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Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) No issues found here. Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus 4 Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk 5 Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom 6 Expires: October 9, 2020 J. Heitz 7 Cisco 8 April 7, 2020 10 BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export 11 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-03 13 Abstract 15 A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes 16 received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from 17 other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP 18 neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the 19 classification uses the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route, 20 which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs 21 such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other 22 modifications of the origin AS. This document updates [RFC6811]. 24 Requirements Language 26 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 27 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 28 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 29 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 30 capitals, as shown here. 32 Status of This Memo 34 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 35 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 37 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 38 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 39 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 40 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 42 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 43 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 44 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 45 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 47 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 9, 2020. 49 Copyright Notice 51 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 52 document authors. All rights reserved. 54 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 55 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 56 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 57 publication of this document. Please review these documents 58 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 59 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 60 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 61 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 62 described in the Simplified BSD License. 64 Table of Contents 66 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 67 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 68 3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 69 4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 70 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 71 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 72 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 73 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 74 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 75 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 76 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 78 1. Introduction 80 This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811], 81 BGP prefix origin validation. It highlights an important use case of 82 origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of 83 correct implementation in this context. 85 The term 'effective origin AS' as used in this document refers to the 86 Autonomous System number which is used by [RFC6811] BGP Prefix Origin 87 Validation. 89 As the effective origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by 90 configuration and outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating 91 BGP speaker MUST apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see 92 [RFC6811] Sec 2 and [RFC8481] Sec 4) against the origin Autonomous 93 System number which will actually be used by subsequent [RFC6811] BGP 94 Prefix Origin Validation. 96 This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by 97 removal of private ASs, confederation [RFC5065], migration [RFC7705], 98 etc. Any AS_PATH modifications resulting in effective origin AS 99 change MUST be taken into account. 101 This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations 102 must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation 103 state when applying egress policy. 105 2. Suggested Reading 107 It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, 108 [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based 109 Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, 110 [RFC8481]. 112 3. Egress Processing 114 BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation MUST 115 provide the same policy configuration primitives for decisions based 116 on validation state available for use in ingress, redistribution, and 117 egress policies. When applied to egress policy, validation state 118 MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it 119 will (or would) be announced to the peer. The effective origin AS 120 may differ from that of the route in the RIB due to commonly 121 available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path 122 manipulation, confederation handling, etc. 124 Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for 125 outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected, 126 static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly - 127 better support for the robustness principle. 129 4. Operational Considerations 131 Configurations may have complex policy where the final announced 132 effective origin AS may not be easily predicted before the outbound 133 policies have been run. Therefore it SHOULD be possible to specify 134 origin validation policy which will run after all non-validating 135 outbound policies. 137 An implementation SHOULD be able to list announcements that were not 138 sent to a peer, e.g., because they were marked Invalid, as long as 139 the router still has them in memory. 141 5. Security Considerations 143 This document does not create security considerations beyond those of 144 [RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. By facilitating more correct validation, it 145 attempts to improve BGP reliability. 147 6. IANA Considerations 149 This document has no IANA Considerations. 151 7. Acknowledgments 153 Thanks to reviews and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard, 154 Benjamin Kaduk, Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Alvaro Retana, Job 155 Snijders, Robert Sparks, and Robert Wilton. 157 8. References 159 8.1. Normative References 161 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 162 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 163 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 164 . 166 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A 167 Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, 168 DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, 169 . 171 [RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous 172 System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, 173 DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007, 174 . 176 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 177 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 178 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 179 . 181 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 182 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, 183 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 184 . 186 [RFC7705] George, W. and S. Amante, "Autonomous System Migration 187 Mechanisms and Their Effects on the BGP AS_PATH 188 Attribute", RFC 7705, DOI 10.17487/RFC7705, November 2015, 189 . 191 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 192 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 193 May 2017, . 195 [RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based 196 on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481, 197 DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018, 198 . 200 8.2. Informative References 202 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 203 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 204 February 2012, . 206 Authors' Addresses 208 Randy Bush 209 Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus 210 5147 Crystal Springs 211 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 212 US 214 Email: randy@psg.com 216 Ruediger Volk 217 Deutsche Telekom 219 Email: rv@nic.dtag.de 221 Jakob Heitz 222 Cisco 223 170 West Tasman Drive 224 San Jose, CA 95134 225 USA 227 Email: jheitz@cisco.com