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'CMS' on line 448 looks like a reference -- Missing reference section? 'MUSTSHOULD' on line 456 looks like a reference -- Missing reference section? 'SJ-KEA' on line 459 looks like a reference -- Missing reference section? 'KEA' on line 451 looks like a reference -- Missing reference section? 'INFO' on line 454 looks like a reference Summary: 9 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 7 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 INTERNET-DRAFT John Pawling 2 draft-ietf-smime-cmskea-00.txt J.G. Van Dyke & Associates 3 2 April 1999 4 Expires: 2 October 1999 6 CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions 8 Status of this Memo 10 This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all 11 provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working 12 documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and 13 its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working 14 documents as Internet-Drafts. 16 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 17 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 18 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material 19 or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 21 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 22 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt 24 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 25 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 27 Abstract 29 This document describes the conventions for using the Key Exchange 30 Algorithm (KEA) and SKIPJACK encryption algorithm in conjunction with the 31 Cryptographic Message Syntax [CMS] enveloped-data and encrypted-data 32 content types. 34 This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To 35 subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the single 36 word "subscribe" in the body of the message. There is a Web site for 37 the mailing list at . 39 1. Introduction 41 Throughout this document, the terms MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD and MAY are 42 used in capital letters. This conforms to the definitions in 43 [MUSTSHOULD]. [MUSTSHOULD] defines the use of these key words to help 44 make the intent of standards track documents as clear as possible. The 45 same key words are used in this document to help implementers achieve 46 interoperability. Software that claims compliance with this document 47 MUST provide the capabilities as indicated by the MUST, MUST NOT, 48 SHOULD and MAY terms. The KEA and SKIPJACK cryptographic algorithms are 49 described in [SJ-KEA]. 51 2. Content Encryption Process 53 This section applies to the construction of both the enveloped-data and 54 encrypted-data content types. Compliant software MUST meet the 55 requirements stated in the [CMS] "Content-encryption Process" section. 56 The input to the encryption process MUST be padded to a multiple of 57 eight octets using the padding rules described in the [CMS] "Content- 58 encryption Process" section. The content MUST be encrypted as a single 59 string using the SKIPJACK algorithm in 64-bit Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) 60 mode using randomly-generated 8-byte Initialization Vector (IV) and 80- 61 bit SKIPJACK content-encryption key (CEK) values. 63 3. Content Decryption Process 65 This section applies to the processing of both the enveloped-data and 66 encrypted-data content types. The encryptedContent MUST be decrypted as 67 a single string using the SKIPJACK algorithm in 64-bit CBC mode. The 80- 68 bit SKIPJACK CEK and the 8-byte IV MUST be used as inputs to the SKIPJACK 69 decryption process. Following decryption, the padding MUST be removed 70 from the decrypted data. The padding rules are described in the [CMS] 71 "Content-encryption Process" section. 73 4. Enveloped-data Conventions 75 The CMS enveloped-data content type consists of an encrypted content and 76 wrapped CEKs for one or more recipients. Compliant software MUST 77 meet the requirements for constructing an enveloped-data content type 78 stated in [CMS]. The [CMS] "Enveloped-data Content Type" section 79 should be studied before reading this section, because this section 80 does not repeat the [CMS] text. 82 An 8-byte IV and 80-bit CEK MUST be randomly generated for each instance 83 of an enveloped-data content type as inputs to the SKIPJACK algorithm for 84 use to encrypt the content. The SKIPJACK CEK MUST only be used for 85 encrypting the content of a single instance of an enveloped-data content 86 type. 88 KEA and SKIPJACK can be used with the enveloped-data content type using 89 either of the following key management techniques defined in [CMS] 90 Section 6: 92 1) Key Agreement: The SKIPJACK CEK is uniquely wrapped for each 93 recipient using a pairwise symmetric key-encryption key (KEK) generated 94 using KEA using the originator's private KEA key, recipient's public KEA 95 key and other values. Section 4.2 describes the use of KEA and SKIPJACK 96 to provide key agreement. 98 2) "Previously Distributed" Symmetric KEK: The SKIPJACK CEK is wrapped 99 using a "previously distributed" symmetric KEK (such as a Mail List Key) 100 generated using KEA. The methods by which KEA is used to generate the 101 symmetric KEK and by which the symmetric KEK is distributed are beyond 102 the scope of this document. Section 4.3 describes the use of KEA and 103 SKIPJACK to support "previously distributed" KEKs. 105 [CMS] Section 6 also defines the concept of the key transport key 106 management technique. The key transport technique MUST NOT be used with 107 KEA. 109 4.1. EnvelopedData Fields 111 The enveloped-data content type is Abstract Syntax Notation.1 (ASN.1) 112 encoded using the EnvelopedData syntax. The fields of the EnvelopedData 113 syntax must be populated as follows: 115 The EnvelopedData version MUST be 2. 117 If key agreement is being used, then the EnvelopedData originatorInfo 118 field SHOULD be present and SHOULD include the originator's KEA X.509 v3 119 certificate containing the KEA public key associated with the KEA private 120 key used to form each pairwise symmetric KEK used to wrap each copy of 121 the SKIPJACK CEK. The issuers' X.509 v3 certificates required to form 122 the complete certification path for the originator's KEA X.509 v3 123 certificate MAY be included in the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field. 124 Self-signed certificates SHOULD NOT be included in the EnvelopedData 125 originatorInfo field. 127 The EnvelopedData RecipientInfo CHOICE is dependent on the key management 128 technique used. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 provide more information. 130 The EnvelopedData encryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm 131 algorithm field MUST be the id-fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm 132 object identifier (OID). The EnvelopedData encryptedContentInfo 133 contentEncryptionAlgorithm parameters field MUST include the random 8- 134 byte IV used as the input to the content encryption process. 136 The EnvelopedData unprotectedAttrs MAY be present. 138 4.2. Key Agreement 140 This section describes the conventions for using KEA and SKIPJACK with 141 the CMS enveloped-data content type to support key agreement. When key 142 agreement is used, then the RecipientInfo keyAgreeRecipientInfo CHOICE 143 MUST be used. 145 If the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field does not include the 146 originator's KEA X.509 v3 certificate, then each recipientInfos 147 KeyAgreementRecipientInfo originator field MUST include the 148 issuerAndSerialNumber CHOICE identifying the originator's KEA X.509 v3 149 certificate. If the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field includes the 150 originator's KEA X.509 v3 certificate, then each recipientInfos 151 KeyAgreementRecipientInfo originator field MUST include either the 152 subjectKeyIdentifier CHOICE containing the value from the 153 subjectKeyIdentifier extension of the originator's KEA v3 X.509 154 certificate or the issuerAndSerialNumber CHOICE identifying the 155 originator's KEA X.509 v3 certificate. To minimize the size of the 156 EnvelopedData, it is recommended that the subjectKeyIdentifier CHOICE be 157 used. 159 In some environments, the KeyAgreementRecipientInfo originator field MAY 160 include the originatorKey CHOICE. The originatorKey CHOICE SHOULD NOT be 161 used with KEA for e-mail transactions. Within a controlled security 162 architecture, a module may produce KEA key pairs for use in conjunction 163 with internal/local storage of encrypted data. In this case, there may 164 not be an X.509 certificate associated with a (possibly) short term or 165 one time use public KEA key. When originatorKey is used, then the KEA 166 public key MUST be conveyed in the publicKey BIT STRING as specified in 167 [KEA] Section 3.1.2. The originatorKey algorithm identifier MUST be the 168 id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OID. The originatorKey algorithm parameters 169 field MUST contain the KEA "domain identifier" (ASN.1 encoded as an OCTET 170 STRING) identifying the KEA algorithm parameters (i.e., p/q/g values) 171 associated with the KEA public key. [KEA] Section 3.1.1 describes the 172 method for computing the KEA domain identifier value. 174 4.2.1. SKIPJACK CEK Wrap Process 176 The SKIPJACK CEK is uniquely wrapped for each recipient of the 177 EnvelopedData using a pairwise KEK generated using the KEA 178 material of the originator and the recipient along with the 179 originator's User Keying Material (UKM) (i.e. Ra). The CMS 180 EnvelopedData syntax provides two options for wrapping the SKIPJACK 181 CEK for each recipient using a KEA-generated KEK. The "shared 182 Originator UKM" option SHOULD be used when constructing EnvelopedData 183 objects. The "unique originator UKM" option MAY be used when 184 constructing EnvelopedData objects. Compliant software MUST be capable 185 of processing EnvelopedData objects constructed using either option or 186 both options. 188 1) Shared Originator UKM Option: CMS provides the ability for a 189 single, shared originator's UKM to be used to generate each pairwise 190 KEK used to wrap the SKIPJACK CEK for each recipient. When using 191 the shared originator UKM option, a single RecipientInfo 192 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure MUST be constructed to contain the 193 wrapped SKIPJACK CEKs for all of the KEA recipients sharing the same 194 KEA parameters. The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure includes multiple 195 RecipientEncryptedKey fields that each contain the SKIPJACK CEK wrapped 196 for a specific recipient. 198 2) Unique Originator UKM Option: CMS also provides the ability for a 199 unique originator UKM to be used to generate each pairwise KEK used to 200 wrap the SKIPJACK CEK for each recipient. When using the unique 201 originator UKM option, a separate RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 202 structure MUST be constructed for each recipient. Each 203 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure includes a single RecipientEncryptedKey 204 field containing the SKIPJACK CEK wrapped for the recipient. This 205 option requires more overhead than the shared UKM option because the 206 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields (i.e. version, originator, ukm, 207 keyEncryptionAlgorithm) must be repeated for each recipient. 209 The next two paragraphs apply to both options. 211 The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm algorithm field MUST 212 include the id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OID. The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 213 keyEncryptionAlgorithm parameters field MUST be the id- 214 fortezzaWrap80 OID indicating that the FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function is 215 used to wrap the 80-bit SKIPJACK CEK. 217 If the originator is not already an explicit recipient, then a copy of 218 the SKIPJACK CEK SHOULD be wrapped for the originator and included in 219 the EnvelopedData. This allows the originator to decrypt the contents 220 of the EnvelopedData. 222 4.2.1.1. SKIPJACK CEK Wrap Process Using A Shared Originator UKM Value 224 This section describes how a shared originator UKM value is used as an 225 input to KEA to generate each pairwise KEK used to wrap the SKIPJACK CEK 226 for each recipient. 228 When using the shared originator UKM option, a single RecipientInfo 229 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure MUST be constructed to contain the 230 wrapped SKIPJACK CEKs for all of the KEA recipients using the same 231 set of KEA parameters. If all recipients' KEA public keys were 232 generated using the same set of KEA parameters, then there MUST only be 233 a single RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure for all of the 234 KEA recipients. If the recipients' KEA public keys were generated 235 using different sets of KEA parameters, then multiple RecipientInfo 236 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields MUST be constructed because the 237 originatorIdentifierOrKey will be different for each distinct set of 238 recipients' KEA parameters. 240 A unique 128-byte originator's UKM MUST be generated for each distinct 241 set of recipients' KEA parameters. The originator's UKM MUST be placed 242 in each KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm OCTET STRING. 244 The originator's and recipient's KEA parameters MUST be identical to use 245 KEA to successfully generate a pairwise KEK. [KEA] describes how a KEA 246 public key is conveyed in an X.509 v3 certificate. [KEA] states that the 247 KEA parameters are not included in KEA certificates; instead, a "domain 248 identifier" is supplied in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm parameters 249 field of every KEA certificate. The values of the KEA domain identifiers 250 in the originator's and recipient's KEA X.509 v3 certificates can be 251 compared to determine if the originator's and recipient's KEA parameters 252 are identical. 254 The following steps MUST be repeated for each recipient: 256 1) KEA MUST be used to generate the pairwise KEK based on the 257 originator's UKM, originator's private KEA key, recipient's 128 byte 258 public KEA key (obtained from the recipient's KEA X.509 v3 certificate) 259 and the recipient's 128-byte public KEA key used as the Rb value. 261 2) The SKIPJACK CEK MUST be wrapped using the KEA-generated pairwise 262 KEK as input to the FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function. The FORTEZZA 80-bit 263 wrap function takes the 80-bit SKIPJACK CEK along with a 16-bit check 264 value and produces a 96-bit result using the KEA-generated pairwise KEK. 266 3) A new RecipientEncryptedKey SEQUENCE MUST be constructed for the 267 recipient. 269 4) The value of the subjectKeyIdentifier extension from the recipient's 270 KEA X.509 v3 certificate MUST be placed in the recipient's 271 RecipientEncryptedKey rid rKeyId subjectKeyIdentifier field. The 272 KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier CHOICE MUST be rKeyId. The date and other 273 fields MUST be absent from the recipientEncryptedKey rid rKeyId 274 SEQUENCE. 276 5) The wrapped SKIPJACK CEK MUST be placed in the recipient's 277 RecipientEncryptedKey encryptedKey OCTET STRING. 279 6) The recipient's RecipientEncryptedKey MUST be included in the 280 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo recipientEncryptedKeys SEQUENCE OF 281 RecipientEncryptedKey. 283 4.2.1.2. SKIPJACK CEK Wrap Process Using Unique Originator UKM Values 285 This section describes how a unique originator UKM value is generated 286 for each recipient to be used as an input to KEA to generate that 287 recipient's pairwise KEK. 289 The following steps MUST be repeated for each recipient: 291 1) A new RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure MUST be 292 constructed. 294 2) A unique 128-byte originator's UKM MUST be generated. The 295 originator's UKM MUST be placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm OCTET 296 STRING. 298 3) KEA MUST be used to generate the pairwise KEK based on the 299 originator's UKM, originator's private KEA key, recipient's 128-byte 300 public KEA key and recipient's 128-byte public KEA key used as the Rb 301 value. 303 4) The SKIPJACK CEK MUST be wrapped using the KEA-generated pairwise 304 KEK as input to the FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function. The FORTEZZA 80-bit 305 wrap function takes the 80-bit SKIPJACK CEK along with a 16-bit check 306 value and produces a 96-bit result using the KEA-generated pairwise KEK. 308 5) A new RecipientEncryptedKey SEQUENCE MUST be constructed. 310 6) The value of the subjectKeyIdentifier extension from the recipient's 311 KEA X.509 v3 certificate MUST be placed in the RecipientEncryptedKey 312 rid rKeyId subjectKeyIdentifier field. The KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier 313 CHOICE MUST be rKeyId. The date and other fields MUST be absent from 314 the RecipientEncryptedKey rid rKeyId SEQUENCE. 316 7) The wrapped SKIPJACK CEK MUST be placed in the RecipientEncryptedKey 317 encryptedKey OCTET STRING. 319 8) The recipient's RecipientEncryptedKey MUST be the only 320 RecipientEncryptedKey present in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 321 recipientEncryptedKeys SEQUENCE OF RecipientEncryptedKey. 323 9) The RecipientInfo containing the recipient's KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 324 MUST be included in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfos SET OF 325 RecipientInfo. 327 4.2.2. SKIPJACK CEK Unwrap Process 329 1) Compliant software MUST be capable of processing EnvelopedData 330 objects constructed using the shared and/or unique originator UKM 331 options. To support the shared UKM option, the receiving software MUST 332 be capable of searching for the recipient's RecipientEncryptedKey in a 333 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo recipientEncryptedKeys SEQUENCE OF 334 RecipientEncryptedKey. To support the unique UKM option, the receiving 335 software MUST be capable of searching for the recipient's 336 RecipientEncryptedKey in the EnvelopedData recipientInfos SET OF 337 RecipientInfo, with each RecipientInfo containing exactly one 338 RecipientEncryptedKey. For each RecipientEncryptedKey, if the rid 339 rkeyId CHOICE is present, then the receiving software MUST attempt to 340 match the value of the subjectKeyIdentifier extension from the 341 recipient's KEA X.509 v3 certificate with the RecipientEncryptedKey rid 342 rKeyId subjectKeyIdentifier field. If the rid issuerAndSerialNumber 343 CHOICE is present, then the receiving software MUST attempt to match 344 the values of the issuer name and serial number from the recipient's 345 KEA X.509 v3 certificate with the RecipientEncryptedKey rid 346 issuerAndSerialNumber field. 348 2) The receiving software MUST extract the originator's UKM from the 349 ukm OCTET STRING contained in the same KeyAgreeRecipientInfo that 350 includes the recipient's RecipientEncryptedKey. 352 3) The receiving software MUST locate the originator's KEA X.509 v3 353 certificate identified by the originator field contained in the same 354 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo that includes the recipient's 355 RecipientEncryptedKey. 357 4) KEA MUST be used to generate the pairwise KEK based on the 358 originator's UKM, originator's 128-byte public KEA key (extracted from 359 originator's KEA X.509 v3 certificate), recipient's private KEA key 360 (associated with recipient's KEA X.509 v3 certificate identified by the 361 RecipientEncryptedKey rid field) and the originator's 128-byte public KEA 362 key used as the Rb value. 364 5) The SKIPJACK CEK MUST be unwrapped using the KEA-generated pairwise 365 KEK as input to the FORTEZZA 80-bit unwrap function. 367 6) The unwrapped 80-bit SKIPJACK CEK resulting from the SKIPJACK CEK 368 unwrap process and the 8-byte IV obtained from the EnvelopedData 369 encryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm parameters field are 370 used as inputs to the SKIPJACK content decryption process to decrypt the 371 EnvelopedData encryptedContent. 373 4.3. "Previously Distributed" Symmetric KEK 375 This section describes the conventions for using KEA and SKIPJACK with 376 the CMS enveloped-data content type to support "previously distributed" 377 symmetric KEKs. When a "previously distributed" symmetric KEK is used to 378 wrap the SKIPJACK CEK, then the RecipientInfo KEKRecipientInfo CHOICE 379 MUST be used. The methods by which KEA is used to generate the symmetric 380 KEK and by which the symmetric KEK is distributed are beyond the scope of 381 this document. 383 The KEKRecipientInfo fields MUST be populated as specified in the [CMS] 384 "KEKRecipientInfo Type" section. The KEKRecipientInfo 385 keyEncryptionAlgorithm algorithm field MUST be the id- 386 keyExchangeAlgorithm OID. The KEKRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm 387 parameters field MUST be the id-fortezzaWrap80 OID indicating that the 388 FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function is used to wrap the 80-bit SKIPJACK CEK. 389 The KEKRecipientInfo encryptedKey field MUST include the SKIPJACK CEK 390 wrapped using the "previously distributed" symmetric KEK as input to the 391 FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function. 393 5. Encrypted-data Conventions 395 The CMS encrypted-data content type consists of an encrypted content, 396 but no recipient information. The method for conveying the SKIPJACK CEK 397 required to decrypt the encrypted-data encrypted content is beyond the 398 scope of this document. Compliant software MUST meet the requirements 399 for constructing an encrypted-data content type stated in [CMS]. The 400 [CMS] "Encrypted-data Content Type" section should be studied before 401 reading this section, because this section does not repeat the [CMS] 402 text. 404 The encrypted-data content type is ASN.1 encoded using the EncryptedData 405 syntax. The fields of the EncryptedData syntax must be populated as 406 follows: 408 The EncryptedData version MUST be set according to [CMS]. 410 The EncryptedData encryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm 411 algorithm field MUST be the id-fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm 412 OID. The EncryptedData encryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm 413 parameters field MUST include the random 8-byte IV used as the input to 414 the content encryption process. 416 The EncryptedData unprotectedAttrs MAY be present. 418 6. FORTEZZA 80-bit Wrap Function 420 The United States Government has not published the description of the 421 FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function. 423 7. Object Identifier Definitions 425 The following OIDs are specified in [INFO], but are repeated here for 426 the reader's convenience: 428 id-fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso- 429 ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) 430 algorithms(1) fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm (4)} 432 As per the definition of the id-fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm OID, the 433 SKIPJACK IV MUST be ASN.1 encoded according to the following ASN.1 434 syntax: 436 Skipjack-Parm ::= SEQUENCE { initialization_vector OCTET STRING } 438 id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) 439 country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) 440 algorithms(1) keyExchangeAlgorithm (22)} 442 id-fortezzaWrap80 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) 443 us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) 444 fortezzaWrap80Algorithm (23)} 446 A. References 448 [CMS] "Cryptographic Message Syntax", Internet Draft, draft-ietf-smime- 449 cms-11.txt. 451 [KEA] "Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) Keys in Internet 452 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates", RFC 2528. 454 [INFO] Registry of INFOSEC Technical Objects, 17 September 1998 456 [MUSTSHOULD] "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement 457 Levels", RFC 2119. 459 [SJ-KEA] SKIPJACK and KEA Algorithm Specifications, Version 2.0, 460 http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/skipjack-kea.htm. 462 B. Acknowledgments 464 The following people have made significant contributions to this draft: 465 David Dalkowski, Russ Housley, Pierce Leonberger, Rich Nicholas, Bob 466 Relyea and Jim Schaad. 468 C. Author's Address 470 John Pawling 471 J.G. Van Dyke & Associates, Inc., a Wang Global Company 472 141 National Business Pkwy, Suite 210 473 Annapolis Junction, MD 20701 474 jsp@jgvandyke.com 475 (301) 939-2739 476 (410) 880-6095 478 D. 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