idnits 2.17.1 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == There are 4 instances of lines with private range IPv4 addresses in the document. If these are generic example addresses, they should be changed to use any of the ranges defined in RFC 6890 (or successor): 192.0.2.x, 198.51.100.x or 203.0.113.x. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year -- The document date (April 13, 2016) is 2907 days in the past. Is this intentional? -- Found something which looks like a code comment -- if you have code sections in the document, please surround them with '' and '' lines. Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Unused Reference: 'RFC6890' is defined on line 407, but no explicit reference was found in the text == Outdated reference: A later version (-08) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-07 == Outdated reference: A later version (-07) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-04 == Outdated reference: A later version (-09) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-07 == Outdated reference: A later version (-18) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-14 == Outdated reference: A later version (-21) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-16 Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 8 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Secure Inter-Domain Routing D. Mandelberg 3 Internet-Draft BBN Technologies 4 Intended status: Standards Track April 13, 2016 5 Expires: October 15, 2016 7 Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI 8 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-01 10 Abstract 12 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global 13 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet 14 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those 15 resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers 16 (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination 17 assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to 18 validate the path of a BGP route. Some ISPs locally use BGP with 19 private address space or private AS numbers (see RFC6890). These 20 local BGP routes cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and SHOULD be 21 considered invalid based on the global RPKI (see RFC6491). The 22 mechanisms described below provide ISPs with a way to make local 23 assertions about private (reserved) INRs while using the RPKI's 24 assertions about all other INRs. 26 Status of This Memo 28 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 29 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 31 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 32 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 33 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 34 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 36 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 37 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 38 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 39 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 41 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 15, 2016. 43 Copyright Notice 45 Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 46 document authors. All rights reserved. 48 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 49 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 50 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 51 publication of this document. Please review these documents 52 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 53 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 54 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 55 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 56 described in the Simplified BSD License. 58 Table of Contents 60 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 61 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 2. Validation Output Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 63 3. Locally Adding Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 4. Configuring SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 5. Combining Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 66 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 67 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 68 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 69 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 70 9.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 71 9.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 72 Appendix A. Example SLURM File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 73 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 75 1. Introduction 77 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global 78 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet 79 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those 80 resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6) 81 addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] 82 to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that 83 block. 85 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to validate 86 BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is described in 87 [RFC6483], and validation of the path of a route is described in 88 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview].) However, some ISPs locally use BGP 89 with private address space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or 90 private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). These local BGP routes 91 cannot be verified by the global RPKI, and SHOULD be considered 92 invalid when using the RPKI. For example, [RFC6491] recommends the 93 creation of ROAs that would invalidate routes for reserved and 94 unallocated address space. 96 This document specifies two new mechanisms to enable ISPs to make 97 local assertions about some INRs while using the RPKI's assertions 98 about all other INRs. These mechanisms primarily support the second 99 use case in [I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases], and may additionally 100 support the third use case. The second use case describes use of 101 [RFC1918] addresses or use of public address space not allocated to 102 the ISP that is using it. The third use case describes a situation 103 in which an ISP publishes a variant of the RPKI hierarchy (for its 104 customers). In this variant some prefixes and/or AS numbers are 105 different from what the RPKI repository system presents to the 106 general ISP population. The result is that routes for consumers of 107 this variant hierarchy will be re-directed (via routing). Note that 108 it also is possible to use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions 109 about non-private INRs, e.g., allocated address space that is not 110 globally routed. Network operators who elect to use SLURM in this 111 fashion should use extreme caution. (The fact that SLURM can be used 112 in this fashion is not an endorsement of such use by the author.) 114 Both mechanisms are specified in terms of abstract sets of 115 assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an assertion is a tuple 116 of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS number} as used by 117 rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1 118 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. For BGPsec 119 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], an assertion is a tuple of {AS 120 number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki- 121 rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions 122 are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions, 123 respectively.) Output Filtering, described in Section 2, filters out 124 (removes from consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in 125 the RPKI about locally reserved INRs. Locally Adding Assertions, 126 described in Section 3, adds local assertions about locally reserved 127 INRs. The combination of both mechanisms is described in Section 5. 129 To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. 130 That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as 131 if SLURM were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM 132 configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the 133 case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS 134 numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Adding Assertions. 135 If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown 136 state [RFC6483]. If both additions occur then both routes would be 137 in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other 138 does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid. 140 In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data 141 it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr 142 protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions 143 it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in 144 assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document 145 are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both 146 the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying 147 party software MAY modify other forms of output in comparable ways, 148 but that is outside the scope of this document. 150 1.1. Terminology 152 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 153 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 154 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 156 2. Validation Output Filtering 158 To prevent the global RPKI from affecting routes with locally 159 reserved INRs, a relying party is locally configured with a (possibly 160 empty) list of IP prefixes and/or AS numbers that are used locally. 161 (In general, these IP prefixes and AS numbers will be taken from 162 reserved INR spaces.) Any Origin Validation assertions where the IP 163 prefix is equal to or subsumed by a locally reserved IP prefix, are 164 removed from the relying party's output. (Note that an Origin 165 Validation assertion is not removed due to its AS number matching a 166 locally reserved AS number.) Any BGPsec assertion where the AS 167 number is equal to a locally reserved AS number is removed from the 168 relying party's output. 170 3. Locally Adding Assertions 172 Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty) list 173 of assertions. This list is added to the relying party's output. 175 4. Configuring SLURM 177 Relying party software SHOULD support the following configuration 178 format for Validation Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions. 179 The format is defined using the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) 180 notation and core rules from [RFC5234] and the rules 181 and from Appendix A of [RFC3986]. See Appendix A for 182 an example SLURM file. 184 A SLURM configuration file, , consists of a head and a 185 body. The head identifies the file as a SLURM configuration file, 186 specifies the version of SLURM for which the file was written, and 187 optionally contains other information described below. The body 188 contains the configuration for Validation Output Filtering and 189 Locally Adding Assertions. 191 SLURMFile = head body 193 head = firstLine *(commentLine / headLine) 195 body = *(commentLine / bodyLine) 197 firstLine = %x53.4c.55.52.4d SP "1.0" EOL ; "SLURM 1.0" 199 commentLine = *WSP [comment] EOL 201 headLine = *WSP headCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL 203 bodyLine = *WSP bodyCommand [ 1*WSP [comment] ] EOL 205 comment = "#" *(VCHAR / WSP) 207 EOL = CRLF / LF 209 The head may specify a target. If present, the target string 210 identifies the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be 211 used. The meaning of the target string, if any, is determined by the 212 user. If a target is present, a relying party SHOULD verify that 213 that the target is an acceptable value, and reject the SLURM file if 214 the target is not acceptable. For example, the relying party could 215 be configured to accept SLURM files only if they do not specify a 216 target, have a target value of "hostname=rpki.example.com", or have a 217 target value of "as=65536". If more than one target line is present, 218 all targets must be acceptable to the RP. 220 headCommand = target 222 target = 223 %x74.61.72.67.65.74 1*WSP ; "target" 224 1*VCHAR 226 The body contains zero or more configuration lines for Validation 227 Output Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions. Each command 228 specifies an INR to use for Validation Output Filtering. Each 229 command specifies an assertion to use for Locally Adding Assertions. 231 bodyCommand = add / del 233 add = 234 %x61.64.64 1*WSP ; "add" 235 addItem 237 del = 238 %x64.65.6c 1*WSP ; "del" 239 delItem 241 addItem = addItemPrefixAS / addItemASKey 243 ; Add a mapping from a prefix and max length to an AS number. 244 addItemPrefixAS = 245 %x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination" 246 IPprefixMaxLen 1*WSP 247 ASnum 249 ; Add a mapping from an AS number to a router public key. 250 addItemASKey = 251 %x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec" 252 ASnum 1*WSP 253 RouterSKI 1*WSP 254 RouterPubKey 256 delItem = delItemPrefix / delItemAS 258 ; Filter prefix-AS mappings, using the given prefix 259 delItemPrefix = 260 %x6f.72.69.67.69.6e.61.74.69.6f.6e 1*WSP ; "origination" 261 IPprefix 263 ; Filter AS-key mappings for the given AS 264 delItemAS = 265 %x62.67.70.73.65.63 1*WSP ; "bgpsec" 266 ASnum 268 IPprefix = IPv4prefix / IPv6prefix 270 IPprefixMaxLen = IPv4prefixMaxLen / IPv6prefixMaxLen 272 IPv4prefix = IPv4address "/" 1*2DIGIT 273 IPv6prefix = IPv6address "/" 1*3DIGIT 275 ; In the following two rules, if the maximum length component is 276 ; missing, it is treated as equal to the prefix length. 277 IPv4prefixMaxLen = IPv4prefix ["-" 1*2DIGIT] 278 IPv6prefixMaxLen = IPv6prefix ["-" 1*3DIGIT] 280 ASnum = 1*DIGIT 282 ; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router certificate's 283 ; Subject Key Identifer, as described in 284 ; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is the 285 ; value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length 286 ; fields. 288 RouterSKI = Base64 290 ; This is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router public key's 291 ; subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in 292 ; [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding 293 ; of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length 294 ; values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. 295 RouterPubKey = Base64 297 Base64 = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/") 0*2"=" 299 An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM 300 files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output 301 Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions are the respective unions of 302 the inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for 303 multiple files is when the files have distinct scopes. For example, 304 an organization may belong to two separate networks that use 305 different private-use IP prefixes and AS numbers. To detect conflict 306 between multiple SLURM files, a relying party SHOULD issue a warning 307 in the following cases: 309 1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation assertions 310 if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such 311 that X is contained by any prefix in any or 312 in file Y and X is contained by any prefix in any 313 or in file Z. 315 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there 316 exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X is 317 used in any or in file Y and X is used 318 in any or in file Z. 320 5. Combining Mechanisms 322 In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both output 323 filtering and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting 324 assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed 325 before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions 326 MUST NOT be removed by output filtering. 328 6. IANA Considerations 330 None. 332 7. Security Considerations 334 The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator 335 with additional ways to control its own network while making use of 336 RPKI data. These mechanisms are applied only locally; they do not 337 influence how other network operators interpret RPKI data. 338 Nonetheless, care should be taken in how these mechanisms are 339 employed. 341 8. Acknowledgements 343 The author would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and 344 detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wesley Wang for the 345 idea behind the target command, to Declan Ma for the idea behind use 346 of multiple SLURM files, and to Richard Hansen for his careful 347 reviews. 349 9. References 351 9.1. Informative References 353 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview] 354 Lepinski, M., "An Overview of BGPsec", draft-ietf-sidr- 355 bgpsec-overview-07 (work in progress), June 2015. 357 [I-D.ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases] 358 Bush, R., "RPKI Local Trust Anchor Use Cases", draft-ietf- 359 sidr-lta-use-cases-04 (work in progress), December 2015. 361 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis] 362 Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 363 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", draft-ietf- 364 sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-07 (work in progress), March 365 2016. 367 [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., 368 and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", 369 BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, 370 . 372 [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation, 373 selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)", 374 BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996, 375 . 377 [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast 378 Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, 379 . 381 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 382 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 383 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 384 . 386 [RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route 387 Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key 388 Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations 389 (ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012, 390 . 392 [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public 393 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA", 394 RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012, 395 . 397 [RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and 398 M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address 399 Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April 400 2012, . 402 [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 403 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, 404 DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013, 405 . 407 [RFC6890] Cotton, M., Vegoda, L., Bonica, R., Ed., and B. Haberman, 408 "Special-Purpose IP Address Registries", BCP 153, 409 RFC 6890, DOI 10.17487/RFC6890, April 2013, 410 . 412 [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for 413 Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July 414 2013, . 416 9.2. Normative References 418 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs] 419 Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature 420 Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-14 (work in 421 progress), November 2015. 423 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] 424 Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "A Profile for BGPsec Router 425 Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and 426 Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki- 427 profiles-16 (work in progress), March 2016. 429 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 430 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 431 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 432 . 434 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform 435 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, 436 RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, 437 . 439 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data 440 Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, 441 . 443 [RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax 444 Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, 445 DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008, 446 . 448 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 449 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, 450 DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, 451 . 453 Appendix A. Example SLURM File 454 SLURM 1.0 456 # This file is only intended to be used on a relying party running 457 # on rpki.example.com. 458 target hostname=rpki.example.com # this is a comment 460 # Reserve IP prefixes for local use. 461 del origination 10.0.0.0/24 462 del origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc::/48 464 # Reserve AS numbers for local use. 465 del bgpsec 64512 466 del bgpsec 64513 468 # Allow either 64512 or 64513 to originate routes to 10.0.0.0/24. 469 add origination 10.0.0.0/24 64512 470 add origination 10.0.0.0/24 64513 472 # 64512 originates fd0b:dd1d:2dcc::/52 and sub-prefixes up to length 473 # 56. 474 add origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc::/52-56 64512 476 # However, 64513 originates fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:42::/64. 477 add origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:42::/64 64513 479 # 64513 also originates fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:100::/52 480 add origination fd0b:dd1d:2dcc:100::/52 64513 482 # Authorize router keys to sign BGPsec paths on behalf of the 483 # specified ASes. Note that the Base64 strings used in this 484 # example are not valid SKIs or router public keys, due to line 485 # length restrictions in RFCs. 486 add bgpsec 64512 Zm9v VGhpcyBpcyBub3QgYSByb3V0ZXIgcHVibGljIGtleQ== 487 add bgpsec 64512 YmFy b3IgYSBmbG9jayBvZiBkdWNrcw== 488 add bgpsec 64513 YWJj bWF5YmUgYSBkaWZmZXJlbnQgYXZpYW4gY2Fycmllcj8= 490 Author's Address 492 David Mandelberg 493 BBN Technologies 494 10 Moulton St. 495 Cambridge, MA 02138 496 US 498 Email: david@mandelberg.org