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'CMS' on line 485 looks like a reference -- Missing reference section? 'MUSTSHOULD' on line 492 looks like a reference -- Missing reference section? 'SJ-KEA' on line 495 looks like a reference -- Missing reference section? 'KEA' on line 487 looks like a reference -- Missing reference section? 'INFO' on line 490 looks like a reference -- Missing reference section? 'USSUP1' on line 498 looks like a reference Summary: 8 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 8 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 INTERNET-DRAFT John Pawling 2 draft-ietf-smime-cmskea-03.txt J.G. Van Dyke & Associates 3 2 December 1999 4 Expires: 2 June 2000 6 CMS KEA and SKIPJACK Conventions 8 Status of this Memo 10 This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all 11 provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working 12 documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and 13 its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working 14 documents as Internet-Drafts. 16 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 17 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 18 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material 19 or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 21 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 22 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt 24 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 25 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 27 Abstract 29 This document describes the conventions for using the Key Exchange 30 Algorithm (KEA) and SKIPJACK encryption algorithm in conjunction with the 31 Cryptographic Message Syntax [CMS] enveloped-data and encrypted-data 32 content types. 34 This draft is being discussed on the 'ietf-smime' mailing list. To 35 subscribe, send a message to ietf-smime-request@imc.org with the single 36 word "subscribe" in the body of the message. There is a Web site for 37 the mailing list at . 39 1. Introduction 41 Throughout this document, the terms MUST, MUST NOT, SHOULD and MAY are 42 used in capital letters. This conforms to the definitions in 43 [MUSTSHOULD]. [MUSTSHOULD] defines the use of these key words to help 44 make the intent of standards track documents as clear as possible. The 45 same key words are used in this document to help implementers achieve 46 interoperability. Software that claims compliance with this document 47 MUST provide the capabilities as indicated by the MUST, MUST NOT, 48 SHOULD and MAY terms. The KEA and SKIPJACK cryptographic algorithms are 49 described in [SJ-KEA]. 51 2. Content Encryption Process 53 This section applies to the construction of both the enveloped-data and 54 encrypted-data content types. Compliant software MUST meet the 55 requirements stated in [CMS] Section 6.3, "Content-encryption Process". 56 The input to the encryption process MUST be padded to a multiple of 57 eight octets using the padding rules described in [CMS] Section 6.3. 58 The content MUST be encrypted as a single string using the SKIPJACK 59 algorithm in 64-bit Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode using 60 randomly-generated 8-byte Initialization Vector (IV) and 80-bit 61 SKIPJACK content-encryption key (CEK) values. 63 3. Content Decryption Process 65 This section applies to the processing of both the enveloped-data and 66 encrypted-data content types. The encryptedContent MUST be decrypted as 67 a single string using the SKIPJACK algorithm in 64-bit CBC mode. The 80- 68 bit SKIPJACK CEK and the 8-byte IV MUST be used as inputs to the SKIPJACK 69 decryption process. Following decryption, the padding MUST be removed 70 from the decrypted data. The padding rules are described in [CMS] 71 Section 6.3, "Content-encryption Process". 73 4. Enveloped-data Conventions 75 The CMS enveloped-data content type consists of an encrypted content and 76 wrapped CEKs for one or more recipients. Compliant software MUST 77 meet the requirements for constructing an enveloped-data content type 78 stated in [CMS] Section 6, "Enveloped-data Content Type". [CMS] Section 6 79 should be studied before reading this section, because this section 80 does not repeat the [CMS] text. 82 An 8-byte IV and 80-bit CEK MUST be randomly generated for each instance 83 of an enveloped-data content type as inputs to the SKIPJACK algorithm for 84 use to encrypt the content. The SKIPJACK CEK MUST only be used for 85 encrypting the content of a single instance of an enveloped-data content 86 type. 88 KEA and SKIPJACK can be used with the enveloped-data content type using 89 either of the following key management techniques defined in [CMS] 90 Section 6: 92 1) Key Agreement: The SKIPJACK CEK is uniquely wrapped for each 93 recipient using a pairwise symmetric key-encryption key (KEK) generated 94 using KEA using the originator's private KEA key, recipient's public KEA 95 key and other values. Section 4.2 describes the use of KEA and SKIPJACK 96 to provide key agreement. 98 2) "Previously Distributed" Symmetric KEK: The SKIPJACK CEK is wrapped 99 using a "previously distributed" symmetric KEK (such as a Mail List Key) 100 generated using KEA. The methods by which KEA is used to generate the 101 symmetric KEK and by which the symmetric KEK is distributed are beyond 102 the scope of this document. Section 4.3 describes the use of KEA and 103 SKIPJACK to support "previously distributed" KEKs. 105 [CMS] Section 6 also defines the concept of the key transport key 106 management technique. The key transport technique MUST NOT be used with 107 KEA. 109 4.1. EnvelopedData Fields 111 The enveloped-data content type is Abstract Syntax Notation.1 (ASN.1) 112 encoded using the EnvelopedData syntax. The fields of the EnvelopedData 113 syntax must be populated as follows: 115 The EnvelopedData version MUST be 2. 117 If key agreement is being used, then the EnvelopedData originatorInfo 118 field SHOULD be present and SHOULD include the originator's KEA X.509 v3 119 certificate containing the KEA public key associated with the KEA private 120 key used to form each pairwise symmetric KEK used to wrap each copy of 121 the SKIPJACK CEK. The issuers' X.509 v3 certificates required to form 122 the complete certification path for the originator's KEA X.509 v3 123 certificate MAY be included in the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field. 124 Self-signed certificates SHOULD NOT be included in the EnvelopedData 125 originatorInfo field. 127 The EnvelopedData RecipientInfo CHOICE is dependent on the key management 128 technique used. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 provide more information. 130 The EnvelopedData encryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm 131 algorithm field MUST be the id-fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm 132 object identifier (OID). The EnvelopedData encryptedContentInfo 133 contentEncryptionAlgorithm parameters field MUST include the random 8- 134 byte IV used as the input to the content encryption process. 136 The EnvelopedData unprotectedAttrs MAY be present. 138 4.2. Key Agreement 140 This section describes the conventions for using KEA and SKIPJACK with 141 the CMS enveloped-data content type to support key agreement. When key 142 agreement is used, then the RecipientInfo keyAgreeRecipientInfo CHOICE 143 MUST be used. 145 If the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field does not include the 146 originator's KEA X.509 v3 certificate, then each recipientInfos 147 KeyAgreementRecipientInfo originator field MUST include the 148 issuerAndSerialNumber CHOICE identifying the originator's KEA X.509 v3 149 certificate. If the EnvelopedData originatorInfo field includes the 150 originator's KEA X.509 v3 certificate, then each recipientInfos 151 KeyAgreementRecipientInfo originator field MUST include either the 152 subjectKeyIdentifier CHOICE containing the value from the 153 subjectKeyIdentifier extension of the originator's KEA v3 X.509 154 certificate or the issuerAndSerialNumber CHOICE identifying the 155 originator's KEA X.509 v3 certificate. To minimize the size of the 156 EnvelopedData, it is recommended that the subjectKeyIdentifier CHOICE be 157 used. 159 In some environments, the KeyAgreementRecipientInfo originator field MAY 160 include the originatorKey CHOICE. The originatorKey CHOICE SHOULD NOT be 161 used with KEA for e-mail transactions. Within a controlled security 162 architecture, a module may produce KEA key pairs for use in conjunction 163 with internal/local storage of encrypted data. In this case, there may 164 not be an X.509 certificate associated with a (possibly) short term or 165 one time use public KEA key. When originatorKey is used, then the KEA 166 public key MUST be conveyed in the publicKey BIT STRING as specified in 167 [KEA] Section 3.1.2. The originatorKey algorithm identifier MUST be the 168 id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OID. The originatorKey algorithm parameters 169 field MUST contain the KEA "domain identifier" (ASN.1 encoded as an OCTET 170 STRING) identifying the KEA algorithm parameters (i.e., p/q/g values) 171 associated with the KEA public key. [KEA] Section 3.1.1 describes the 172 method for computing the KEA domain identifier value. 174 4.2.1. SKIPJACK CEK Wrap Process 176 The SKIPJACK CEK is uniquely wrapped for each recipient of the 177 EnvelopedData using a pairwise KEK generated using the KEA 178 material of the originator and the recipient along with the 179 originator's User Keying Material (UKM) (i.e. Ra). The CMS 180 EnvelopedData syntax provides two options for wrapping the SKIPJACK 181 CEK for each recipient using a KEA-generated KEK. The "shared 182 Originator UKM" option SHOULD be used when constructing EnvelopedData 183 objects. The "unique originator UKM" option MAY be used when 184 constructing EnvelopedData objects. Compliant software MUST be capable 185 of processing EnvelopedData objects constructed using either option or 186 both options. 188 1) Shared Originator UKM Option: CMS provides the ability for a 189 single, shared originator's UKM to be used to generate each pairwise 190 KEK used to wrap the SKIPJACK CEK for each recipient. When using 191 the shared originator UKM option, a single RecipientInfo 192 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure MUST be constructed to contain the 193 wrapped SKIPJACK CEKs for all of the KEA recipients sharing the same 194 KEA parameters. The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure includes multiple 195 RecipientEncryptedKey fields that each contain the SKIPJACK CEK wrapped 196 for a specific recipient. 198 2) Unique Originator UKM Option: CMS also provides the ability for a 199 unique originator UKM to be used to generate each pairwise KEK used to 200 wrap the SKIPJACK CEK for each recipient. When using the unique 201 originator UKM option, a separate RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 202 structure MUST be constructed for each recipient. Each 203 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure includes a single RecipientEncryptedKey 204 field containing the SKIPJACK CEK wrapped for the recipient. This 205 option requires more overhead than the shared UKM option because the 206 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields (i.e. version, originator, ukm, 207 keyEncryptionAlgorithm) must be repeated for each recipient. 209 The next two paragraphs apply to both options. 211 The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm algorithm field MUST 212 include the id-kEAKeyEncryptionAlgorithm OID. The KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 213 keyEncryptionAlgorithm parameters field MUST contain a KeyWrapAlgorithm 214 as specified in [CMS] Appendix A, "ASN.1 Module". The algorithm field 215 of KeyWrapAlgorithm MUST be the id-fortezzaWrap80 OID indicating that 216 the FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function is used to wrap the 80-bit SKIPJACK 217 CEK. The parameters field of KeyWrapAlgorithm MUST be absent. 219 If the originator is not already an explicit recipient, then a copy of 220 the SKIPJACK CEK SHOULD be wrapped for the originator and included in 221 the EnvelopedData. This allows the originator to decrypt the contents 222 of the EnvelopedData. 224 4.2.1.1. SKIPJACK CEK Wrap Process Using A Shared Originator UKM Value 226 This section describes how a shared originator UKM value is used as an 227 input to KEA to generate each pairwise KEK used to wrap the SKIPJACK CEK 228 for each recipient. 230 When using the shared originator UKM option, a single RecipientInfo 231 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure MUST be constructed to contain the 232 wrapped SKIPJACK CEKs for all of the KEA recipients using the same 233 set of KEA parameters. If all recipients' KEA public keys were 234 generated using the same set of KEA parameters, then there MUST only be 235 a single RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure for all of the 236 KEA recipients. If the recipients' KEA public keys were generated 237 using different sets of KEA parameters, then multiple RecipientInfo 238 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo fields MUST be constructed because the 239 originatorIdentifierOrKey will be different for each distinct set of 240 recipients' KEA parameters. 242 A unique 128-byte originator's UKM MUST be generated for each distinct 243 set of recipients' KEA parameters. The originator's UKM MUST be placed 244 in each KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm OCTET STRING. 246 The originator's and recipient's KEA parameters MUST be identical to use 247 KEA to successfully generate a pairwise KEK. [KEA] describes how a KEA 248 public key is conveyed in an X.509 v3 certificate. [KEA] states that the 249 KEA parameters are not included in KEA certificates; instead, a "domain 250 identifier" is supplied in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm parameters 251 field of every KEA certificate. The values of the KEA domain identifiers 252 in the originator's and recipient's KEA X.509 v3 certificates can be 253 compared to determine if the originator's and recipient's KEA parameters 254 are identical. 256 The following steps MUST be repeated for each recipient: 258 1) KEA MUST be used to generate the pairwise KEK based on the 259 originator's UKM, originator's private KEA key, recipient's 128 byte 260 public KEA key (obtained from the recipient's KEA X.509 v3 certificate) 261 and the recipient's 128-byte public KEA key used as the Rb value. 263 2) The SKIPJACK CEK MUST be wrapped using the KEA-generated pairwise 264 KEK as input to the FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function. The FORTEZZA 80-bit 265 wrap function takes the 80-bit SKIPJACK CEK along with a 16-bit check 266 value and produces a 96-bit result using the KEA-generated pairwise KEK. 268 3) A new RecipientEncryptedKey SEQUENCE MUST be constructed for the 269 recipient. 271 4) The value of the subjectKeyIdentifier extension from the recipient's 272 KEA X.509 v3 certificate MUST be placed in the recipient's 273 RecipientEncryptedKey rid rKeyId subjectKeyIdentifier field. The 274 KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier CHOICE MUST be rKeyId. The date and other 275 fields MUST be absent from the recipientEncryptedKey rid rKeyId 276 SEQUENCE. 278 5) The wrapped SKIPJACK CEK MUST be placed in the recipient's 279 RecipientEncryptedKey encryptedKey OCTET STRING. 281 6) The recipient's RecipientEncryptedKey MUST be included in the 282 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo recipientEncryptedKeys SEQUENCE OF 283 RecipientEncryptedKey. 285 4.2.1.2. SKIPJACK CEK Wrap Process Using Unique Originator UKM Values 287 This section describes how a unique originator UKM value is generated 288 for each recipient to be used as an input to KEA to generate that 289 recipient's pairwise KEK. 291 The following steps MUST be repeated for each recipient: 293 1) A new RecipientInfo KeyAgreeRecipientInfo structure MUST be 294 constructed. 296 2) A unique 128-byte originator's UKM MUST be generated. The 297 originator's UKM MUST be placed in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo ukm OCTET 298 STRING. 300 3) KEA MUST be used to generate the pairwise KEK based on the 301 originator's UKM, originator's private KEA key, recipient's 128-byte 302 public KEA key and recipient's 128-byte public KEA key used as the Rb 303 value. 305 4) The SKIPJACK CEK MUST be wrapped using the KEA-generated pairwise 306 KEK as input to the FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function. The FORTEZZA 80-bit 307 wrap function takes the 80-bit SKIPJACK CEK along with a 16-bit check 308 value and produces a 96-bit result using the KEA-generated pairwise KEK. 310 5) A new RecipientEncryptedKey SEQUENCE MUST be constructed. 312 6) The value of the subjectKeyIdentifier extension from the recipient's 313 KEA X.509 v3 certificate MUST be placed in the RecipientEncryptedKey 314 rid rKeyId subjectKeyIdentifier field. The KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier 315 CHOICE MUST be rKeyId. The date and other fields MUST be absent from 316 the RecipientEncryptedKey rid rKeyId SEQUENCE. 318 7) The wrapped SKIPJACK CEK MUST be placed in the RecipientEncryptedKey 319 encryptedKey OCTET STRING. 321 8) The recipient's RecipientEncryptedKey MUST be the only 322 RecipientEncryptedKey present in the KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 323 recipientEncryptedKeys SEQUENCE OF RecipientEncryptedKey. 325 9) The RecipientInfo containing the recipient's KeyAgreeRecipientInfo 326 MUST be included in the EnvelopedData RecipientInfos SET OF 327 RecipientInfo. 329 4.2.2. SKIPJACK CEK Unwrap Process 331 1) Compliant software MUST be capable of processing EnvelopedData 332 objects constructed using the shared and/or unique originator UKM 333 options. To support the shared UKM option, the receiving software MUST 334 be capable of searching for the recipient's RecipientEncryptedKey in a 335 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo recipientEncryptedKeys SEQUENCE OF 336 RecipientEncryptedKey. To support the unique UKM option, the receiving 337 software MUST be capable of searching for the recipient's 338 RecipientEncryptedKey in the EnvelopedData recipientInfos SET OF 339 RecipientInfo, with each RecipientInfo containing exactly one 340 RecipientEncryptedKey. For each RecipientEncryptedKey, if the rid 341 rkeyId CHOICE is present, then the receiving software MUST attempt to 342 match the value of the subjectKeyIdentifier extension from the 343 recipient's KEA X.509 v3 certificate with the RecipientEncryptedKey rid 344 rKeyId subjectKeyIdentifier field. If the rid issuerAndSerialNumber 345 CHOICE is present, then the receiving software MUST attempt to match 346 the values of the issuer name and serial number from the recipient's 347 KEA X.509 v3 certificate with the RecipientEncryptedKey rid 348 issuerAndSerialNumber field. 350 2) The receiving software MUST extract the originator's UKM from the 351 ukm OCTET STRING contained in the same KeyAgreeRecipientInfo that 352 includes the recipient's RecipientEncryptedKey. 354 3) The receiving software MUST locate the originator's KEA X.509 v3 355 certificate identified by the originator field contained in the same 356 KeyAgreeRecipientInfo that includes the recipient's 357 RecipientEncryptedKey. 359 4) KEA MUST be used to generate the pairwise KEK based on the 360 originator's UKM, originator's 128-byte public KEA key (extracted from 361 originator's KEA X.509 v3 certificate), recipient's private KEA key 362 (associated with recipient's KEA X.509 v3 certificate identified by the 363 RecipientEncryptedKey rid field) and the originator's 128-byte public KEA 364 key used as the Rb value. 366 5) The SKIPJACK CEK MUST be unwrapped using the KEA-generated pairwise 367 KEK as input to the FORTEZZA 80-bit unwrap function. 369 6) The unwrapped 80-bit SKIPJACK CEK resulting from the SKIPJACK CEK 370 unwrap process and the 8-byte IV obtained from the EnvelopedData 371 encryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm parameters field are 372 used as inputs to the SKIPJACK content decryption process to decrypt the 373 EnvelopedData encryptedContent. 375 4.3. "Previously Distributed" Symmetric KEK 377 This section describes the conventions for using KEA and SKIPJACK with 378 the CMS enveloped-data content type to support "previously distributed" 379 symmetric KEKs. When a "previously distributed" symmetric KEK is used to 380 wrap the SKIPJACK CEK, then the RecipientInfo KEKRecipientInfo CHOICE 381 MUST be used. The methods by which KEA is used to generate the symmetric 382 KEK and by which the symmetric KEK is distributed are beyond the scope of 383 this document. 385 The KEKRecipientInfo fields MUST be populated as specified in [CMS] Section 386 6.2.3, "KEKRecipientInfo Type". The KEKRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm 387 algorithm field MUST be the id-fortezzaWrap80 OID indicating that the 388 FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function is used to wrap the 80-bit SKIPJACK CEK. 389 The KEKRecipientInfo keyEncryptionAlgorithm parameters field MUST be absent. 390 The KEKRecipientInfo encryptedKey field MUST include the SKIPJACK CEK 391 wrapped using the "previously distributed" symmetric KEK as input to the 392 FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function. 394 5. Encrypted-data Conventions 396 The CMS encrypted-data content type consists of an encrypted content, 397 but no recipient information. The method for conveying the SKIPJACK CEK 398 required to decrypt the encrypted-data encrypted content is beyond the 399 scope of this document. Compliant software MUST meet the requirements 400 for constructing an encrypted-data content type stated [CMS] Section 8, 401 "Encrypted-data Content Type". [CMS] Section 8 should be studied before 402 reading this section, because this section does not repeat the [CMS] 403 text. 405 The encrypted-data content type is ASN.1 encoded using the EncryptedData 406 syntax. The fields of the EncryptedData syntax must be populated as 407 follows: 409 The EncryptedData version MUST be set according to [CMS] Section 8. 411 The EncryptedData encryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm 412 algorithm field MUST be the id-fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm 413 OID. The EncryptedData encryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm 414 parameters field MUST include the random 8-byte IV used as the input to 415 the content encryption process. 417 The EncryptedData unprotectedAttrs MAY be present. 419 6. FORTEZZA 80-bit Wrap Function 421 The United States Government has not published the description of the 422 FORTEZZA 80-bit wrap function. 424 7. SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions 426 RFC 2633, Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities signed attribute 427 (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUNCEs) to be used to specify a 428 partial list of algorithms that the software announcing the 429 SMIMECapabilities can support. When constructing a signedData object, 430 compliant software MAY include the SMIMECapabilities signed attribute 431 announcing that it supports the KEA and SKIPJACK algorithms. 433 The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing KEA MUST include the 434 id-kEAKeyEncryptionAlgorithm OID in the capabilityID field and MUST include 435 a KeyWrapAlgorithm SEQUENCE in the parameters field. The algorithm field of 436 KeyWrapAlgorithm MUST be the id-fortezzaWrap80 OID. The parameters field of 437 KeyWrapAlgorithm MUST be absent. The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE for KEA SHOULD 438 be included in the key management algorithms portion of the 439 SMIMECapabilities list. The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing KEA MUST 440 be DER-encoded as follows: 3018 0609 6086 4801 6502 0101 1830 0b06 0960 8648 441 0165 0201 0117. 443 The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing SKIPJACK MUST include the 444 id-fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm OID in the capabilityID field and the 445 parameters field MUST be absent. The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE for SKIPJACK 446 SHOULD be included in the symmetric encryption algorithms portion of the 447 SMIMECapabilities list. The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing SKIPJACK 448 MUST be DER-encoded as follows: 300b 0609 6086 4801 6502 0101 0400. 450 8. Object Identifier Definitions 452 The following OIDs are specified in [INFO], but are repeated here for 453 the reader's convenience: 455 id-fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso- 456 ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) 457 algorithms(1) fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm (4)} 459 As specified in [USSUP1], when the id-fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm 460 OID is present in the AlgorithmIdentifier algorithm field, then the 461 AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present and MUST include 462 the SKIPJACK IV ASN.1 encoded using the following syntax: 464 Skipjack-Parm ::= SEQUENCE { initialization-vector OCTET STRING } 466 Note: [CMS] Section 2, "General Overview" describes the ASN.1 encoding 467 conventions for the CMS content types including the enveloped-data and 468 encrypted-data content types in which the 469 id-fortezzaConfidentialityAlgorithm OID and parameters will be present. 471 id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) 472 country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) 473 algorithms(1) keyExchangeAlgorithm (22)} 475 id-fortezzaWrap80 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) 476 us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) algorithms(1) 477 fortezzaWrap80Algorithm (23)} 479 id-kEAKeyEncryptionAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) 480 country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) dod(2) infosec(1) 481 algorithms(1) kEAKeyEncryptionAlgorithm (24)} 483 A. References 485 [CMS] RFC 2630, Cryptographic Message Syntax, June 1999. 487 [KEA] RFC 2528, Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) Keys in 488 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates, March 1999. 490 [INFO] Registry of INFOSEC Technical Objects, 22 July 1999. 492 [MUSTSHOULD] RFC 2119, Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate 493 Requirement Levels. 495 [SJ-KEA] SKIPJACK and KEA Algorithm Specifications, Version 2.0, 496 http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/skipjack-kea.htm. 498 [USSUP1] Allied Communication Publication 120 (ACP120) Common 499 Security Protocol (CSP) United States (US) Supplement No. 1, June 1998; 500 http://www.armadillo.huntsville.al.us/Fortezza_docs/missi2.html#specs. 502 B. Acknowledgments 504 The following people have made significant contributions to this draft: 505 David Dalkowski, Phillip Griffin, Russ Housley, Pierce Leonberger, 506 Rich Nicholas, Bob Relyea and Jim Schaad. 508 C. Changes between CMSKEA-02 and CMSKEA-03: 510 1) Changed all section references to CMS to include section numbers 511 rather than just section titles. 513 2) Added Section 7, SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions. 515 D. Author's Address 517 John Pawling 518 J.G. Van Dyke & Associates, Inc., a Wang Government Services Company 519 141 National Business Pkwy, Suite 210 520 Annapolis Junction, MD 20701 521 jsp@jgvandyke.com 522 (301) 939-2739 523 (410) 880-6095 525 E. Full Copyright Statement 527 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved. 528 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to 529 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it 530 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published 531 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any 532 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph 533 are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this 534 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing 535 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other 536 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of 537 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for 538 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process shall be 539 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than 540 English. 542 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be 543 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This 544 document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS 545 IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK 546 FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT 547 NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN 548 WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 549 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.