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Miscellaneous warnings: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == The copyright year in the IETF Trust and authors Copyright Line does not match the current year == Using lowercase 'not' together with uppercase 'MUST', 'SHALL', 'SHOULD', or 'RECOMMENDED' is not an accepted usage according to RFC 2119. Please use uppercase 'NOT' together with RFC 2119 keywords (if that is what you mean). Found 'MUST not' in this paragraph: However, the CA certificates for each key, and the contents published by each key MUST be equivalent. In other words it MUST not make a difference which of the keys is used as a starting point for top-down validation by RP software. -- The document date (January 7, 2020) is 1570 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5781 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6486 (Obsoleted by RFC 9286) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 7230 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110, RFC 9112) Summary: 4 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group C. Martinez 3 Internet-Draft LACNIC 4 Intended status: Standards Track G. Michaelson 5 Expires: July 10, 2020 APNIC 6 T. Bruijnzeels 7 NLnet Labs 8 R. Austein 9 Dragon Research Labs 10 January 7, 2020 12 RPKI Signed Object for Trust Anchor Keys 13 draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-04 15 Abstract 17 Trust Anchor Locators (TALs) [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal] are used by 18 Relying Parties in the RPKI to locate and validate Trust Anchor 19 certificates used in RPKI validation. This document defines an RPKI 20 signed object for Trust Anchor Keys (TAK), that can be used by Trust 21 Anchors to signal their set of current keys and the location(s) of 22 the accompanying CA certiifcates to Relying Parties, as well as 23 changes to this set in the form of revoked keys and new keys, in 24 order to support both planned and unplanned key rolls without 25 impacting RPKI validation. 27 Status of This Memo 29 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 30 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 32 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 33 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 34 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 35 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 37 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 38 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 39 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 40 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 42 This Internet-Draft will expire on July 10, 2020. 44 Copyright Notice 46 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 47 document authors. All rights reserved. 49 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 50 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 51 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 52 publication of this document. Please review these documents 53 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 54 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 55 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 56 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 57 described in the Simplified BSD License. 59 Table of Contents 61 1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 3. TAK Object definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 3.1. The TAK Object Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 3.2. The TAK Object eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 3.2.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 67 3.2.2. current . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 68 3.2.3. revoked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 3.3. TAK Object Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 4. TAK Object Generation and Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 5. Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 72 6. Maintaining multiple TA keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 73 7. Performing TA Key Rolls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 74 7.1. Phase 1: Add a TAK for Key 'A' . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 75 7.2. Phase 2: Add a Key 'B' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 76 7.3. Phase 3: Roll to Key 'C' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 77 7.3.1. Planned Direction Roll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 78 7.3.2. Unplanned Direction Roll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 79 7.4. Phase X: Roll to Key 'D', 'E', .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 80 8. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 81 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 82 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 83 10.1. OID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 84 10.2. File Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 85 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 86 12. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 87 13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 88 14. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 89 14.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 90 14.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 91 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 93 1. Requirements notation 95 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 96 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 97 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 98 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 99 capitals, as shown here. 101 2. Overview 103 Trust Anchor Locators (TALs) [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal] are used by 104 Relying Parties in the RPKI to locate and validate Trust Anchor (TA) 105 certificates used in RPKI validation. However, until now there has 106 been no formal way of notifying Relying Parties (RP) of updates to a 107 TAL. Such updates may be needed in particular in case a Trust Anchor 108 needs to perform a planned, or unplanned, key roll. 110 This document defines a new RPKI signed object that can be used to 111 document the current set of keys and the location(s) of the 112 accompanying CA certificates, as well as any changes to this set. 113 This allows RPs to be notified automatically of such changes, and 114 enables Trust Anchors to pre-stage a number of operational keys so 115 that planned and unplanned key rolls can be performed without risking 116 the invalidation of the RPKI tree under the TA. We call this object 117 the Trust Anchor Keys (TAK) object. 119 When Relying Parties (RPs) are first bootstrapped, they use any 120 current TAL to discover a key and location(s) of the TA 121 certificate(s) for a TA. The RP can then retrieve and validating the 122 TA certificate, and subsequently validate the manifest [RFC6486] and 123 CRL [section 5 of @!RFC6487]. However, before processing any other 124 objects it will then first validate the TAK object, if present. All 125 enumerated new keys (and locations) are then added to a new list of 126 current TA keys for this TA. The RP will then recursively fetch and 127 validate the TA certificates, manifest, CRL and TAK objects for each 128 of these keys. As a part of this process the RP will also compile a 129 list of revoked keys enumerated by any of the validly signed TAK 130 objects. As the final step the RP will then filter out any revoked 131 TA keys from its new set. This new set now replaces the previous 132 set. 134 This process allows Trust Anchors to operate a set of N current keys, 135 where any key can effectively revoke any or all of the other keys to 136 perform either a planned, or an unplanned, key roll. This also 137 allows Trust Anchors to produce long lived TAK objects as forward 138 pointers to RPs, and retire its old key when doing a key roll. While 139 the generic process is quite involved, the amount of work needed to 140 support an envisioned normal key roll is fairly limited. Under 141 normal circumstances a TA will typically have two current keys, so 142 that is can perform an emergency roll over in case one of the keys is 143 lost. This means that the RP will need to validate one additional CA 144 certificate, a CRL, a manifest and two TAK objects. 146 When a key roll is executed a TA will remove one old key, and 147 introduce one new (back-up) key. The RP will remove the old key from 148 its set, and it will not be queried again, and it will add the new 149 key and its TA certifcate location(s). 151 Only in a situation where an RP is very outdated can it be expected 152 that the RP will have to discover several chained TAK object. But, 153 since it will remove the outdated TALs in this process, this presents 154 a one time cost only. 156 3. TAK Object definition 158 The TAK object makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed 159 objects [RFC6488], which defines a Crytopgraphic Message Syntax (CMS) 160 [RFC5652] wrapper for the Signed TALs content as well as a generic 161 validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete 162 the specification of the TAK object (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), 163 this document defines: 165 o The OID defined in Section 3.1 that identifies the signed object 166 as being a TAK. (This OID appears within the eContentType in the 167 encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed 168 attribute in the signerInfo object). 170 o The ASN.1 syntax for the TAK eContent defined in Section 3.2. 172 o Additional steps to the validation steps specified in [RFC6488] 173 required to validate the TAK, defined in Section 3.3. 175 3.1. The TAK Object Content Type 177 This document requests an OID for TAK objects as follows: 179 signed-Tal OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 180 rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 id-smime (1) TBD } 182 This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the 183 encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute 184 in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]) 186 3.2. The TAK Object eContent 188 The content of a TAK object is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished 189 Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690], and is defined as follows: 191 TAK ::= SEQUENCE { 192 version INTEGER DEFAULT 0, 193 current ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CurrentKey, 194 revoked ::= SEQUENCE OF SubjectPublicKeyInfo 195 } 197 CurrentKey ::= SEQUENCE { 198 certificateURIs SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateURI, 199 subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo 200 } 202 CertificateURI ::= IA5String 204 SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 205 algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 206 subjectPublicKey BIT STRING 207 } 209 3.2.1. version 211 The version number of the TAK object MUST be 0. 213 3.2.2. current 215 This field defines the set of current keys (CurrentKey) according to 216 the signer of this Signed TALs object. 218 3.2.2.1. CurrentKey 220 This field defines a current TA Key, equivalent to [I-D.ietf-sidrops- 221 https-tal]. This structure contains a sequence of one or more URIs 222 and a SubjectPublicKeyInfo. 224 3.2.2.1.1. certificateURIs 226 This field is equivalent to the URI section in section 2.1 of 227 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal]. It MUST contain at least one 228 CertificateURI element. Each CertificateURI element contains the 229 IA5String representation of either an rsync URI [RFC5781], or an 230 HTTPS URI [RFC7230]. 232 3.2.2.1.2. subjectPublicKeyInfo 234 This field contains a SubjectPublicKeyInfo [section 4.1.2.7 or 235 @!RFC5280] in DER format [X.690]. 237 3.2.3. revoked 239 This field contains the list of keys, identified by 240 SubjectPublicKeyInfo, that are no longer to be used according to the 241 signer of this document. 243 3.3. TAK Object Validation 245 To determine whether a TAK object is valid, the RP MUST perform the 246 following steps in addition to those specified in [RFC6488]: 248 o The eContentType OID matches the OID described in Section 3.1 250 o The TAK object appears as the product of a Trust Anchor CA 251 certificate. 253 o This Trust Anchor CA has published only one TAK object in its 254 repository for this key, and this object appears on the Manifest 255 as the only entry using the ".tak" extension (see [RFC6481]). In 256 case more than one TAK object is found, all such objects MUST be 257 considered invalid. 259 o The EE certificate of this TAK object describes its Internet 260 Number Resources (INRs) using the "inherit" attribute 262 o The decoded TAK content conforms to the format defined in 263 Section 3.2. 265 If the above procedure indicates that the manifest is invalid, then 266 the TAK object MUST be discarded and treated as though no TAK object 267 were present. 269 4. TAK Object Generation and Publication 271 A TA MAY choose to use TAK objects to communicate its set of current, 272 and revoked keys. If a TA chooses to use TAK objects, then it SHOULD 273 generate and publish TAK objects under each of its current keys. An 274 exception to this rule exists when a TA has lost permanent access to 275 one of its keys or the accompanying repository publication point. In 276 such cases however, the key in question MUST be revoked as described 277 below in Section 7. 279 A non-normative guideline for naming this object is that the filename 280 chosen for the Signed TAL Object in the publication repository be a 281 value derived from the public key part of the entity's key pair, 282 using the algorithm described for CRLs in section 2.2 of [RFC6481] 283 for generation of filenames. The filename extension of ".tak" MUST 284 be used to denote the object as a TAK. Note that this is in-line 285 with filename extensions defined in section 7.2 of [RFC6481] 287 In order to generate the TAK Objects, the TA MUST perform the 288 following actions: 290 o The TA MUST generate a key pair for a "one-time-use" EE 291 certificate to use for the TAK 293 o The TA MUST generate a one-time-use EE certificate for the TAK 295 o This EE certificate MUST have an SIA extension access description 296 field with an accessMethod OID value of id-ad-signedobject, where 297 the associated accessLocation references the publication point of 298 the TAK as an object URL. 300 o As described in [RFC6487], an [RFC3779] extension is required in 301 the EE certificate used for this object. However, because the 302 resource set is irrelevant to this object type, this certificate 303 MUST describe its Internet Number Resources (INRs) using the 304 "inherit" attribute, rather than explicit description of a 305 resource set. 307 o This EE certificate MUST have a "notBefore" time that matches, or 308 predates the moment that the TAK will be published. 310 o This EE certificate MUST have a "notAfter" time that reflects the 311 intended duration for which this TAK will be published. If the EE 312 certificate for a Signed TAL is expired, it MUST no longer be 313 published, but it MAY be replaced by a newly generated TAK object 314 with equivalent content and an updated "notAfter" time. 316 o The same set of current keys (see Section 3.2.2) MUST be included 317 on each TAK object for each current key. 319 o The TAK object MUST include all revoked keys (see Section 3.2.3) 320 that became revoked while the key signing the TAK in question was 321 current. 323 5. Relying Party Use 325 Relying Parties MUST keep a record of all current keys for each 326 configured Trust Anchor, as well as the URI(s) where the CA 327 certificate for each of these keys may be retrieved. This record MAY 328 be bootstrapped by the use of a pre-configured (and unsigned) TAL 329 file [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal], but it MUST be updated with 330 authoritative signed information found in valid TAK objects found in 331 subsequent validation runs. 333 When performing top-down validation RPs MUST first validate and 334 process any TAK objects for each of its known current keys for a TA 335 by performing the following steps: 337 o A CA certificate is retrieved and validated from the known URIs as 338 described in sections 3 and 4 of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal]. 340 o The manifest and CRL for this certificate are then validated first 341 as described in [RFC6487] and [RFC6486]. 343 o The TAK file, if present, is validated as described in 344 Section 3.3. 346 For each valid TAK file thus found all current keys, i.e. 347 SubjectPublicKeyInfo and URIs, are kept. If any previously unknown 348 keys are added to the set of current keys, then they MUST also be 349 processed as described above. 351 Once the TAK objects for all keys are processed the set of current 352 keys and URIs for the TA is updated as follows: * All new current 353 keys found on any valid TAK object are added to the set of current 354 keys. * The set of URIs for each current key is replaced by the union 355 of all URIs for this key found on all valid TAK objects. * Finally, 356 any current key that matches any revoked key on any valid TAK object 357 is removed from the set of current keys. 359 Note that if a current key does not occur on any valid TAK object, 360 but it is not revoked either, then it and any previously known URIs 361 for it are kept. Also note that if an RP was bootstrapped using a 362 TAL file [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal], the keys and URIs will now 363 have been replaced by values found on TAK objects. 365 After this the RP can choose any one of the valid CA certificates for 366 any key that is still in the set of current keys for this TA, in 367 order to continue the top-down validation of object for this TA as 368 described in [RFC6487]. 370 6. Maintaining multiple TA keys 372 If a TA operates multiple keys, then the signed material for these 373 keys MUST be published under different directories in the context of 374 the 'id-ad-caRepository' and 'id-ad-rpkiManifest' Subject Information 375 Access descriptions contained on the CA certificates [RFC6487]. 376 Publishing objects under the same space would lead to confusion at 377 best, and in case of file name collisions of objects invalidity. 379 However, the CA certificates for each key, and the contents published 380 by each key MUST be equivalent. In other words it MUST not make a 381 difference which of the keys is used as a starting point for top-down 382 validation by RP software. 384 This means that the IP and AS resources contained on all current CA 385 certificates for the current TA keys MUST be the same. Furthermore 386 for any delegation of IP and AS resources to a child, the TA MUST 387 have an equivalent CA certificate published under each of its keys. 388 Any updates in delegations MUST be reflected under each of its keys. 389 A TA SHOULD NOT publish any other objects besides a CRL, a Manifest, 390 a single TAK object, and any number of CA certificates for delegation 391 to child Certification Authorities. 393 If a TA uses a single remote publication server for its keys using 394 the RPKI publication protocol [RFC8181], then it MUST include all 395 and PDUs for the products of each of its keys 396 in a single query in order to ensure that they will reflect the same 397 content at all times. 399 If a TA uses multiple publication servers then it is by definition 400 inevitable that the content of different keys will be out of sync at 401 times. In such cases the TA SHOULD ensure that the duration of these 402 moments are limited to the shortest possible time. Furthermore the 403 following should be observed: 405 o In cases where a CA certificate is revoked completely, or replaced 406 by a certificate with a reduced set of resources, these changes 407 will not take effect fully until all the TA keys repository 408 publication points have been updated. Given that TA key 409 operations are normally performed infrequently we don't expect 410 that this is a problem. I.e. if the revocation or shrinking of an 411 issued CA certificate is staged for days, or weeks anyway, then 412 experiencing a delay of several minutes for the repository 413 publication points to all be updated is fairly insignificant. 415 o In cases where a CA certificate is replaced by a certificate with 416 an extend set of resources the TA MUST inform the receiving CA 417 only after all its repository publication points have been 418 updated. This ensures that the receiving CA will not issue any 419 products that could be invalid if an RP uses a TA key just before 420 the CA certificate was due to be updated. 422 Finally, note that the publication locations of CA certificates for 423 delegations to child CAs under each key will be different, and 424 therefore the Authority Information Access 'id-ad-caIssuers' value on 425 certificates issued by the child CAs may not match (section 4.8.7 of 426 [RFC6487]). However, this information is not considered critical for 427 validation of these objects and provided as hints to RP software 428 only. Therefore RP software MUST NOT reject these certificates based 429 on a mismatch of this value. 431 7. Performing TA Key Rolls 433 In this section we will describe how present day RPKI TAs that use 434 only one key pair, and that do not use TAK objects, can change to 435 having two current keys at all times allowing them to perform both 436 planned and unplanned key rolls. 438 7.1. Phase 1: Add a TAK for Key 'A' 440 Before adding any new keys a Trust Anchor may want to build up 441 operational experience in maintaining a TAK object that describes its 442 current key only. We will call refer to this key as key 'A' 443 throughout this section. 445 The TA will have a TAL file [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal] that 446 contains one or more URIs where the (equivalent) CA certificates for 447 this key 'A' can be retrieved. The TA can now generate a TAK objects 448 that includes key 'A' only in its sequence of 'CurrentKey' values. 450 The TA SHOULD publish the CA certificate for key 'A' at one or more 451 new locations not used in the TAL file, and use these new URIs in the 452 TAK object. The TA is free to choose any naming strategy for these 453 locations. As a non-normative suggestion, one such approach could be 454 to use the date that this phase was started as part of the file name 455 or a directory where the CA certificate is published. 457 The TA can now monitor the retrieval of its CA certificates from the 458 URI(s) in the newly published TAK object, relative to the retrieval 459 from the URI(s) listed in its TAL file, to learn the proportion of 460 RPs that can successfully validate and use the TAK object. 462 7.2. Phase 2: Add a Key 'B' 464 The TA can now generate a new key pair, key 'B'. This key MUST now 465 be used to create a new CA certificate for this key, and issue 466 equivalent CA certificates for delegations to child CAs, as described 467 in Section 6. 469 At this point, the TA can also issue a new TAL file 470 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal] for key 'B', and test locally that the 471 validation outcome for the new key is indeed equivalent to the other 472 current key(s). 474 When the TA is certain that both keys are equivalent, it MUST issue a 475 new TAK object under each of its current keys, and include both the 476 old key 'A' and this new key 'B' in the set of current keys. 478 The TA SHOULD now also release a new TAL file for this new key 'B' as 479 the intended new key to be used by RP software. However, as 480 described above, it SHOULD use a different set of URIs in the TAL 481 compared to the TAK file, so that it can learn the proportion of RPs 482 that can successfully validate and use the updated TAK objects. 484 7.3. Phase 3: Roll to Key 'C' 486 In this phase a new key, key 'C' is generated as described above in 487 Section 7.2. And one of the previous keys is revoked. 489 7.3.1. Planned Direction Roll 491 If the key roll is planned, and the TA has access to all its keys 492 'A', 'B' and 'C', and the publication servers for each of the keys, 493 then a new TAK object is generated for each of these keys listing 494 keys 'B' and 'C' as current, and key 'A' as revoked. 496 The TA SHOULD now publish a long-lived TAK file, CRL and Manifest 497 under key 'A', remove all other content, and destroy key 'A'. This 498 way RP software that uses a TAL for key 'A' can still successfully 499 find keys 'B' and 'C', and in future 'D', 'E', etc. 501 If access to key 'A' was lost, then the process is slightly 502 different. The TAK object for key 'A' cannot be updated and will 503 therefore still refer to keys 'A' and 'B' as the current keys, and 504 include no revocations. However, an updated TAK object listing keys 505 'B' and 'C' as current, and listing key 'A' as revoked can still be 506 issued and published under keys 'B' and 'C'. As described in 507 Section 5 RPs will then discover that key 'A' is revoked, and 508 continue to use keys 'B' and 'C'. 510 7.3.2. Unplanned Direction Roll 512 If key 'B' is compromised, the process is similar to above, except of 513 course that now keys 'A' and 'C' are included in the set of current 514 keys, and key 'B' is in the set of revoked keys. If the TA still has 515 access to key 'B', then it SHOULD publish a long-lived TAK file, CRL 516 and manifest for key 'B' and remove all other content for it. If it 517 cannot perform this action then simply marking key 'B' as revoked 518 will still notify RPs to disregard it. 520 7.4. Phase X: Roll to Key 'D', 'E', .. 522 Further key rolls are essentially no different the roll to key 'C' 523 described in Section 7.3, except that there is no need to still 524 include key 'A' in the list of revoked keys when the the roll to key 525 'D' is performed. RPs will already have learned to that key 'A' is 526 revoked, before they learn about key 'D'. 528 8. Deployment Considerations 530 Including Signed TAL objects while RP tools do not support this 531 standard will result in these RPs rejecting these objects. It is not 532 expected that this will result in the invalidation of any other 533 object under a Trust Anchor. 535 That said, the flagging mechanism introduced here can only be relied 536 on once a majority of RPs support it. Defining when that moment 537 arrives is by definition something that cannot be established at the 538 time of writing this document. The use of unique URIs in TAK objects 539 compared to their equivalent TAL files should help operators 540 understand which proportion of RPs support this mechanism. 542 9. Security Considerations 544 It should be noted that because any key can revoke the other key(s), 545 a risk introduced: if an adversary can gain access to one of the 546 keys, and publication servers for it, then they can essentially take 547 over a TA. It should also be noted that a TA can revoke all of its 548 keys by accident and make itself obsolete. 550 However, these risks can be mitigated greatly by the use of Hardware 551 Security Modules (HSM) by TAs, which will guard against theft of a 552 private key, and operational processes to guard against (accidental) 553 mis-use of the keys in an HSM by operators. 555 Although HSMs can help against key theft, the risk of key loss is 556 still very applicable. In some ways more so, because back-ups are 557 hard by design. Key loss can easily happen for example when an 558 operator card set that is used to authorise use of a key in an HSM 559 can no longer be used, e.g. because cards are broken or lost, or a 560 persons who holds a card is sadly no longer with us, or passwords are 561 forgotten, etc. 563 In such cases the ability to perform an unplanned roll as described 564 in this document will be very useful, provided that access to the 565 both keys is arranged differently, and the issues affecting one key, 566 do not necessarily affect the other key. 568 An example where the planned rolls are useful is when a TA is using 569 an HSM from vendor X, and they want to migrate to an HSM from vendor 570 Y. 572 10. IANA Considerations 574 10.1. OID 576 IANA is to add the following to the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry: 578 Decimal | Description | References 579 --------+--------------------------------+--------------- 580 TBD | Trust Anchor Keys | [section 3.1] 582 10.2. File Extension 584 IANA is to add an item for the Signed TAL file extension to the "RPKI 585 Repository Name Scheme" created by [RFC6481] as follows: 587 Extension | RPKI Object | References 588 -----------+------------------------------------------- 589 .tak | Trust Anchor Keys | [this document] 591 11. Security Considerations 593 TBD 595 12. Revision History 597 03 - Last Draft under Tim's authorship. 599 04 - First Draft with Georges's authorship. No substantive 600 revisions. 602 13. Acknowledgements 604 The authors wish to thank Martin Hoffmann for a thourough review of 605 this document. 607 14. References 609 14.1. Normative References 611 [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal] 612 Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., Kent, S., and T. 613 Bruijnzeels, "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) 614 Trust Anchor Locator", draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-08 615 (work in progress), April 2019. 617 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 618 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 619 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 620 . 622 [RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP 623 Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, 624 DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, 625 . 627 [RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI 628 Scheme", RFC 5781, DOI 10.17487/RFC5781, February 2010, 629 . 631 [RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 632 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, 633 DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012, 634 . 636 [RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, 637 "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 638 (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012, 639 . 641 [RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for 642 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, 643 DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, 644 . 646 [RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object 647 Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 648 (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012, 649 . 651 [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer 652 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", 653 RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, 654 . 656 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 657 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 658 May 2017, . 660 [RFC8181] Weiler, S., Sonalker, A., and R. Austein, "A Publication 661 Protocol for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure 662 (RPKI)", RFC 8181, DOI 10.17487/RFC8181, July 2017, 663 . 665 [X.690] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, 666 "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: 667 Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical 668 Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules 669 (DER)", 2002. 671 14.2. Informative References 673 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 674 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 675 . 677 Authors' Addresses 679 Carlos Martinez 680 LACNIC 682 Email: carlos@lacnic.net 683 URI: https://www.lacnic.net/ 685 George G. Michaelson 686 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 687 6 Cordelia St 688 South Brisbane, QLD 4101 689 Australia 691 Email: ggm@apnic.net 692 Tim Bruijnzeels 693 NLnet Labs 695 Email: tim@nlnetlabs.nl 696 URI: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/ 698 Rob Austein 699 Dragon Research Labs 701 Email: sra@hactrn.net