelated to protocol operation (ran 1145 out of memory, a coding assertion failed, et cetera). 1147 2: No Data Available: The cache believes itself to be in good 1148 working order, but is unable to answer either a Serial Query or a 1149 Reset Query because it has no useful data available at this time. 1150 This is likely to be a temporary error, and most likely indicates 1151 that the cache has not yet completed pulling down an initial 1152 current data set from the Global RPKI system after some kind of 1153 event that invalidated whatever data it might have previously held 1154 (reboot, network partition, et cetera). 1156 3: Invalid Request (fatal): The cache server believes the client's 1157 request to be invalid. 1159 4: Unsupported Protocol Version (fatal): The Protocol Version is not 1160 known by the receiver of the PDU. 1162 5: Unsupported PDU Type (fatal): The PDU Type is not known by the 1163 receiver of the PDU. 1165 6: Withdrawal of Unknown Record (fatal): The received PDU has Flag=0 1166 but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple for an 1167 IPvX PDU, {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a Router Key 1168 PDU) does not exist in the receiver's database. 1170 7: Duplicate Announcement Received (fatal): The received PDU has 1171 Flag=1 but a matching record ({Prefix, Len, Max-Len, ASN} tuple 1172 for an IPvX PDU, {SKI, ASN, Subject Public Key} tuple for a Router 1173 Key PDU) is already active in the router. 1175 13. Security Considerations 1177 As this document describes a security protocol, many aspects of 1178 security interest are described in the relevant sections. This 1179 section points out issues which may not be obvious in other sections. 1181 Cache Validation: In order for a collection of caches as described 1182 in Section 11 to guarantee a consistent view, they need to be 1183 given consistent trust anchors to use in their internal validation 1184 process. Distribution of a consistent trust anchor is assumed to 1185 be out of band. 1187 Cache Peer Identification: The router initiates a transport session 1188 to a cache, which it identifies by either IP address or fully 1189 qualified domain name. Be aware that a DNS or address spoofing 1190 attack could make the correct cache unreachable. No session would 1191 be established, as the authorization keys would not match. 1193 Transport Security: The RPKI relies on object, not server or 1194 transport, trust. That is, the IANA root trust anchor is 1195 distributed to all caches through some out-of-band means, and can 1196 then be used by each cache to validate certificates and ROAs all 1197 the way down the tree. The inter-cache relationships are based on 1198 this object security model; hence, the inter-cache transport can 1199 be lightly protected. 1201 But, this protocol document assumes that the routers cannot do the 1202 validation cryptography. Hence, the last link, from cache to 1203 router, is secured by server authentication and transport-level 1204 security. This is dangerous, as server authentication and 1205 transport have very different threat models than object security. 1207 So, the strength of the trust relationship and the transport 1208 between the router(s) and the cache(s) are critical. You're 1209 betting your routing on this. 1211 While we cannot say the cache must be on the same LAN, if only due 1212 to the issue of an enterprise wanting to off-load the cache task 1213 to their upstream ISP(s), locality, trust, and control are very 1214 critical issues here. The cache(s) really SHOULD be as close, in 1215 the sense of controlled and protected (against DDoS, MITM) 1216 transport, to the router(s) as possible. It also SHOULD be 1217 topologically close so that a minimum of validated routing data 1218 are needed to bootstrap a router's access to a cache. 1220 The identity of the cache server SHOULD be verified and 1221 authenticated by the router client, and vice versa, before any 1222 data are exchanged. 1224 Transports which cannot provide the necessary authentication and 1225 integrity (see Section 9) must rely on network design and 1226 operational controls to provide protection against spoofing/ 1227 corruption attacks. As pointed out in Section 9, TCP-AO is the 1228 long-term plan. Protocols which provide integrity and 1229 authenticity SHOULD be used, and if they cannot, i.e., TCP is used 1230 as the transport, the router and cache MUST be on the same 1231 trusted, controlled network. 1233 14. IANA Considerations 1235 IANA has assigned "well-known" TCP Port Numbers to the RPKI-Router 1236 Protocol for the following, see Section 9: 1238 rpki-rtr 1239 rpki-rtr-tls 1241 IANA has created a registry for tuples of Protocol Version / PDU 1242 Type, each of which may range from 0 to 255. The name of the 1243 registry is "rpki-rtr-pdu". The policy for adding to the registry is 1244 RFC Required per [RFC5226], either Standards Track or Experimental. 1245 The initial entries are as follows: 1247 Protocol PDU 1248 Version Type Description 1249 -------- ---- --------------- 1250 0 0 Serial Notify 1251 0 1 Serial Query 1252 0 2 Reset Query 1253 0 3 Cache Response 1254 0 4 IPv4 Prefix 1255 0 6 IPv6 Prefix 1256 0 7 End of Data 1257 0 8 Cache Reset 1258 0 10 Error Report 1259 0 255 Reserved 1261 IANA has created a registry for Error Codes 0 to 255. The name of 1262 the registry is "rpki-rtr-error". The policy for adding to the 1263 registry is Expert Review per [RFC5226], where the responsible IESG 1264 Area Director should appoint the Expert Reviewer. The initial 1265 entries are as follows: 1267 Error 1268 Code Description 1269 ----- ---------------- 1270 0 Corrupt Data 1271 1 Internal Error 1272 2 No Data Available 1273 3 Invalid Request 1274 4 Unsupported Protocol Version 1275 5 Unsupported PDU Type 1276 6 Withdrawal of Unknown Record 1277 7 Duplicate Announcement Received 1278 255 Reserved 1280 IANA has added an SSH Connection Protocol Subsystem Name, as defined 1281 in [RFC4250], of "rpki-rtr". 1283 15. Acknowledgments 1285 The authors wish to thank Nils Bars, Steve Bellovin, Tim Bruijnzeels, 1286 Rex Fernando, Paul Hoffman, Fabian Holler, Russ Housley, Pradosh 1287 Mohapatra, Keyur Patel, David Mandelberg, Sandy Murphy, Robert 1288 Raszuk, Andreas Reuter, Thomas C. Schmidt, John Scudder, Ruediger 1289 Volk, Matthias Waehlisch, and David Ward. Particular thanks go to 1290 Hannes Gredler for showing us the dangers of unnecessary fields. 1292 16. References 1294 16.1. Normative References 1296 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] 1297 Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature 1298 Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-09 (work in 1299 progress), January 2015. 1301 [RFC1982] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Serial Number Arithmetic", RFC 1982, 1302 August 1996. 1304 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 1305 Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, March 1997. 1307 [RFC2385] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 1308 Signature Option", RFC 2385, August 1998. 1310 [RFC3269] Kermode, R. and L. Vicisano, "Author Guidelines for 1311 Reliable Multicast Transport (RMT) Building Blocks and 1312 Protocol Instantiation documents", RFC 3269, April 2002. 1314 [RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) 1315 Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006. 1317 [RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH) 1318 Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006. 1320 [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the 1321 Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005. 1323 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 1324 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, BCP 26, 1325 May 2008. 1327 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 1328 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. 1330 [RFC5925] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP 1331 Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010. 1333 [RFC5926] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms 1334 for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926, 1335 June 2010. 1337 [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and 1338 Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity 1339 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 1340 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer 1341 Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. 1343 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 1344 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 1345 2012. 1347 [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 1348 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, 1349 January 2013. 1351 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 1352 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January 1353 2013. 1355 16.2. Informative References 1357 [RFC1996] Vixie, P., "A Mechanism for Prompt Notification of Zone 1358 Changes (DNS NOTIFY)", RFC 1996, August 1996. 1360 [RFC4808] Bellovin, S., "Key Change Strategies for TCP-MD5", RFC 1361 4808, March 2007. 1363 [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI 1364 Scheme", RFC 5781, February 2010. 1366 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 1367 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. 1369 [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 1370 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, 1371 February 2012. 1373 [RFC7128] Bush, R., Austein, R., Patel, K., Gredler, H., and M. 1374 Waehlisch, "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) 1375 Router Implementation Report", RFC 7128, February 2014. 1377 Authors' Addresses 1379 Randy Bush 1380 Internet Initiative Japan 1381 5147 Crystal Springs 1382 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 1383 US 1385 Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 1386 Email: randy@psg.com 1388 Rob Austein 1389 Dragon Research Labs 1391 Email: sra@hactrn.net