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2 SIDR D. Ma
3 Internet-Draft ZDNS
4 Intended status: Standards Track D. Mandelberg
5 Expires: August 9, 2018 Unaffiliated
6 T. Bruijnzeels
7 RIPE NCC
8 February 5, 2018
10 Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
11 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-05
13 Abstract
15 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
16 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
17 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
18 resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
19 (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
20 assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to
21 validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to
22 establish a local view of the RPKI to control its own network while
23 making use of RPKI data. The mechanisms described in this document
24 provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local,
25 customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data
26 as needed.
28 Status of This Memo
30 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
31 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
33 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
34 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
35 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
36 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
38 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
39 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
40 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
41 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
43 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 9, 2018.
45 Copyright Notice
47 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
48 document authors. All rights reserved.
50 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
51 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
52 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
53 publication of this document. Please review these documents
54 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
55 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
56 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
57 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
58 described in the Simplified BSD License.
60 Table of Contents
62 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
63 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
64 2. RPKI RPs with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
65 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
66 3.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
67 3.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
68 3.3. SLURM Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
69 3.4. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
70 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
71 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
72 3.5. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
73 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
74 3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
75 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11
76 4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
77 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
78 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
79 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
80 6. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
81 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
82 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
83 8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
84 8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
85 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
87 1. Introduction
89 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
90 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
91 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
92 resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
93 addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482]
94 to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
95 block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
96 validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is
97 described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is
98 described in [RFC8205].)
100 However, an RPKI relying party may want to override some of the
101 information expressed via putative TAs and the certificates
102 downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For instances, [RFC6491]
103 recommends the creation of ROAs that would invalidate public routes
104 for reserved and unallocated address space, yet some ISPs might like
105 to use BGP and the RPKI with private address space ([RFC1918],
106 [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]).
107 Local use of private address space and/or AS numbers is consistent
108 with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot be verified by the
109 global RPKI. This motivates creation of mechanisms that enable a
110 network operator to publish a variant of RPKI hierarchy (for its own
111 use and that of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a
112 network operator might wish to make use of a local override
113 capability to protect routes from adverse actions [RFC8211], until
114 the results of such actions have been addressed. The mechanisms
115 developed to provide this capability to network operators are hereby
116 called Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the
117 RPKI (SLURM).
119 SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by
120 generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6811], an
121 assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS
122 number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1
123 [RFC8210]. For BGPsec [RFC8205], an assertion is a tuple of {AS
124 number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki-
125 rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions
126 are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions,
127 respectively.)
129 1.1. Terminology
131 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
132 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
133 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
135 2. RPKI RPs with SLURM
137 SLURM provides a simple way to enable RPs to establish a local,
138 customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if
139 needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from
140 consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that
141 are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec
142 assertions.
144 In general, the primary output of an RPKI relying party is the data
145 it sends to routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr
146 protocol enables routers to query a relying party for all assertions
147 it knows about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in
148 assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document
149 are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both
150 the old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. Relying
151 party software may modify other forms of output in comparable ways,
152 but that is outside the scope of this document.
154 +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
155 | | | | | |
156 | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
157 | | | | | |
158 +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+
159 |
160 +-------------------------------------------------+
161 |
162 +------v-------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
163 | | | | | | | |
164 | SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers|
165 | Filters | | Assertions | | | | |
166 +--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
168 Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the Relying Party Stack
170 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms
172 3.1. Use of JSON
174 This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC7159]format. JSON
175 members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM Files.
176 Relying Parties MUST consider any deviations from the specification
177 an error. Future additions to the specifications in this document
178 MUST use an incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member.
180 3.2. SLURM File Overview
182 A SLURM file consists of:
184 o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1
186 o A slurmTarget element (Section 3.3) consisting of:
188 * Zero or more target elements. In this version of SLURM, there
189 are two types of values for the target: ASN or FQDN. If more
190 than one target line is present, all targets must be acceptable
191 to the RP.
193 o Validation Output Filters (Section 3.4), consisting of:
195 * An array of zero or more Prefix Filters, described in
196 Section 3.4.1
198 * An array of zero or more BGPSec Filters, described in
199 Section 3.4.2
201 o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of:
203 * An array of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in
204 Section 3.5.1
206 * An array of zero or more BGPSec Assertions, described in
207 Section 3.5.2
209 In the envisioned typical use case, a relying party uses both
210 Validation Output Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this
211 case, the resulting assertions MUST be the same as if output
212 filtering were performed before locally adding assertions. I.e.,
213 locally added assertions MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
215 The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM
216 file that has no filters or assertions:
218 {
219 "slurmVersion": 1,
220 "slurmTarget": [],
221 "validationOutputFilters": {
222 "prefixFilters": [],
223 "bgpsecFilters": []
224 },
225 "locallyAddedAssertions": {
226 "prefixAssertions": [],
227 "bgpsecAssertions": []
228 }
229 }
231 Empty SLURM File
233 3.3. SLURM Target
235 A SLURM filer MUST specify a "slurmTarget" element that identifies
236 the environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be used. The
237 "slurmTarget" element MAY have an empty array as its value, which
238 means "applies to all". The meaning of the "slurmTarget" element, if
239 present, is determined by the user. If a "slurmTarget" element is
240 present, a relying party SHOULD verify that the target is an
241 acceptable value, and reject this SLURM file if the "slurmTarget"
242 element is not acceptable. Each "slurmTarget" element contains
243 merely one "asn" or one "hostname". An explanatory "comment" MAY be
244 included in each "slurmTarget" element so that it can be shown to
245 users of the RP software.
247 For instance, a large ISP may want some of its ASes to establish a
248 local view of RPKI while the others not. Accordingly, this ISP needs
249 to make its RPs aware of this distinction for different BGP speakers
250 by adding ASN(s) to SLURM file target. Such a target value is an ASN
251 expressed in number.
253 "slurmTarget": [
254 {
255 "asn": 65536
256 "comment": "This file is intended for BGP speakers in AS 65536"
257 }
258 ]
260 slurmTarget example 1
262 Also, for instance, an organization may share one trusted third-party
263 SLURM file source. For the local control, or in the case of
264 Emergency Response Team Coordination, the SLURM file source may
265 generate a SLURM file that is to be applied to only one specific RP.
266 This file can take advantage of the "target" element to restrict the
267 ASes that will accept and use the file. Accordingly, the SLURM file
268 source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by
269 adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target.
270 Such a target value is a server name expressed in FQDN.
272 "slurmTarget": [
273 {
274 "hostname": "rpki.example.com"
275 "comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki.example.com"
276 }
277 ]
279 slurmTarget example 2
281 3.4. Validation Output Filters
283 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters
285 The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters
286 (Prefix Filters in short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either an
287 IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an AS number. It is RECOMMENDED that an
288 explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it
289 can be shown to users of the RP software.
291 Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured
292 Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output.
294 A Validated ROA Prefix is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if
295 one of the following cases applies:
297 1. If the Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, the
298 VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP Prefix is equal
299 to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter.
301 2. If Prefix Filter contains an AS number only, the VRP is
302 considered to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix
303 Filter ASN.
305 3. If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix AND an AS
306 Number, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP Prefix is equal
307 to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter AND the VRP ASN matches the
308 Prefix Filter ASN
310 The following JSON structure represents an array of "prefixFilters"
311 with an element for each use case listed above:
313 "prefixFilters": [
314 {
315 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
316 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
317 },
318 {
319 "asn": 64496,
320 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
321 },
322 {
323 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
324 "asn": 64497,
325 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
326 }
327 ]
329 prefixFilters examples
331 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters
333 The RP can configure zero or more BGPSec Assertion Filters (BGPSec
334 Filters in short). Each BGPSec Filter can contain an AS number and/
335 or a Router SKI.
337 The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
338 certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and
339 [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the
340 ASN.1 tag or length fields.
342 Furthermore it is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included
343 with each BGPSec Filter, so that it can be shown to users of the RP
344 software.
346 Any BGPSec Assertion that matches any configured BGPSec Filter MUST
347 be removed from the RPs output.
349 A BGPSec Assertion is considered to match with a BGPSec Filter if one
350 of the following cases applies:
352 1. If the BGPSec Filter contains an AS number only, a BGPSec
353 Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the
354 Filter ASN.
356 2. If the BGPSec Filter contains a Router SKI only, a BGPSec
357 Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI
358 matches the Filter Router SKI.
360 3. If the BGPSec Filter contains both an AS number AND a Router SKI,
361 then a BGPSec Assertion is considered to match if both the
362 Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI
363 matches the Filter Router SKI.
365 The following JSON structure represents an array of "bgpsecFilters"
366 with an element for each use case listed above:
368 "bgpsecFilters": [
369 {
370 "asn": 64496,
371 "comment": "All keys for ASN"
372 },
373 {
374 "routerSKI": "",
375 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
376 },
377 {
378 "asn": 64497,
379 "routerSKI": "",
380 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
381 }
382 ]
384 bgpsecFilters examples
386 3.5. Locally Added Assertions
388 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions
390 Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty)
391 array of ROA Prefix Assertions. This array is added to the RP's
392 output.
394 Each ROA Prefix Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, an AS
395 number, optionally a MaxLength and optionally a comment that can be
396 shown to users of the RP software.
398 The following JSON structure represents an array of
399 "prefixAssertions" with an element for each use case listed above:
401 "prefixAssertions": [
402 {
403 "asn": 64496,
404 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
405 "comment": "My other important route"
406 },
407 {
408 "asn": 64496,
409 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
410 "maxPrefixLength": 48,
411 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
412 }
413 ]
415 prefixAssertions examples
417 3.5.2. BGPSec Assertions
419 Each relying party is locally configured with a (possibly empty)
420 array of BGPSec Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output.
422 Each BGPSec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the
423 Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to
424 users of the RP software.
426 The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
427 certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and
428 [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the
429 ASN.1 tag or length fields.
431 The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
432 public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in [RFC8208].
433 This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo,
434 including the ASN.1 tag and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo
435 SEQUENCE.
437 The following JSON structure represents an array of
438 "bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above:
440 "bgpsecAssertions": [
441 {
442 "asn": 64496,
443 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
444 "SKI": "",
445 "publicKey": ""
446 }
447 ]
449 prefixAssertions examples
451 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions
453 The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file
454 that uses all the elements described in the previous sections:
456 {
457 "slurmVersion": 1,
458 "slurmTarget":[
459 {
460 "asn":65536
461 },
462 {
463 "hostname":"rpki.example.com"
464 }
465 ],
466 "validationOutputFilters": {
467 "prefixFilters": [
468 {
469 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
470 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
471 },
472 {
473 "asn": 64496,
474 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
475 },
476 {
477 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
478 "asn": 64497,
479 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
480 }
481 ],
482 "bgpsecFilters": [
483 {
484 "asn": 64496,
485 "comment": "All keys for ASN"
487 },
488 {
489 "routerSKI": "Zm9v",
490 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
491 },
492 {
493 "asn": 64497,
494 "routerSKI": "YmFy",
495 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
496 }
497 ]
498 },
499 "locallyAddedAssertions": {
500 "prefixAssertions": [
501 {
502 "asn": 64496,
503 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
504 "comment": "My other important route"
505 },
506 {
507 "asn": 64496,
508 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
509 "maxPrefixLength": 48,
510 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
511 }
512 ],
513 "bgpsecAssertions": [
514 {
515 "asn": 64496,
516 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
517 "SKI": "",
518 "publicKey": ""
519 }
520 ]
521 }
522 }
524 Full SLURM File
526 4. SLURM File Configuration
528 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity
530 To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
531 That is, the output of the relying party must be either the same as
532 if SLURM file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM
533 configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the
534 case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS
535 numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions.
536 If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown
537 state [RFC6811]. If both additions occur then both routes would be
538 in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other
539 does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid.
541 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files
543 An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
544 files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
545 Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the
546 inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for multiple
547 files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance,
548 operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to
549 frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files
550 to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from
551 different sources it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict
552 among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP MUST
553 check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the INR
554 assertions and report errors to the sources that created these SLURM
555 files in question.
557 If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
558 files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error
559 report in the following cases:
561 1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation
562 assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM
563 files Y,Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any
564 or in file Y and X is
565 contained by any prefix in any or
566 in file Z.
568 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there
569 exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y,Z such that X
570 is used in any or in file Y
571 and X is used in any or in
572 file Z.
574 5. IANA Considerations
576 None
578 6. Security considerations
580 The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
581 with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving
582 autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are
583 applied only locally; they do not influence how other network
584 operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be taken in
585 how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is possible to
586 use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs,
587 e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. For example,
588 a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network
589 operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action. Network
590 operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme
591 caution.
593 The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an
594 RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a
595 security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the
596 assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP
597 can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could
598 declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice
599 versa. As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security
600 implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
601 provided by a third party.
603 Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
604 integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
605 may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
606 file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
607 of the updated SLURM file. Yet the mechanism to update SLURM file to
608 guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this
609 document.
611 7. Acknowledgements
613 The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
614 detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the
615 idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful
616 reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their editorial assistance.
618 8. References
620 8.1. Informative References
622 [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
623 and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
624 BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
625 .
627 [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
628 selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
629 BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
630 .
632 [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
633 Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
634 .
636 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
637 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
638 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
639 .
641 [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
642 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
643 RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
644 .
646 [RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
647 M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
648 Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
649 2012, .
651 [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
652 Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
653 2013, .
655 8.2. Normative References
657 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
658 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
659 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
660 .
662 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
663 Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
664 .
666 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
667 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
668 DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
669 .
671 [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
672 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
673 DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
674 .
676 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
677 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
678 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
679 .
681 [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
682 Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
683 2014, .
685 [RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
686 Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
687 2017, .
689 [RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
690 Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208,
691 DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017,
692 .
694 [RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
695 BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
696 and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
697 DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
698 .
700 [RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
701 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
702 RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
703 .
705 [RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
706 Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
707 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211,
708 DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,
709 .
711 Authors' Addresses
713 Di Ma
714 ZDNS
715 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
716 Haidian, Beijing 100190
717 China
719 Email: madi@zdns.cn
720 David Mandelberg
721 Unaffiliated
723 Email: david@mandelberg.org
724 URI: https://david.mandelberg.org
726 Tim Bruijnzeels
727 RIPE NCC
728 Stationsplein 11
729 Amsterdam 1012 AB
730 Netherlands
732 Email: tim@ripe.net