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Bruijnzeels 7 RIPE NCC 8 March 22, 2018 10 Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI 11 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-07 13 Abstract 15 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global 16 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet 17 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those 18 resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers 19 (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination 20 assertions. ISPs can also be able to use the RPKI to validate the 21 path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to establish a local 22 view of the RPKI to control its own network while making use of RPKI 23 data. The mechanisms described in this document provide a simple way 24 to enable INR holders to establish a local, customized view of the 25 RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data as needed. 27 Status of This Memo 29 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 30 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 32 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 33 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 34 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 35 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 37 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 38 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 39 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 40 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 42 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 23, 2018. 44 Copyright Notice 46 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 47 document authors. All rights reserved. 49 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 50 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 51 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 52 publication of this document. Please review these documents 53 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 54 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 55 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 56 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 57 described in the Simplified BSD License. 59 Table of Contents 61 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 62 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 2. RP with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 64 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 3.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 66 3.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 67 3.3. SLURM Target . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 3.4. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 69 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 70 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 71 3.5. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 72 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 73 3.5.2. BGPsec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 74 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11 75 4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 76 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 77 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 78 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 79 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 80 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 81 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 82 8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 83 8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 84 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 86 1. Introduction 88 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global 89 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet 90 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those 91 resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6) 92 addresses can issue a Route Origination Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] 93 to authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that 94 block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to 95 validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is 96 described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is 97 described in [RFC8205].) 99 However, an "RPKI relying party" (RP) may want to override some of 100 the information expressed via putative Trust Anchor(TA) and the 101 certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For 102 instances, [RFC6491] recommends the creation of ROAs that would 103 invalidate public routes for reserved and unallocated address space, 104 yet some ISPs might like to use BGP and the RPKI with private address 105 space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers 106 ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). Local use of private address space and/or AS 107 numbers is consistent with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot 108 be verified by the global RPKI. This motivates creation of 109 mechanisms that enable a network operator to publish a variant of 110 RPKI hierarchy (for its own use and that of its customers) at its 111 discretion. Additionally, a network operator might wish to make use 112 of a local override capability to protect routes from adverse actions 113 [RFC8211], until the results of such actions have been addressed. 114 The mechanisms developed to provide this capability to network 115 operators are hereby called Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource 116 Management with the RPKI (SLURM). 118 SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by 119 generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6811], an 120 assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS 121 number} as used by rpki-rtr version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1 122 [RFC8210]. For BGPsec [RFC8205], an assertion is a tuple of {AS 123 number, subject key identifier, router public key} as used by rpki- 124 rtr version 1. (For the remainder of this document, these assertions 125 are called Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec assertions, 126 respectively.) 128 1.1. Terminology 130 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 131 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 132 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 134 2. RP with SLURM 136 SLURM provides a simple way to enable an RP to establish a local, 137 customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if 138 needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from 139 consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that 140 are overridden by local Origin Validation assertions and BGPsec 141 assertions. 143 In general, the primary output of an RP is the data it sends to 144 routers over the rpki-rtr protocol. The rpki-rtr protocol enables 145 routers to query an RP for all assertions it knows about (Reset 146 Query) or for an update of only the changes in assertions (Serial 147 Query). The mechanisms specified in this document are to be applied 148 to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both the old and new sets 149 that are compared for a Serial Query. RP software may modify other 150 forms of output in comparable ways, but that is outside the scope of 151 this document. 153 +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+ 154 | | | | | | 155 | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation | 156 | | | | | | 157 +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+ 158 | 159 +-------------------------------------------------+ 160 | 161 +------v-------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+ 162 | | | | | | | | 163 | SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers| 164 | Filters | | Assertions | | | | | 165 +--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+ 167 Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the RP Stack 169 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms 171 3.1. Use of JSON 173 This document describes responses in the JSON [RFC8259] format. JSON 174 members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM Files. 175 An RP MUST consider any deviations from the specification an error. 176 Future additions to the specifications in this document MUST use an 177 incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member. 179 3.2. SLURM File Overview 181 A SLURM file consists of: 183 o A SLURM Version indication that MUST be 1 185 o A slurmTarget element (Section 3.3) consisting of: 187 * Zero or more target elements. In this version of SLURM, there 188 are two types of values for the target: ASN or Fully Qualified 189 Domain Name(FQDN). If more than one target line is present, 190 all targets MUST be acceptable to the RP. 192 o Validation Output Filters (Section 3.4), consisting of: 194 * An array of zero or more Prefix Filters, described in 195 Section 3.4.1 197 * An array of zero or more BGPsec Filters, described in 198 Section 3.4.2 200 o Locally Added Assertions (Section 3.5), consisting of: 202 * An array of zero or more Prefix Assertions, described in 203 Section 3.5.1 205 * An array of zero or more BGPsec Assertions, described in 206 Section 3.5.2 208 In the envisioned typical use case, an RP uses both Validation Output 209 Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this case, the resulting 210 assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed 211 before locally adding assertions. I.e., locally added assertions 212 MUST NOT be removed by output filtering. 214 The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM 215 file that has no filters or assertions: 217 { 218 "slurmVersion": 1, 219 "slurmTarget": [], 220 "validationOutputFilters": { 221 "prefixFilters": [], 222 "bgpsecFilters": [] 223 }, 224 "locallyAddedAssertions": { 225 "prefixAssertions": [], 226 "bgpsecAssertions": [] 227 } 228 } 230 Empty SLURM File 232 3.3. SLURM Target 234 A SLURM file MUST specify a "slurmTarget" element that identifies the 235 environment in which the SLURM file is intended to be used. The 236 "slurmTarget" element MAY have an empty array as its value, which 237 means "applies to all". The meaning of the "slurmTarget" element, if 238 present, is determined by the user. If a "slurmTarget" element is 239 present, an RP SHOULD verify that the target is an acceptable value, 240 and reject this SLURM file if the "slurmTarget" element is not 241 acceptable. Each "slurmTarget" element contains merely one "asn" or 242 one "hostname". An explanatory "comment" MAY be included in each 243 "slurmTarget" element so that it can be shown to users of the RP 244 software. 246 For instance, a large ISP may want some of its ASes to establish a 247 local view of RPKI while the others not. Accordingly, this ISP needs 248 to make its RPs aware of this distinction for different BGP speakers 249 by adding ASN(s) to SLURM file target. Such a target value is an ASN 250 expressed in number. 252 "slurmTarget": [ 253 { 254 "asn": 65536, 255 "comment": "This file is intended for BGP speakers in AS 65536" 256 } 257 ] 259 slurmTarget example 1 261 Also, for instance, an organization may share one trusted third-party 262 SLURM file source. For the local control, or in the case of 263 Emergency Response Team Coordination, the SLURM file source may 264 generate a SLURM file that is to be applied to only one specific RP. 265 This file can take advantage of the "target" element to restrict the 266 ASes that will accept and use the file. Accordingly, the SLURM file 267 source needs to indicate which RP(s) should make use of the file by 268 adding the domain name(s) of the RP(s) to the SLURM file target. 269 Such a target value is a server name expressed in FQDN. 271 "slurmTarget": [ 272 { 273 "hostname": "rpki.example.com", 274 "comment": "This file is intended for RP server rpki.example.com" 275 } 276 ] 278 slurmTarget example 2 280 3.4. Validation Output Filters 282 3.4.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters 284 The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters 285 (Prefix Filters in short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either an 286 IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an AS number. It is RECOMMENDED that an 287 explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it 288 can be shown to users of the RP software. 290 Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured 291 Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output. 293 A Validated ROA Prefix is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if 294 one of the following cases applies: 296 1. If the Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, the 297 VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP Prefix is equal 298 to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter. 300 2. If Prefix Filter contains an AS number only, the VRP is 301 considered to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix 302 Filter ASN. 304 3. If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix AND an AS 305 Number, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP Prefix is equal 306 to or subsumed by the Prefix Filter AND the VRP ASN matches the 307 Prefix Filter ASN. 309 The following JSON structure represents an array of "prefixFilters" 310 with an element for each use case listed above: 312 "prefixFilters": [ 313 { 314 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", 315 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix" 316 }, 317 { 318 "asn": 64496, 319 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN" 320 }, 321 { 322 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 323 "asn": 64497, 324 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" 325 } 326 ] 328 prefixFilters examples 330 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters 332 The RP can configure zero or more BGPsec Assertion Filters (BGPsec 333 Filters in short). Each BGPsec Filter can contain an AS number and/ 334 or a Router SKI. 336 The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router 337 certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and 338 [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the 339 ASN.1 tag or length fields. 341 Furthermore it is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included 342 with each BGPsec Filter, so that it can be shown to users of the RP 343 software. 345 Any BGPsec Assertion that matches any configured BGPsec Filter MUST 346 be removed from the RP's output. 348 A BGPsec Assertion is considered to match with a BGPsec Filter if one 349 of the following cases applies: 351 1. If the BGPsec Filter contains an AS number only, a BGPsec 352 Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the 353 Filter ASN. 355 2. If the BGPsec Filter contains a Router SKI only, a BGPsec 356 Assertion is considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI 357 matches the Filter Router SKI. 359 3. If the BGPsec Filter contains both an AS number AND a Router SKI, 360 then a BGPsec Assertion is considered to match if both the 361 Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI 362 matches the Filter Router SKI. 364 The following JSON structure represents an array of "bgpsecFilters" 365 with an element for each use case listed above: 367 "bgpsecFilters": [ 368 { 369 "asn": 64496, 370 "comment": "All keys for ASN" 371 }, 372 { 373 "routerSKI": "", 374 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI" 375 }, 376 { 377 "asn": 64497, 378 "routerSKI": "", 379 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" 380 } 381 ] 383 bgpsecFilters examples 385 3.5. Locally Added Assertions 387 3.5.1. ROA Prefix Assertions 389 Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ROA 390 Prefix Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output. 392 Each ROA Prefix Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, an AS 393 number, optionally a MaxLength and optionally a comment that can be 394 shown to users of the RP software. 396 The following JSON structure represents an array of 397 "prefixAssertions" with an element for each use case listed above: 399 "prefixAssertions": [ 400 { 401 "asn": 64496, 402 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 403 "comment": "My other important route" 404 }, 405 { 406 "asn": 64496, 407 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", 408 "maxPrefixLength": 48, 409 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" 410 } 411 ] 413 prefixAssertions examples 415 3.5.2. BGPsec Assertions 417 Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of BGPsec 418 Assertions. This array is added to the RP's output. 420 Each BGPsec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a Router SKI, the 421 Router Public Key, and optionally a comment that can be shown to 422 users of the RP software. 424 The Router SKI is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router 425 certificate's Subject Key Identifier, as described in [RFC8209] and 426 [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the 427 ASN.1 tag or length fields. 429 The Router Public Key is the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a router 430 public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as described in [RFC8208]. 431 This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, 432 including the ASN.1 tag and length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo 433 SEQUENCE. 435 The following JSON structure represents an array of 436 "bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above: 438 "bgpsecAssertions": [ 439 { 440 "asn": 64496, 441 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN", 442 "SKI": "", 443 "publicKey": "" 444 } 445 ] 447 prefixAssertions examples 449 3.6. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions 451 The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file 452 that uses all the elements described in the previous sections: 454 { 455 "slurmVersion": 1, 456 "slurmTarget":[ 457 { 458 "asn":65536 459 }, 460 { 461 "hostname":"rpki.example.com" 462 } 463 ], 464 "validationOutputFilters": { 465 "prefixFilters": [ 466 { 467 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", 468 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix" 469 }, 470 { 471 "asn": 64496, 472 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN" 473 }, 474 { 475 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 476 "asn": 64497, 477 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" 478 } 479 ], 480 "bgpsecFilters": [ 481 { 482 "asn": 64496, 483 "comment": "All keys for ASN" 485 }, 486 { 487 "routerSKI": "Zm9v", 488 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI" 489 }, 490 { 491 "asn": 64497, 492 "routerSKI": "YmFy", 493 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" 494 } 495 ] 496 }, 497 "locallyAddedAssertions": { 498 "prefixAssertions": [ 499 { 500 "asn": 64496, 501 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 502 "comment": "My other important route" 503 }, 504 { 505 "asn": 64496, 506 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", 507 "maxPrefixLength": 48, 508 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" 509 } 510 ], 511 "bgpsecAssertions": [ 512 { 513 "asn": 64496, 514 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN", 515 "SKI": "", 516 "publicKey": "" 517 } 518 ] 519 } 520 } 522 Full SLURM File 524 4. SLURM File Configuration 526 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity 528 To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. 529 That is, the output of the RP must be either the same as if SLURM 530 file were not used, or it must reflect the entire SLURM 531 configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the 532 case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin AS 533 numbers. Both routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions. 534 If neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown 535 state [RFC6811]. If both additions occur then both routes would be 536 in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other 537 does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid. 539 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files 541 An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM 542 files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output 543 Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the 544 inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for multiple 545 files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance, 546 operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to 547 frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files 548 to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from 549 different sources it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict 550 among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP MUST 551 check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the INR 552 assertions and report errors to the sources that created these SLURM 553 files in question. 555 If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM 556 files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error 557 report in the following cases: 559 1. There may be conflicting changes to Origin Validation 560 assertions if there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM 561 files Y, Z such that X is contained by any prefix in any 562 or in file Y and X is 563 contained by any prefix in any or 564 in file Z. 566 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec assertions if there 567 exists an AS number X and distinct SLURM files Y, Z such that 568 X is used in any or in file 569 Y and X is used in any or 570 in file Z. 572 5. IANA Considerations 574 None 576 6. Security Considerations 578 The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator 579 with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving 580 autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are 581 applied only locally; they do not influence how other network 582 operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be taken in 583 how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is possible to 584 use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs, 585 e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. For example, 586 a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network 587 operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action. Network 588 operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme 589 caution. 591 The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an 592 RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a 593 security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the 594 assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP 595 can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could 596 declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice 597 versa. As a result, an RP must carefully consider the security 598 implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is 599 provided by a third party. 601 Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and 602 integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file 603 may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM 604 file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity 605 of the updated SLURM file. Yet the mechanism to update SLURM file to 606 guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this 607 document. 609 7. Acknowledgments 611 The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and 612 detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to Wei Wang for the 613 idea behind the target command, to Richard Hansen for his careful 614 reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their editorial assistance. 616 8. References 618 8.1. Informative References 620 [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., 621 and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", 622 BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, 623 . 625 [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation, 626 selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)", 627 BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996, 628 . 630 [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast 631 Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, 632 . 634 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 635 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 636 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 637 . 639 [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public 640 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA", 641 RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012, 642 . 644 [RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and 645 M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address 646 Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April 647 2012, . 649 [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for 650 Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July 651 2013, . 653 [RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification 654 Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource 655 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211, 656 DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017, 657 . 659 8.2. Normative References 661 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 662 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 663 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 664 . 666 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data 667 Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, 668 . 670 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 671 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, 672 DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, 673 . 675 [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 676 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, 677 DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013, 678 . 680 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 681 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, 682 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 683 . 685 [RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol 686 Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September 687 2017, . 689 [RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key 690 Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208, 691 DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017, 692 . 694 [RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for 695 BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, 696 and Certification Requests", RFC 8209, 697 DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017, 698 . 700 [RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 701 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1", 702 RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017, 703 . 705 [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 706 Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, 707 DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, 708 . 710 Authors' Addresses 711 Di Ma 712 ZDNS 713 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun 714 Haidian, Beijing 100190 715 China 717 Email: madi@zdns.cn 719 David Mandelberg 720 Unaffiliated 722 Email: david@mandelberg.org 723 URI: https://david.mandelberg.org 725 Tim Bruijnzeels 726 RIPE NCC 727 Stationsplein 11 728 Amsterdam 1012 AB 729 Netherlands 731 Email: tim@ripe.net