idnits 2.17.1 draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-00.txt: Checking boilerplate required by RFC 5378 and the IETF Trust (see https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info): ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/1id-guidelines.txt: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- No issues found here. Checking nits according to https://www.ietf.org/id-info/checklist : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** The abstract seems to contain references ([I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]), which it shouldn't. Please replace those with straight textual mentions of the documents in question. Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year == The document seems to lack the recommended RFC 2119 boilerplate, even if it appears to use RFC 2119 keywords -- however, there's a paragraph with a matching beginning. Boilerplate error? (The document does seem to have the reference to RFC 2119 which the ID-Checklist requires). -- The document date (January 13, 2017) is 2653 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Unused Reference: 'RFC4360' is defined on line 212, but no explicit reference was found in the text ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 7999 == Outdated reference: A later version (-11) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07 Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 4 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group T. King 3 Internet-Draft D. Kopp 4 Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX 5 Expires: July 17, 2017 A. Lambrianidis 6 AMS-IX 7 A. Fenioux 8 France-IX 9 January 13, 2017 11 Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers 12 draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-00 14 Abstract 16 This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation 17 State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] 18 to signal prefix origin validation results from a route-server to its 19 peers. Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can 20 use this information in their local routing decision process. 22 Requirements Language 24 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 25 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to 26 be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all 27 upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English 28 words, without normative meaning. 30 Status of This Memo 32 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 33 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 35 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 36 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 37 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 38 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 40 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 41 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 42 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 43 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 45 This Internet-Draft will expire on July 17, 2017. 47 Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017 49 Copyright Notice 51 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 52 document authors. All rights reserved. 54 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 55 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 56 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 57 publication of this document. Please review these documents 58 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 59 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 60 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 61 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 62 described in the Simplified BSD License. 64 Table of Contents 66 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 67 2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route- 68 Server to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 69 3. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 70 3.1. Local Routing Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 71 3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation 72 State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 73 3.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not 74 Available at a Route-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 75 3.4. Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 76 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 77 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 78 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 79 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 80 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 81 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 83 1. Introduction 85 RPKI-based prefix origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant 86 operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to 87 boost acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and ultimately 88 increase the security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may 89 provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at the route-server 90 [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. The result of this prefix origin 91 validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin 92 Validation State Extended Community as introduced in 93 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]. 95 Peers receiving the prefix origin validation result from the route- 96 server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision 98 Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017 100 process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic 101 engineering purposes of a particular route. 103 2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to 104 Peers 106 The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined 107 in [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]) is utilized for 108 signaling prefix origin validation result from a route-server to 109 peers. 111 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] proposes an encoding of 112 the prefix origin validation result [RFC6811] as follows: 114 +-------+-----------+ 115 | Value | Meaning | 116 +-------+-----------+ 117 | 0 | Valid | 118 | 1 | Not found | 119 | 2 | Invalid | 120 +-------+-----------+ 122 Table 1 124 This encoding is re-used. Route-servers providing RPKI-based prefix 125 origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix 126 origin validation result (see [RFC6811]). 128 3. Operational Recommendations 130 3.1. Local Routing Decision Process 132 A peer receiving prefix origin validation results from the route 133 server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision 134 process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the 135 rules as described in section 5 [RFC6811]. 137 A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route 138 server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS. 140 3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State 141 Extended Community 143 An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the 144 BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the 145 extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers. 146 This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing 147 prefix origin validation or not. 149 Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017 151 Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes 152 tagged with arbitrary prefix origin validation results via a route- 153 server, influencing maliciously the decision process of other route- 154 server peers. 156 3.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not Available at 157 a Route-Server 159 In case information about the validity of a BGP prefix origin is not 160 available at the route-server (e.g., error in the ROA cache, CPU 161 overload) the route-server MUST NOT add the BGP Prefix Origin 162 Validation State Extended Community to the route. 164 3.4. Error Handling at Peers 166 A route sent by a route-server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP 167 Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community. 169 A peer receiving a route from a route-server containing more than one 170 BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only 171 consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the 172 validation result field and disregard the other values. Values 173 larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded. 175 4. IANA Considerations 177 None. 179 5. Security Considerations 181 A route-server could be misused to spread malicious prefix origin 182 validation results. However, peers have to trust the route-server 183 anyway as it collects and redistributes BGP routing information to 184 other peers. 186 To countermeasure DDoS attacks, it is widespread to provide 187 blackholing services at IXPs (see RFC 7999 [RFC7999]). Peers are 188 using blackholing to drop traffic, typically by announcing smaller 189 subnets, which are unter attack. Assuming, for practical reasons, 190 peers will not reflect these announcements in their ROAs. In such 191 situations, the RPKI validation status for a prefixes, providing a 192 ROA, would be "Invalid". Given that other peers evaluating the RPKI 193 status, this leads to a degradation of prefixes being blackholed. 194 It's recommended that peers validating the RPKI status use a adopted 195 classification for such prefixes. 197 Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017 199 The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not 200 pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route- 201 servers and peers. 203 6. References 205 6.1. Normative References 207 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 208 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 209 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 210 . 212 [RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended 213 Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360, 214 February 2006, . 216 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 217 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, 218 DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 219 . 221 [RFC7999] King, T., Dietzel, C., Snijders, J., Doering, G., and G. 222 Hankins, "BLACKHOLE Community", RFC 7999, 223 DOI 10.17487/RFC7999, October 2016, 224 . 226 6.2. Informative References 228 [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server] 229 Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker, 230 "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix- 231 bgp-route-server-12 (work in progress), June 2016. 233 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] 234 Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R. 235 Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended 236 Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07 237 (work in progress), November 2015. 239 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 240 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 241 February 2012, . 243 Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017 245 Authors' Addresses 247 Thomas King 248 DE-CIX Management GmbH 249 Lichtstrasse 43i 250 Cologne 50825 251 DE 253 Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net 255 Daniel Kopp 256 DE-CIX Management GmbH 257 Lichtstrasse 43i 258 Cologne 50825 259 DE 261 Email: daniel.kopp@de-cix.net 263 Aristidis Lambrianidis 264 Amsterdam Internet Exchange 265 Frederiksplein 42 266 Amsterdam 1017 XN 267 NL 269 Email: aristidis.lambrianidis@ams-ix.net 271 Arnaud Fenioux 272 France-IX 273 88 Avenue Des Ternes 274 Paris 75017 275 FR 277 Email: afenioux@franceix.net