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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) -- Looks like a reference, but probably isn't: '0' on line 226 == Missing Reference: 'ThisRFC' is mentioned on line 264, but not defined -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'IANA-AF' ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6485 (Obsoleted by RFC 7935) -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'X680' -- Possible downref: Non-RFC (?) normative reference: ref. 'X690' Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 5 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group A. Azimov 3 Internet-Draft Yandex 4 Intended status: Standards Track E. Uskov 5 Expires: May 7, 2020 Qrator Labs 6 R. Bush 7 Internet Initiative Japan 8 K. Patel 9 Arrcus 10 J. Snijders 11 NTT 12 R. Housley 13 Vigil Security 14 November 4, 2019 16 A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization 17 draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-01 19 Abstract 21 This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System 22 Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An 23 Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object 24 that provides a means of verifying that a Customer Autonomous System 25 holder has authorized members of Provider set to be its upstream 26 providers and for the Providers to send prefixes received from the 27 Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and 28 peers. 30 Requirements Language 32 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 33 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 34 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 35 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 36 capitals, as shown here. 38 Status of This Memo 40 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 41 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 43 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 44 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 45 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 46 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 48 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 49 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 50 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 51 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 53 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020. 55 Copyright Notice 57 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 58 document authors. All rights reserved. 60 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 61 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 62 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 63 publication of this document. Please review these documents 64 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 65 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 66 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 67 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 68 described in the Simplified BSD License. 70 Table of Contents 72 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 73 2. The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 74 3. The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 75 3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 76 3.2. AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 77 3.3. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 78 3.4. providerASSET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 79 4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 80 5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . 5 81 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 82 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 83 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 84 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 85 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 86 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 87 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 89 1. Introduction 91 The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) 92 is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more 93 information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed 94 to verify that a AS has permission from a Customer AS (CAS) holder to 95 send routes in all directions. The digitally signed Autonomous 96 System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this 97 verification mechanism. 99 The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects 100 [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 101 [RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic 102 validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be 103 validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current 104 infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in 105 [RFC6485], or its successor. 107 To complete the specification of the ASPA (see Section 4 of 108 [RFC6488]), this document defines: 110 1. The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed 111 object. This OID appears in the eContentType field of the 112 encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed 113 attribute within the signerInfo structure). 115 2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload 116 signed by the CAS. The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1 117 [X680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X690]. 119 3. The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation 120 steps specified in [RFC6488]). 122 2. The ASPA Content Type 124 The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-cct-ASPA, which has the 125 numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD. This OID MUST appear 126 both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as 127 well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo 128 structure (see [RFC6488]). 130 3. The ASPA eContent 132 The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as 133 the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized to further 134 propagate announcements received from the customer. If customer has 135 multiple providers they SHOULD be registered in a single ASPA object. 136 An ASPA is formally defined as: 138 ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= 139 { ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } 141 id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD } 143 ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { 144 version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0, 145 AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier, 146 customerASID ASID, 147 providerASSET SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID } 149 ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) } 151 AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER 153 ASID ::= INTEGER 155 Note that this content appears as the eContent within the 156 encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488]. 158 3.1. version 160 The version number of the ASProviderAttestation MUST be v0. 162 3.2. AFI 164 The AFI field contains Address Family Identifier for which the 165 relation between customer and provider ASes is authorized. Presently 166 defined values for the Address Family Identifier field are specified 167 in the IANA's Address Family Numbers registry [IANA-AF]. 169 3.3. customerASID 171 The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous 172 System that authorizes an upstream providers (listed in the 173 providerASSET) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family 174 other ASes. 176 3.4. providerASSET 178 The providerASSET contains the sequence (set) of AS numbers that are 179 authorized to further propagate announcements in the specified 180 address family received from the customer. 182 4. ASPA Validation 184 Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing 185 announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object 186 itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the 187 validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following 188 additional ASPA-specific validation step. 190 o The autonomous system identifier delegation extension [RFC3779] is 191 present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the 192 ASPA), and the customer AS number in the ASPA is contained within 193 the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's autonomous 194 system identifier delegation extension. 196 5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type 197 RPKI-ASPA-2018 198 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 199 pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018(TBD2) } 200 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= 201 BEGIN 202 IMPORTS 204 CONTENT-TYPE 205 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- RFC 6268 206 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 207 pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ; 209 ContentSet CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-ASPA, ... } 211 -- 212 -- ASPA Content Type 213 -- 215 id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) 216 us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 16 } 218 id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 } 220 id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD } 222 ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= 223 { TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } 225 ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { 226 version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0, 227 AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier, 228 customerASID ASID, 229 providerASSET SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID } 231 ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) } 233 AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER 235 ASID ::= INTEGER 237 END 239 6. IANA Considerations 241 Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018 to the SMI Security for S/MIME 242 Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry 243 (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi- 244 numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows: 246 Decimal | Description | Specification 247 ----------------------------------------------------------- 248 TBD2 | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018 | [ThisRFC] 250 Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 251 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ 252 smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows: 254 Decimal | Description | Specification 255 ----------------------------------------------------------- 256 TBD | id-ct-ASPA | [ThisRFC] 258 Please add the ASPA to the RPKI Signed Object registry 259 (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as 260 follows: 262 Name | OID | Specification 263 ----------------------------------------------------------- 264 ASPA | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD | [ThisRFC] 266 7. Security Considerations 268 8. Acknowledgments 270 9. References 272 9.1. Normative References 274 [IANA-AF] IANA, "Address Family Numbers", 275 . 277 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 278 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 279 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 280 . 282 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 283 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, 284 DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, 285 . 287 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 288 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 289 . 291 [RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for 292 Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", 293 RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012, 294 . 296 [RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object 297 Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 298 (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012, 299 . 301 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 302 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 303 May 2017, . 305 [X680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation 306 One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", 307 ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2015. 309 [X690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: 310 Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical 311 Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules 312 (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015. 314 9.2. Informative References 316 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 317 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 318 February 2012, . 320 Authors' Addresses 322 Alexander Azimov 323 Yandex 325 Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com 327 Eugene Uskov 328 Qrator Labs 330 Email: eu@qrator.net 332 Randy Bush 333 Internet Initiative Japan 335 Email: randy@psg.com 336 Keyur Patel 337 Arrcus, Inc. 339 Email: keyur@arrcus.com 341 Job Snijders 342 NTT Communications 343 Theodorus Majofskistraat 100 344 Amsterdam 1065 SZ 345 The Netherlands 347 Email: job@ntt.net 349 Russ Housley 350 Vigil Security, LLC 351 918 Spring Knoll Drive 352 Herndon, VA 20170 353 USA 355 Email: housley@vigilsec.com