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(The document does seem to have the reference to RFC 2119 which the ID-Checklist requires). -- The document date (April 19, 2018) is 2198 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) No issues found here. Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan 4 Intended status: Standards Track April 19, 2018 5 Expires: October 21, 2018 7 Origin Validation Clarifications 8 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-01 10 Abstract 12 Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among 13 other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas, which 14 routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified 15 by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible 16 misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations. 18 Requirements Language 20 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 21 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to 22 be interpreted as described in [RFC8174] only when they appear in all 23 upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English 24 words, without normative meaning. 26 Status of This Memo 28 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 29 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 31 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 32 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 33 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 34 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 36 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 37 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 38 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 39 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 41 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 21, 2018. 43 Copyright Notice 45 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 46 document authors. All rights reserved. 48 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 49 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 50 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 51 publication of this document. Please review these documents 52 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 53 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 54 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 55 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 56 described in the Simplified BSD License. 58 1. Introduction 60 Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among 61 other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas, which 62 routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified 63 by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible 64 misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations. 66 When a route is distributed into BGP, origin validation marks the 67 announcement as NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811]. 68 Operational testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC 69 were not sufficient to avoid divergent implementations. This 70 document attempts to clarify two areas seeming to cause confusion. 72 The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e., 73 how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid. The issues 74 seem to be which routes to mark and whether to apply policy without 75 operator configuration. 77 2. Suggested Reading 79 It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, 80 [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], and RPKI- 81 based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811]. 83 3. Mark ALL Prefixes 85 A router SHOULD validate and mark all routes in its BGP, no matter 86 how received. Otherwise the operator does not have the ability to 87 drop Invalid routes; and is therefore liable to complaints from 88 neighbors about propagation of invalid routes. For this reason, 89 [RFC6811] says 91 "When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD 92 perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the 93 UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that are 94 redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another protocol 95 or a locally defined static route." 97 [RFC6811] goes on to say "An implementation MAY provide configuration 98 options to control which routes the lookup is applied to." 100 Significant Clarification: In the absence of the operator applying 101 such policy, ALL routes in BGP MUST be marked. 103 This means that, on a router, all routes in BGP, absent operator 104 configuration otherwise, MUST have been marked because they were 105 either received via BGP (whether eBGP or iBGP), redistributed from an 106 IGP, static, or directly connected, or any other distribution into 107 BGP. 109 When redistributing into BGP from connected, static, IGP, iBGP, etc., 110 there is no AS_PATH in the input to allow RPKI validation of the 111 originating AS. In such cases, the router SHOULD use the AS of the 112 router's BGP configuration. If that is ambiguous because of 113 confederation, AS migration, or other multi-AS configuration, then 114 the router configuration MUST provide a means of specifying the AS to 115 be used on the redistribution, either per redistribution or globally. 117 4. Marking not Acting 119 Significant Clarification: Once routes are marked, the operator 120 should be in complete control of any policy applied based the 121 markings. Absent operator configuration, policy MUST NOT be applied. 123 Automatic origin validation policy actions such as those described in 124 [RFC8097], BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community, 125 MUST NOT be carried out or otherwise applied unless specifically 126 configured by the operator. 128 5. Security Considerations 130 This document does not create security considerations beyond those of 131 [RFC6811]. 133 6. IANA Considerations 135 This document has no IANA Considerations. 137 7. Acknowledgments 139 Many thanks to John Scudder who had the patience to give constructive 140 review multiple times, and to Keyur Patel who noted that the AS might 141 have to be specified. George Michaelson, Jay Borkenhagen, John 142 Heasley, and Matthias Waehlisch kindly helped clean up loose wording. 144 8. References 146 8.1. Normative References 148 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 149 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 150 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 151 . 153 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 154 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, 155 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 156 . 158 [RFC8097] Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R. 159 Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended 160 Community", RFC 8097, DOI 10.17487/RFC8097, March 2017, 161 . 163 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 164 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 165 May 2017, . 167 8.2. Informative References 169 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A 170 Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, 171 DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, 172 . 174 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 175 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 176 February 2012, . 178 Author's Address 180 Randy Bush 181 Internet Initiative Japan 182 5147 Crystal Springs 183 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 184 US 186 Email: randy@psg.com