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(The document does seem to have the reference to RFC 2119 which the ID-Checklist requires). -- The document date (August 20, 2018) is 2069 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 6480 Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan 4 Updates: 6811 (if approved) August 20, 2018 5 Intended status: Standards Track 6 Expires: February 21, 2019 8 BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications 9 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-05 11 Abstract 13 Deployment of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) based BGP 14 origin validation is hampered by, among other things, vendor mis- 15 implementations in two critical areas: which routes are validated and 16 whether policy is applied when not specified by configuration. This 17 document is meant to clarify possible misunderstandings causing those 18 mis-implementations; and thus updates RFC 6811 by clarifying that all 19 prefixes should have their validation state set, and that policy must 20 not be applied without operator configuration. 22 Requirements Language 24 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 25 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to 26 be interpreted as described in [RFC8174] only when they appear in all 27 upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English 28 words, without normative meaning. 30 Status of This Memo 32 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 33 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 35 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 36 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 37 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 38 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 40 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 41 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 42 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 43 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 45 This Internet-Draft will expire on February 21, 2019. 47 Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018 49 Copyright Notice 51 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 52 document authors. All rights reserved. 54 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 55 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 56 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 57 publication of this document. Please review these documents 58 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 59 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 60 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 61 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 62 described in the Simplified BSD License. 64 1. Introduction 66 Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among 67 other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas: which 68 routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified 69 by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible 70 misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations. 72 When a route is distributed into BGP, the origin validation state is 73 set to NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811]. Operational 74 testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC were not 75 sufficient to avoid divergent implementations. This document 76 attempts to clarify two areas which seem to cause confusion. 78 The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e., 79 how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid. The issues 80 seem to be which routes should be evaluated and have their evaluation 81 state set, and whether to apply policy without operator 82 configuration. 84 2. Suggested Reading 86 It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, 87 [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], and RPKI- 88 based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811]. 90 3. Evaluate ALL Prefixes 92 Significant Clarification: A router MUST evaluate and set the 93 validation state of all routes in BGP coming from any source (eBGP, 94 iBGP, or redistribution from static, connected, etc.), unless 95 specifically configured otherwise by the operator. Else the operator 96 does not have the ability to drop Invalid routes coming from every 98 Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018 100 potential source; and is therefore liable to complaints from 101 neighbors about propagation of Invalid routes. For this reason, 102 [RFC6811] says: 104 "When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD 105 perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the 106 UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that are 107 redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another protocol 108 or a locally defined static route." 110 [RFC6811] goes on to say "An implementation MAY provide configuration 111 options to control which routes the lookup is applied to." 113 When redistributing into BGP from connected, static, IGP, iBGP, etc., 114 there is no AS_PATH in the input to allow RPKI validation of the 115 originating AS. In such cases, the router MUST use the AS of the 116 router's BGP configuration. If that is ambiguous because of 117 confederation, AS migration, or other multi-AS configuration, then 118 the router configuration MUST provide a means of specifying the AS to 119 be used on the redistribution, either per redistribution or globally. 121 4. Set State, Don't Act 123 Significant Clarification: Once routes are evaluated and have their 124 state set, the operator should be in complete control of any policy 125 applied based on the evaluation state. Absent specific operator 126 configuration, policy MUST NOT be applied. 128 Automatic origin validation policy actions such as those described in 129 [RFC8097], BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community, 130 MUST NOT be carried out or otherwise applied unless specifically 131 configured by the operator. 133 5. Security Considerations 135 This document does not create security considerations beyond those of 136 [RFC6811]. 138 6. IANA Considerations 140 This document has no IANA Considerations. 142 7. Acknowledgments 144 Many thanks to John Scudder who had the patience to give constructive 145 review multiple times, and to Keyur Patel who noted that the AS might 146 have to be specified. George Michaelson, Jay Borkenhagen, John 147 Heasley, and Matthias Waehlisch kindly helped clean up loose wording. 149 Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018 151 8. Normative References 153 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A 154 Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, 155 DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, 156 . 158 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 159 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 160 February 2012, . 162 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 163 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 164 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 165 . 167 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 168 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, 169 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 170 . 172 [RFC8097] Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R. 173 Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended 174 Community", RFC 8097, DOI 10.17487/RFC8097, March 2017, 175 . 177 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 178 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 179 May 2017, . 181 Author's Address 183 Randy Bush 184 Internet Initiative Japan 185 5147 Crystal Springs 186 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 187 US 189 Email: randy@psg.com