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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus 4 Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk 5 Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom 6 Expires: May 2, 2020 J. Heitz 7 Cisco 8 October 30, 2019 10 BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export 11 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-00 13 Abstract 15 A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes 16 received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from 17 other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP 18 neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the 19 classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route, 20 which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs 21 such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other 22 modifications of the origin AS. 24 Requirements Language 26 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 27 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to 28 be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all 29 upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English 30 words, without normative meaning. 32 Status of This Memo 34 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 35 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 37 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 38 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 39 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 40 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 42 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 43 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 44 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 45 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 47 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 2, 2020. 49 Copyright Notice 51 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 52 document authors. All rights reserved. 54 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 55 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 56 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 57 publication of this document. Please review these documents 58 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 59 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 60 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 61 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 62 described in the Simplified BSD License. 64 1. Introduction 66 This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811] 67 of RPKI-based origin validation. It highlights an important use case 68 of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of 69 correct implementation in this context. 71 As the origin AS may be modified by outbound policy, policy semantics 72 based on RPKI Origin Validation state MUST be able to be applied 73 separately on distribution into BGP and on egress. 75 When applied to egress policy, the effective origin AS MUST be used 76 to determine the Origin Validation state. The effective origin AS is 77 that which will actually be the origin AS in the announcement. It 78 might be affected by removal of private AS(s), confederation, AS 79 migration, etc. If there are any AS_PATH modifications resulting in 80 origin AS change, then these MUST be taken into account. 82 2. Suggested Reading 84 It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, 85 [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based 86 Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, 87 [RFC8481]. 89 3. Egress Processing 91 BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation SHOULD 92 provide the same policy configuration primitives for decisions based 93 on validation state available for use in ingress, redistribution, and 94 egress policies. When applied to egress policy, validation state 95 MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it 96 will (or would) be announced to the peer. The effective origin AS 97 may differ from that of the route in the RIB due to commonly 98 available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path 99 manipulation, confederation handling, etc. 101 Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for 102 outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected, 103 static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly - 104 better support for the robustness principle. 106 4. Operational Considerations 108 Configurations may have complex policy where the final announced 109 origin AS may not be easily predicted before all policies have been 110 run. Therefore it SHOULD be possible to specify an origin validation 111 policy which MUST BE run after such non-deterministic policies. 113 An operator SHOULD be able to list what announcements are not sent to 114 a peer because they were marked Invalid, as long as the router still 115 has them in memory. 117 5. Security Considerations 119 This document does not create security considerations beyond those of 120 [RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. 122 6. IANA Considerations 124 This document has no IANA Considerations. 126 7. References 128 7.1. Normative References 130 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 131 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 132 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 133 . 135 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 136 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 137 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 138 . 140 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 141 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, 142 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 143 . 145 [RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based 146 on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481, 147 DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018, 148 . 150 7.2. Informative References 152 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A 153 Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, 154 DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, 155 . 157 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 158 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 159 February 2012, . 161 Authors' Addresses 163 Randy Bush 164 Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus 165 5147 Crystal Springs 166 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 167 US 169 Email: randy@psg.com 171 Ruediger Volk 172 Deutsche Telekom 174 Email: rv@nic.dtag.de 176 Jakob Heitz 177 Cisco 178 170 West Tasman Drive 179 San Jose, CA 95134 180 USA 182 Email: jheitz@cisco.com