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'UNICODE' Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 STIR C. Wendt 3 Internet-Draft Comcast 4 Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson 5 Expires: November 25, 2016 Neustar Inc. 6 May 24, 2016 8 Persona Assertion Token 9 draft-ietf-stir-passport-02 11 Abstract 13 This document defines a token format for verifying with non- 14 repudiation the sender of and authorization to send information 15 related to the originator of personal communications. A 16 cryptographic signature is defined to protect the integrity of the 17 information used to identify the originator of a personal 18 communications session (e.g. the telephone number or URI) and verify 19 the accuracy of this information at the destination. The 20 cryptographic signature is defined with the intention that it can 21 confidently verify the originating persona even when the signature is 22 sent to the destination party over an unsecure channel. The Persona 23 Assertion Token (PASSporT) is particularly useful for many personal 24 communications applications over IP networks and other multi-hop 25 interconnection scenarios where the originating and destination 26 parties may not have a direct trusted relationship. 28 Status of This Memo 30 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 31 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 33 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 34 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 35 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 36 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 38 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 39 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 40 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 41 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 43 This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2016. 45 Copyright Notice 47 Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 48 document authors. All rights reserved. 50 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 51 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 52 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 53 publication of this document. Please review these documents 54 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 55 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 56 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 57 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 58 described in the Simplified BSD License. 60 Table of Contents 62 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 2. Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 3. PASSporT Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 65 3.1. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 66 3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 67 3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5 68 3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5 69 3.2. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 70 3.2.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 71 3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued at claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 73 3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identities . . . . . 6 74 3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 75 3.2.3. Multi-party Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 76 3.3. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 77 4. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 78 4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 79 4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 80 4.3. Alternate PASSporT Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 81 4.4. Registering PASSporT Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 82 5. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 83 5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 10 84 6. Human Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 85 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 86 7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 10 87 7.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 88 7.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 89 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 90 8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 91 8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 12 92 8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 13 93 8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 13 94 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 95 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 96 Appendix A. Example ES256 base PASSporT JWS Serialization and 97 Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 98 A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A . 17 99 A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A . 17 100 Appendix B. Example RS256 base PASSporT JWS Serialization and 101 Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 102 B.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A . 19 103 B.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A . 20 104 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 106 1. Introduction 108 In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing 109 concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for 110 communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging. As an 111 example, modern telephone networks provide the ability to spoof the 112 calling party telephone number for many legitimate purposes including 113 providing network features and services on the behalf of a legitimate 114 telephone number. However, as we have seen, bad actors have taken 115 advantage of this ability for illegitimate and fraudulent purposes 116 meant to trick telephone users to believe they are someone they are 117 not. This problem can be extended to many emerging forms of personal 118 communications. 120 This document defines a common method for creating and validating a 121 token that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or 122 more generally a URI or application specific identity string 123 representing the originator of personal communications. Through 124 extended profiles other information relevant to the personal 125 communications can also be attached to the token. The primary goal 126 of PASSporT is to provide a common framework for signing persona 127 related information in an extensible way. A secondary goal is to 128 provide this functionality independent of any specific personal 129 communications signaling call logic, so that creation and 130 verification of persona information can be implemented in a flexible 131 way and can be used in many personal communications applications 132 including end-to-end applications that require different signaling 133 protocols. It is anticipated that signaling protocol specific 134 guidance will be provided in other related documents and 135 specifications to specify how to use and transport PASSporT tokens, 136 however this is intentionally out of scope for this document. 138 Note: As of the authoring of this document, 139 [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides details of how to use PASSporT 140 within SIP signaling for the signing and verification of telephone 141 numbers. 143 2. Token Overview 145 Tokens are a convenient way of encapsulating information with 146 associated digital signatures. They are used in many applications 147 that require authentication, authorization, encryption, non- 148 repudiation and other use cases. JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] and 149 JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] are designed to provide a compact 150 form for many of these purposes and define a specific method and 151 syntax for signing a specific set of information or "claims" within 152 the token and therefore providing an extensible set of claims. 153 Additionally, JWS provides extensible mechanisms for specifying the 154 method and cryptographic algorithms used for the associated digital 155 signatures. 157 3. PASSporT Definition 159 The PASSporT is constructed based on JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515] 160 specifications. JWS defines the use of JSON data structures in a 161 specified canonical format for signing data corresponding to JOSE 162 header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature. JWT defines specific set of 163 claims that are represented by specified key value pairs which can be 164 extended with custom keys for specific applications. 166 3.1. PASSporT Header 168 The JWS token header is a JOSE header [RFC7515] that defines the type 169 and encryption algorithm used in the token. 171 An example of the header for the case of an ECDSA P-256 digital 172 signature would be the following, 174 { 175 "typ":"passport", 176 "alg":"ES256", 177 "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.crt" 178 } 180 3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter 182 JWS defines the "typ" (Type) Header Parameter to declare the media 183 type [IANA.MediaTypes] of the JWS. 185 For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST minimally include and begin 186 with "passport". This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of 187 type passport. Note with extensions explained later in this 188 document, the typ may be another value if defined as a passport 189 extension. 191 3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter 193 For PASSporT, the "alg" should be defined as follows, for the 194 creation of PASSporT tokens and their corresponding digital 195 signatures, 197 o ES256 MUST be implemented. 199 o RS256 SHOULD be implemented 201 For the verification of PASSporT tokens, both ES256 and RS256 MUST be 202 supported. 204 Note that JWA [RFC7518] defines other algorithms that may be utilized 205 or updated in the future depending on cryptographic strength 206 requirements guided by current security best practice. 208 3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter 210 As defined in JWS, the "x5u" header parameter is used to provide a 211 URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the X.509 public key 212 certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key 213 used to digitally sign the JWS. Note: The definition of what the URI 214 represents in terms of the actor serving the X.509 public key is out 215 of scope of this document. However, generally this would correspond 216 to an HTTPS or DNSSEC resource with the guidance that it MUST be a 217 TLS protected, per JWS spec. 219 3.2. PASSporT Payload 221 The token payload claims should consist of the information which 222 needs to be verified at the destination party. This claim should 223 correspond to a JWT claim [RFC7519] and be encoded as defined by the 224 JWS Payload [RFC7515] 226 The PASSporT defines the use of a number of standard JWT defined 227 headers as well as two new custom headers corresponding to the two 228 parties associated with personal communications, the originator and 229 terminator. These headers or key value pairs are detailed below. 231 3.2.1. JWT defined claims 232 3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued at claim 234 The JSON claim MUST include the "iat" [RFC7519] defined claim issued 235 at. As defined this should be set to a date cooresponding to the 236 origination of the personal communications. The time value should be 237 of the format defined in [RFC7519] Section 2 NumericDate. This is 238 included for securing the token against replay and cut and paste 239 attacks, as explained further in the security considerations in 240 section 7. 242 3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims 244 3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identities 246 Baseline PASSporT defines claims that convey the identity of the 247 origination and destination of personal communications represented as 248 either telephone numbers or Uniform Resource Indicators (URIs). Some 249 using protocols may require other identifiers for personae; these may 250 be specified as claims through the PASSporT extensibility mechanisms. 251 But for telephone numbers and URIs, the following claims should be 252 used: 254 3.2.2.1.1. "otn" and "dtn" - Originating and Destination Telephone 255 Number claim 257 If the originating identity is a telephone number, the claim "otn" 258 SHOULD be included. If the destination identity is a telephone 259 number, the claim "dtn" SHOULD be included. 261 Telephone Number strings for "otn" and "dtn" claims MUST be 262 canonicalized according to the procedures specified in 263 [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 6.1.1. 265 3.2.2.1.2. "ouri" and "duri" - Originating and Destination URI claims 267 If the originating identity is not a telephone number, the claim 268 "ouri" SHOULD be included with the string cooresponding to the URI 269 form of the identity as defined in [RFC3986], alternatively it could 270 also contain an application specific identity string, if URI format 271 is not appropriate. 273 If the destination identity is not a telephone number, the claim 274 "duri" SHOULD be included. The same string format rules apply as 275 stated for "ouri". 277 3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim 279 Some protocols that use PASSporT convey hashes for media security 280 keys within their signaling in order to bind those keys to the 281 identities established in the signaling layers. One example would be 282 the DTLS-SRTP key fingerprints carried in SDP via the "a=fingerprint" 283 attribute; multiple instances of that fingerprint may appear in a 284 single SDP body corresponding to difference media streams offered. 285 The "mky" value of PASSporT contains a hexadecimal key presentation 286 of any hash(es) necessary to establish media security via DTLS-SRTP. 287 This mky value should be formated in a JSON form including the 288 'algorithm' and 'digest' keys with the corresponding algorithm and 289 hexadecimal values. Note that per guidance of Section 5 of this 290 document any whitespace and line feeds must be removed. If there is 291 multiple fingerprint values, more than one, the fingerprint values 292 should be constructed as a JSON array denoted by bracket characters. 294 An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows: 296 For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values, 298 a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65: 299 2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2 300 a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E: 301 5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1 303 the PASSporT Payload object would be: 305 { 306 "iat":"1443208345", 307 "otn":"12155551212", 308 "duri":"sip:alice@example.com", 309 "mky":"[ 310 { 311 "algorithm":"sha-256", 312 "digest":"02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:2E:7D: 313 46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2" 314 }, 315 { 316 "algorithm":"sha-256", 317 "digest":"4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49: 318 6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1" 319 }]" 320 } 322 3.2.3. Multi-party Communications 324 Personal communications in the context of PASSporT can certainly 325 extend to multi-party scenerios where there is more than one 326 destination identity. In the future, it is anticipated that PASSporT 327 will be extended to support these cases. 329 3.3. PASSporT Signature 331 The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS using 332 the private key corresponding to the X.509 public key certificate 333 referenced by the "x5u" header parameter. 335 4. Extending PASSporT 337 PASSporT represents the bare minimum set of claims needed to assert 338 the originating identity, however there will certainly be new and 339 extended applications and usage of PASSPorT that will need to extend 340 the claims to represent other information specific to the origination 341 identities beyond the identity itself. 343 There are two mechanisms defined to extend PASSporT. The first 344 includes an extension of the base passport claims to include 345 additional claims. An alternative method of extending PASSporT is 346 for applications of PASSporT unrelated to the base set of claims, 347 that will define it's own set of claims. Both are described below. 349 4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter 351 For extended profiles of PASSporT, a new JWS header parameter "ppt" 352 MUST be used with a string that uniquely identifies the profile 353 specification that defines any new claims that would extend the base 354 set of claims of PASSporT. 356 An example header with an extended PASSporT profile of "foo" is as 357 follows: 359 { 360 "typ":"passport", 361 "ppt":"foo", 362 "alg":"ES256", 363 "x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.crt" 364 } 366 4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims 368 Future specifications that define such extensions to the PASSporT 369 mechanism MUST explicitly designate what claims they include, the 370 order in which they will appear, and any further information 371 necessary to implement the extension. All extensions MUST 372 incorporate the baseline JWT elements specified in Section 3; claims 373 may only be appended to the claims object specified; they can never 374 be subtracted or re-ordered. Specifying new claims follows the 375 baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519] Section 10.1). Note that 376 understanding an extension as a verifier is always optional for 377 compliance with this specification (though future specifications or 378 profiles for deployment environments may make other "ppt" values 379 mandatory). The creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that 380 verifiers will understand any given extension. Verifiers that do 381 support an extension may then trigger appropriate application-level 382 behavior in the presence of an extension; authors of extensions 383 should provide appropriate extension-specific guidance to application 384 developers on this point. 386 4.3. Alternate PASSporT Extension 388 Some applications may want to use the mechanism of the PASSporT 389 digital signature that is not a superset of the base set of claims of 390 the PASSporT token as defined in Section 3. Rather, a specification 391 may use PASSporT with its own defined set of claims. 393 In this case, the specification SHOULD define its own MIME media type 394 [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes]. The MIME 395 subtype SHOULD start with the string "passport-" to signify that it 396 is related to the PASSporT token. For example, for the "foo" 397 application the MIME type/sub-type could be defined as "application/ 398 passport-foo". 400 4.4. Registering PASSporT Extensions 402 Toward interoperability and to maintain uniqueness of the extended 403 PASSporT profile header parameter string, there SHOULD be an industry 404 registry that tracks the definition of the profile strings. 406 5. Deterministic JSON Serialization 408 In order to provide a deterministic representation of the PASSporT 409 Header and Claims, particularly if PASSporT is used across multiple 410 signaling environments, the JSON header object and JSON Claim object 411 MUST be computed as follows. 413 The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the 414 thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3. 415 Each JSON object MUST contain no whitespace or line breaks before or 416 after any syntactic elements and with the required members ordered 417 lexicographically by the Unicode [UNICODE] code points of the member 418 names. 420 In addition, the JSON header and claim members MUST follow the 421 lexicographical ordering and character and string rules defined in 422 [RFC7638] Section 3.3. 424 5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form 426 For the example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 3.2.2.2, the 427 following is the deterministic JSON object form. 429 {"iat": 1443208345,"otn":"12155551212","duri": 430 "sip:alice@example.com","mky":{"algorithm":"sha-256","digest": 431 "02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54: 432 F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2;sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18: 433 3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54: 434 42:CD:54:F1"}} 436 6. Human Readability 438 JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515] are defined to use Base64 and/or UTF8 439 encoding to the Header, Payload, and Signature sections. However, 440 many personal communications protocols, such as SIP and XMPP, use a 441 "human readable" format to allow for ease of use and ease of 442 operational debugging and monitoring. As such, specifications using 443 PASSporT may provide guidance on whether Base64 encoding or plain 444 text will be used for the construction of the PASSporT Header and 445 Claim sections. 447 7. Security Considerations 449 7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks 451 There are a number of security considerations for use of the token 452 for avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks. PASSporT tokens 453 must be sent along with other application level protocol information 454 (e.g. for SIP an INVITE as defined in [RFC3261]). There should be a 455 link between various information provided in the token and 456 information provided by the application level protocol information. 458 These would include: 460 o "iat" claim should closely correspond to a date/time the message 461 was originated. It should also be within a relative delta time 462 that is reasonable for clock drift and transmission time 463 characteristics associated with the application using the PASSporT 464 token. 466 o either "dtn" claim or "duri" claim is included to prevent the 467 ability to use a previously originated message to send to another 468 destination party 470 7.2. Solution Considerations 472 It should be recognized that the use of this token should not, in 473 it's own right, be considered a full solution for absolute non- 474 repudiation of the persona being asserted. This only provides non- 475 repudiation of the signer of PASSporT. If the signer and the persona 476 are not one in the same, which can and often will be the case in 477 telecommunications networks today, protecting the destination party 478 from being spoofed may take some interpretation or additional 479 verification of the link between the PASSporT signature and the 480 persona being asserted. 482 In addition, the telecommunications systems and specifications that 483 use PASSporT should in practice provide mechanisms for: 485 o Managing X.509 certificates and X.509 certificate chains to an 486 authorized trust anchor that can be a trusted entity to all 487 participants in the telecommunications network 489 o Accounting for entities that may route calls from other peer or 490 interconnected telecommunications networks that are not part of 491 the "trusted" communications network or may not be following the 492 usage of PASSporT or the profile of PASSporT appropriate to that 493 network 495 o Following best practices around management and security of X.509 496 certificates 498 7.3. Privacy Considerations 500 Because PASSporT explicity includes claims of identitifiers of 501 parties involved in communications, times, and potentially other call 502 detail, care should be taken outside of traditional protected or 503 private telephony communications paths where there may be concerns 504 about exposing information to either unintended or illegitimately 505 intented actors. These identifiers are often exposed through many 506 communications signaling protocols as of today, but appropriate 507 precautions should be taken. 509 8. IANA Considerations 511 8.1. Media Type Registration 513 8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested 515 This section registers the "application/passport" media type 516 [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the 517 manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the 518 content is a PASSporT defined JWT and JWS. 520 o Type name: application 522 o Subtype name: passport 524 o Required parameters: n/a 526 o Optional parameters: n/a 528 o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/passport values are 529 encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may 530 be the empty string), each separated from the next by a single 531 period ('.') character. 533 o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section 534 of RFC 7515. 536 o Interoperability considerations: n/a 538 o Published specification: draft-ietf-stir-passport-00 540 o Applications that use this media type: STIR and other applications 541 that require identity related assertion 543 o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a 545 o Additional information: 547 * Magic number(s): n/a 549 * File extension(s): n/a 551 * Macintosh file type code(s): n/a 553 o Person and email address to contact for further information: Chris 554 Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net 556 o Intended usage: COMMON 557 o Restrictions on usage: none 559 o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net 561 o Change Controller: IESG 563 o Provisional registration? No 565 8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 567 8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested 569 o Claim Name: "otn" 571 o Claim Description: Originating Telephone Number String 573 o Change Controller: IESG 575 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- 576 passport-00 578 o Claim Name: "dtn" 580 o Claim Description: Destination Telephone Number String 582 o Change Controller: IESG 584 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- 585 passport-00 587 o Claim Name: "ouri" 589 o Claim Description: Originating URI String 591 o Change Controller: IESG 593 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- 594 passport-00 596 o Claim Name: "duri" 598 o Claim Description: Destination URI String 600 o Change Controller: IESG 602 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- 603 passport-00 605 o Claim Name: "mky" 607 o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String 609 o Change Controller: IESG 611 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- 612 passport-00 614 9. Acknowledgements 616 Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group 617 including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill, 618 Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, and Eric Burger 619 for their review, ideas, and contributions. Also thanks to Henning 620 Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, and Richard Barnes for 621 valuable feedback on the technical and security aspects of the 622 document. Additional thanks to Harsha Bellur for assistance in 623 coding the example tokens. 625 10. References 627 [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] 628 Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt, 629 "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session 630 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-07 631 (work in progress), February 2016. 633 [IANA.MediaTypes] 634 "IANA, "Media Types"", . 636 [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail 637 Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, 638 DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, 639 . 641 [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, 642 A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. 643 Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, 644 DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, 645 . 647 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform 648 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, 649 RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, 650 . 652 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 653 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 654 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 655 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, 656 . 658 [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type 659 Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, 660 RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, 661 . 663 [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web 664 Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May 665 2015, . 667 [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, 668 DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, 669 . 671 [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token 672 (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, 673 . 675 [RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) 676 Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September 677 2015, . 679 [UNICODE] "The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard"", 680 . 682 Appendix A. Example ES256 base PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature 684 For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members: 686 o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) 688 o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload) 690 o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature) 692 Note: there will never be a JWS Unprotected Header for PASSporT. 694 First, an example PASSporT Protected Header is as follows: 696 { 697 "typ":"passport", 698 "alg":"ES256", 699 "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.crt" 700 } 702 This would be serialized to the form: 704 {"typ":"passport","alg":"ES256","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/ 705 passport.crt"} 707 Encoding this with UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value: 709 eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j 710 ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9 712 Second, an example PASSporT Payload is as follows: 714 { 715 "iat":"1443208345", 716 "otn":"12155551212", 717 "duri":"sip:alice@example.com" 718 } 720 This would be serialized to the form: 722 {"iat":"1443208345","otn":"12155551212","duri": 723 "sip:alice@example.com"} 725 Encoding this with the UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value: 727 eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJp 728 Ijoic2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0 730 Computing the digital signature of the PASSporT Signing Input 731 ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS 732 Payload)) 734 KK89q2RFY-BkKQQhiB0z6-fIaFUy6NDyUboKXOix9XnYLxTCjdw1UHjCbw4Ce 735 feKwH_t7W-bnGlZz4pI-rMjfQ 737 The final PASSporT token is produced by concatenating the values in 738 the order Header.Payload.Signature with period (',') characters. For 739 the above example values this would produce the following: 741 eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j 742 ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9 743 . 744 eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJpIjoi 745 c2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0 746 . 747 KK89q2RFY-BkKQQhiB0z6-fIaFUy6NDyUboKXOix9XnYLxTCjdw1UHjCbw4CefeK 748 wH_t7W-bnGlZz4pI-rMjfQ 750 A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A 752 -----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- 753 MHcCAQEEIFeZ1R208QCvcu5GuYyMfG4W7sH4m99/7eHSDLpdYllFoAoGCCqGSM49 754 AwEHoUQDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcs 755 lQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g== 756 -----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- 758 A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A 760 -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- 761 MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH 762 78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcslQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g== 763 -----END PUBLIC KEY----- 765 Appendix B. Example RS256 base PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature 767 For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members: 769 o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) 771 o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload) 773 o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature) 775 Note: there will never be a JWS Unprotected Header for PASSporT. 777 First, an example PASSporT Protected Header is as follows: 779 { 780 "typ":"passport", 781 "alg":"RS256", 782 "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.crt" 783 } 785 This would be serialized to the form: 787 {"typ":"passport","alg":"RS256","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/ 788 passport.crt"} 790 Encoding this with UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value: 792 eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IlJTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM 793 6Ly9jZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9 795 Second, an example PASSporT Payload is as follows: 797 { 798 "iat":"1443208345", 799 "otn":"12155551212", 800 "duri":"sip:alice@example.com" 801 } 803 This would be serialized to the form: 805 {"iat":"1443208345","otn":"12155551212","duri": 806 "sip:alice@example.com"} 808 Encoding this with the UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value: 810 eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJp 811 Ijoic2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0 813 Computing the digital signature of the PASSporT Signing Input 814 ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS 815 Payload)) 817 AaeXRqm7kHnkZu2j6cQmDCiomZRiaE55bYWhFgnX8xMqpBFq96M0xgMM5OLa9 818 _LMrkuKv2ivK5GZz8OlFrmAirucRlAh8YdUkj5Cr5xPRr-gg9acD9jqJUnQ-Z 819 xpL1yq-FFVLhvpbsE5NMPHXUp5lpt62rD-S0NlhwHNCeMqZHxt6T5BmZBXITE 820 d1PRRij_6FhE3wxWEhZMthWJuEbcPpRMZDu-R7lTNddn62nUKjn3s00R3gm25 821 Dto5Z0dzfQpAysJvnbc1QRimfsYqJPUFc57lnglVLf4WrpeZCc8-LcoXeSr_d 822 seDgsrmg2EuHmn5h1nTOmLgF16ZHm121ZVjiXz2sMFvs9RaIxw0AFkM7rnV56 823 OxAFCRuzMNldiEVf8plRZVvqZ4BfVQlCNXNyyVgPOUtNr3ta6yD2H0oANQvvH 824 twjuSwB9Kruj4Wsu5N7Iki4MBs6SWJDmcUV-NW_AHYLaao-IvFVe4oCkJNjsq 825 wwXuLv1TO2sDHdc5sQO5zm21019PPxw1udHVtywsRVNKLo0RzE0TqYUF7XclC 826 Dur7MMOx9SnStV2PFIM7Jejyn9x54RtJEjOnchaSalfIFr_UXqXgVmRZVTzLD 827 QIlcmHjlhhLnCnNx3sYsAANen8Y8jtfgJ2ewjGotB4Lq8VYe1FacBKKk0VyCf 828 ImXba0u1hB8Q 830 The final PASSporT token is produced by concatenating the values in 831 the order Header.Payload.Signature with period (',') characters. For 832 the above example values this would produce the following: 834 eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IlJTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6L 835 y9jZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9 836 . 837 eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJpI 838 joic2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0 839 . 840 AaeXRqm7kHnkZu2j6cQmDCiomZRiaE55bYWhFgnX8xMqpBFq96M0xgMM5OLa9 841 _LMrkuKv2ivK5GZz8OlFrmAirucRlAh8YdUkj5Cr5xPRr-gg9acD9jqJUnQ-Z 842 xpL1yq-FFVLhvpbsE5NMPHXUp5lpt62rD-S0NlhwHNCeMqZHxt6T5BmZBXITE 843 d1PRRij_6FhE3wxWEhZMthWJuEbcPpRMZDu-R7lTNddn62nUKjn3s00R3gm25 844 Dto5Z0dzfQpAysJvnbc1QRimfsYqJPUFc57lnglVLf4WrpeZCc8-LcoXeSr_d 845 seDgsrmg2EuHmn5h1nTOmLgF16ZHm121ZVjiXz2sMFvs9RaIxw0AFkM7rnV56 846 OxAFCRuzMNldiEVf8plRZVvqZ4BfVQlCNXNyyVgPOUtNr3ta6yD2H0oANQvvH 847 twjuSwB9Kruj4Wsu5N7Iki4MBs6SWJDmcUV-NW_AHYLaao-IvFVe4oCkJNjsq 848 wwXuLv1TO2sDHdc5sQO5zm21019PPxw1udHVtywsRVNKLo0RzE0TqYUF7XclC 849 Dur7MMOx9SnStV2PFIM7Jejyn9x54RtJEjOnchaSalfIFr_UXqXgVmRZVTzLD 850 QIlcmHjlhhLnCnNx3sYsAANen8Y8jtfgJ2ewjGotB4Lq8VYe1FacBKKk0VyCf 851 ImXba0u1hB8Q 853 B.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A 855 -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 856 MIIJKQIBAAKCAgEAsrKb3NsMgrXTzEcNlg3vaBbI12mG3D9QBn61H8PpsVFIh3MA 857 XNXjkV64he/eEQou3STTEgSqUXj5kj+jnnVFF0Cd0T6j7SuRvpq5YaiKfXgdUlsv 858 F3LjTRGyoKRNOf16f/zEFiyJBX10vj/LKvnWos1vVTSqBeui2dNLynr0+f1n8b0+ 859 0FZwACceo3qaVwuSNIJWSQgM1qAINBpPEKnrIpdt5fa7mUorJ5gjITys3gjNJ4ee 860 sjqUEu5ZGXDgMshVtH2iMceC1393sK6rJ7z+g3jVziSo6vy9lA2wveKMuoqQTwp0 861 V0IrkzExU7vpTzyx0E3mJNmlgmDp7Whp2HCvKjeG+iPfsuPMDRggUrdy9qG6QTFq 862 QORzLywTpu78ExYMSfqt94NVhf2Dv+QEPoytT1avN6bwGu/R/84g2z0YMfum5roS 863 TG5PGP4H56vjML8wNTd6v8Ny8SLAgzG/XBaV7c8Ll2awLEj4FSeBpNzTyDgnLrth 864 7Tk0LmM8EtO1aozDDEaMFrNy4/L+Uuwxp/wcFADawE9N7VdHa9endEo9V/bu1tkq 865 ecv1Ma+G4NvJZzD8JTBRVsHNc3zvI0qD0KWCjqPvaIMiiVATVAIW9ZEtUZNm5UVu 866 DzhcY7QrXNRpGE6ULIXgim66mbfUQ0LFq4G+zUjoRZTA92rFBn4vDKvsPs8CAwEA 867 AQKCAgEAk3Sc9sbucOGXbuZmyJ6hIhRDELXsacv4vhNKZHbmXMJFBjgYYYLBsRAn 868 VaZUaV0sxKEBZsngvTAFSPAolLYSGBji4Wo+HJQqRM0qEfLgrJ40G+RQXJoaBFuJ 869 OdO6QhLvRbOPHvkK7DPU5LSBcuoMefTpXLcDYbVKgVJBJUkG405+ulS+A26AJzAg 870 sSeXOiK7N4chqkvxRB10B4J6IbcE51trfSp3LQutxpNc0a1evC0pFOhtRIbf7yss 871 7Lhe2KjFSBWvhEIsrqRpYKsRYs4qetR4IQ3RMW7zBLuzT00lcTyrzf1DeUmJ6YDb 872 Qkw6Pn9H/yp4sYnDcG2GOrhBNy/s6ZecANLDbKg6MqwszDqLZnIOh7zPV1MPGEjc 873 LkfLue1CA7FaipDUAlSYDfkaNHEcGFxHEgTuv3zmcuMijgNzCtA71M/6kG41DZa1 874 8PZmqcw8CmMo+1UD3QwL5hHvMbeCyq1UZQvrTmwSLaGjC/goTjChzrsq5NBQcNNb 875 eiGUFXciqJlh10NfxT8arefoQ/EDuARiZNvwGDqrGkvZk3/xokGeQi6nf1DL4NtU 876 wQJyzVDJERFs9SohwkJWlPACFxISbxBztyw3nUvGN2iUQdnglGXmwmo7Ork0uook 877 R2TV1OS7INVOTiEx8AApdiFXWZ752pB96ww6s5pDP3Isp0yxddECggEBAOuSVK2/ 878 7v9aCzlf+IZiklTkpG9CRkBqEsIj6p9ADBMWahqxlzjKwzGJH55v0U/etqOOZYVV 879 HFzHIzlfZN1Yy1LXYKKcrwU23rLLiG5IsYFCcX2t1Cw6ZxHEsuMsOi8X8IbhSjJe 880 xTGmwYiJqdKlSyznFopPtZ0leVqMjHTAMCk36AzRwTMnjOIhA1p1Ru0HPFK1RF/5 881 /EuAUPws2ur1CDjsJwOQa2gRpInbxzZMCE/J+OqgWz4DMivLMCYT40zSjvY7+sqW 882 K77khwSm9/wMhuvVDedXHaNcrrQQbrk89oYt0Lx74RjUGc/nF79loQDOTZ/Hc7Fq 883 1Nj2cuw0rIdJoUkCggEBAMIxrp4jSjdNT62WpnTfejJUdLVvn+3zvuNWcwIpUrIl 884 ILBINlVofMMKLIi0VuqFc7tJiim+dUufp+taoj4E2rPumxZGMb7m9/XGFIyDY+2j 885 qJEin6kK8WMT5he94C5uQg3faSzMi+sbEa4HSXMhBOP6iLqSQyUZpq1ecRjOdnDk 886 bWCAHoRRYKSaPMJRdQjHD5++hItLCo2MiwVFBl2nRVh3vHIYARY3K84BMnvbUayd 887 nfZB/tGOuvTksMRHcqoDFgXNj5/ymqBzoSpQzCMfH79Sv1uQPkDqKO/YbBT3HVDv 888 6nKX44Vv4iy9Xwqsv3nTtuq2gpFJU30tfHBVltYB91cCggEAUaJhE+EaeoUCtLxM 889 TI2mNiMR1Lh7zeC0ZXC64rr4NDklReDbDcQ+RlFFkssfFvWQBzfWeJEZBhHAZCZp 890 tscJlsiqZU+02zK7k+wyeD1avfd/itUNXNJUW3T1pQHzm9RI9wTliHUNEvq9wIos 891 PqInXgUq631Z635MApQILIFZbz8/fAnIUOjYypg0KEnR7Vv/jI3ihvwDcUqjRfBp 892 YNjPI6K6lmKaxfKvOVLfQzKwAq50QyKU2/WRklmUcu2bbEjfX/dDHqdRu5JIM9WE 893 xGS28MzhR5UJ4U3CAQZcyHaW28LOvjKTu93sn/5uXVZjp/rWLZOZxRbHcfRduPs7 894 +poKeQKCAQBc8nqppip3ncFtTJYPiodqX5Ic5Xie4/ORzGbvueei7LJgra+T4ZcV 895 o2D9bZPMXGOwWNqQcGCj+Z7dv1u4Y4pqZOJGHwLgZJx6PnzHZHwH2jVsgi35Mwum 896 aHfRFUif8JYdHbmxf5XYyfQEX+h/+mXk2J1o72jD8Ssd//4R6YA3OJ5BehEhM/IV 897 1t0OBP8HXH/V7dJy+U/rwEEqHIeXe+BtH6JK2cJrZ6zHxTrsnWTSQf7BR4U3uCEz 898 5eHVkH0JcsCvtlvwKqZn9fBF2LZceSEw6eI9aSTi3TEK24Of5Uda3fpRLvHvhEW1 899 NE6xRU3Aed0rKoAEGhyj5YmSGuU/OWGxAoIBAQDbREen8GWGLFmj0iQFs0I2Jr1k 900 1iazomLyR9Vvhe8sUu57mE0lKbFo6vt8RPm69NSJ7nMCrSbCwG+qERMdMLK8OuiY 901 v+W3wvvKcpXCShJ1GpgqKmBdP4VnHKvgHQ/kzdtLDmJI4SkTim1Mi94szSMPIfQw 902 cMdZAGivDPjdXw95xENLClPOkhjX9t/qZjkZclQyjYCYGJHRxX6J7PdcKRY0/9VV 903 jgRwxooE2POv11/qSk1O3lhFvjjm5oxr7CKPcHvESk/r8mh+VWO4DaOD4gQ9ke00 904 2QGhocy3K578uL4ph7nfTR2QD96mxCNX9b2Pj9HG8Qb3wEvtaGBfUu8do2mT 905 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 907 B.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A 909 -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- 910 MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEAsrKb3NsMgrXTzEcNlg3v 911 aBbI12mG3D9QBn61H8PpsVFIh3MAXNXjkV64he/eEQou3STTEgSqUXj5kj+jnnVF 912 F0Cd0T6j7SuRvpq5YaiKfXgdUlsvF3LjTRGyoKRNOf16f/zEFiyJBX10vj/LKvnW 913 os1vVTSqBeui2dNLynr0+f1n8b0+0FZwACceo3qaVwuSNIJWSQgM1qAINBpPEKnr 914 Ipdt5fa7mUorJ5gjITys3gjNJ4eesjqUEu5ZGXDgMshVtH2iMceC1393sK6rJ7z+ 915 g3jVziSo6vy9lA2wveKMuoqQTwp0V0IrkzExU7vpTzyx0E3mJNmlgmDp7Whp2HCv 916 KjeG+iPfsuPMDRggUrdy9qG6QTFqQORzLywTpu78ExYMSfqt94NVhf2Dv+QEPoyt 917 T1avN6bwGu/R/84g2z0YMfum5roSTG5PGP4H56vjML8wNTd6v8Ny8SLAgzG/XBaV 918 7c8Ll2awLEj4FSeBpNzTyDgnLrth7Tk0LmM8EtO1aozDDEaMFrNy4/L+Uuwxp/wc 919 FADawE9N7VdHa9endEo9V/bu1tkqecv1Ma+G4NvJZzD8JTBRVsHNc3zvI0qD0KWC 920 jqPvaIMiiVATVAIW9ZEtUZNm5UVuDzhcY7QrXNRpGE6ULIXgim66mbfUQ0LFq4G+ 921 zUjoRZTA92rFBn4vDKvsPs8CAwEAAQ== 922 -----END PUBLIC KEY----- 924 Authors' Addresses 925 Chris Wendt 926 Comcast 927 One Comcast Center 928 Philadelphia, PA 19103 929 USA 931 Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net 933 Jon Peterson 934 Neustar Inc. 935 1800 Sutter St Suite 570 936 Concord, CA 94520 937 US 939 Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz