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== Using lowercase 'not' together with uppercase 'MUST', 'SHALL', 'SHOULD',
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use uppercase 'NOT' together with RFC 2119 keywords (if that is what you
mean).
Found 'MUST not' in this paragraph:
This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC7159] format.
JSON members that are not defined here MUST not be used in SLURM Files,
however Relying Parties SHOULD ignore such unrecognized JSON members at
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2 SIDR D. Mandelberg
3 Internet-Draft Unaffiliated
4 Intended status: Standards Track D. Ma
5 Expires: September 14, 2017 ZDNS
6 T. Bruijnzeels
7 RIPE NCC
8 March 13, 2017
10 Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
11 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-04
13 Abstract
15 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
16 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
17 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
18 resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
19 (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
20 assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to
21 validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to
22 establish a local view of the RPKI to control its own network while
23 making use of RPKI data. The mechanisms described in this document
24 provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local,
25 customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data
26 as needed.
28 Status of This Memo
30 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
31 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
33 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
34 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
35 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
36 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
38 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
39 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
40 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
41 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
43 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.
45 Copyright Notice
47 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
48 document authors. All rights reserved.
50 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
51 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
52 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
53 publication of this document. Please review these documents
54 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
55 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
56 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
57 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
58 described in the Simplified BSD License.
60 Table of Contents
62 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
63 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
64 2. RPKI RPs with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
65 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
66 3.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
67 3.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
68 3.3. SLURM Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
69 3.4. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
70 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
71 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
72 3.5. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
73 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
74 3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
75 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11
76 4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
77 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
78 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
79 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
80 6. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
81 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
82 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
83 8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
84 8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
85 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
87 1. Introduction
89 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
90 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
91 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
92 resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
93 addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482]
94 to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
95 block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
96 validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is
97 described in [RFC6483], and validation of the path of a route is
98 described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview].)
100 However, an RPKI relying party may want to override some of the
101 information expressed via putative TAs and the certificates
102 downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For instances, [RFC6491]
103 recommends the creation of ROAs that would invalidate public routes
104 for reserved and unallocated address space, yet some ISPs might like
105 to use BGP and the RPKI with private address space ([RFC1918],
106 [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]).
107 Local use of private address space and/or AS numbers is consistent
108 with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot be verified by the
109 global RPKI. This motivates creation of mechanisms that enable a
110 network operator to publish a variant of RPKI hierarchy (for its own
111 use and that of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a
112 network operator might wish to make use of a local override
113 capability to protect routes from adverse actions
114 [I-D.ietf-sidr-adverse-actions], until the results of such actions
115 have been addressed. The mechanisms developed to provide this
116 capability to network operators are hereby called Simplified Local
117 internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI (SLURM).
119 SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by
120 generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6483], an
121 assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS
122 number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1
123 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]. For BGPsec
124 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], an assertion is a tuple of {AS
125 number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki-
126 rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions
127 are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions,
128 respectively.)
130 1.1. Terminology
132 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
133 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
134 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
136 2. RPKI RPs with SLURM
138 SLURM provides a simple way to enable RPs to establish a local,
139 customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if
140 needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from
141 consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that
142 are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec
143 assertions.
145 In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data
146 it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr
147 protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions
148 it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in
149 assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document
150 are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both
151 the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying
152 party software MAY modify other forms of output in comparable ways,
153 but that is outside the scope of this document.
155 +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
156 | | | | | |
157 | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
158 | | | | | |
159 +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+
160 |
161 +-------------------------------------------------+
162 |
163 +------v-------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
164 | | | | | | | |
165 | SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers|
166 | Filters | | Assertions | | | | |
167 +--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
169 Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack
171 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms
173 3.1. Use of JSON
175 This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC7159] format. JSON
176 members that are not defined here MUST not be used in SLURM Files,
177 however Relying Parties SHOULD ignore such unrecognized JSON members
178 at the top level, while any deviations from the specification at
179 lower levels MUST be considered an error.
181 3.2. SLURM File Overview
183 A SLURM file consists of:
185 o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1
187 o A slurmTarget element (Section 3.3) consisting of:
189 * Zero or more target elements. In this version of SLURM, there
190 are two types of values for the target: ASN or FQDN. If more
191 than one target line is present, all targets must be acceptable
192 to the RP.
194 o Validation Output Filters (Section 3.4), consisting of:
196 * An array of zero or more Prefix Filters, described in
197 Section 3.4.1
199 * An array of zero or more BGPSec Filters, described in
200 Section 3.4.2
202 o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of:
204 * An array of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in
205 Section 3.5.1
207 * An array of zero or more BGPSec Assertions, described in
208 Section 3.5.2
210 In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both output
211 filtering and locally added assertions. In this case, the resulting
212 assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed
213 before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions
214 MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
216 The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM
217 file that has no filters or assertions:
219 {
220 "slurmVersion": 1,
221 "slurmTarget": [],
222 "validationOutputFilters": {
223 "prefixFilters": [],
224 "bgpsecFilters": []
225 },
226 "locallyAddedAssertions": {
227 "prefixAssertions": [],
228 "bgpsecAssertions": []
229 }
230 }
232 Empty SLURM File
234 3.3. SLURM Target
236 A SLURM filer MUST specify a "slurmTarget" element that identifies
237 the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be used. The
238 "slurmTarget" element MAY have an empty array as its value, which
239 means "applies to all". The meaning of the "slurmTarget" element, if
240 present, is determined by the user. If a "slurmTarget" element is
241 present, a relying party SHOULD verify that the target is an
242 acceptable value, and reject this SLURM file if the "slurmTarget"
243 element is not acceptable. Each "slurmTarget" element contains
244 merely one "asn" or one "hostname". An explanatory "comment" MAY be
245 included in each "slurmTarget" element so that it can be shown to
246 users of the RP software.
248 For instance, a large ISP may want some of its ASes to establish a
249 local view of RPKI while the others not. Accordingly, this ISP needs
250 to make its RPs aware of this distinction for different BGP speakers
251 by adding ASN(s) to SLURM file target. Such a target value is an ASN
252 expressed in number.
254 "slurmTarget": [
255 {
256 "asn": 65536
257 "comment": "This file is intended for BGP speakers in AS 65536"
258 }
259 ]
261 slurmTarget example 1
263 Also, for instance, an organization may share one trusted third-party
264 SLURM file source. For the local control, or in the case of
265 Emergency Response Team Coordination, the SLURM file source may
266 generate a SLURM file that is to be applied to only one specific RP.
267 This file can take advantage of the "target" element to restrict the
268 ASes that will accept and use the file. Accordingly, the SLURM file
269 source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by
270 adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target.
271 Such a target value is a server name expressed in FQDN.
273 "slurmTarget": [
274 {
275 "hostname": "rpki.example.com"
276 "comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki.example.com"
277 }
278 ]
280 slurmTarget example 2
282 3.4. Validation Output Filters
284 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters
286 The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters
287 (Prefix Filters in short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either an
288 IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an AS number. It is RECOMMENDED that an
289 explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it
290 can be shown to users of the RP software.
292 Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured
293 Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output.
295 A Validated ROA Prefix is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if
296 one of the following cases applies:
298 1. If the Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, the
299 VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP Prefix is equal
300 to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter.
302 2. If Prefix Filter contains an AS number only, the VRP is
303 considered to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix
304 Filter ASN.
306 3. If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix AND an AS
307 Number, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP Prefix is equal
308 to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter AND the VRP ASN matches the
309 Prefix Filter ASN
311 The following JSON structure represents an array of "prefixFilters"
312 with an element for each use case listed above:
314 "prefixFilters": [
315 {
316 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
317 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
318 },
319 {
320 "asn": 64496,
321 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
322 },
323 {
324 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
325 "asn": 64497,
326 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
327 }
328 ]
330 prefixFilters examples
332 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters
334 The RP can configure zero or more BGPSec Assertion Filters (BGPSec
335 Filters in short). Each BGPSec Filter can contain an AS number and/
336 or a Router SKI.
338 The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
339 certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [I-D.ietf-sidr-
340 bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1
341 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length fields.
343 Furthermore it is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included
344 with each BGPSec Filter, so that it can be shown to users of the RP
345 software.
347 Any BGPSec Assertion that matches any configured BGPSec Filter MUST
348 be removed from the RPs output.
350 A BGPSec Assertion is considered to match with a BGPSec Filter if one
351 of the following cases applies:
353 1. If the BGPSec Filter contains an AS number only, a BGPSec
354 Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the
355 Filter ASN.
357 2. If the BGPSec Filter contains a Router SKI only, a BGPSec
358 Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI
359 matches the Filter Router SKI.
361 3. If the BGPSec Filter contains both an AS number AND a Router SKI,
362 then a BGPSec Assertion is considered to match if both the
363 Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI
364 matches the Filter Router SKI.
366 The following JSON structure represents an array of "bgpsecFilters"
367 with an element for each use case listed above:
369 "bgpsecFilters": [
370 {
371 "asn": 64496,
372 "comment": "All keys for ASN"
373 },
374 {
375 "routerSKI": "",
376 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
377 },
378 {
379 "asn": 64497,
380 "routerSKI": "",
381 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
382 }
383 ]
385 bgpsecFilters examples
387 3.5. Locally Added Assertions
389 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions
391 Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty)
392 array of ROA Prefix Assertions. This array is added to the RP's
393 output.
395 Each ROA Prefix Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, an AS
396 number, optionally a MaxLength and optionally a comment that can be
397 shown to users of the RP software.
399 The following JSON structure represents an array of
400 "prefixAssertions" with an element for each use case listed above:
402 "prefixAssertions": [
403 {
404 "asn": 64496,
405 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
406 "comment": "My other important route"
407 },
408 {
409 "asn": 64496,
410 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
411 "maxPrefixLength": 48,
412 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
413 }
414 ]
416 prefixAssertions examples
418 3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions
420 Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty)
421 array of BGPSec Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output.
423 Each BGPSec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the
424 Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to
425 users of the RP software.
427 The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
428 certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in
429 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] and [RFC6487]. This is the value
430 of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length fields.
432 The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
433 public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in
434 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of
435 the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length values
436 of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
438 The following JSON structure represents an array of
439 "bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above:
441 "bgpsecAssertions": [
442 {
443 "asn": 64496,
444 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
445 "SKI": "",
446 "publicKey": ""
447 }
448 ]
450 prefixAssertions examples
452 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions
454 The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file
455 that uses all the elements described in the previous sections:
457 {
458 "slurmVersion": 1,
459 "slurmTarget":[
460 {
461 "asn":65536
462 },
463 {
464 "hostname":"rpki.example.com"
465 }
466 ],
467 "validationOutputFilters": {
468 "prefixFilters": [
469 {
470 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
471 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
472 },
473 {
474 "asn": 64496,
475 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
476 },
477 {
478 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
479 "asn": 64497,
480 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
481 }
482 ],
483 "bgpsecFilters": [
484 {
485 "asn": 64496,
486 "comment": "All keys for ASN"
488 },
489 {
490 "routerSKI": "Zm9v",
491 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
492 },
493 {
494 "asn": 64497,
495 "routerSKI": "YmFy",
496 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
497 }
498 ]
499 },
500 "locallyAddedAssertions": {
501 "prefixAssertions": [
502 {
503 "asn": 64496,
504 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
505 "comment": "My other important route"
506 },
507 {
508 "asn": 64496,
509 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
510 "maxPrefixLength": 48,
511 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
512 }
513 ],
514 "bgpsecAssertions": [
515 {
516 "asn": 64496,
517 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
518 "SKI": "",
519 "publicKey": ""
520 }
521 ]
522 }
523 }
525 Full SLURM File
527 4. SLURM File Configuration
529 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity
531 To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
532 That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as
533 if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM
534 configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the
535 case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS
536 numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Adding Assertions.
537 If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown
538 state [RFC6483]. If both additions occur then both routes would be
539 in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other
540 does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid.
542 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files
544 An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
545 files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
546 Filtering and Locally Adding Assertions are the respective unions of
547 the inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for
548 multiple files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance,
549 operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to
550 frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files
551 to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from
552 different source it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict
553 among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP
554 SHOULD check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the
555 INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created these
556 SLURM files in question.
558 If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
559 files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error
560 report in the following cases:
562 1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation
563 assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM
564 files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any
565 or in file Y and X is
566 contained by any prefix in any or
567 in file Z.
569 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there
570 exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X
571 is used in any or in file Y
572 and X is used in any or in
573 file Z.
575 5. IANA Considerations
577 None
579 6. Security considerations
581 The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
582 with additional ways to control make use of RPKI data while
583 preserving autonomy in address space and ASN management. These
584 mechanisms are applied only locally; they do not influence how other
585 network operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be
586 taken in how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is
587 possible to use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-
588 private INRs, e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed.
589 For example, a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a
590 network operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action.
591 Network operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use
592 extreme caution.
594 The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an
595 RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a
596 security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the
597 assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP
598 can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could
599 declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice
600 versa. As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security
601 implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
602 provided by a third party.
604 Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
605 integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
606 may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
607 file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
608 of the updated SLURM file.
610 7. Acknowledgements
612 The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
613 detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the
614 idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful
615 reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their editorial assistance.
617 8. References
619 8.1. Informative References
621 [I-D.ietf-sidr-adverse-actions]
622 Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
623 Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
624 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", draft-ietf-sidr-
625 adverse-actions-04 (work in progress), January 2017.
627 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
628 Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPsec",
629 draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-08 (work in progress),
630 June 2016.
632 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis]
633 Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
634 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
635 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-rfc6810-bis-09 (work in
636 progress), February 2017.
638 [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
639 and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
640 BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
641 .
643 [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
644 selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
645 BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
646 .
648 [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
649 Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
650 .
652 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
653 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
654 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
655 .
657 [RFC6483] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route
658 Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
659 Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations
660 (ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, February 2012,
661 .
663 [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
664 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
665 RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
666 .
668 [RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
669 M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
670 Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
671 2012, .
673 [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
674 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
675 DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
676 .
678 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
679 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
680 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
681 .
683 [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
684 Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
685 2013, .
687 [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
688 Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
689 2014, .
691 8.2. Normative References
693 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs]
694 Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
695 Formats, & Signature Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-
696 algs-17 (work in progress), March 2017.
698 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
699 Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
700 BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
701 and Certification Requests", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-
702 profiles-18 (work in progress), July 2016.
704 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
705 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
706 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
707 .
709 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
710 Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
711 .
713 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
714 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
715 DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
716 .
718 Authors' Addresses
720 David Mandelberg
721 Unaffiliated
723 Email: david@mandelberg.org
725 Di Ma
726 ZDNS
727 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
728 Haidian, Beijing 100190
729 China
731 Email: madi@zdns.cn
733 Tim Bruijnzeels
734 RIPE NCC
735 Singel 258
736 Amsterdam 1016 AB
737 Netherlands
739 Email: tim@ripe.net