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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 INTERNET-DRAFT Donald Eastlake 2 Intended status: Proposed Standard Futurewei 3 Dacheng Zhang 4 Huawei 5 Expires: Januaryy 12, 2021 July 13, 2020 7 Simple Group Keying Protocol TRILL Use Protfiles 8 10 Abstract 12 This document specifies use profiles for the application of the 13 simple group keying protocol (SGKP) to multi-destination TRILL 14 Extended RBridge Channel message security (RFC 7978) and TRILL over 15 IP packet security (draft-ietf-trill-over-ip). 17 Status of This Memo 19 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 20 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 22 Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent 23 to the authors or the TRILL working group mailing list: 24 trill@ietf.org. 26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 27 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 28 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 29 Drafts. 31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 36 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 37 http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html. The list of Internet-Draft 38 Shadow Directories can be accessed at 39 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 41 Table of Contents 43 1. Introduction............................................3 44 1.1 Terminology and Acronyms..............................3 46 2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security.....5 47 2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................5 48 2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......6 50 3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security......................7 51 3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................7 52 3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......8 54 4. Security Considerations.................................9 56 5. IANA Considerations....................................10 57 5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers.........10 58 5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType..........10 60 Normative References......................................11 61 Informative References....................................12 63 Acknowledgements..........................................13 64 Authors' Addresses........................................14 66 1. Introduction 68 This document specifies use profiles for the application of the 69 simple group keying protocol (SGKP) [SGKPrfc] to the use of DTLS 70 [RFC6347] formatted TRILL [RFC6325] [RFC7780] Extended RBridge 71 Channel message security [RFC7178] [RFC7978] and to the use of IPsec 72 formatted TRILL over IP [TRILLoverIP]. It is anticipated that there 73 will be other uses for the group keying protocol. 75 1.1 Terminology and Acronyms 77 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 78 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 79 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] [RFC8174] 80 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 82 This document uses terminology and acronyms defined in [RFC6325] and 83 [RFC7178]. Some of these are repeated below for convenience along 84 with additional new terms and acronyms. 86 Data Label - VLAN or FGL. 88 DTLS - Datagram Transport Level Security [RFC6347]. 90 FGL - Fine Grained Label [RFC7172]. 92 GKd - A distinguished station in a group that is in charge of 93 which group keying (Section 2) is in use. 95 GKs - Stations in a group other than GKd (Section 2). 97 HKDF - Hash based Key Derivation Function [RFC5869]. 99 IS-IS - Intermediate System to Intermediate System [RFC7176]. 101 keying material - The set of a Key ID, a secret key, and a cypher 102 suite. 104 PDU - Protocol Data Unit. 106 QoS - Quality of Service. 108 RBridge - An alternative term for a TRILL switch. 110 SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm [RFC6234]. 112 TRILL - Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links or Tunneled 113 Routing in the Link Layer. 115 TRILL switch - A device that implements the TRILL protocol 116 [RFC6325] [RFC7780], sometimes referred to as an RBridge. 118 2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security 120 This section specifies a profile of the simple group keying protocol 121 (SGKP) defined in [SGKPrfc]. This profile provides shared secret 122 keying to secure multi-destination Extended RBridge Channel messages 123 [RFC7978] as described in Setction 2.2. 125 For this SKGP use profile, a group is identified by TRILL Data Label 126 (VLAN or FGL [RFC7172]) and consists of the data reachable [RFC7780] 127 RBridges with interest in that Data Label. GKd is the RBridge in the 128 group that, of those group members supporting the Group Keying 129 Protocol, is the highest priority to be a TRILL distribution tree 130 root as specified in Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]. If not all members of 131 the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then there are two cases 132 of destinations for multi-destination Channel Tunnel RBridge Channel 133 messages: 135 (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support the 136 Group Keying Protocol, it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured 137 multi-destination RBridge Channel message to cover the group and 138 serially unicast to the group members not supporting the Group 139 Keying Protocol. 140 (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the 141 group members using pairwise security. 143 2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages 145 Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge 146 Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1) 147 RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or 148 Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978]. 150 The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as 151 follows: 153 Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the 154 network manager chooses to use a lower priority after 155 determining that such lower priority group keying messages 156 will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be 157 used as it may cause interference with the establishment and 158 maintenance of adjacency. 160 Use Type = 1 162 KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID. 164 CypherSuiteLng = 2, CypherSuite is the cypher suite used in 165 groupcast extended RBridge Channel data messages for the 166 corresponding KeyID2. This is a DTLS [RFC6347] cypher suite. 168 KeyID2 Length = 1, KeyID2 is the index under which a group key is 169 set. Group keys are, in effect, indexed by this KeyID2 and 170 the nickname of the GKd as used in the Ingress Nickname 171 field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying messages. 173 2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data 175 Protected Extended RBridge Channel [RFC7978] messages are multicast 176 (M bit set to one in the TRILL Header) and set the SType field to a 177 new value TBD2 for "Group Secured" (see Section 5.2). Since there 178 could be multiple group keys distribued and enabled for use, data is 179 formatted as two bytes of Key ID followed by data formatted as TLS 180 1.3 [RFC8446] application_data using the cyphersuite and keying 181 material stored under the Key ID. Such a message on the wire looks 182 like the following: 184 +---------------------------+ 185 | Link Header | 186 +---------------------------+ 187 | TRILL Header | 188 +---------------------------+ 189 | RBridge Channel Header | 190 | snd Extension | 191 +---------------------------+ 192 | RBridge Channel Payload | 193 | +----------------------+ | 194 | | 2-byte Key ID | | 195 | +----------------------+ | 196 | | DTLS formatted | | 197 | | application data | | 198 | +----------------------+ | 199 +---------------------------+ 200 | Link Trailer | 201 +---------------------------+ 203 3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security 205 The SGKP usage profile specified in this section provides shared 206 secret keying to secure TRILL over IP messages [TRILLoverIP]. The 207 keys put in place by the group keying protocol are available for use 208 as IPSEC keys. 210 For this use profile, a group is identified by an IP multicast 211 address and consists of the RBridges adjacent [RFC7177] to the sender 212 reachable with that multicast address over a TRILL over IP link. GKd 213 is the RBridge in the group that, of those group members supporting 214 the Group Keying Protocol, has the highest priority to be a TRILL 215 distribution tree root as specified in Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]. If 216 not all members of the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then 217 there are two cases for multi-destination TRILL over IP messages: 219 (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support SGKP, 220 it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured IPSEC message to cover 221 the group and serially unicast to the group members not 222 supporting the Group Keying Protocol. 223 (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the 224 group members using pairwise security. 226 3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages 228 Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge 229 Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1) 230 RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or 231 Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978]. 233 The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as 234 follows: 236 Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the 237 network manager chooses to use a lower priority after 238 determining that such lower priority group keying messages 239 will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be 240 used as it may cause interference with the establishment and 241 maintenance of adjacency. 243 Use Type = 2 245 KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID. 247 CypherSuiteLng = variable, CypherSuite is an IKEv2 crypto 248 algorithm "proposal" [RFC7296]. 250 KeyID2 Length = 4, KeyID2 is the IPsec multicast SA. It is the 251 index under which a group key is set. Group keys are indexed 252 by this KeyID2 and the nickname of the GKd as used in the 253 Ingress Nickname field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying 254 messages. 256 3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data 258 Multi-destination TRILL over IP data packets are formatted as 259 multicast IPsec ESP tunnel mode [RFC4303] packets. The key and crpto 260 algorithms in use are indicated by the multicast SA. 262 4. Security Considerations 264 See [SGKPrfc] for Simple Group Keying Protocol security 265 considerations. 267 See [RFC7978] for Extended RBridge Channel security considerations. 269 See [RFC7457] in connection with TLS and DTLS security 270 considerations. 272 See [TRILLoverIP] for TRILL over IP secrity considerations. 274 See [RFC4303] for IPsec ESP security considerations. 276 5. IANA Considerations 278 This section gives IANA Considerations. 280 5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers 282 IANA is requested to assign, from the range assigned by Standards 283 Action, TBD1 as the TRILL RBridge Channel protocol number for use 284 when the "Group Keying" protocol is transmitted over Extended RBridge 285 Channel messages. 287 The added RBridge Channel protocols registry entry on the TRILL 288 Parameters web page is as follows: 290 Protocol Description Reference 291 -------- -------------- ------------------ 292 TBD1 Group Keying Section 2 of [this document] 294 5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType 296 IANA is requested to assign TBD2 as the Group Secured SType in the 297 "Extended RBridge Channel Security Types Subregistry" on the TRILL 298 Parameters web page as follows: 300 SType Description Reference 301 ----- ------------- ---------- 302 TBD2 Group Secured Section 2.2 of [this document] 304 Normative References 306 [RFC2119] - BBradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 307 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, 308 March 1997, . 310 [RFC4303] - Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 311 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, . 314 [RFC5310] - Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R., 315 and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication", RFC 316 5310, DOI 10.17487/RFC5310, February 2009, . 319 [RFC5869] - Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and- 320 Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010, 321 . 323 [RFC6325] - Perlman, R., Eastlake 3rd, D., Dutt, D., Gai, S., and A. 324 Ghanwani, "Routing Bridges (RBridges): Base Protocol 325 Specification", RFC 6325, DOI 10.17487/RFC6325, July 2011, 326 . 328 [RFC6347] - Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer 329 Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012, . 332 [RFC7172] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Agarwal, P., Perlman, R., 333 and D. Dutt, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links 334 (TRILL): Fine-Grained Labeling", RFC 7172, DOI 335 10.17487/RFC7172, May 2014, . 338 [RFC7176] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Senevirathne, T., Ghanwani, A., Dutt, 339 D., and A. Banerjee, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of 340 Links (TRILL) Use of IS-IS", RFC 7176, May 2014, 341 . 343 [RFC7177] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Perlman, R., Ghanwani, A., Yang, H., 344 and V. Manral, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links 345 (TRILL): Adjacency", RFC 7177, DOI 10.17487/RFC7177, May 2014, 346 . 348 [RFC7178] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Manral, V., Li, Y., Aldrin, S., and D. 349 Ward, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL): 350 RBridge Channel Support", RFC 7178, DOI 10.17487/RFC7178, May 351 2014, . 353 [RFC7296] - Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. 355 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", 356 STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 2014, 357 . 359 [RFC7780] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Perlman, R., Banerjee, A., 360 Ghanwani, A., and S. Gupta, "Transparent Interconnection of 361 Lots of Links (TRILL): Clarifications, Corrections, and 362 Updates", RFC 7780, DOI 10.17487/RFC7780, February 2016, 363 . 365 [RFC7978] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Umair, M., and Y. Li, "Transparent 366 Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL): RBridge Channel 367 Header Extension", RFC 7978, DOI 10.17487/RFC7978, September 368 2016, . 370 [RFC8174] - Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 371 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 372 2017, . 374 [RFC8446] - Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 375 Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 376 2018, . 378 [TRILLoverIP] - M. Cullen, D. Eastlake, M. Zhang, D. Zhang, 379 "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL) over IP", 380 draft-ietf-trill-over-ip, work in progress. 382 [SGKPrfc] - D. Eastlake, D. Zhang, "Simple Group Keying Protocol 383 (SGKP)", draft-ietf-trill-group-keying, work in progress. 385 Informative References 387 [RFC6234] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash 388 Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 389 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, . 392 [RFC7457] - Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing 393 Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram 394 TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, February 2015, . 397 Acknowledgements 399 The contributions of the following are hereby gratefully 400 acknowledged: 402 TBD 404 Authors' Addresses 406 Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd 407 Futurewei Technologies 408 2386 Panoramic Circle 409 Apopka, FL 32703 USA 411 Phone: +1-508-333-2270 412 EMail: d3e3e3@gmail.com 414 Dacheng Zhang 415 Huawei Technologies 417 Email: dacheng.zhang@huawei.com 419 Copyright, Disclaimer, and Additional IPR Provisions 421 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 422 document authors. 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