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2 SIDR D. Ma
3 Internet-Draft ZDNS
4 Intended status: Standards Track D. Mandelberg
5 Expires: September 23, 2018 Unaffiliated
6 T. Bruijnzeels
7 RIPE NCC
8 March 22, 2018
10 Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI
11 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07
13 Abstract
15 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
16 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
17 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
18 resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
19 (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination
20 assertions. ISPs can also be able to use the RPKI to validate the
21 path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to establish a local
22 view of the RPKI to control its own network while making use of RPKI
23 data. The mechanisms described in this document provide a simple way
24 to enable INR holders to establish a local, customized view of the
25 RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data as needed.
27 Status of This Memo
29 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
30 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
32 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
33 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
34 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
35 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
37 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
38 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
39 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
40 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
42 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 23, 2018.
44 Copyright Notice
46 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
47 document authors. All rights reserved.
49 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
50 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
51 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
52 publication of this document. Please review these documents
53 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
54 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
55 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
56 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
57 described in the Simplified BSD License.
59 Table of Contents
61 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
62 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
63 2. RP with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
64 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
65 3.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
66 3.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
67 3.3. SLURM Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
68 3.4. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
69 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
70 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
71 3.5. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
72 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
73 3.5.2. BGPsec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
74 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11
75 4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
76 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
77 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
78 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
79 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
80 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
81 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
82 8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
83 8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
84 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
86 1. Introduction
88 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
89 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
90 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
91 resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
92 addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482]
93 to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
94 block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
95 validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is
96 described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is
97 described in [RFC8205].)
99 However, an "RPKI relying party" (RP) may want to override some of
100 the information expressed via putative Trust Anchor(TA) and the
101 certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For
102 instances, [RFC6491] recommends the creation of ROAs that would
103 invalidate public routes for reserved and unallocated address space,
104 yet some ISPs might like to use BGP and the RPKI with private address
105 space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers
106 ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). Local use of private address space and/or AS
107 numbers is consistent with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot
108 be verified by the global RPKI. This motivates creation of
109 mechanisms that enable a network operator to publish a variant of
110 RPKI hierarchy (for its own use and that of its customers) at its
111 discretion. Additionally, a network operator might wish to make use
112 of a local override capability to protect routes from adverse actions
113 [RFC8211], until the results of such actions have been addressed.
114 The mechanisms developed to provide this capability to network
115 operators are hereby called Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource
116 Management with the RPKI (SLURM).
118 SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by
119 generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6811], an
120 assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS
121 number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1
122 [RFC8210]. For BGPsec [RFC8205], an assertion is a tuple of {AS
123 number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki-
124 rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions
125 are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions,
126 respectively.)
128 1.1. Terminology
130 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
131 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
132 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
134 2. RP with SLURM
136 SLURM provides a simple way to enable an RP to establish a local,
137 customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if
138 needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from
139 consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that
140 are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec
141 assertions.
143 In general, the primary output of an RP is the data it sends to
144 routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr protocol enables
145 routers to query an RP for all assertions it knows about (Reset
146 Query) or for an update of only the changes in assertions (Serial
147 Query). The mechanisms specified in this document are to be applied
148 to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both the old and new sets
149 that are compared for a Serial Query. RP software may modify other
150 forms of output in comparable ways, but that is outside the scope of
151 this document.
153 +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
154 | | | | | |
155 | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
156 | | | | | |
157 +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+
158 |
159 +-------------------------------------------------+
160 |
161 +------v-------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
162 | | | | | | | |
163 | SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers|
164 | Filters | | Assertions | | | | |
165 +--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+
167 Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the RP Stack
169 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms
171 3.1. Use of JSON
173 This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC8259] format. JSON
174 members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM Files.
175 An RP MUST consider any deviations from the specification an error.
176 Future additions to the specifications in this document MUST use an
177 incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member.
179 3.2. SLURM File Overview
181 A SLURM file consists of:
183 o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1
185 o A slurmTarget element (Section 3.3) consisting of:
187 * Zero or more target elements. In this version of SLURM, there
188 are two types of values for the target: ASN or Fully Qualified
189 Domain Name(FQDN). If more than one target line is present,
190 all targets MUST be acceptable to the RP.
192 o Validation Output Filters (Section 3.4), consisting of:
194 * An array of zero or more Prefix Filters, described in
195 Section 3.4.1
197 * An array of zero or more BGPsec Filters, described in
198 Section 3.4.2
200 o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of:
202 * An array of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in
203 Section 3.5.1
205 * An array of zero or more BGPsec Assertions, described in
206 Section 3.5.2
208 In the envisioned typical use case, an RP uses both Validation Output
209 Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this case, the resulting
210 assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed
211 before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions
212 MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
214 The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM
215 file that has no filters or assertions:
217 {
218 "slurmVersion": 1,
219 "slurmTarget": [],
220 "validationOutputFilters": {
221 "prefixFilters": [],
222 "bgpsecFilters": []
223 },
224 "locallyAddedAssertions": {
225 "prefixAssertions": [],
226 "bgpsecAssertions": []
227 }
228 }
230 Empty SLURM File
232 3.3. SLURM Target
234 A SLURM file MUST specify a "slurmTarget" element that identifies the
235 environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be used. The
236 "slurmTarget" element MAY have an empty array as its value, which
237 means "applies to all". The meaning of the "slurmTarget" element, if
238 present, is determined by the user. If a "slurmTarget" element is
239 present, an RP SHOULD verify that the target is an acceptable value,
240 and reject this SLURM file if the "slurmTarget" element is not
241 acceptable. Each "slurmTarget" element contains merely one "asn" or
242 one "hostname". An explanatory "comment" MAY be included in each
243 "slurmTarget" element so that it can be shown to users of the RP
244 software.
246 For instance, a large ISP may want some of its ASes to establish a
247 local view of RPKI while the others not. Accordingly, this ISP needs
248 to make its RPs aware of this distinction for different BGP speakers
249 by adding ASN(s) to SLURM file target. Such a target value is an ASN
250 expressed in number.
252 "slurmTarget": [
253 {
254 "asn": 65536,
255 "comment": "This file is intended for BGP speakers in AS 65536"
256 }
257 ]
259 slurmTarget example 1
261 Also, for instance, an organization may share one trusted third-party
262 SLURM file source. For the local control, or in the case of
263 Emergency Response Team Coordination, the SLURM file source may
264 generate a SLURM file that is to be applied to only one specific RP.
265 This file can take advantage of the "target" element to restrict the
266 ASes that will accept and use the file. Accordingly, the SLURM file
267 source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by
268 adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target.
269 Such a target value is a server name expressed in FQDN.
271 "slurmTarget": [
272 {
273 "hostname": "rpki.example.com",
274 "comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki.example.com"
275 }
276 ]
278 slurmTarget example 2
280 3.4. Validation Output Filters
282 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters
284 The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters
285 (Prefix Filters in short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either an
286 IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an AS number. It is RECOMMENDED that an
287 explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it
288 can be shown to users of the RP software.
290 Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured
291 Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output.
293 A Validated ROA Prefix is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if
294 one of the following cases applies:
296 1. If the Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, the
297 VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP Prefix is equal
298 to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter.
300 2. If Prefix Filter contains an AS number only, the VRP is
301 considered to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix
302 Filter ASN.
304 3. If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix AND an AS
305 Number, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP Prefix is equal
306 to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter AND the VRP ASN matches the
307 Prefix Filter ASN.
309 The following JSON structure represents an array of "prefixFilters"
310 with an element for each use case listed above:
312 "prefixFilters": [
313 {
314 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
315 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
316 },
317 {
318 "asn": 64496,
319 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
320 },
321 {
322 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
323 "asn": 64497,
324 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
325 }
326 ]
328 prefixFilters examples
330 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters
332 The RP can configure zero or more BGPsec Assertion Filters (BGPsec
333 Filters in short). Each BGPsec Filter can contain an AS number and/
334 or a Router SKI.
336 The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
337 certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and
338 [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the
339 ASN.1 tag or length fields.
341 Furthermore it is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included
342 with each BGPsec Filter, so that it can be shown to users of the RP
343 software.
345 Any BGPsec Assertion that matches any configured BGPsec Filter MUST
346 be removed from the RP's output.
348 A BGPsec Assertion is considered to match with a BGPsec Filter if one
349 of the following cases applies:
351 1. If the BGPsec Filter contains an AS number only, a BGPsec
352 Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the
353 Filter ASN.
355 2. If the BGPsec Filter contains a Router SKI only, a BGPsec
356 Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI
357 matches the Filter Router SKI.
359 3. If the BGPsec Filter contains both an AS number AND a Router SKI,
360 then a BGPsec Assertion is considered to match if both the
361 Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI
362 matches the Filter Router SKI.
364 The following JSON structure represents an array of "bgpsecFilters"
365 with an element for each use case listed above:
367 "bgpsecFilters": [
368 {
369 "asn": 64496,
370 "comment": "All keys for ASN"
371 },
372 {
373 "routerSKI": "",
374 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
375 },
376 {
377 "asn": 64497,
378 "routerSKI": "",
379 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
380 }
381 ]
383 bgpsecFilters examples
385 3.5. Locally Added Assertions
387 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions
389 Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ROA
390 Prefix Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output.
392 Each ROA Prefix Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, an AS
393 number, optionally a MaxLength and optionally a comment that can be
394 shown to users of the RP software.
396 The following JSON structure represents an array of
397 "prefixAssertions" with an element for each use case listed above:
399 "prefixAssertions": [
400 {
401 "asn": 64496,
402 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
403 "comment": "My other important route"
404 },
405 {
406 "asn": 64496,
407 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
408 "maxPrefixLength": 48,
409 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
410 }
411 ]
413 prefixAssertions examples
415 3.5.2. BGPsec Assertions
417 Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of BGPsec
418 Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output.
420 Each BGPsec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the
421 Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to
422 users of the RP software.
424 The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
425 certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and
426 [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the
427 ASN.1 tag or length fields.
429 The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router
430 public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in [RFC8208].
431 This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo,
432 including the ASN.1 tag and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo
433 SEQUENCE.
435 The following JSON structure represents an array of
436 "bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above:
438 "bgpsecAssertions": [
439 {
440 "asn": 64496,
441 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
442 "SKI": "",
443 "publicKey": ""
444 }
445 ]
447 prefixAssertions examples
449 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions
451 The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file
452 that uses all the elements described in the previous sections:
454 {
455 "slurmVersion": 1,
456 "slurmTarget":[
457 {
458 "asn":65536
459 },
460 {
461 "hostname":"rpki.example.com"
462 }
463 ],
464 "validationOutputFilters": {
465 "prefixFilters": [
466 {
467 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
468 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
469 },
470 {
471 "asn": 64496,
472 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
473 },
474 {
475 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
476 "asn": 64497,
477 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
478 }
479 ],
480 "bgpsecFilters": [
481 {
482 "asn": 64496,
483 "comment": "All keys for ASN"
485 },
486 {
487 "routerSKI": "Zm9v",
488 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
489 },
490 {
491 "asn": 64497,
492 "routerSKI": "YmFy",
493 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
494 }
495 ]
496 },
497 "locallyAddedAssertions": {
498 "prefixAssertions": [
499 {
500 "asn": 64496,
501 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
502 "comment": "My other important route"
503 },
504 {
505 "asn": 64496,
506 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
507 "maxPrefixLength": 48,
508 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
509 }
510 ],
511 "bgpsecAssertions": [
512 {
513 "asn": 64496,
514 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
515 "SKI": "",
516 "publicKey": ""
517 }
518 ]
519 }
520 }
522 Full SLURM File
524 4. SLURM File Configuration
526 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity
528 To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
529 That is, the output of the RP must be either the same as if SLURM
530 file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM
531 configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the
532 case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS
533 numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions.
534 If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown
535 state [RFC6811]. If both additions occur then both routes would be
536 in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other
537 does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid.
539 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files
541 An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
542 files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
543 Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the
544 inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for multiple
545 files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance,
546 operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to
547 frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files
548 to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from
549 different sources it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict
550 among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP MUST
551 check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the INR
552 assertions and report errors to the sources that created these SLURM
553 files in question.
555 If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
556 files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error
557 report in the following cases:
559 1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation
560 assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM
561 files Y, Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any
562 or in file Y and X is
563 contained by any prefix in any or
564 in file Z.
566 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there
567 exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y, Z such that
568 X is used in any or in file
569 Y and X is used in any or
570 in file Z.
572 5. IANA Considerations
574 None
576 6. Security Considerations
578 The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
579 with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving
580 autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are
581 applied only locally; they do not influence how other network
582 operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be taken in
583 how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is possible to
584 use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs,
585 e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. For example,
586 a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network
587 operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action. Network
588 operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme
589 caution.
591 The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an
592 RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a
593 security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the
594 assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP
595 can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could
596 declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice
597 versa. As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security
598 implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
599 provided by a third party.
601 Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
602 integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
603 may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
604 file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
605 of the updated SLURM file. Yet the mechanism to update SLURM file to
606 guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this
607 document.
609 7. Acknowledgments
611 The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and
612 detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the
613 idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful
614 reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their editorial assistance.
616 8. References
618 8.1. Informative References
620 [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
621 and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
622 BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
623 .
625 [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
626 selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
627 BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
628 .
630 [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
631 Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
632 .
634 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
635 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
636 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
637 .
639 [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
640 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
641 RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
642 .
644 [RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
645 M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
646 Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
647 2012, .
649 [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
650 Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
651 2013, .
653 [RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
654 Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
655 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211,
656 DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,
657 .
659 8.2. Normative References
661 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
662 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
663 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
664 .
666 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
667 Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
668 .
670 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
671 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
672 DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
673 .
675 [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
676 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810,
677 DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,
678 .
680 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
681 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
682 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
683 .
685 [RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
686 Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
687 2017, .
689 [RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
690 Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208,
691 DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017,
692 .
694 [RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
695 BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
696 and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
697 DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
698 .
700 [RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
701 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
702 RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
703 .
705 [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
706 Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
707 DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
708 .
710 Authors' Addresses
711 Di Ma
712 ZDNS
713 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
714 Haidian, Beijing 100190
715 China
717 Email: madi@zdns.cn
719 David Mandelberg
720 Unaffiliated
722 Email: david@mandelberg.org
723 URI: https://david.mandelberg.org
725 Tim Bruijnzeels
726 RIPE NCC
727 Stationsplein 11
728 Amsterdam 1012 AB
729 Netherlands
731 Email: tim@ripe.net