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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) No issues found here. Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus 4 Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk 5 Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom 6 Expires: September 5, 2020 J. Heitz 7 Cisco 8 March 4, 2020 10 BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export 11 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01 13 Abstract 15 A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes 16 received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from 17 other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP 18 neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the 19 classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route, 20 which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs 21 such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other 22 modifications of the origin AS. 24 Requirements Language 26 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 27 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 28 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 29 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 30 capitals, as shown here. 32 Status of This Memo 34 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 35 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 37 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 38 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 39 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 40 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 42 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 43 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 44 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 45 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 47 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 5, 2020. 49 Copyright Notice 51 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 52 document authors. All rights reserved. 54 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 55 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 56 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 57 publication of this document. Please review these documents 58 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 59 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 60 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 61 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 62 described in the Simplified BSD License. 64 Table of Contents 66 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 67 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 68 3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 69 4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 70 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 71 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 72 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 73 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 74 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 75 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 77 1. Introduction 79 This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811] 80 of RPKI-based origin validation. It highlights an important use case 81 of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of 82 correct implementation in this context. 84 As the origin AS may be modified by outbound policy, policy semantics 85 based on RPKI Origin Validation state MUST be able to be applied 86 separately on distribution into BGP and on egress. 88 When applied to egress policy, the effective origin AS MUST be used 89 to determine the Origin Validation state. The effective origin AS is 90 that which will actually be the origin AS in the announcement. It 91 might be affected by removal of private AS(s), confederation, AS 92 migration, etc. If there are any AS_PATH modifications resulting in 93 origin AS change, then these MUST be taken into account. 95 This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations 96 must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation 97 state when applying egress policy. 99 2. Suggested Reading 101 It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, 102 [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based 103 Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, 104 [RFC8481]. 106 3. Egress Processing 108 BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation SHOULD 109 provide the same policy configuration primitives for decisions based 110 on validation state available for use in ingress, redistribution, and 111 egress policies. When applied to egress policy, validation state 112 MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it 113 will (or would) be announced to the peer. The effective origin AS 114 may differ from that of the route in the RIB due to commonly 115 available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path 116 manipulation, confederation handling, etc. 118 Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for 119 outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected, 120 static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly - 121 better support for the robustness principle. 123 4. Operational Considerations 125 Configurations may have complex policy where the final announced 126 origin AS may not be easily predicted before all policies have been 127 run. Therefore it SHOULD be possible to specify an origin validation 128 policy which MUST BE run after such non-deterministic policies. 130 An operator SHOULD be able to list what announcements are not sent to 131 a peer because they were marked Invalid, as long as the router still 132 has them in memory. 134 5. Security Considerations 136 This document does not create security considerations beyond those of 137 [RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. 139 6. IANA Considerations 141 This document has no IANA Considerations. 143 7. References 145 7.1. Normative References 147 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 148 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 149 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 150 . 152 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 153 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 154 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 155 . 157 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 158 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, 159 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 160 . 162 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 163 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 164 May 2017, . 166 [RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based 167 on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481, 168 DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018, 169 . 171 7.2. Informative References 173 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A 174 Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, 175 DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, 176 . 178 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 179 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 180 February 2012, . 182 Authors' Addresses 183 Randy Bush 184 Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus 185 5147 Crystal Springs 186 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 187 US 189 Email: randy@psg.com 191 Ruediger Volk 192 Deutsche Telekom 194 Email: rv@nic.dtag.de 196 Jakob Heitz 197 Cisco 198 170 West Tasman Drive 199 San Jose, CA 95134 200 USA 202 Email: jheitz@cisco.com