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Bruijnzeels 7 RIPE NCC 8 April 26, 2018 10 Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI 11 (SLURM) 12 draft-ietf-sidr-slurm-08 14 Abstract 16 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global 17 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet 18 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those 19 resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers 20 (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origin assertions. 21 ISPs can also use the RPKI to validate the path of a BGP route. 22 However, ISPs may want to establish a local view of exceptions to the 23 RPKI data in the form of local filters and additions. The mechanisms 24 described in this document provide a simple way to enable INR holders 25 to establish a local, customized view of the RPKI, overriding global 26 RPKI repository data as needed. 28 Status of This Memo 30 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 31 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 33 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 34 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 35 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 36 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 38 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 39 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 40 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 41 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 43 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 28, 2018. 45 Copyright Notice 47 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 48 document authors. All rights reserved. 50 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 51 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 52 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 53 publication of this document. Please review these documents 54 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 55 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 56 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 57 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 58 described in the Simplified BSD License. 60 Table of Contents 62 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 63 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 64 2. RP with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 66 3.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 67 3.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 3.3. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 3.3.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 3.3.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 71 3.4. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 72 3.4.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 73 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 74 3.5. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 11 75 4. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 76 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 77 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 78 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 79 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 80 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 81 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 82 8.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 83 8.2. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 84 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 86 1. Introduction 88 The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global 89 authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet 90 Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those 91 resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6) 92 addresses can issue a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] to 93 authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that 94 block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to 95 validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is 96 described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is 97 described in [RFC8205].) 99 However, an "RPKI relying party" (RP) may want to override some of 100 the information expressed via configured Trust Anchors (TAs) and the 101 certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For 102 instances, [RFC6491] recommends the creation of ROAs that would 103 invalidate public routes for reserved and unallocated address space, 104 yet some ISPs might like to use BGP and the RPKI with private address 105 space ([RFC1918], [RFC4193], [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers 106 ([RFC1930], [RFC6996]). Local use of private address space and/or AS 107 numbers is consistent with the RFCs cited above, but such use cannot 108 be verified by the global RPKI. This motivates creation of 109 mechanisms that enable a network operator to publish exception to the 110 RPKI in the form of filters and additions (for its own use and that 111 of its customers) at its discretion. Additionally, a network 112 operator might wish to make use of a local override capability to 113 protect routes from adverse actions [RFC8211], until the results of 114 such actions have been addressed. The mechanisms developed to 115 provide this capability to network operators are hereby called 116 Simplified Local internet nUmber Resource Management with the RPKI 117 (SLURM). 119 SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by 120 generating sets of assertions. For Origin Validation [RFC6811], an 121 assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length, AS 122 number (ASN)} as used by rpki-rtr (the RPKI to Router Protocol) 123 version 0 [RFC6810] and rpki-rtr version 1 [RFC8210]. For BGPsec 124 [RFC8205], an assertion is a tuple of {ASN, subject key identifier, 125 router public key} as used by rpki-rtr version 1. (For the remainder 126 of this document, these assertions are called ROA Prefix Assertions 127 and BGPsec Assertions, respectively.) 129 1.1. Terminology 131 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT","REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 132 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 133 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 134 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 135 capitals, as shown here. 137 2. RP with SLURM 139 SLURM provides a simple way to enable an RP to establish a local, 140 customized view of the RPKI, by overriding RPKI repository data if 141 needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (removes from 142 consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI that 143 are overridden by local ROA Prefix Assertions and BGPsec Assertions. 145 In general, the primary output of an RP is the data it sends to 146 routers over the rpki-rtr protocol [RFC8210]. The rpki-rtr protocol 147 enables routers to query an RP for all assertions it knows about 148 (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in assertions 149 (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document are to be 150 applied to the result set for a Reset Query, and to both the old and 151 new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. RP software may 152 modify other forms of output in comparable ways, but that is outside 153 the scope of this document. 155 +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+ 156 | | | | | | 157 | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation | 158 | | | | | | 159 +--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+ 160 | 161 +-------------------------------------------------+ 162 | 163 +------v-------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+ 164 | | | | | | | | 165 | SLURM +---> SLURM +---> rpki-rtr +---> BGP Speakers| 166 | Filters | | Assertions | | | | | 167 +--------------+ +------------+ +----------+ +-------------+ 169 Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the RP Stack 171 3. SLURM File and Mechanisms 173 3.1. Use of JSON 175 SLURM filters and assertions are specified in JSON [RFC8259] format. 176 JSON members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM 177 Files. An RP MUST consider any deviations from the specification 178 errors. Future additions to the specifications in this document MUST 179 use an incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member. 181 3.2. SLURM File Overview 183 A SLURM file consists of a single JSON object containing the 184 following members: 186 o A "slurmVersion" member that MUST be set to 1, encoded as a number 188 o A "validationOutputFilters" member (Section 3.3), whose value is 189 an object. The object MUST contain exactly two members: 191 * A "prefixFilters" member, whose value is described in 192 Section 3.3.1. 194 * A "bgpsecFilters" member, whose value is described in 195 Section 3.3.2. 197 o A "locallyAddedAssertions" member (Section 3.4), whose value is an 198 object. The object MUST contain exactly two members: 200 * A "prefixAssertions" member, whose value is described in 201 Section 3.4.1. 203 * A "bgpsecAssertions" member, whose value is described in 204 Section 3.4.2. 206 In the envisioned typical use case, an RP uses both Validation Output 207 Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this case, the resulting 208 assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed 209 before locally adding assertions. i.e. locally added assertions 210 MUST NOT be removed by output filtering. 212 The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM 213 file that has no filters or assertions: 215 { 216 "slurmVersion": 1, 217 "validationOutputFilters": { 218 "prefixFilters": [], 219 "bgpsecFilters": [] 220 }, 221 "locallyAddedAssertions": { 222 "prefixAssertions": [], 223 "bgpsecAssertions": [] 224 } 225 } 227 Empty SLURM File 229 3.3. Validation Output Filters 231 3.3.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters 233 The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters 234 (Prefix Filters in short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either an 235 IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an ASN. It is RECOMMENDED that an 236 explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter, so that it 237 can be shown to users of the RP software. 239 The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixFilters" member, as 240 an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one of 241 either, or one each of both following members: 243 o A "prefix" member, whose value is string representing either an 244 IPv4 prefix (Section 3.1 of [RFC4632]) or an IPv6 prefix 245 ([RFC5952]). 247 o An "asn" member, whose value is a number. 249 In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member, 250 whose value is a string. 252 The following example JSON structure represents a "prefixFilters" 253 member with an array of example objects for each use case listed 254 above: 256 "prefixFilters": [ 257 { 258 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", 259 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix" 260 }, 261 { 262 "asn": 64496, 263 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN" 264 }, 265 { 266 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 267 "asn": 64497, 268 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" 269 } 270 ] 272 prefixFilters examples 274 Any Validated ROA Prefix (VRP, [RFC6811]) that matches any configured 275 Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output. 277 A VRP is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if one of the 278 following cases applies: 280 1. If the Prefix Filter contains an IPv4 or IPv6 Prefix only, the 281 VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP prefix is equal 282 to or covered by the Prefix Filter prefix. 284 2. If Prefix Filter contains an ASN only, the VRP is considered to 285 match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix Filter ASN. 287 3. If Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an ASN, 288 the VRP is considered to match if the VRP prefix is equal to or 289 covered by the Prefix Filter prefix and the VRP ASN matches the 290 Prefix Filter ASN. 292 3.3.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters 294 The RP can configure zero or more BGPsec Assertion Filters (BGPsec 295 Filters in short). Each BGPsec Filter can contain an ASN and/or the 296 Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a Router Subject Key Identifier (SKI), 297 as described in [RFC8209] and [RFC6487]. It is RECOMMENDED that an 298 explanatory comment is also included with each BGPSec Filter, so that 299 it can be shown to users of the RP software. 301 The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecFilters" member, as 302 an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one of 303 either, or one each of both following members: 305 o An "asn" member, whose value is a number 307 o An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without 308 trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the certificate's Subject 309 Public Key as described in Section 4.8.2. of [RFC6487] (This is 310 the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or 311 length fields.) 313 In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member, 314 whose value is a string. 316 The following example JSON structure represents a "bgpsecFilters" 317 member with an array of example objects for each use case listed 318 above: 320 "bgpsecFilters": [ 321 { 322 "asn": 64496, 323 "comment": "All keys for ASN" 324 }, 325 { 326 "SKI": "", 327 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI" 328 }, 329 { 330 "asn": 64497, 331 "SKI": "", 332 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" 333 } 334 ] 336 bgpsecFilters examples 338 Any BGPsec Assertion that matches any configured BGPsec Filter MUST 339 be removed from the RP's output. A BGPsec Assertion is considered to 340 match with a BGPsec Filter if one of the following cases applies: 342 1. If the BGPsec Filter contains an ASN only, a BGPsec Assertion is 343 considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN. 345 2. If the BGPsec Filter contains an SKI only, a BGPsec Assertion is 346 considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI matches the 347 Filter SKI. 349 3. If the BGPsec Filter contains both an ASN and a Router SKI, then 350 a BGPsec Assertion is considered to match if both the Assertion 351 ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI matches 352 the Filter Router SKI. 354 3.4. Locally Added Assertions 356 3.4.1. ROA Prefix Assertions 358 Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ROA 359 Prefix Assertions (Prefix Assertion in short). Each ROA Prefix 360 Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an ASN. It MAY 361 include a value for the maximum length. It is RECOMMENDED that an 362 explanatory comment is also included with each, so that it can be 363 shown to users ofthe RP software. 365 The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixAssertions" member, 366 as an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one 367 each of both following members: 369 o A "prefix" member, whose value is string representing either an 370 IPv4 prefix (Section 3.1 of [RFC4632]) or an IPv6 prefix 371 ([RFC5952]). 373 o An "asn" member, whose value is a number. 375 In addition, each object MAY contain one of each of the following 376 members: 378 o A "maxPrefixLength" member, whose value is a number. 380 o A "comment" member, whose value is a string. 382 The following example JSON structure represents a "prefixAssertions" 383 member with an array of example objects for each use case listed 384 above: 386 "prefixAssertions": [ 387 { 388 "asn": 64496, 389 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 390 "comment": "My other important route" 391 }, 392 { 393 "asn": 64496, 394 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", 395 "maxPrefixLength": 48, 396 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" 397 } 398 ] 400 prefixAssertions examples 402 Note that the combination of the prefix, ASN and optional maximum 403 length describes a VRP as described in [RFC6811]. The RP MUST add 404 all Prefix Assertions found this way to the VRP found through RPKI 405 validation, and ensure that it sends the complete set of PDUs, 406 excluding duplicates when using the rpki-rtr protocol, see 407 Section 5.6 and 5.7 of [RFC8210]. 409 3.4.2. BGPsec Assertions 411 Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of BGPsec 412 Assertions. Each BGPsec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a 413 Router SKI, and the Router Public Key. It is RECOMMENDED that an 414 explanatory comment is also included, so that it can be shown to 415 users of the RP software. 417 The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecAssertions" member, 418 as an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one 419 each of all of the following members: 421 An "asn" member, whose value is a number. 423 An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without 424 trailing '=' (Section 5 of RFC4648 ) of the router's public key 425 equivalent to a certificate's Subject Public Key as described in 426 Section 4.8.2. of [RFC6487]. This is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET 427 STRING without the ASN.1 tag or length fields. 429 A "routerPublicKey" member, whose value is is the Base64 encoding 430 without trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the equivalent to 431 a router certificate's public key's subjectPublicKeyInfo value, as 432 described in [RFC8208]. This is the full ASN.1 DER encoding of 433 the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and length 434 values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE. 436 The following JSON structure represents an array of 437 "bgpsecAssertions" with one element as described above: 439 "bgpsecAssertions": [ 440 { 441 "asn": 64496, 442 "SKI": "", 443 "publicKey": "", 444 "comment": "My known key for my important ASN" 445 } 446 ] 448 bgpsecAssertions examples 450 Note that a bgpsecAssertion matches the syntax of the Router Key PDU 451 described in section 5.10 of [RFC8210]. Relying Parties MUST add any 452 bgpsecAssertion thus found to the set of Router PDUs, excluding 453 duplicates, when using the RPKI-RTR protocol [RFC8210]. 455 3.5. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions 457 The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file 458 that uses all the elements described in the previous sections: 460 { 461 "slurmVersion": 1, 462 "validationOutputFilters": { 463 "prefixFilters": [ 464 { 465 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", 466 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix" 467 }, 468 { 469 "asn": 64496, 470 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN" 471 }, 472 { 473 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 474 "asn": 64497, 475 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" 476 } 477 ], 478 "bgpsecFilters": [ 479 { 480 "asn": 64496, 481 "comment": "All keys for ASN" 482 }, 483 { 484 "SKI": "Zm9v", 485 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI" 486 }, 487 { 488 "asn": 64497, 489 "SKI": "YmFy", 490 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" 491 } 492 ] 493 }, 494 "locallyAddedAssertions": { 495 "prefixAssertions": [ 496 { 497 "asn": 64496, 498 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 499 "comment": "My other important route" 500 }, 501 { 502 "asn": 64496, 503 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", 504 "maxPrefixLength": 48, 505 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" 506 } 507 ], 508 "bgpsecAssertions": [ 509 { 510 "asn": 64496, 511 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN", 512 "SKI": "", 513 "publicKey": "" 514 } 515 ] 516 } 517 } 519 Example of Full SLURM File 521 4. SLURM File Configuration 523 4.1. SLURM File Atomicity 525 To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic. 526 That is, the output of the RP MUST be either the same as if SLURM 527 file were not used, or it MUST reflect the entire SLURM 528 configuration. For an example of why this is required, consider the 529 case of two local routes for the same prefix but different origin 530 ASNs. Both routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions. If 531 neither addition occurs, then both routes could be in the unknown 532 state [RFC6811]. If both additions occur then both routes would be 533 in the valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other 534 does not, then one could be invalid while the other is valid. 536 4.2. Multiple SLURM Files 538 An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM 539 files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output 540 Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the 541 inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for multiple 542 files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance, 543 operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to 544 frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files 545 to this RP respectively. Before an RP configures SLURM files from 546 different sources it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict 547 among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP 548 SHOULD check the entries of SLURM file with regard to overlaps of the 549 INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created these 550 SLURM files in question. The RP gets multiple SLURM files as a set, 551 and the whole set MUST be rejected in case of any overlaps among 552 SLURM files. 554 If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM 555 files, the RP MUST NOT use them, and SHOULD issue a warning as error 556 report in the following cases: 558 1. There may be conflicting changes to ROA Prefix Assertions if 559 there exists an IP address X and distinct SLURM files Y, Z 560 such that X is contained by any prefix in any 561 or in file Y and X is 562 contained by any prefix in any or 563 in file Z. 565 2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec Assertions if there 566 exists an ASN X and distinct SLURM files Y, Z such that X is 567 used in any or in file Y 568 and X is used in any or in 569 file Z. 571 5. IANA Considerations 573 None 575 6. Security Considerations 577 The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator 578 with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving 579 autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are 580 applied only locally; they do not influence how other network 581 operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be taken in 582 how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is possible to 583 use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs, 584 e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. For example, 585 a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network 586 operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action. Network 587 operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme 588 caution. 590 The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an 591 RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a 592 security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the 593 assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP 594 can undermine the security offered by the RPKI, to that RP. It could 595 declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and vice 596 versa. As a result, an RP MUST carefully consider the security 597 implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is 598 provided by a third party. 600 Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and 601 integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file 602 may be pre-configured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM 603 file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity 604 of the updated SLURM file. Yet the mechanism to update SLURM file to 605 guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this 606 document. 608 7. Acknowledgments 610 The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and 611 detailed reviews of this document. Thanks go to to Richard Hansen 612 for his careful reviews, to Hui Zou and Chunlin An for their 613 editorial assistance. 615 8. References 617 8.1. Informative References 619 [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., 620 and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", 621 BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, 622 . 624 [RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation, 625 selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)", 626 BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996, 627 . 629 [RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast 630 Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, 631 . 633 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 634 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 635 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 636 . 638 [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public 639 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA", 640 RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012, 641 . 643 [RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and 644 M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address 645 Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April 646 2012, . 648 [RFC6810] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 649 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", RFC 6810, 650 DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013, 651 . 653 [RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for 654 Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July 655 2013, . 657 [RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 658 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1", 659 RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017, 660 . 662 [RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification 663 Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource 664 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211, 665 DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017, 666 . 668 8.2. Normative References 670 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 671 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 672 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 673 . 675 [RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing 676 (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation 677 Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August 678 2006, . 680 [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data 681 Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, 682 . 684 [RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6 685 Address Text Representation", RFC 5952, 686 DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010, 687 . 689 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 690 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, 691 DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, 692 . 694 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 695 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, 696 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 697 . 699 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 700 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 701 May 2017, . 703 [RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol 704 Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September 705 2017, . 707 [RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key 708 Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208, 709 DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017, 710 . 712 [RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for 713 BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, 714 and Certification Requests", RFC 8209, 715 DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017, 716 . 718 [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 719 Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, 720 DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, 721 . 723 Authors' Addresses 725 Di Ma 726 ZDNS 727 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun 728 Haidian, Beijing 100190 729 China 731 Email: madi@zdns.cn 733 David Mandelberg 734 Unaffiliated 736 Email: david@mandelberg.org 737 URI: https://david.mandelberg.org 739 Tim Bruijnzeels 740 RIPE NCC 741 Stationsplein 11 742 Amsterdam 1012 AB 743 Netherlands 745 Email: tim@ripe.net