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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Secure Inter-Domain Routing D. Mandelberg 3 Internet-Draft BBN Technologies 4 Intended status: Best Current Practice October 7, 2015 5 Expires: April 9, 2016 7 Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI 8 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-00 10 Abstract 12 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global 13 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet 14 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those 15 resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers 16 (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination 17 assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to 18 validate the path of a BGP route. Some ISPs locally use BGP with 19 private address space or private AS numbers (see RFC6890). These 20 local BGP routes cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and SHOULD be 21 considered invalid based on the global RPKI (see RFC6491). The 22 mechanisms described below provide ISPs with a way to make local 23 assertions about private (reserved) INRs while using the RPKI's 24 assertions about all other INRs. 26 Status of This Memo 28 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 29 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 31 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 32 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 33 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 34 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 36 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 37 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 38 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 39 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 41 This Internet-Draft will expire on April 9, 2016. 43 Copyright Notice 45 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 46 document authors. All rights reserved. 48 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 49 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 50 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 51 publication of this document. Please review these documents 52 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 53 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 54 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 55 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 56 described in the Simplified BSD License. 58 Table of Contents 60 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 61 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 2. Validation Output Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 63 3. Locally Adding Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 4. Configuring SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 5. Combining Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 66 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 67 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 68 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 69 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 70 9.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 71 9.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 72 Appendix A. Example SLURM File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 73 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 75 1. Introduction 77 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global 78 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet 79 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those 80 resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6) 81 addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] 82 to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that 83 block. 85 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to validate 86 BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is described in 87 [RFC6483], and validation of the path of a route is described in 88 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview].) However, some ISPs locally use BGP 89 with private address space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or 90 private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). These local BGP routes 91 cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and SHOULD be considered 92 invalid when using the RPKI. For example, [RFC6491] recommends the 93 creation of ROAs that would invalidate routes for reserved and 94 unallocated address space. 96 This document specifies two new mechanisms to enable ISPs to make 97 local assertions about some INRs while using the RPKI's assertions 98 about all other INRs. These mechanisms support the second and third 99 use cases in [I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases]. The second use case 100 describes use of [RFC1918] addresses or use of public address space 101 not allocated to the ISP that is using it. The third use case 102 describes a situation in which an ISP publishes a variant of the RPKI 103 hierarchy (for its customers). In this variant some prefixes and/or 104 AS numbers are different from what the RPKI repository system 105 presents to the general ISP population. The result is that routes 106 for consumers of this variant hierarchy will be re-directed (via 107 routing). 109 Both mechanisms are specified in terms of abstract sets of 110 assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an assertion is a tuple 111 of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS number} as used by 112 rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1 113 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. For BGPsec 114 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], an assertion is a tuple of {AS 115 number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki- 116 rtr version 1. Output Filtering, described in Section 2, filters out 117 any assertions by the RPKI about locally reserved INRs. Locally 118 Adding Assertions, described in Section 3, adds local assertions 119 about locally reserved INRs. The combination of both mechanisms is 120 described in Section 5. 122 To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. 123 That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as 124 if SLURM were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM 125 configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the 126 case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS 127 numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Adding Assertions. 128 If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown 129 state [RFC6483]. If both additions occur then both routes would be 130 in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other 131 does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid. 133 In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data 134 it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr 135 protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions 136 it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in 137 assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document 138 are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both 139 the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying 140 party software MAY modify other forms of output in comparable ways, 141 but that is outside the scope of this document. 143 This document is intended to supersede [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] while 144 focusing only on local management of private INRs. Another draft 145 [I-D.kent-sidr-suspenders] focuses on the other aspects of local 146 management. 148 1.1. Terminology 150 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 151 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 152 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 154 2. Validation Output Filtering 156 To prevent the global RPKI from affecting routes with locally 157 reserved INRs, a relying party may be locally configured with a list 158 of IP prefixes and/or AS numbers that are used locally, and taken 159 from reserved INR spaces. Any Origin Validation assertions where the 160 IP prefix is equal to or subsumed by a locally reserved IP prefix, 161 are removed from the relying party's output. Any Origin Validation 162 assertions where the IP prefix contains a locally reserved IP prefix 163 are removed; the relying party software SHOULD issue a warning when 164 this action is taken. (Note that an Origin Validation assertion is 165 not removed due to its AS number matching a locally reserved AS 166 number.) Any BGPsec assertion where the AS number is equal to a 167 locally reserved AS number is removed from the relying party's 168 output. 170 3. Locally Adding Assertions 172 Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list 173 of assertions. This list is added to the relying party's output. 175 4. Configuring SLURM 177 Relying party software SHOULD support the following configuration 178 format for Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions. 179 The format is defined using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) 180 notation and core rules from [RFC5234] and the rules 181 and from Appendix A of [RFC3986]. See Appendix A for 182 an example SLURM file. 184 A SLURM configuration file, , consists of a head and a 185 body. The head identifies the file as a SLURM configuration file, 186 specifies the version of SLURM for which the file was written, and 187 optionally contains other information described below. The body 188 contains the configuration for Validation Output Filtering and 189 Locally Adding Assertions. 191 SLURMFile = head body 193 head = firstLine *(commentLine / headLine) 195 body = *(commentLine / bodyLine) 197 firstLine = %x53.4c.55.52.4d SP "1.0" EOL ; "SLURM 1.0" 199 commentLine = *WSP [comment] EOL 201 headLine = *WSP headCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL 203 bodyLine = *WSP bodyCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL 205 comment = "#" *(VCHAR / WSP) 207 EOL = CRLF / LF 209 The head may specify a target. If present, the target string 210 identifies the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be 211 used. The meaning of the target string, if any, is determined by the 212 user. If a target is present, a relying party SHOULD verify that 213 that the target is an acceptable value, and reject the SLURM file if 214 the target is not acceptable. For example, the relying party could 215 be configured to accept SLURM files only if they do not specify a 216 target, have a target value of "hostname=rpki.example.com", or have a 217 target value of "as=65536". If more than one target line is present, 218 all targets must be acceptable to the RP. 220 headCommand = target 222 target = 223 %x74.61.72.67.65.74 1*WSP ; "target" 224 1*VCHAR 226 The body contains zero or more configuration lines for Validation 227 Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions. Each command 228 specifies an INR to use for Validation Output Filtering. Each 229 command specifies an assertion to use for Locally Adding Assertions. 231 bodyCommand = add / del 233 add = 234 %x61.64.64 1*WSP ; "add" 235 addItem 237 del = 238 %x64.65.6c 1*WSP ; "del" 239 delItem 241 addItem = addItemPrefixAS / addItemASKey 243 ; Add a mapping from a prefix and max length to an AS number. 244 addItemPrefixAS = 245 %x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination" 246 IPprefixMaxLen 1*WSP 247 ASnum 249 ; Add a mapping from an AS number to a router public key. 250 addItemASKey = 251 %x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec" 252 ASnum 1*WSP 253 RouterSKI 1*WSP 254 RouterPubKey 256 delItem = delItemPrefix / delItemAS 258 ; Filter prefix-AS mappings, using the given prefix 259 delItemPrefix = 260 %x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination" 261 IPprefix 263 ; Filter AS-key mappings for the given AS 264 delItemAS = 265 %x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec" 266 ASnum 268 IPprefix = IPv4prefix / IPv6prefix 270 IPprefixMaxLen = IPv4prefixMaxLen / IPv6prefixMaxLen 272 IPv4prefix = IPv4address "/" 1*2DIGIT 273 IPv6prefix = IPv6address "/" 1*3DIGIT 275 ; In the following two rules, if the maximum length component is 276 ; missing, it is treated as equal to the prefix length. 277 IPv4prefixMaxLen = IPv4prefix ["-" 1*2DIGIT] 278 IPv6prefixMaxLen = IPv6prefix ["-" 1*3DIGIT] 280 ASnum = 1*DIGIT 282 ; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router certificate's 283 ; Subject Key Identifer, as described in 284 ; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is the 285 ; value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length 286 ; fields. 288 RouterSKI = Base64 290 ; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router public key's 291 ; subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in 292 ; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding 293 ; of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length 294 ; values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. 295 RouterPubKey = Base64 297 Base64 = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/") 0*2"=" 299 An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM 300 files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output 301 Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions are the respective unions of 302 the inputs from each file. The typical use case for multiple files 303 is when the files have distinct scopes. For example, an organization 304 may belong to two separate networks that use different private-use IP 305 prefixes and AS numbers. To detect conflict between multiple SLURM 306 files, a relying party SHOULD issue a warning in the following cases: 308 1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation assertions 309 if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such 310 that X is contained by any prefix in any or 311 in file Y and X is contained by any prefix in any 312 or in file Z. 314 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there 315 exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X is 316 used in any or in file Y and X is used 317 in any or in file Z. 319 5. Combining Mechanisms 321 In the typical use case, a relying party uses both output filtering 322 and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting assertions 323 MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed before locally 324 adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions MUST NOT be 325 removed by output filtering. 327 If a relying party chooses to use both SLURM and Suspenders 328 [I-D.kent-sidr-suspenders], the SLURM mechanisms MUST be performed on 329 the output of Suspenders. 331 6. IANA Considerations 333 TBD 335 7. Security Considerations 337 The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator 338 with additional ways to control its own network while making use of 339 RPKI data. These mechanisms are applied only locally; they do not 340 influence how other network operators interpret RPKI data. 341 Nonetheless, care should be taken in how these mechanisms are 342 employed. 344 8. Acknowledgements 346 The author would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and 347 detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wesley Wang for the 348 idea behind the target command, to Declan Ma for the idea behind use 349 of multiple SLURM files, and to Richard Hansen for his careful 350 reviews. 352 9. References 354 9.1. Informative References 356 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview] 357 Lepinski, M., "An Overview of BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr- 358 bgpsec-overview-07 (work in progress), June 2015. 360 [I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases] 361 Bush, R., "RPKI Local Trust Anchor Use Cases", draft-ietf- 362 sidr-lta-use-cases-03 (work in progress), June 2015. 364 [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt] 365 Reynolds, M., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Local Trust 366 Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key 367 Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-ltamgmt-08 (work in 368 progress), April 2013. 370 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis] 371 Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 372 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", draft-ietf- 373 sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-06 (work in progress), October 374 2015. 376 [I-D.kent-sidr-suspenders] 377 Kent, S. and D. Mandelberg, "Suspenders: A Fail-safe 378 Mechanism for the RPKI", draft-kent-sidr-suspenders-03 379 (work in progress), April 2015. 381 [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., 382 and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", 383 BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, 384 . 386 [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation, 387 selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)", 388 BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996, 389 . 391 [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast 392 Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, 393 . 395 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 396 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 397 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 398 . 400 [RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route 401 Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key 402 Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations 403 (ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012, 404 . 406 [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public 407 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA", 408 RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012, 409 . 411 [RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and 412 M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address 413 Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April 414 2012, . 416 [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 417 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, 418 DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013, 419 . 421 [RFC6890] Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., Ed., and B. Haberman, 422 "Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153, 423 RFC 6890, DOI 10.17487/RFC6890, April 2013, 424 . 426 [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for 427 Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July 428 2013, . 430 9.2. Normative References 432 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] 433 Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature 434 Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-11 (work in 435 progress), August 2015. 437 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] 438 Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "A Profile for BGPsec Router 439 Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and 440 Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki- 441 profiles-11 (work in progress), August 2015. 443 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 444 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 445 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 446 . 448 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform 449 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, 450 RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, 451 . 453 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data 454 Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, 455 . 457 [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax 458 Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, 459 DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008, 460 . 462 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 463 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, 464 DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, 465 . 467 Appendix A. Example SLURM File 468 SLURM 1.0 470 # This file is only intended to be used on a relying party running 471 # on rpki.example.com. 472 target hostname=rpki.example.com # this is a comment 474 # Reserve IP prefixes for local use. 475 del origination 10.0.0.0/24 476 del origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc::/48 478 # Reserve AS numbers for local use. 479 del bgpsec 64512 480 del bgpsec 64513 482 # Allow either 64512 or 64513 to originate routes to 10.0.0.0/24. 483 add origination 10.0.0.0/24 64512 484 add origination 10.0.0.0/24 64513 486 # 64512 originates fd0b:dd1d:2dcc::/52 and sub-prefixes up to length 487 # 56. 488 add origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc::/52-56 64512 490 # However, 64513 originates fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:42::/64. 491 add origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:42::/64 64513 493 # 64513 also originates fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:100::/52 494 add origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:100::/52 64513 496 # Authorize router keys to sign BGPsec paths on behalf of the 497 # specified ASes. Note that the Base64 strings used in this 498 # example are not valid SKIs or router public keys, due to line 499 # length restrictions in RFCs. 500 add bgpsec 64512 Zm9v VGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSByb3V0ZXIgcHVibGljIGtleQ== 501 add bgpsec 64512 YmFy b3IgYSBmbG9jayBvZiBkdWNrcw== 502 add bgpsec 64513 YWJj bWF5YmUgYSBkaWZmZXJlbnQgYXZpYW4gY2Fycmllcj8= 504 Author's Address 506 David Mandelberg 507 BBN Technologies 508 10 Moulton St. 509 Camridge, MA 02138 510 US 512 Email: david@mandelberg.org