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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 INTERNET-DRAFT Donald Eastlake 2 Intended status: Proposed Standard Dacheng Zhang 3 Huawei 4 Expires: July 27, 2018 January 28, 2018 6 Simple Group Keying Protocol TRILL Use Protfiles 7 9 Abstract 11 This document specifies use profiles for the application of the 12 simple group keying protocol (SGKP) to multi-destination TRILL 13 Extended RBridge Channel message security (RFC 7978) and TRILL over 14 IP packet security (draft-ietf-trill-over-ip). 16 Status of This Memo 18 This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the 19 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 21 Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent 22 to the authors or the TRILL working group mailing list: 23 trill@ietf.org. 25 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 26 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 27 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 28 Drafts. 30 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 31 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 32 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 33 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 35 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 36 http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html. The list of Internet-Draft 37 Shadow Directories can be accessed at 38 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 40 Table of Contents 42 1. Introduction............................................3 43 1.1 Terminology and Acronyms..............................3 45 2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security.....5 46 2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................5 47 2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......6 49 3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security......................7 50 3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................7 51 3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......8 53 4. Security Considerations.................................9 55 5. IANA Considerations....................................10 56 5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers.........10 57 5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType..........10 59 Normative References......................................11 60 Informative References....................................12 62 Acknowledgements..........................................13 63 Authors' Addresses........................................14 65 1. Introduction 67 This document specifies use profiles for the application of the 68 simple group keying protocol (SGKP) [SGKPrfc] to the case using DTLS 69 [RFC6347] formatted TRILL [RFC6325] [RFC7780] Extended RBridge 70 Channel message security [RFC7178] [RFC7978] and to the case of using 71 IPsec formatted TRILL over IP [TRILLoverIP]. It is anticipated that 72 there will be other uses for this group keying protocol. 74 1.1 Terminology and Acronyms 76 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 77 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 78 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] [RFC8174] 79 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 81 This document uses terminology and acronyms defined in [RFC6325] and 82 [RFC7178]. Some of these are repeated below for convenience along 83 with additional new terms and acronyms. 85 Data Label - VLAN or FGL. 87 DTLS - Datagram Transport Level Security [RFC6347]. 89 FGL - Fine Grained Label [RFC7172]. 91 GKd - A distinguished station in a group that is in charge of 92 which group keying (Section 2) is in use. 94 GKs - Stations in a group other than GKd (Section 2). 96 HKDF - Hash based Key Derivation Function [RFC5869]. 98 IS-IS - Intermediate System to Intermediate System [RFC7176]. 100 keying material - The set of a Key ID, a secret key, and a cypher 101 suite. 103 PDU - Protocol Data Unit. 105 QoS - Quality of Service. 107 RBridge - An alternative term for a TRILL switch. 109 SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm [RFC6234]. 111 TRILL - Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links or Tunneled 112 Routing in the Link Layer. 114 TRILL switch - A device that implements the TRILL protocol 115 [RFC6325] [RFC7780], sometimes referred to as an RBridge. 117 2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security 119 This section specifies a profile of the simple group keying protocol 120 (SGKP) defined in [SGKPrfc]. This particular profile provides shared 121 secret keying to secure multi-destination Extended RBridge Channel 122 messages [RFC7978] as described in Setction 2.2. 124 For this SKGP use profile, a group is identified by TRILL Data Label 125 (VLAN or FGL [RFC7172]) and consists of the data reachable [RFC7780] 126 RBridges with interest in that Data Label. GKd is the RBridge in the 127 group that, of those group members supporting the Group Keying 128 Protocol, is the highest priority to be a TRILL distribution tree 129 root. If not all members of the group support the Group Keying 130 Protocol, then there are two cases of destinations for multi- 131 destination Channel Tunnel RBridge Channel messages: 133 (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support the 134 Group Keying Protocol, it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured 135 multi-destination RBridge Channel message to cover the group and 136 serially unicast to the group members not supporting the Group 137 Keying Protocol. 138 (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the 139 group members using pairwise security. 141 2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages 143 Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge 144 Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1) 145 RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or 146 Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978]. 148 The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as 149 follows: 151 Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the 152 network manager chooses to use a lower priority after 153 determining that such lower priority group keying messages 154 will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be 155 used as it may cause interference with the establishment and 156 maintenance of adjacency. 158 Use Type = 1 160 KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID. 162 CypherSuiteLng = 2, CypherSuite is the cypher suite used in 163 groupcast extended RBridge Channel data messages for the 164 corresponding KeyID2. This is a DTLS [RFC6347] cypher suite. 166 KeyID2 Length = 1, KeyID2 is the index under which a group key is 167 set. Group keys are, in effect, indexed by this KeyID2 and 168 the nickname of the GKd as used in the Ingress Nickname 169 field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying messages. 171 2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data 173 Protected Extended RBridge Channel [RFC7978] messages are multicast 174 (M bit set to one in the TRILL Header) and set the SType field to a 175 new value TBD2 for "Group Secured" (see Section 5.2). Since there 176 could be multiple group keys distribued and enabled for use, data is 177 formatted as two bytes of Key ID followed by data formatted as TLS 178 1.2 [RFC5246] application_data using the cyphersuite and keying 179 material stored under the Key ID. Such a message on the wire looks 180 like the following: 182 +---------------------------+ 183 | Link Header | 184 +---------------------------+ 185 | TRILL Header | 186 +---------------------------+ 187 | RBridge Channel Header | 188 | snd Extension | 189 +---------------------------+ 190 | RBridge Channel Payload | 191 | +----------------------+ | 192 | | 2-byte Key ID | | 193 | +----------------------+ | 194 | | DTLS formatted | | 195 | | application data | | 196 | +----------------------+ | 197 +---------------------------+ 198 | Link Trailer | 199 +---------------------------+ 201 3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security 203 This SGKP usage profile provides shared secret keying to secure TRILL 204 over IP messages [TRILLoverIP]. The keys put in place by the group 205 keying protocol are available for use as IPSEC keys. 207 For this use profile, a group is identified by an IP multicast 208 address and consists of the RBridges adjacent [RFC7177] to the sender 209 reachable with that multicast address. GKd is the RBridge in the 210 group that, of those group members supporting the Group Keying 211 Protocol, has the highest priority to be a TRILL distribution tree 212 root. If not all members of the group support the Group Keying 213 Protocol, then there are two cases for multi-destination TRILL over 214 IP messages: 216 (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support SGKP, 217 it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured IPSEC message to cover 218 the group and serially unicast to the group members not 219 supporting the Group Keying Protocol. 220 (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the 221 group members using pairwise security. 223 3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages 225 Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge 226 Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1) 227 RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or 228 Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978]. 230 The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as 231 follows: 233 Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the 234 network manager chooses to use a lower priority after 235 determining that such lower priority group keying messages 236 will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be 237 used as it may cause interference with the establishment and 238 maintenance of adjacency. 240 Use Type = 2 242 KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID. 244 CypherSuiteLng = variable, CypherSuite is an IKEv2 crypto 245 algorithm "proposal" [RFC7296]. 247 KeyID2 Length = 4, KeyID2 is the IPsec multicast SA. It is the 248 index under which a group key is set. Group keys are indexed 249 by this KeyID2 and the nickname of the GKd as used in the 250 Ingress Nickname field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying 251 messages. 253 3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data 255 Multi-destination TRILL over IP data packets are formatted as 256 multicast IPsec ESP tunnel mode [RFC4303] packets. The key and crpto 257 algorithms in use are indicated by the multicast SA. 259 4. Security Considerations 261 See [SGKPrfc] for Simple Group Keying Protocol security 262 considerations. 264 See [RFC7978] for Extended RBridge Channel security considerations. 266 See [RFC7457] in connection with TLS and DTLS security 267 considerations. 269 See [TRILLoverIP] for TRILL over IP secrity considerations. 271 See [RFC4303] for IPsec ESP security considerations. 273 5. IANA Considerations 275 This section gives IANA Considerations. 277 5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers 279 IANA is requested to assign TBD1 as the TRILL RBridge Channel 280 protocol number, from the range assigned by Standards Action, for use 281 when the "Group Keying" protocol is transmitted over Extended RBridge 282 Channel messages. 284 The added RBridge Channel protocols registry entry on the TRILL 285 Parameters web page is as follows: 287 Protocol Description Reference 288 -------- -------------- ------------------ 289 TBD1 Group Keying Section 2 of [this document] 291 5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType 293 IANA is requested to assign TBD2 as the Group Secured SType in the 294 "Extended RBridge Channel Security Types Subregistry" on the TRILL 295 Parameters web page as follows: 297 SType Description Reference 298 ----- ------------- ---------- 299 TBD2 Group Secured Section 2.2 of [this document] 301 Normative References 303 [RFC2119] - BBradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 304 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, 305 March 1997, . 307 [RFC4303] - Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 308 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, . 311 [RFC5246] - Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 312 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008, 313 . 315 [RFC5310] - Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R., 316 and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication", RFC 317 5310, DOI 10.17487/RFC5310, February 2009, . 320 [RFC5869] - Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and- 321 Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010, 322 . 324 [RFC6325] - Perlman, R., Eastlake 3rd, D., Dutt, D., Gai, S., and A. 325 Ghanwani, "Routing Bridges (RBridges): Base Protocol 326 Specification", RFC 6325, DOI 10.17487/RFC6325, July 2011, 327 . 329 [RFC6347] - Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer 330 Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012, . 333 [RFC7172] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Agarwal, P., Perlman, R., 334 and D. Dutt, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links 335 (TRILL): Fine-Grained Labeling", RFC 7172, DOI 336 10.17487/RFC7172, May 2014, . 339 [RFC7176] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Senevirathne, T., Ghanwani, A., Dutt, 340 D., and A. Banerjee, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of 341 Links (TRILL) Use of IS-IS", RFC 7176, May 2014, 342 . 344 [RFC7177] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Perlman, R., Ghanwani, A., Yang, H., 345 and V. Manral, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links 346 (TRILL): Adjacency", RFC 7177, DOI 10.17487/RFC7177, May 2014, 347 . 349 [RFC7178] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Manral, V., Li, Y., Aldrin, S., and D. 350 Ward, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL): 352 RBridge Channel Support", RFC 7178, DOI 10.17487/RFC7178, May 353 2014, . 355 [RFC7296] - Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. 356 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", 357 STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 2014, 358 . 360 [RFC7780] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Perlman, R., Banerjee, A., 361 Ghanwani, A., and S. Gupta, "Transparent Interconnection of 362 Lots of Links (TRILL): Clarifications, Corrections, and 363 Updates", RFC 7780, DOI 10.17487/RFC7780, February 2016, 364 . 366 [RFC7978] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Umair, M., and Y. Li, "Transparent 367 Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL): RBridge Channel 368 Header Extension", RFC 7978, DOI 10.17487/RFC7978, September 369 2016, . 371 [RFC8174] - Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 372 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 373 2017, . 375 [TRILLoverIP] - M. Cullen, D. Eastlake, M. Zhang, D. Zhang, 376 "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL) over IP", 377 draft-ietf-trill-over-ip, work in progress. 379 [SGKPrfc] - D. Eastlake, D. Zhang, "Simple Group Keying Protocol 380 (SGKP)", draft-ietf-trill-group-keying, work in progress. 382 Informative References 384 [RFC6234] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash 385 Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 386 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, . 389 [RFC7457] - Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing 390 Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram 391 TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, February 2015, . 394 Acknowledgements 396 The contributions of the following are hereby gratefully 397 acknowledged: 399 TBD 401 The document was prepared in raw nroff. All macros used were defined 402 within the source file. 404 Authors' Addresses 406 Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd 407 Huawei Technologies 408 155 Beaver Street 409 Milford, MA 01757 USA 411 Phone: +1-508-333-2270 412 EMail: d3e3e3@gmail.com 414 Dacheng Zhang 415 Huawei Technologies 417 Email: dacheng.zhang@huawei.com 419 Copyright, Disclaimer, and Additional IPR Provisions 421 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 422 document authors. All rights reserved. 424 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 425 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 426 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 427 publication of this document. 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