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Uskov 5 Expires: May 6, 2021 JetLend 6 R. Bush 7 Internet Initiative Japan 8 K. Patel 9 Arrcus 10 J. Snijders 11 NTT 12 R. Housley 13 Vigil Security 14 November 2, 2020 16 A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization 17 draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-04 19 Abstract 21 This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System 22 Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An 23 Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object 24 that provides a means of verifying that a Customer Autonomous System 25 holder has authorized members of Provider set to be its upstream 26 providers and for the Providers to send prefixes received from the 27 Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and 28 peers. 30 Requirements Language 32 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 33 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 34 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 35 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 36 capitals, as shown here. 38 Status of This Memo 40 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 41 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 43 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 44 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 45 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 46 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 48 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 49 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 50 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 51 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 53 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2021. 55 Copyright Notice 57 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 58 document authors. All rights reserved. 60 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 61 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 62 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 63 publication of this document. Please review these documents 64 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 65 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 66 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 67 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 68 described in the Simplified BSD License. 70 Table of Contents 72 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 73 2. The ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 74 3. The ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 75 3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 76 3.2. AFI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 77 3.3. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 78 3.4. providerASSET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 79 4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 80 5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . 5 81 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 82 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 83 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 84 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 85 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 86 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 87 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 89 1. Introduction 91 The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) 92 is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more 93 information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed 94 to verify that a AS has permission from a Customer AS (CAS) holder to 95 send routes in all directions. The digitally signed Autonomous 96 System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this 97 verification mechanism. 99 The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects 100 [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) 101 [RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic 102 validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be 103 validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current 104 infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in 105 [RFC6485], or its successor. 107 To complete the specification of the ASPA (see Section 4 of 108 [RFC6488]), this document defines: 110 1. The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed 111 object. This OID appears in the eContentType field of the 112 encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed 113 attribute within the signerInfo structure). 115 2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload 116 signed by the CAS. The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1 117 [X680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X690]. 119 3. The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation 120 steps specified in [RFC6488]). 122 2. The ASPA Content Type 124 The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-cct-ASPA, which has the 125 numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD. This OID MUST appear 126 both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as 127 well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo 128 structure (see [RFC6488]). 130 3. The ASPA eContent 132 The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as 133 the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized to further 134 propagate announcements received from the customer. If customer has 135 multiple providers they MUST be registered in a single ASPA object. 136 This rule is important to avoid possible race conditions during 137 updates. An ASPA is formally defined as: 139 ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= 140 { ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } 142 id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD } 144 ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { 145 version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0, 146 AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier, 147 customerASID ASID, 148 providerASSET SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID } 150 ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) } 152 AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)) 154 ASID ::= INTEGER 156 Note that this content appears as the eContent within the 157 encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488]. 159 3.1. version 161 The version number of the ASProviderAttestation MUST be v0. 163 3.2. AFI 165 The AFI field contains Address Family Identifier for which the 166 relation between customer and provider ASes is authorized. Presently 167 defined values for the Address Family Identifier field are specified 168 in the IANA's Address Family Numbers registry [IANA-AF]. 170 3.3. customerASID 172 The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous 173 System that authorizes an upstream providers (listed in the 174 providerASSET) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family 175 other ASes. 177 3.4. providerASSET 179 The providerASSET contains the sequence (set) of AS numbers that are 180 authorized to further propagate announcements in the specified 181 address family received from the customer. 183 4. ASPA Validation 185 Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing 186 announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object 187 itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the 188 validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following 189 additional ASPA-specific validation step. 191 o The autonomous system identifier delegation extension [RFC3779] is 192 present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the 193 ASPA), and the customer AS number in the ASPA is contained within 194 the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's autonomous 195 system identifier delegation extension. 197 5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type 198 RPKI-ASPA-2018 199 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 200 pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018(TBD2) } 201 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= 202 BEGIN 203 IMPORTS 205 CONTENT-TYPE 206 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- RFC 6268 207 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 208 pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ; 210 ContentSet CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-ASPA, ... } 212 -- 213 -- ASPA Content Type 214 -- 216 id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) 217 us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 16 } 219 id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 } 221 id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD } 223 ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::= 224 { TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA } 226 ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { 227 version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0, 228 AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier, 229 customerASID ASID, 230 providerASSET SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID } 232 ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) } 234 AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER 236 ASID ::= INTEGER 238 END 240 6. IANA Considerations 242 Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018 to the SMI Security for S/MIME 243 Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry 244 (https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi- 245 numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows: 247 Decimal | Description | Specification 248 ----------------------------------------------------------- 249 TBD2 | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018 | [ThisRFC] 251 Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type 252 (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/ 253 smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows: 255 Decimal | Description | Specification 256 ----------------------------------------------------------- 257 TBD | id-ct-ASPA | [ThisRFC] 259 Please add the ASPA to the RPKI Signed Object registry 260 (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as 261 follows: 263 Name | OID | Specification 264 ----------------------------------------------------------- 265 ASPA | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD | [ThisRFC] 267 7. Security Considerations 269 While it's not restricted, but it's highly recommended maintaining 270 for selected Customer AS a single ASPA object that covers all its 271 providers. Such policy should prevent race conditions during ASPA 272 updates that might affect prefix propagation. The software that 273 provides hosting for ASPA records SHOULD support enforcement of this 274 rule. In the case of the transition process between different CA 275 registries, the ASPA records SHOULD be kept identical in all 276 registries. 278 8. Acknowledgments 280 9. References 282 9.1. Normative References 284 [IANA-AF] IANA, "Address Family Numbers", 285 . 287 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 288 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 289 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 290 . 292 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 293 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, 294 DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, 295 . 297 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 298 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 299 . 301 [RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for 302 Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", 303 RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012, 304 . 306 [RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object 307 Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 308 (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012, 309 . 311 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 312 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 313 May 2017, . 315 [X680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation 316 One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", 317 ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2015. 319 [X690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: 320 Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical 321 Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules 322 (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015. 324 9.2. Informative References 326 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 327 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 328 February 2012, . 330 Authors' Addresses 332 Alexander Azimov 333 Yandex 335 Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com 336 Eugene Uskov 337 JetLend 339 Email: eu@jetlend.ru 341 Randy Bush 342 Internet Initiative Japan 344 Email: randy@psg.com 346 Keyur Patel 347 Arrcus, Inc. 349 Email: keyur@arrcus.com 351 Job Snijders 352 NTT Communications 353 Theodorus Majofskistraat 100 354 Amsterdam 1065 SZ 355 The Netherlands 357 Email: job@ntt.net 359 Russ Housley 360 Vigil Security, LLC 361 918 Spring Knoll Drive 362 Herndon, VA 20170 363 USA 365 Email: housley@vigilsec.com