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(The document does seem to have the reference to RFC 2119 which the ID-Checklist requires). -- The document date (July 25, 2018) is 2095 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) No issues found here. Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan 4 Updates: 6811 (if approved) July 25, 2018 5 Intended status: Standards Track 6 Expires: January 26, 2019 8 Origin Validation Clarifications 9 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-03 11 Abstract 13 Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among 14 other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas: which 15 routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified 16 by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible 17 misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations; and thus updates 18 RFC6811 by clarifying that all prefixes should be marked, and that 19 policy must not be applied without operator configuration" 21 Requirements Language 23 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 24 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to 25 be interpreted as described in [RFC8174] only when they appear in all 26 upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English 27 words, without normative meaning. 29 Status of This Memo 31 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 32 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 34 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 35 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 36 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 37 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 39 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 40 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 41 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 42 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 44 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 26, 2019. 46 Copyright Notice 48 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 49 document authors. All rights reserved. 51 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 52 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 53 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 54 publication of this document. Please review these documents 55 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 56 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 57 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 58 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 59 described in the Simplified BSD License. 61 1. Introduction 63 Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among 64 other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas, which 65 routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified 66 by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible 67 misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations. 69 When a route is distributed into BGP, origin validation marks the 70 announcement as NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811]. 71 Operational testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC 72 were not sufficient to avoid divergent implementations. This 73 document attempts to clarify two areas seeming to cause confusion. 75 The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e., 76 how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid. The issues 77 seem to be which routes to mark and whether to apply policy without 78 operator configuration. 80 2. Suggested Reading 82 It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, 83 [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], and RPKI- 84 based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811]. 86 3. Mark ALL Prefixes 88 Significant Clarification: A router MUST mark all routes in BGP 89 coming from any source (eBGP, iBGP, or redistribution from static, 90 connected, etc.), unless specifically configured otherwise by the 91 operator. Else the operator does not have the ability to drop 92 Invalid routes coming from every potential source; and is therefore 93 liable to complaints from neighbors about propagation of Invalid 94 routes. For this reason, [RFC6811] says 96 "When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD 97 perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the 98 UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that are 99 redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another protocol 100 or a locally defined static route." 102 [RFC6811] goes on to say "An implementation MAY provide configuration 103 options to control which routes the lookup is applied to." 105 When redistributing into BGP from connected, static, IGP, iBGP, etc., 106 there is no AS_PATH in the input to allow RPKI validation of the 107 originating AS. In such cases, the router SHOULD use the AS of the 108 router's BGP configuration. If that is ambiguous because of 109 confederation, AS migration, or other multi-AS configuration, then 110 the router configuration MUST provide a means of specifying the AS to 111 be used on the redistribution, either per redistribution or globally. 113 4. Marking not Acting 115 Significant Clarification: Once routes are marked, the operator 116 should be in complete control of any policy applied based on the 117 markings. Absent specific operator configuration, policy MUST NOT be 118 applied. 120 Automatic origin validation policy actions such as those described in 121 [RFC8097], BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community, 122 MUST NOT be carried out or otherwise applied unless specifically 123 configured by the operator. 125 5. Security Considerations 127 This document does not create security considerations beyond those of 128 [RFC6811]. 130 6. IANA Considerations 132 This document has no IANA Considerations. 134 7. Acknowledgments 136 Many thanks to John Scudder who had the patience to give constructive 137 review multiple times, and to Keyur Patel who noted that the AS might 138 have to be specified. George Michaelson, Jay Borkenhagen, John 139 Heasley, and Matthias Waehlisch kindly helped clean up loose wording. 141 8. References 143 8.1. Normative References 145 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 146 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 147 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 148 . 150 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 151 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, 152 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 153 . 155 [RFC8097] Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R. 156 Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended 157 Community", RFC 8097, DOI 10.17487/RFC8097, March 2017, 158 . 160 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 161 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 162 May 2017, . 164 8.2. Informative References 166 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A 167 Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, 168 DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, 169 . 171 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 172 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 173 February 2012, . 175 Author's Address 177 Randy Bush 178 Internet Initiative Japan 179 5147 Crystal Springs 180 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 181 US 183 Email: randy@psg.com