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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group J. Peterson 3 Internet-Draft Neustar 4 Intended status: Standards Track S. Turner 5 Expires: December 27, 2016 sn3rd 6 June 25, 2016 8 Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates 9 draft-ietf-stir-certificates-05.txt 11 Abstract 13 In order to prevent the impersonation of telephone numbers on the 14 Internet, some kind of credential system needs to exist that 15 cryptographically proves authority over telephone numbers. This 16 document describes the use of certificates in establishing authority 17 over telephone numbers, as a component of a broader architecture for 18 managing telephone numbers as identities in protocols like SIP. 20 Status of This Memo 22 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 23 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 25 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 26 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 27 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 28 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 30 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 31 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 32 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 33 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 35 This Internet-Draft will expire on December 27, 2016. 37 Copyright Notice 39 Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 40 document authors. All rights reserved. 42 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 43 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 44 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 45 publication of this document. Please review these documents 46 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 47 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 48 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 49 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 50 described in the Simplified BSD License. 52 Table of Contents 54 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 55 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. Authority for Telephone Numbers in Certificates . . . . . . . 3 57 4. Certificate Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 58 5. Enrollment and Authorization using the TN Authorization List 6 59 5.1. Certificate Extension Scope and Structure . . . . . . . . 7 60 6. Provisioning Private Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 61 7. Acquiring Credentials to Verify Signatures . . . . . . . . . 8 62 8. Verifying Certificate Scope with TN Authorization List . . . 9 63 9. Certificate Freshness and Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 64 9.1. Choosing a Verification Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 65 9.2. Using OCSP with TN Auth List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 66 9.2.1. OCSP Extension Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 67 9.3. Acquiring TN Lists By Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 68 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 69 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 70 12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 71 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 72 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 73 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 75 1. Introduction 77 The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] identifies the primary enabler 78 of robocalling, vishing, swatting and related attacks as the 79 capability to impersonate a calling party number. The starkest 80 examples of these attacks are cases where automated callees on the 81 PSTN rely on the calling number as a security measure, for example to 82 access a voicemail system. Robocallers use impersonation as a means 83 of obscuring identity; while robocallers can, in the ordinary PSTN, 84 block (that is, withhold) their caller identity, callees are less 85 likely to pick up calls from blocked identities, and therefore 86 appearing to calling from some number, any number, is preferable. 87 Robocallers however prefer not to call from a number that can trace 88 back to the robocaller, and therefore they impersonate numbers that 89 are not assigned to them. 91 One of the most important components of a system to prevent 92 impersonation is the implementation of credentials which identify the 93 parties who control telephone numbers. With these credentials, 94 parties can prove that they are in fact authorized to use telephony 95 numbers, and thus distinguish themselves from impersonators unable to 96 present such credentials. For that reason the STIR threat model 98 [RFC7375] stipulates, "The design of the credential system envisioned 99 as a solution to these threats must, for example, limit the scope of 100 the credentials issued to carriers or national authorities to those 101 numbers that fall under their purview." This document describes 102 credential systems for telephone numbers based on X.509 version 3 103 certificates in accordance with [RFC5280]. While telephone numbers 104 have long been a part of the X.509 standard, this document provides 105 ways to determine authority more aligned with telephone network 106 requirements, including extending X.509 with a Telephone Number 107 Authorization List which binds certificates to authority for 108 particular telephone numbers, or potentially telephone number blocks 109 or ranges. 111 In the STIR in-band architecture specified in 112 [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis], two basic types of entities need access 113 to these credentials: authentication services, and verification 114 services (or verifiers). An authentication service must be operated 115 by an entity enrolled with the certification authority (see 116 Section 5), whereas a verifier need only trust the root certificate 117 of the authority, and have a means to access and validate the public 118 keys associated with these certificates. Although the guidance in 119 this document is written with the STIR in-band architecture in mind, 120 the credential system described in this document could be useful for 121 other protocols that want to make use of certificates to prove 122 authority over telephone numbers on the Internet. 124 This document specifies only the credential syntax and semantics 125 necessary to support this architecture. It does not assume any 126 particular certification authority or deployment environment. We 127 anticipate that some deployment experience will be necessary to 128 determine optimal operational models. 130 2. Terminology 132 In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", 133 "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT 134 RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as 135 described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] and RFC 6919 [RFC6919]. 137 3. Authority for Telephone Numbers in Certificates 139 At a high level, this specification details two non-exclusive 140 approaches that can be employed to determine authority over telephone 141 numbers with certificates. 143 The first approach is to leverage the subject of the certificate to 144 ascertain that the holder of the certificate is authorized to claim 145 authority over a telephone number. The subject might be represented 146 as a domain name in the SubjectAltName, such as an "example.net" 147 where that domain is known to relying parties as a carrier, or 148 represented with other identifiers related to the operation of the 149 telephone network including Service Provider Identifiers (SPIDs) 150 could serve as a subject as well. A relying party could then employ 151 an external data set or service that determines whether or not a 152 specific telephone number is under the authority of the carrier 153 identified as the subject of the certificate, and use that to 154 ascertain whether or not the carrier should have authority over a 155 telephone number. Potentially, a certificate extension to convey the 156 URI of such an information service trusted by the issuer of the 157 certificate could be developed (though this specification does not 158 propose one). Alternatively, some relying parties could form 159 bilateral or multilateral trust relationships with peer carriers, 160 trusting one another's assertions just as telephone carriers in the 161 SS7 network today rely on transitive trust when displaying the 162 calling party telephone number received through SS7 signaling. 164 The second approach is to extend the syntax of certificates to 165 include a new attribute, defined here as TN Authorization List, which 166 contains a list of telephone numbers defining the scope of authority 167 of the certificate. Relying parties, if they trust the issuer of the 168 certificate as a source of authoritative information on telephone 169 numbers, could therefore use the TN Authorization List instead of the 170 subject of the certificate to make a decision about whether or not 171 the signer has authority over a particular telephone number. The TN 172 Authorization List could be provided in one of two ways: as a literal 173 value in the certificate, or as a network service that allows relying 174 parties to query in real time to determine that a telephone number is 175 in the scope of a certificate. Using the TN Authorization list 176 rather than the certificate subject makes sense when, for example, 177 for privacy reasons, the certificate owner would prefer not to be 178 identified, or in cases where the holder of the certificate does not 179 participate in the sort of traditional carrier infrastructure taht 180 the first approach assumes. 182 The first approach requires little change to existing PKI 183 certificates; for the second approach, we must define an appropriate 184 enrollment and authorization process. For the purposes of STIR, the 185 over-the-wire format specified in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] 186 accommodates either of these approaches: the methods for 187 canonicalizing, signing, for identifying and accessing the 188 certificate and so on remain the same; it is only the verifier 189 behavior and authorization decision that will change depending on the 190 approach to telephone number authority taken by the certificate. For 191 that reason, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and in 192 fact a certificate issued to a traditional telephone network service 193 provider could contain a TN Authorization List or not, depending on 194 the certification authority issuing the credential. Regardless of 195 which approach is used, certificates that assert authority over 196 telephone numbers are subject to the ordinary operational procedures 197 that govern certificate use per [RFC5280]. This means that 198 verification services must be mindful of the need to ensure that they 199 trust the root certificate authority that issued the certificate, and 200 that they have some means to determine the freshness of the 201 certificate (see Section 9). 203 4. Certificate Usage 205 [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] requires that all credential systems used 206 for signing the Identity header in SIP detail the following: 208 1. The URI schemes permitted in the SIP Identity header "info" 209 parameter, as well as any special procedures required to 210 dereference the URIs. While normative text is given below in 211 Section 7, this mechanism permits the HTTP, CID and SIP URI 212 schemes to appear in the "info" parameter. 214 2. Procedures required to extract keying material from the resources 215 designated by the URI. Implementations perform no special 216 procedures beyond dereferencing the "info" URI. See Section 7. 218 3. Procedures used by the verification service to determine the 219 scope of the credential. This specification effectively proposes 220 two methods, as outlined in Section 3: one where the subject (or 221 more properly subjectAltName) of the certificate indicates the 222 scope of authority through a domain name, and relying parties 223 either trust the subject entirely or have some direct means of 224 determining whether or not a number falls under a subject's 225 authority; and another where an extension to the certificate as 226 described in Section 8 identifies the scope of the certificate. 228 4. The cryptographic algorithms required to validate the 229 credentials. For this specification, that means the signature 230 algorithms used to sign certificates. This specification 231 REQUIRES that implementations support both ECDSA with the P-256 232 curve (see [RFC4754]) and RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 (see [RFC3447] 233 Section 8.2) for certificate signatures. Implementers are 234 advised that RS256 is mandated only as a transitional mechanism, 235 due to its widespread use in existing PKI, but we anticipate that 236 this mechanism will eventually be deprecated. 238 5. Finally, note that all certificates compliant with this 239 specification MUST provide cryptographic keying material 240 sufficient to generate the ECDSA P-256 signatures necessary to 241 support the ES256 hashed signatures required by PASSporT 243 [I-D.ietf-stir-passport], which in turn follows JSON Web Token 244 (JWT) [RFC7519]. 246 5. Enrollment and Authorization using the TN Authorization List 248 This document assumes a threefold model for certificate enrollment 249 when using the TN Authorization List extension. 251 The first enrollment model is one where the certification authority 252 acts in concert with national numbering authorities to issue 253 credentials to those parties to whom numbers are assigned. In the 254 United States, for example, telephone number blocks are assigned to 255 Local Exchange Carriers (LECs) by the North American Numbering Plan 256 Administrator (NANPA), who is in turn directed by the national 257 regulator. LECs may also receive numbers in smaller allocations, 258 through number pooling, or via an individual assignment through 259 number portability. LECs assign numbers to customers, who may be 260 private individuals or organizations - and organizations take 261 responsibility for assigning numbers within their own enterprise. 262 This model requires top-down adoption of the model from regulators 263 through to carriers. 265 The second enrollment model is a bottom-up approach where a 266 certification authority requires that an entity prove control by 267 means of some sort of test, which, as with certification authorities 268 for web PKI, might either be automated or a manual administrative 269 process. As an example of an automated process, an authority might 270 send a text message to a telephone number containing a URL (which 271 might be dereferenced by the recipient) as a means of verifying that 272 a user has control of terminal corresponding to that number. Checks 273 of this form are frequently used in commercial systems today to 274 validate telephone numbers provided by users. This is comparable to 275 existing enrollment systems used by some certificate authorities for 276 issuing S/MIME credentials for email by verifying that the party 277 applying for a credential receives mail at the email address in 278 question. 280 The third enrollment model is delegation: that is, the holder of a 281 certificate (assigned by either of the two methods above) might 282 delegate some or all of their authority to another party. In some 283 cases, multiple levels of delegation could occur: a LEC, for example, 284 might delegate authority to a customer organization for a block of 285 100 numbers used by an IP PBX, and the organization might in turn 286 delegate authority for a particular number to an individual employee. 287 This is analogous to delegation of organizational identities in 288 traditional hierarchical Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) who use 289 the name constraints extension [RFC5280]; the root CA delegates names 290 in sales to the sales department CA, names in development to the 291 development CA, etc. As lengthy certificate delegation chains are 292 brittle, however, and can cause delays in the verification process, 293 this document considers optimizations to reduce the complexity of 294 verification. 296 [TBD] Future versions of this specification may address adding a 297 level of assurance indication to certificates to differentiate those 298 enrolled from proof-of-possession versus delegation. 300 [TBD] Future versions of this specification may also discuss methods 301 of partial delegation, where certificate holders delegate only part 302 of their authority. For example, individual assignees may want to 303 delegate to a service authority for text messages associated with 304 their telephone number, but not for other functions. 306 5.1. Certificate Extension Scope and Structure 308 This specification places no limits on the number of telephone 309 numbers that can be associated with any given certificate. Some 310 service providers may be assigned millions of numbers, and may wish 311 to have a single certificate that is capable of signing for any one 312 of those numbers. Others may wish to compartmentalize authority over 313 subsets of the numbers they control. 315 Moreover, service providers may wish to have multiple certificates 316 with the same scope of authority. For example, a service provider 317 with several regional gateway systems may want each system to be 318 capable of signing for each of their numbers, but not want to have 319 each system share the same private key. 321 The set of telephone numbers for which a particular certificate is 322 valid is expressed in the certificate through a certificate 323 extension; the certificate's extensibility mechanism is defined in 324 [RFC5280] but the TN Authorization List extension is specified in 325 this document. 327 The subjects of certificates containing the TN Authorization List 328 extension are typically the administrative entities to whom numbers 329 are assigned or delegated. For example, a LEC might hold a 330 certificate for a range of telephone numbers. In some cases, the 331 organization or individual issued such a certificate may not want to 332 associate themselves with a certificate; for example, a private 333 individual with a certificate for a single telephone number might not 334 want to distribute that certificate publicly if every verifier 335 immediately knew their name. The certification authorities issuing 336 certificates with the TN Authorization List extensions may, in 337 accordance with their policies, obscure the identity of the subject, 338 though mechanisms for doing so are outside the scope of this 339 document. 341 6. Provisioning Private Keying Material 343 In order for authentication services to sign calls via the procedures 344 described in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis], they must hold a private key 345 corresponding to a certificate with authority over the calling 346 number. This specification does not require that any particular 347 entity in a SIP deployment architecture sign requests, only that it 348 be an entity with an appropriate private key; the authentication 349 service role may be instantiated by any entity in a SIP network. For 350 a certificate granting authority only over a particular number which 351 has been issued to an end user, for example, an end user device might 352 hold the private key and generate the signature. In the case of a 353 service provider with authority over large blocks of numbers, an 354 intermediary might hold the private key and sign calls. 356 The specification recommends distribution of private keys through 357 PKCS#8 objects signed by a trusted entity, for example through the 358 CMS package specified in [RFC5958]. 360 7. Acquiring Credentials to Verify Signatures 362 This specification documents multiple ways that a verifier can gain 363 access to the credentials needed to verify a request. As the 364 validity of certificates does not depend on the method of their 365 acquisition, there is no need to standardize any single mechanism for 366 this purpose. All entities that comply with 367 [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] necessarily support SIP, and consequently 368 SIP itself can serve as a way to acquire certificates. 369 [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides an "info" parameter of the 370 Identity header which contains a URI where the credential used to 371 generate the Identity header, and requires documents which define 372 credential systems to list the URI schemes that may be present in the 373 "info" parameter. For implementations compliant with this 374 specification, three URI schemes are REQUIRED: the CID URI, the SIP 375 URI, and the HTTP URI. 377 The simplest way for a verifier to acquire the certificate needed to 378 verify a signature is for the certificate be conveyed in a SIP 379 request along with the signature itself. In SIP, for example, a 380 certificate could be carried in a multipart MIME body [RFC2046], and 381 the URI in the Identity header "info" parameter could specify that 382 body with a CID URI [RFC2392]. However, in many environments this is 383 not feasible due to message size restrictions or lack of necessary 384 support for multipart MIME. 386 More commonly, the Identity header "info" parameter in a SIP request 387 may contain a URI that the verifier dereferences with a network call. 388 Implementations of this specification are required to support the use 389 of SIP for this function (via the SUBSCRIBE/NOTIFY mechanism), as 390 well as HTTP, via the Enrollment over Secure Transport mechanisms 391 described in RFC 7030 [RFC7030]. 393 Note well that as an optimization, a verifier may have access to a 394 service, a cache or other local store that grants access to 395 certificates for a particular telephone number. However, there may 396 be multiple valid certificates that can sign a call setup request for 397 a telephone number, and as a consequence, there needs to be some 398 discriminator that the signer uses to identify their credentials. 399 The Identity header "info" parameter itself can serve as such a 400 discriminator, provided implementations use that parameter as a key 401 when accessing certificates from caches or other sources. 403 8. Verifying Certificate Scope with TN Authorization List 405 The subjects of certificates containing the TN Authorization List 406 extension are the administrative entities to whom numbers are 407 assigned or delegated. When a verifier is validating a caller's 408 identity, local policy always determines the circumstances under 409 which any particular subject may be trusted, but the purpose of the 410 TN Authorization List extension particular is to allow a verifier to 411 ascertain when the certification authority has designed that the 412 subject has authority over a particular telephone number or number 413 range. 415 The Telephony Number (TN) Authorization List certificate extension is 416 identified by the following object identifier: 418 id-ce-TNAuthList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce TBD } 420 The TN Authorization List certificate extension has the following 421 syntax: 423 TNAuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNAuthorization 425 TNAuthorization ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNEntry 427 TNEntry ::= CHOICE { 428 spid [0] ServiceProviderIdentifierList, 429 range [1] TelephoneNumberRange, 430 one E164Number } 432 ServiceProviderIdentifierList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..3) OF 433 OCTET STRING 435 -- When all three are present: SPID, Alt SPID, and Last Alt SPID 437 TelephoneNumberRange ::= SEQUENCE { 438 start E164Number, 439 count INTEGER } 441 E164Number ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789")) 443 The TN Authorization List certificate extension indicates the 444 authorized phone numbers for the call setup signer. It indicates one 445 or more blocks of telephone number entries that have been authorized 446 for use by the call setup signer. There are three ways to identify 447 the block: 449 1. A Service Provider Identifier (SPID) can be used to indirectly 450 name all of the telephone numbers associated with that service 451 provider, 453 2. Telephone numbers can be listed in a range, and 455 3. A single telephone number can be listed. 457 Note that because large-scale service providers may want to associate 458 many numbers, possibly millions of numbers, with a particular 459 certificate, optimizations are required for those cases to prevent 460 certificate size from becoming unmanageable. In these cases, the TN 461 Authorization List may be given by reference rather than by value, 462 through the presence of a separate certificate extension that permits 463 verifiers to either securely download the list of numbers associated 464 with a certificate, or to verify that a single number is under the 465 authority of this certificate. This optimization will be detailed in 466 future version of this specification. 468 9. Certificate Freshness and Revocation 470 Regardless of which of the approaches in Section 3 is followed for 471 using certificates, some sort of certificate verification mechanism 472 is required. However, the traditional problem of certificate 473 freshness gains a new wrinkle when using the TN Authorization List 474 extension, because verifiers must establish not only that a 475 certificate remains valid, but also that the certificate's scope 476 contains the telephone number that the verifier is validating. 477 Dynamic changes to number assignments can occur due to number 478 portability, for example. So even if a verifier has a valid cached 479 certificate for a telephone number (or a range containing the 480 number), the verifier must determine that the entity that signed is 481 still a proper authority for that number. 483 To verify the status of the certificate, the verifier needs to 484 acquire the certificate if necessary (via the methods described in 485 Section 7), and then would need to either: 487 (a) Rely on short-lived certificates and not check the certificate's 488 status, or 490 (b) Rely on status information from the authority 492 The tradeoff between short lived certificates and using status 493 information is the former's burden is on the front end (i.e., 494 enrollment) and the latter's burden is on the back end (i.e., 495 verification). Both impact call setup time, but it is assumed that 496 performing enrollment for each call is more of an impact that using 497 status information. This document therefore recommends relying on 498 status information. 500 9.1. Choosing a Verification Method 502 There are three common certificate verification mechanisms employed 503 by CAs: 505 1. Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [RFC5280] 507 2. Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [RFC6960], and 509 3. Server-based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) [RFC5055]. 511 When relying on status information, the verifier needs to obtain the 512 status information - but before that can happen, the verifier needs 513 to know where to locate it. Placing the location of the status 514 information in the certificate makes the certificate larger, but it 515 eases the client workload. The CRL Distribution Point certificate 516 extension includes the location of the CRL and the Authority 517 Information Access certificate extension includes the location of 518 OCSP and/or SCVP servers; both of these extensions are defined in 519 [RFC5280]. In all cases, the status information location is provided 520 in the form of an URI. 522 CRLs are an obviously attractive solution because they are supported 523 by every CA. CRLs have a reputation of being quite large (10s of 524 MBytes), because CAs maintain and issue one monolithic CRL with all 525 of their revoked certificates, but CRLs do support a variety of 526 mechanisms to scope the size of the CRLs based on revocation reasons 527 (e.g., key compromise vs CA compromise), user certificates only, and 528 CA certificates only as well as just operationally deciding to keep 529 the CRLs small. However, scoping the CRL introduces other issues 530 (i.e., does the RP have all of the CRL partitions). 532 CAs in the STIR architecture will likely all create CRLs for audit 533 purposes, but it NOT RECOMMENDED that they be relying upon for status 534 information. Instead, one of the two "online" options is preferred. 535 Between the two, OCSP is much more widely deployed and this document 536 therefore recommends the use of OCSP in high-volume environments for 537 validating the freshness of certificates, based on [RFC6960], 538 incorporating some (but not all) of the optimizations of [RFC5019]. 540 9.2. Using OCSP with TN Auth List 542 Certificates compliant with this specification therefore SHOULD 543 include a URL pointing to an OCSP service in the Authority 544 Information Access (AIA) certificate extension, via the "id-ad-ocsp" 545 accessMethod specified in [RFC5280]. Baseline OCSP however supports 546 only three possible response values: good, revoked, or unknown. With 547 some extension, OCSP would not indicate whether the certificate is 548 authorized for a particular telephone number that the verifier is 549 validating. 551 [TBD] What would happen in the unknown case? Can we profile OCSP 552 usage so that unknown is never returned for our extension? 554 At a high level, there are two ways that a client might pose this 555 authorization question: 557 For this certificate, is the following number currently in its 558 scope of validity? 560 What are all the telephone numbers associated with this 561 certificate, or this certificate subject? 563 Only the former lends itself to piggybacking on the OCSP status 564 mechanism; since the verifier is already asking an authority about 565 the certificate's status, why not reuse that mechanism, instead of 566 creating a new service that requires additional round trips? Like 567 most PKIX-developed protocols, OCSP is extensible; OCSP supports 568 request extensions (including sending multiple requests at once) and 569 per-request extensions. It seems unlikely that the verifier will be 570 requesting authorization checks on multiple telephone numbers in one 571 request, so a per-request extension is what is needed. 573 [TBD] HVE OCSP requires SHA-1 be used as the hash algorithm, 574 we're6960 obviously going to change this to be SHA-256. 576 The requirement to consult OCSP in real time results in a network 577 round-trip time of day, which is something to consider because it 578 will add to the call setup time. OCSP server implementations 579 commonly pre-generate responses, and to speed up HTTPS connections, 580 servers often provide OCSP responses for each certificate in their 581 hierarchy. If possible, both of these OCSP concepts should be 582 adopted for use with STIR. 584 9.2.1. OCSP Extension Specification 586 The extension mechanism for OCSP follows X.509 v3 certificate 587 extensions, and thus requires an OID, a criticality flag, and ASN.1 588 syntax as defined by the OID. The criticality specified here is 589 optional: per [RFC6960] Section 4.4, support for all OCSP extensions 590 is optional. If the OCSP server does not understand the requested 591 extension, it will still provide the baseline validation of the 592 certificate itself. Moreover, in practical STIR deployments, the 593 issuer of the certificate will set the accessLocation for the OCSP 594 AIA extension to point to an OCSP service that supports this 595 extension, so the risk of interoperability failure due to lack of 596 support for this extension is minimal. 598 The OCSP TNQuery extension is included as one of the 599 requestExtensions in requests. It may also appear in the 600 responseExtensions. When an OCSP server includes a number in the 601 responseExtensions, this informs the client that the certificate is 602 still valid for the number that appears in the TNQuery extension 603 field. If the TNQuery is absent from a response to a query 604 containing a TNQuery in its requestExtensions, then the server is not 605 able to validate that the number is still in the scope of authority 606 of the certificate. 608 id-pkix-ocsp-stir-tn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp TBD } 610 TNQuery ::= E164Number 612 Note that HVE OCSP profile [RFC5019] prohibits the use of per-request 613 extensions. As it is anticipated that STIR will use OCSP in a high- 614 volume environment, many of the optimizations recommended by HVE are 615 desirable for the STIR environment. This document therefore uses 616 these extensions in a baseline OCSP environment with some HVE 617 optimizations. [More TBD] 619 Ideally, once a certificate has been acquired by a verifier, some 620 sort of asynchronous mechanism could notify and update the verifier 621 if the scope of the certificate changes so that verifiers could 622 implement a cache. While not all possible categories of verifiers 623 could implement such behavior, some sort of event-driven notification 624 of certificate status is another potential subject of future work. 625 One potential direction is that a future SIP SUBSCRIBE/NOTIFY-based 626 accessMethod for AIA might be defined (which would also be applicable 627 to the method described in the following section) by some future 628 specification. 630 Strategies for stapling OCSP [RFC6961] have become common in some web 631 PKI environments as an optimization which allows web servers to send 632 up-to-date certificate status information acquired from OCSP to 633 clients as TLS is negotiated. A similar mechanism could be 634 implemented for SIP requests, in which the authentication service 635 adds status information for its certificate to the SIP request, which 636 would save the verifier the trouble of performing the OCSP dip 637 itself. Especially for high-volume authentication and verification 638 services, this could result in significant performance improvements. 639 This is left as an optimization for future work. 641 9.3. Acquiring TN Lists By Reference 643 Acquiring a list of the telephone numbers associated with a 644 certificate or its subject lends itself to an application-layer 645 query/response interaction outside of OCSP, one which could be 646 initiated through a separate URI included in the certificate. The 647 AIA extension (see [RFC5280]) supports such a mechanism: it 648 designates an OID to identify the accessMethod and an accessLocation, 649 which would most likely be a URI. A verifier would then follow the 650 URI to ascertain whether the list of TNs authorized for use by the 651 caller. 653 HTTPS is the most obvious candidate for a protocol to be used for 654 fetching the list of telephone number associated with a particular 655 certificate. This document defines a new AIA accessMethod, called 656 "id-ad-stir-tn", which uses the following AIA OID: 658 id-ad-stir-tn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad TBD } 660 When the "id-ad-stir-tn" accessMethod is used, the accessLocation 661 MUST be an HTTPS URI. The document returned by dereferencing that 662 URI will contain the complete TN Authorization List (see Section 8) 663 for the certificate. 665 Delivering the entire list of telephone numbers associated with a 666 particular certificate will divulge to STIR verifiers information 667 about telephone numbers other than the one associated with the 668 particular call that the verifier is checking. In some environments, 669 where STIR verifiers handle a high volume of calls, maintaining an 670 up-to-date and complete cache for the numbers associated with crucial 671 certificate holders could give an important boost to performance. 673 10. Acknowledgments 675 Russ Housley, Brian Rosen, Cullen Jennings and Eric Rescorla provided 676 key input to the discussions leading to this document. 678 11. IANA Considerations 680 This document makes use of object identifiers for the TN Certificate 681 Extension defined in Section 8, TN-HVE OCSP extension in 682 Section 9.2.1, the TN by reference AIA access descriptor defined in 683 Section 9.3, and the ASN.1 module identifier defined in Appendix A. 684 It therefore requests that the IANA make the following assignments: 686 o TN Certificate Extension in the SMI Security for PKIX Certificate 687 Extension registry: http://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/ 688 smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1 690 o TN-HVE OCSP extension in the SMI Security for PKIX Online 691 Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) registry: 692 http://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi- 693 numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 695 o TNS by reference access descriptor in the SMI Security for PKIX 696 Access Descriptor registry: http://www.iana.org/assignments/smi- 697 numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48 699 o The TN ASN.1 module in SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier 700 registry: http://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi- 701 numbers.xhtml#smi-numbers-1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0 703 12. Security Considerations 705 This document is entirely about security. For further information on 706 certificate security and practices, see [RFC5280], in particular its 707 Security Considerations. 709 13. References 711 [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] 712 Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Persona Assertion Token", 713 draft-ietf-stir-passport-03 (work in progress), June 2016. 715 [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] 716 Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt, 717 "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session 718 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-09 719 (work in progress), May 2016. 721 [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail 722 Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, 723 DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, 724 . 726 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 727 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 728 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 729 . 731 [RFC2392] Levinson, E., "Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource 732 Locators", RFC 2392, DOI 10.17487/RFC2392, August 1998, 733 . 735 [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography 736 Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications 737 Version 2.1", RFC 3447, DOI 10.17487/RFC3447, February 738 2003, . 740 [RFC4754] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using 741 the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", 742 RFC 4754, DOI 10.17487/RFC4754, January 2007, 743 . 745 [RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online 746 Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume 747 Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September 748 2007, . 750 [RFC5055] Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W. 751 Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol 752 (SCVP)", RFC 5055, DOI 10.17487/RFC5055, December 2007, 753 . 755 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 756 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 757 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 758 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, 759 . 761 [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the 762 Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, 763 DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, 764 . 766 [RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, 767 DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010, 768 . 770 [RFC6919] Barnes, R., Kent, S., and E. Rescorla, "Further Key Words 771 for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 6919, 772 DOI 10.17487/RFC6919, April 2013, 773 . 775 [RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., 776 Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key 777 Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", 778 RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013, 779 . 781 [RFC6961] Pettersen, Y., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 782 Multiple Certificate Status Request Extension", RFC 6961, 783 DOI 10.17487/RFC6961, June 2013, 784 . 786 [RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed., 787 "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, 788 DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013, 789 . 791 [RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure 792 Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements", 793 RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014, 794 . 796 [RFC7375] Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model", 797 RFC 7375, DOI 10.17487/RFC7375, October 2014, 798 . 800 [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token 801 (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, 802 . 804 [X.680] USC/Information Sciences Institute, "Information 805 Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One.", ITU-T X.680, 806 ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002, 2002. 808 [X.681] USC/Information Sciences Institute, "Information 809 Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One: Information 810 Object Specification", ITU-T X.681, ISO/IEC 8824-2:2002, 811 2002. 813 [X.682] USC/Information Sciences Institute, "Information 814 Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One: Constraint 815 Specification", ITU-T X.682, ISO/IEC 8824-3:2002, 2002. 817 [X.683] USC/Information Sciences Institute, "Information 818 Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One: 819 Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications", ITU-T X.683, 820 ISO/IEC 8824-4:2002, 2002. 822 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module 824 This appendix provides the normative ASN.1 [X.680] definitions for 825 the structures described in this specification using ASN.1, as 826 defined in [X.680] through [X.683]. 828 This ASN.1 module imports ASN.1 from [RFC5912]. 830 TN-Module { 831 iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 832 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 833 id-mod-tn-module(TBD) } 835 DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN 837 IMPORTS 838 id-ad, id-ad-ocsp -- From [RFC5912] 839 FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 { 840 iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) 841 mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } 843 id-ce -- From [RFC5912] 844 FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 { 845 iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) 846 mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) } 848 EXTENSION -- From [RFC5912] 849 FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 { 850 iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) 851 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 852 id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } 854 ; 856 -- TN Entry Certificate Extension 858 ext-tnAuthList EXTENSION ::= { 859 SYNTAX TNAuthorizationList IDENTIFIED BY id-ce-TNAuthList } 861 TNAuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNAuthorization 863 TNAuthorization ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNEntry 865 TNEntry ::= CHOICE { 866 spid [0] ServiceProviderIdentifierList, 867 range [1] TelephoneNumberRange, 868 one E164Number } 870 ServiceProviderIdentifierList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..3) OF 871 OCTET STRING 873 -- When all three are present: SPID, Alt SPID, and Last Alt SPID 875 TelephoneNumberRange ::= SEQUENCE { 876 start E164Number, 877 count INTEGER } 879 E164Number ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789")) 881 -- TN OCSP Extension 883 re-ocsp-tn-query EXTENSION ::= { 884 SYNTAX TNQuery IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-stir-tn } 886 TNQuery ::= E164Number 888 -- TN Access Descriptor 890 id-ad-stir-tn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad TBD } 891 -- 892 -- Object Identifiers 893 -- 895 id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp 896 id-ce-TNAuthList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce TBD } 897 id-pkix-ocsp-stir-tn OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp TBD } 899 END 901 Authors' Addresses 903 Jon Peterson 904 Neustar, Inc. 906 Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz 908 Sean Turner 909 sn3rd 911 Email: sean@sn3rd.com